1 2026:CGHC:4537 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 401 of 2016 1 - Ajay Kumar Kunjam (Died) Through LRs 1.1 - Kirtti Bala Kunjam W/o Late Ajay Kumar Kunjam Aged About 37 Years R/o Near Itrawala, Opposite- Banstal, Shastri Bazar, Thana- Golebazar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Labour, Mantralaya, New Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Director, Directorate, Employee State Insurances Services, D 290/5, Taigore Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - The Insurance Medical Officer, Employee State Insurance Services, Raipur Centre, Choubey Collony, Thana Saraswati Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Shri Bharat Rajput, Advocate. For State : Ms. Supriya Upasne, Govt. Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 27.01. 202 6 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 25.04.2013 whereby the services of the original petitioner was terminated. The petitioner is also claiming for reinstatement with full backwages and consequential benefits. 2. The subject matter in brief is that, the petitioner was appointed as Chowkidar vide order dated 05.06.2002 on probation period of one year from the date of joining. The regularization of services of the INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.02.02 13:30:20 +0530 2 petitioner depends upon satisfaction of his service. It was also the condition that if the employee remain absent for more than 10 days, his services would be deemed to be terminated without prior notice. He was posted at the office of Insurance Medical Officer, Employee State Insurance, Champa. On 17.06.2011 the petitioner was served with a show cause notice to explain his absence on certain periods, which he explained on 27.09.2012, however, his services have been terminated vide order dated 25.04.2013 on the ground that he was appointed on probation of one year, but as per the decision taken by the State Govt. their services were continued on probation and he was indulged in remaining unauthorized absent repeatedly and there is no improvement in his conduct and again from the month of January, 2013 he is unauthorizedly absent from his duty and therefore his services have been terminated which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the termination order dated 25.04.2013 is arbitrary, illegal and contrary to law and also violates the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was appointed in the year 2002 and his services were deemed to be confirmed after completion of probation period. Without affording any opportunity of hearing or without conducting any Departmental Enquiry, his services cannot be terminated. There was no adverse entry communicated to him at any point of time in his service record and therefore without issuing any show cause notice he has been terminated which violates the principles of natural justice. Even if the petitioner was deemed to be on probation, an enquiry must have been conducted by the 3 authorities concerned and therefore his termination is bad in law and requires to be set aside. He would further submit that although during pendency of present petition the original petitioner died and the petition is being prosecuting by his wife claiming quashment of termination order of the original petitioner Ajay Kumar Kunjam so that his wife may be benefited for his service benefits. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and would submit that clause-5 of the appointment order of the petitioner clearly stipulates that if the petitioner remain absent for more than 10 days, his services were deemed to be terminated without any prior notice. In the termination order dated 25.04.2013 it has been mentioned that the employees of Class-III & IV who have been appointed in the year 2002-03 have not been regularized as per the decision taken by the State Govt. and the original petitioner was in habit of unauthorized absence on various occasions during his tenure and despite seeking explanation, his conduct remain unchanged and again from the month of January 2013 he remain absent in violation of clause-5 of his appointment order and therefore his services have been terminated for which no prior notice was required as the original petitioner was not a regular employee of the department. It is also submitted that the petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 25.04.2013, however, he filed the present writ petition on 28.01.2016 i.e. after about 2 and ½ years of his termination order. Therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in the present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 4 5. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the writ petition. 