2026:HHC:42210 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 86 of 2018 Reserved on: 18.09.2026 Date of Decision: 30.09.2026. Dinesh Kumar ….Petitioner Versus Principal Secretary & Ors. ….Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Mohinder Verma, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 3 & 6 : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.5 : Nemo Respondent No.4 is already ex parte vide order dated 03.07.2023 Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 45 of 2017 registered at Police Station Barotiwala for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Himachal Pradesh Beverages Ltd. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:42210 (HPBL), was established for the wholesale trade of liquor in the State of HP. It had opened its various depots in various parts of the State, and one such depot was located at BBNDA, Baddi District, Solan, H.P. It was found during the reconciliation of the accounts that Ankush Chauhan, E.T.I., posted as Assistant Depot Manager, had sold liquor on a credit basis to the retail licensees, and an amount of ₹3,22,51,948/- remained recoverable. This was done by the official despite his express knowledge that the provision of credit sale does not exist in the liquor sale policy of HPBL. Ankush Chauhan had connived with the petitioner and other co-accused to cause loss to the informant, HPBL. Therefore, it was prayed that action be taken against the accused. 3. The police registered the FIR, investigated the matter, and filed a charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the petitioner and 8 other persons had applied for licenses at various depots situated in different parts of the State. The petitioner and the other persons entered into a 3 2026:HHC:42210 partnership deed, and it was agreed that all the persons would carry out the trade and business of liquor in the name and style of M/s. A.D. Wines for the years 2016 and 2017 as per the existing Excise Rules and Regulations. The regular books of accounts of the firm would be maintained, and every partner would have a right to inspect such books. Pratap Chauhan, respondent No. 5, was authorised to open a current account in UCO Bank at Rohru. The petitioner was a licensee at Sawda. He had deposited the fee with the accountant who was to operate the accounts of M/s A.D. Wine, Rohru. ₹1,97,20,000/- was deposited by the petitioner with Partap Chauhan. He remitted the amount to HPBL. No amount is due towards the petitioner. The Chartered Accountant of HPBL also conducted the audit and verified the records. ₹1,96,40,000 /- was paid by the petitioner to HPBL in 2016 and 2017. HPBL erred in registering the FIR. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 5. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by respondents No. 2 and 3 asserting that the petitioner is an individual licensee for the sale of liquor. Entering into a partnership after the grant of license will not help the individual 4 2026:HHC:42210 licensee. The liquor was lifted from the HPBL without the payment of any money contrary to the policy, in connivance with the co-accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. A separate reply was filed by respondent No. 5 asserting that he is not a proper party as no relief has been claimed against him. The respondent No. 5 was nominated by Anil Kumar Dogra to open a current account at UCO Bank at Rohru. A Power of Attorney was executed in this regard. The advance payment was made to the respondent No.5 out of ₹1,97,20,000/-. The respondent No. 5 remitted the amount to the account of HPBL. Hence, it was prayed that the petition be dismissed qua respondent No. 5. 7. Rejoinders denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition were filed. 8. I have heard Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents No. 1 to 3 & 6. 9. Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was 5 2026:HHC:42210 falsely implicated. He had entered into an agreement with the other persons to form a partnership firm in the name of M/s A.D. Wine. The firm had authorised the respondent No. 5 to operate the account and remit the money to the account of HPBL. The respondent No. 5 executed an affidavit admitting that he had received the money from the petitioner and remitted it to HPBL. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents No.1 to 3 & 6/State submitted that the Sale of liquor could not have been made on a credit basis as per the liquor license policy. The co-accused had misused his position to permit the petitioner to lift the liquor without payment of the money, which caused loss to HPBL. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of a crime. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:42210 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 7 2026:HHC:42210 (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the 8 2026:HHC:42210 accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9 2026:HHC:42210 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 14. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of the process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 15. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10 2026:HHC:42210 16. The status report filed by the police shows that the petitioner and other persons had taken the liquor on credit from HPBL in connivance with the co-accused Ankush Chauhan. HPBL had framed a Liquor Sale Policy for the year 2016-17. Clause 4.1 of the same reads as under: “Issue of stocks shall be against e-payments through internet banking or Direct Credit in the account of HPBL through Challans/RTGS/NEFT into various Bank branches authorised by HPBL. No Credit Sale is allowed.” 17. Clause 2 of Liquor Sale Policy for the year 2016-17 provided the procedure for the sale of the liquor as under: “ The retailer will first verify the availability of the stock from the web portal of the HPBL and accordingly upload his indent on the web portal of the Excise and Taxation Department for the purpose of issuance of e-Excise pass/manual pass and after obtaining it, he will upload his indent mentioning therein Excise Pass No. and its validity on the portal of HPBL. The system will verify the availability of requested stock and payment of cost of liquor which the retailer would have made in advance and the invoice will be generated automatically which the retailer can download either at the computer system installed at the individually/jointly held licensed warehouse of HPBL at his own office.” 18. A combined reading of these two clauses shows that it was impermissible to carry out the credit sale. The sale was to be made after the payment of the advance amount to HPBL. In the present case, it was asserted in the FIR that no advance payment 11 2026:HHC:42210 was made and the liquor was lifted on a credit basis. This is contrary to the policy, and prima facie shows that the same could not have been done without the involvement of the co-accused Ankush Chauhan. 19. The status report mentions that the Chartered Accountant, Manoj Gupta, carried out the audit of the accounts of HPBL and found that the petitioner had lifted the stock from Baddi worth ₹1,79,23,808 /-. The name of the licensee, AD Wine, has been mentioned separately, which shows that the petitioner and AD Wines were working separately and had got the licenses separately. Thus, the plea that the petitioner was a partner of the firm AD Wines and was not individually liable cannot be accepted. 20. It is undisputed that the petitioner was granted an individual license; therefore, entering into any agreement after the allotment of the license would not help him. 21. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are incorrect as the money has been deposited with the respondent No. 5, who remitted it to HPBL. Respondent No. 5 had executed the affidavit to this effect. This submission cannot be accepted 12 2026:HHC:42210 during these proceedings. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 22. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view 13 2026:HHC:42210 that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23, this Court, while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- 14 2026:HHC:42210 trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 24. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited, as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 15 2026:HHC:42210 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 25. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 26. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the 16 2026:HHC:42210 materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 27. The allegations in the FIR prima facie show the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, and it is impermissible to quash the FIR. 28. No other point was urged. 29. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 30. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 31. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th September, 2026 (Nikita)