2026:HHC:3346 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2781 of 2025 Reserved on: 16.1.2026 Date of Decision: 23.1.2026. Ramesh Chand ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 7 of 2025, dated 9.4.2025, registered at Women Police Station, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64 and 351(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:3346 2. It has been asserted that the allegations against the petitioner are false. The victim has not made any statement against the petitioner. The medical evidence does not support the prosecution’s case. Petitioner’s family is suffering because of his continued detention. The investigation is complete, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by a filing of a status report asserting that the petitioner used to call the victim to his home and rape her. The victim had a stomachache on 8.4.2025 and she was taken to the hospital, where it was found that she was pregnant. She delivered a child in the hospital. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim’s school record mentions her date of birth as 14.6.2007. The victim was a minor on the date of the incident. As per the report of the DNA analysis, the victim was found to be the biological mother, and the petitioner was found to be the biological father of the baby. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. The police filed the charge sheet on 15.7.2025, and the 3 2026:HHC:3346 matter was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 8.12.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The victim made a statement under Section 183 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) exonerating the petitioner. There is no material at this stage to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. He prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the DNA analysis mentions the petitioner as the biological father of the baby, which prima facie shows that the petitioner had raped the victim. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 2026:HHC:3346 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which 5 2026:HHC:3346 suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be 6 2026:HHC:3346 granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its 7 2026:HHC:3346 discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is  Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an 8 2026:HHC:3346 accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The report of DNA analysis mentions that the petitioner is the biological father and the victim is the biological mother of the baby. Therefore, the scientific evidence, prima facie, establishes that the petitioner had sexual intercourse with the victim, which resulted in her pregnancy and delivery of a child. 11. The status report mentions that the victim was born on 14.6.2007; therefore, she was a minor at the time of the incident. Hence, the petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64 and 351(2) of BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 9 2026:HHC:3346 12. The victim stated in her statement recorded under Section 183 of BNSS that some unknown person, and not the petitioner, had raped her. This statement will not prima facie help the petitioner. In Padam Singh Versus State of H.P. 2013 Cri. L.J. 1470, the victim, a mentally challenged person, was raped, but could not name the accused. Human semen was detected on the vaginal swabs and the Salwar. The DNA profile from the semen matched the DNA profile of the accused. It was laid down by this Court that the report of DNA analysis was sufficient to convict the accused. Similarly, in Kishan Chand Vs. State of H.P. 2018 Cr.L.J. 2451, the victim did not support the prosecution; however, the DNA of the semen detected on her salwar matched the DNA obtained from the blood sample of the accused. This Court held that the scientific evidence was sufficient to convict the accused. Similarly, in Rajinder Kumar Vs. State of H.P. 2019 Crl. L.J. 2839, the accused was the real uncle of the victim. She did not support the prosecution's case. The accused was found to be the biological father of the child. This Court held that the DNA report was sufficient to convict the accused, and the fact that the victim had not supported the prosecution's case was not sufficient to record the acquittal. Therefore, prima facie, the 10 2026:HHC:3346 mere fact that the victim has not supported the prosecution's case is not sufficient to record the acquittal when the scientific evidence, prima facie, establishes that the petitioner is the biological father of the baby. 13. The offence punishable under Section 64 of the BNS is punishable with imprisonment for life. Thus, the penalty is severe. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no 11 2026:HHC:3346 amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 14. Considering the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. 15. No other point was urged. 16. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 12 2026:HHC:3346 17. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Vacation Judge 23rd January, 2026 (Chander)