6. It is not in dispute that the original writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Chowkidar vide order dated 05.06.2002 on probation period of one year. It was the condition that his regularization would be considered if his services would be found satisfactory. There was also a condition in his appointment order in clause-5 that, nl fnu ls vf/kd vukf/kd~~r :i ls vuqifLFkr jgus ij mudh lsok;sa vuqifLFkfr dh fnukad ls fcuk uksfVl fn;s Loeso lekIr le>h tkosxhA The petitioner a filed document Ex.P/5 which is notice issued by the respondent authorities calling explanation about his unauthorized absent on various occasion during his tenure. The period of unauthorized absence from his duty is as under: 1 tqykbZ 2009 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 2 vxLr 2009 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 3 flracj 2009 01-09-2009 ls 15-09-2009 vkSj 24-09-2009 ls 30-09-2009 vuqifLFkr 4 vDVwcj 2009 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 5 uoacj 2009 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 6 fnlacj 2009 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 7 tuojh 2010 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 8 ekpZ 2010 01-03-2010 ls 04-03-2010 ,oa 06-03-2010 ls 15-03-2010 rFkk 26-03-2010 ls 31-03-2010 rd vuqifLFkr 9 vizSy 2010 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 10 ebZ 2010 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 11 twu 2010 01-06-2010 ls 21-06-2010 rFkk 23-06-2010 ls 30-06-2010 rdq vuqifLFkr 12 tqykbZ 2010 01-07-2010 ls 05-07-2010 rFkk 09-07-2010 ls 29-07-2010 rd vuqifLFkr 5 13 vxLr 2010 04-08-2010]18-08-2010 ls 25-08-2010 vkSj 28-08-2010 ls 31-08-2010 rd vuqifLFkr 14 flracj 2010 iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 15 vDVwcj 2010 Dsoy 10 fnu mifLFkr 16 uoacj 2010 ls vizSy 2011 rd iw.kZ :i ls vuqifLFkr 7. In the reply dated 27.09.2013, Annexure P/6, submitted by the original petitioner before the authorities, he has admitted that due to his ill heath he could not appear in his duty and on account of his family problem also he remained absent in duty and could not inform the department in time and asked to forgive and assured that he will not repeat the act in future, however, from perusal of termination order dated 25.04.2013 it transpires that he again remain absent from January, 2013. There is no explanation from the original petitioner as to why he remain absent again and again without any sanctioned leave or without sufficient reason. When the petitioner’s services was not regularized and clause-5 of his appointment order clearly stipulates that if he remains absent for more than 10 days unauthorizedly, his services would be deemed to be cancelled without any prior notice, and he remained unauthorized absent for more than 10 days i.e. from the month of January, 2013 uptill April, 2013, his services have been terminated by the authorities, which cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary. Further, the service of original petitioner was terminated vide order dated 25.04.2013, however, he filed the present writ petition on 28.01.2016 i.e. after about 2 and ½ years of termination. In para -7 of the writ petition he explained the delay that petitioner is an uneducated rustic villager and Class-IV employee, therefore the petitioner was not 6 aware of law of filing of instant petition. It is a settled law that ignorance of law is no excuse. Further, the original petitioner could not explain the delay of 2 and ½ years in claiming his right, particularly when he remained absent from service from January, 2013 and his services were terminated in the month of April, 2013 and despite that he has not chosen to challenge his termination order till filing of present writ petition, all these act clearly demonstrate his disinterest in service. 8. In the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 64, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 9 has held as under:- “9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed. 4 The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence. 5 Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ 4 See Nav Rattanmal and Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704 5 State of Kerala and Others v. V. R. Kalliyanikutty and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005 petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. 6 Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties.7 Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay and Others,8 had referred to the 7 view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company AND. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp,9 in the following words: 6 See Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 7 See N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 8 AIR 1967 SC 1450 9 (1874) LR 5 PC 221 “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” 9. In the matter of Bichitranand Behra v. State of Orissa and others, 2023 Live Law SC 883, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 21 has held as under:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, 8 the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:” 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner though relied upon judgments passed by the Supreme Court in Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of UP & Others, 2000(5)SCC 152, V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab & Others, 2000(3)SCC 239, The State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 and the order dated 22.08.2024 passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in Omprakash Yadav Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Other (WPS No.4736 of 2015), but the facts and consideration of those cases are distinguishable to the facts and consideration of the present case and therefore no benefit can be extended to the petitioner from those judgments. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder