1 CGHC010238252026 2026:CGHC:28089-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3529 of 2026 Anil Kumar Singh S/o Rajaram Singh Aged About 59 Years Class -B Contractor R/o Post -Kamta, P.S. -Hisa, Distt- Nalanda (Bihar). ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Public Health Engineering Secretariat Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex Nawa Raipur, District -Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Engineer In Chief Public Health Engineering Department Chhattisgarh, Raipur District -Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The Executive Engineer And Member Secretary District Water And Sanitation Mission Public Health Engineering Department Distt.- Balrampur -Ramanujganj (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Rahul Mishra, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr.Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 08.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rahul Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.07.08 17:31:13 +0530 2 heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the Respondents/State. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside of the impugned order dated 13.06.2025 ANNEXURE P/1 passed by the respondent no. 3. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be please to set-aside of impugned tender dated 03.02.2026 Annexure-P/2 issued by the respondent no. 3 for the same project to which the petitioner has already been allotted 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the Respondent authorities to restore the original contract dated 20.06.2022 and allow the Petitioner to complete the remaining work. 10.4 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the Respondent authorities to release all pending payments for the one water tank and associated pipeline work already completed by the Petitioner. 10.5 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the Respondent authorities to immediately provide the site/land for the construction of the second water tank, free from all encumbrances. 10.6 That, any other relief or reliefs may also be granted to the petitioner which this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Facts of the case are that the District Water and Sanitation Mission, District Balrampur (C.G.), issued a Notice Inviting 3 Tender (NIT) for the construction of pipelines and two water tanks under the concerned scheme. The Petitioner, being eligible and fully compliant with the terms and conditions prescribed in the aforesaid Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), participated in the tender process and submitted all the requisite documents. Upon due consideration, the tender was awarded to the Petitioner vide work order dated 20.06.2022. 4. Pursuant to the award of the tender, the Petitioner commenced the work immediately and successfully completed the construction of one water tank within the stipulated period. However, the remaining work could not be completed as the Respondent Authorities failed to provide the site required for the construction of the second water tank despite several requests and repeated follow-ups made by the Petitioner. The Respondents failed to discharge their contractual obligation by not handing over the site, thereby preventing completion of the remaining work. 5. Despite the delay having been caused solely due to the Respondents' failure to provide the requisite site, Respondent No. 3 arbitrarily passed the impugned order alleging non- completion of the work within the stipulated period of nine months. Thereafter, Respondent No. 3 also issued a fresh tender for the very same work, notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioner had already completed the construction of one water 4 tank within the contractual period. 6. Aggrieved by the arbitrary cancellation of the contract, the Petitioner submitted several representations before Respondent No. 3, pointing out that one water tank had already been completed within the stipulated period and that the balance work could not be executed solely because the Respondents had failed to provide the site for the second water tank. However, without considering the Petitioner's representations or the work already executed, the Respondent Department proceeded to issue a fresh tender dated 03.02.2026 for the same work. Hence, this petition. 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 13.06.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by Respondent No. 3, as well as the fresh Notice Inviting Tender dated 03.02.2026 (Annexure P/2), are wholly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to the settled principles of law. The impugned actions have been taken without any lawful justification and are, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order dated 13.06.2025 has been passed without issuing any prior notice to the Petitioner or affording him an opportunity of hearing. The order has thus been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem. Consequently, the impugned order is void, 5 arbitrary, and unsustainable in the eyes of law. 8. It is further submitted that the contract awarded to the Petitioner under the Jal Shakti Mission has been cancelled without jurisdiction and without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under law. Despite the fact that the Petitioner had already completed the construction of one water tank within the stipulated period and the remaining work could not be executed solely because the Respondent Authorities failed to provide the site for construction of the second water tank despite repeated requests, Respondent No. 3 proceeded to issue a fresh tender dated 03.02.2026 for the very same work. Such action is arbitrary, illegal, unilateral, and deserves to be set aside. Learned counsel submits that the delay in completion of the remaining work is entirely attributable to the Respondents and not to the Petitioner. The Respondents failed to provide the site required for construction of the second water tank, which was a condition precedent for execution of the remaining work. The Petitioner, therefore, cannot be held responsible for any delay occasioned by the Respondents' own failure to fulfill their contractual obligations. It is further submitted that the impugned order has been passed in a mechanical manner without considering the Petitioner's representations or the actual progress of the work at the site. Respondent No. 3 failed to appreciate that the original contractual period of nine months ceased to be enforceable once the Respondents themselves 6 failed to provide the necessary site for execution of the remaining work. Consequently, the time for completion stood extended in law, and the Petitioner cannot be penalized for a delay caused exclusively by the Respondents. 9. Learned counsel further submits that Respondent No. 3 failed to appreciate that the inability of the Petitioner to complete the remaining work was solely due to the Department's failure to hand over the site for construction of the second water tank. Such failure constitutes a breach of the fundamental terms and conditions of the Notice Inviting Tender by the Respondents themselves, disentitling them from taking any adverse action against the Petitioner. It is also submitted that the impugned order is ex facie illegal as it is a non-speaking order. The authority has failed to consider the Petitioner's explanation regarding the delay or the undisputed fact that one water tank had already been completed within the stipulated period. By issuing a fresh tender without deciding the Petitioner's representations or taking into account the work already executed, Respondent No. 3 has acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, and in a high-handed manner, rendering the impugned order and the consequential tender liable to be quashed. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the Petitioner is a registered Class-B Contractor who has executed the entrusted work with due diligence and sincerity. The arbitrary cancellation of the contract, despite there being no default on the part of the 7 Petitioner, not only causes severe financial prejudice but also casts an unwarranted stigma on his professional reputation. The impugned action is, therefore, liable to be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition as framed and filed is not maintainable as the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 12. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Supreme Court in the said case observed as 8 under: "6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is 9 the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995." (emphasis supplied) 14. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana and others, (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows: "16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil 10 court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) 15. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under: "26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable." 16. Subsequently, in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10 SCC 690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: "24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in 11 the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads." 17. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated: "82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by 12 the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit." (emphasis supplied) 18. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper. 19. From perusal of the pleadings, it appears that the petitioner has prayed for issuance of direction to the respondents to release all pending payments for the one water tank and associated pipeline work already completed by the petitioner. 20. In the instant case, the relief of release of pending payments for the one water tank and associated pipeline work sought by the petitioner is contingent upon the resolution of the disputed question of facts raised, and these questions cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid, it would not be appropriate for this Court 13 to entertain the instant writ petition as there are disputed questions of fact involved. 21. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, further considering the disputed questions of law involved in this writ petition, the relief sought by the petitioner and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good ground to entertain this writ petition. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies available to him under the law. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu