1 CGHC010238312026 2026:CGHC:28088-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3507 of 2026 Anil Kumar Singh S/o Rajaram Singh Aged About 59 Years Class B Contractor, R/o Village And Post - Kamta, P.S. Hisa, District Nalnda Bihar ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Public Health Engineering, Secretariat, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - The Engineer In Chief Public Health Engineering, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - The Executive Engineer And Member Secretary District Water And Sanitation Mission, Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Rahul Mishra, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr.Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 08.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rahul Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.07.08 17:33:30 +0530 2 heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the Respondents/State. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside of the impugned order dated 13.06.2025 ANNEXURE P/1 passed by the Respondent no. 3. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be please to set-aside of impugned tender dated 03.02.2026 Annexure-P/2 issued by the Respondent no. 3 for the same project to which the petitioner has already been allotted. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be please to direct the Respondent no. 3 to allow the Petitioner to complete the remaining 10% of the work and to provide the necessary borewell/boring facilities 10.4 That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be please to direct the Respondent no. 3 to release the pending payments or bills for the 90% work already executed by the Petitioner along with a reasonable rate of interest. 10.5 That, any other relief or reliefs may also be granted to the petitioner which this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Facts of the case are that the District Water and Sanitation Mission, District Balrampur (C.G.), issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for the construction of a pipeline and water tank. The Petitioner, being eligible and fully compliant with the terms and conditions of the NIT, participated in the tender process 3 and submitted all the requisite documents. Upon evaluation, the tender was awarded to the Petitioner vide order dated 11.09.2023. 4. Pursuant to the award of the tender, the Petitioner commenced the work immediately and successfully completed approximately 90% of the work within the stipulated period. However, the remaining work could not be completed due to the Respondent Authorities' failure to provide the necessary borewell/boring facilities required for execution of the project, despite repeated requests made by the Petitioner. After the Respondent Authorities cancelled the tender, the Petitioner submitted representations challenging the said cancellation, particularly in view of the fact that approximately 90% of the work had already been completed. The Petitioner also sought payment for the work already executed. However, without considering the Petitioner's representations or the substantial work completed, the Respondent Department proceeded to issue a fresh tender for the same work. Hence, this petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned Order dated 13.06.2025 (Annexure P/1) and the fresh Notice Inviting Tender dated 03.02.2026 (Annexure P/2), both issued by Respondent No. 3, are illegal, arbitrary, without authority of law, and violative of the Petitioner's legal and contractual rights. The same are, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. 4 He further submits that the impugned Order dated 13.06.2025 (Annexure P/1) has been passed without jurisdiction and in complete violation of the principles of natural justice. No notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to the Petitioner before passing the impugned order. The action of Respondent No. 3 is, therefore, contrary to the well-settled principle of audi alteram partem, rendering the impugned order void and unsustainable in law. He also submits that the contract awarded to the Petitioner under the Jal Jeevan Mission has been cancelled arbitrarily and without following the due process of law. Thereafter, Respondent No. 3 issued a fresh tender dated 03.02.2026 (Annexure P/2) for the very same work, despite the fact that the Petitioner had already completed approximately 90% of the project. Such action is arbitrary, unreasonable, and liable to be set aside. The delay in completion of the remaining work is wholly attributable to the Respondents and not to the Petitioner. The Respondents failed to provide the necessary borewell/boring facilities, which were essential and constituted a condition precedent for execution of the remaining work relating to the water tank and pipeline. The Petitioner cannot be held responsible for the delay caused by the Respondents' own omissions. 6. He contended that the Petitioner has executed nearly 90% of the contractual work after incurring substantial expenditure and has always remained ready and willing to complete the balance 5 work. However, the Respondents, instead of removing the impediments created by their own failure to provide the requisite site facilities, have sought to terminate the contract and re-tender the work. Such conduct is arbitrary, unfair, and contrary to settled principles governing State contracts. He further contended that the impugned order has been passed in a mechanical and non-application of mind manner, without considering the Petitioner's representations or the actual physical progress of the work. Respondent No. 3 failed to appreciate that the original contractual period ceased to be binding once the Respondents themselves failed to provide the essential site facilities. Consequently, the time for performance stood extended in law, and the Petitioner cannot be penalized for delays occasioned solely due to the Respondents' defaults. He also contended that the impugned order is a non-speaking order, as it neither considers the Petitioner's explanation regarding the delay nor records any finding on the fact that approximately 90% of the work had already been completed. The issuance of a fresh tender during the pendency of the Petitioner's representations, without adjudicating his grievances or considering the work already executed, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the impugned Order dated 13.06.2025 (Annexure P/1) and the fresh tender dated 03.02.2026 (Annexure P/2) deserve to be quashed and set 6 aside. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition as framed and filed is not maintainable as the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 9. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Supreme Court in the said case observed as under: "6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under 7 Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not 8 have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995." (emphasis supplied) 11. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana and others, (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows: "16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear 9 denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) 12. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under: "26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable." 13. Subsequently, in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10 SCC 690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: "24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount 10 is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads." 14. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated: "82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the 11 grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit." (emphasis supplied) 15. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper. 16. From perusal of the pleadings, it appears that the petitioner has prayed for issuance of direction to the respondents to release the pending payments or bills for 90% works already executed by the petitioner with a reasonable rate of interest. 17. In the instant case, the relief of release of payments sought by the petitioner is contingent upon the resolution of the disputed question of facts raised, and these questions cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the instant writ petition as there are disputed questions of fact involved. 18. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for 12 the parties, further considering the disputed questions of law involved in this writ petition, the relief sought by the petitioner and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good ground to entertain this writ petition. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies available to him under the law. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu