Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1
CGHC010405522022
2026:CGHC:27697
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 9143 of 2022 1 - Dheeraj Lohani S/o Deepchandra Brahman Aged About 30 Years R/o. Ward No. 9, Tilak Nagar Katghora, Tehsil - Katghora, District - Korba Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary Home (Police) Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
-
492001 2 - Director General Of Police, Chhattisgarh Police Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Inspector General Of Police, Bilaspur Range, District - Bilapur Chhattisgarh 4 - Superintendent Of Police, District - Korba Chhattisgarh 5 - Nirma Toppo, Wd/o Late Shri Shivshankarsahu Aged About 29 Years R/o. E-07, Kharmora Housing Board Colony, Balco Nagar, Police Station - Balco Nagar, District - Korba Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s) For Petitioner/s : Shri Kabir Kalwani, Advocate holding the brief of Shri Anurag Singh, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Shri Abhishek Singh, P.L. For Respondent No.5 : Shri Ravi Kumar Banjare, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Judgment On Board NIRMALA RAO
2 06.07.2026 1) The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:
“1] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/writs, direction/directions, order/orders, quashing/set-aside the impugned order dated 05.03.2020 passed by the Respondent no. 3 i.e. Annexure p/1, orders dated 29.11.2019 passed by respondent no. 4 i.e. Annexure P/2. 2] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the present petition and quash the order of punishment being a writ/writs, and to issue direction/directions, order/orders to reinstate the service of disproportionate the petitioner. 3] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.” 2) The facts of the present case are that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Constable (General Duty) vide order dated 15.4.2013 and was posted at Police Station Korba, District Korba. An article of charge was issued against the petitioner on 2.9.2019 alleging that on the night of 12.7.2019, he unauthorisedly left his place of duty alongwith his arms and ammunition, thereby violating the provisions of Chhattisgarh Police Regulations. It was further alleged that, on the same night, the petitioner entered into the house of his female colleague situated at Kharmora in an intoxicated condition. The Disciplinary Authority appointed an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer. During the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity of
3 hearing. After completion of enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority. In the enquiry report, allegation No.1 was not found proved whereas, the second allegation was found proved. The complainant, a female Constable, herself appeared before the Enquiry Officer and made a specific statement against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority concurring with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer inflicted penalty of removal from service vide order dated
29.11.2019. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which came to be dismissed vide
order dated 5.3.2020. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a mercy petition, which was also dismissed by the competent authority vide order dated 6.9.2022. The petitioner has challenged all the aforesaid orders by filing this petition. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the first allegation with regard to unauthorised absence from his place of duty alongwith arms and ammunition was not found proved by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the said finding. He would further submit that the order of removal from service has been passed solely on the basis of allegation No.2, which is shockingly disproportionate looking to the nature of the misconduct alleged against the petitioner. He would submit that this aspect has not been considered either by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority. He would pray to quash all the three impugned orders. 4 4) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner. They would submit that this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, cannot re-appreciate the evidence recorded in a departmental enquiry. They would contend that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority, can be interfered with only if it is shown that the order has been passed by an authority lacking competence, principles of natural justice have been violated, or procedure prescribed under the applicable Rules and Regulations has not been followed. They would submit that no such grounds have been made out in the present petition. They would submit that this petition deserves to be dismissed. 5) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 6) In the present case, a show-cause notice alongwith article of charge was served upon the petitioner on 2.9.2019, wherein the following allegations were levelled against him:
"1. अपनेकर्तव्य स्थल से दि
नेक 12.07.2019
क रात्रि में मेंय आर्म्ससे
एर्म्सयनेशने क गैराहाजि रा हा!करा प"लिलसे राग्य"लशने में उल्लखि(र्त प्रावधाने, क
त्रिवपरा-र्त कय आचराण प्रा
र्शिश1र्त कराने।
2. दि
नेक 12.07.2019
क
रारात्रि मेंत्रिहाल सेहाकमें3 क (रामें!रा स्थिस्थर्त
त्रिनेवसे परा शराब क नेश में प्रावश करा गैभी-रा क
चराणपण क7 त्य कराने।"
5 7) The petitioner filed reply to the said show-cause notice and thereafter, an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were appointed. The Enquiry Officer afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
The complainant, a female Constable, appeared before the Enquiry Officer and made statement against the petitioner. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Enquiry Officer held allegation No.1 to be not proved whereas, allegation No.2 was held to be proved. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. The disciplinary authority concurred with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and inflicted the penalty of removal from service. The Appellate Authority affirmed the said findings and the mercy petition preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed. It is a well-settled principle of law that re-appreciation of evidence in a departmental enquiry is not permissible in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. An
order passed by the disciplinary authority can be interfered with only it has been passed by the authority lacking jurisdiction or competence, if the principles of natural justice have been violated, or if the procedure prescribed under the applicable Rules has not been followed. 8) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus P. Gunasekaran1 while dealing with the scope of interference in service matters held as under :-
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an 1 . (2015) 2 SCC 610
6 appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings. the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings: (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case: (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced
by
irrelevant
or
extraneous considerations (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
7 (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be: (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14.In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds.
But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted
8 to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 9) Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus Datta Linga Toshatwad2 held that penalty inflicted in a departmental inquiry can be interfered by the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of India if the order has been passed by an incompetent authority or if procedure to inflict the penalty has not been followed or if the penalty if disproportionate looking to the misconduct. 10) In the present case, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the penalty was imposed by an authority not competent, or principles of natural justice were violated, or procedure prescribed under the applicable rules was not followed. The second allegation made against the petitioner constitutes moral turpitude as he entered in the house of his female colleague during the night time in an intoxicated condition, and the said allegation has been found to be proved in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the orders impugned. 11) Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Nimmi 2 . (2005) 13 SCC 709