1 2026:CGHC:27386-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3014 of 2025 1 - Sevan Kumar S/o Lochan Sidar Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Girhulpali, P.O. Lodhiya P.S. Baramkela, Tahsil Sariya District- Sarangarh Bilaigarh (C.G.) 2 - Nilambar @ Lilambar Nayak S/o Late Thakur Ram Nayak Aged About 64 Years R/o Village Jhabar Tahsil And P.S. Baramkela District - Sarangarh - Bilaigarh (C.G.) 3 - Surendra Nayak S/o Nilambar @ Lilambar Nayak Aged About 37 Years R/o Village Jhabar Tahsil And P.S. Baramkela District - Sarangarh - Bilaigarh (C.G.) 4 - Khemsagar Yadav S/o Chaitram Yadav Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Jhabar Tahsil And P.S. Baramkela District - Sarangarh - Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Baramkela, District- Sarangarh Bilaigarh (C.G.) 2 - Ajambar Singh Sidar S/o Late Bihari Prasad Aged About 27 Years Village Sangitarai Jutemill, District- Raigarh (C.G.) (Complainant) ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Shri Atul Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate. For State : Shri Sumeet Singh, Dy. Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Shri CJK Rao , Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 03.07.2026 INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.07.08 19:09:22 +0530 2 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1 The petitioners have filed this petition seeking following reliefs: “1) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant petition filed under section 528 of B.N.S.S. 2023 filed by the petitioners, in the interest of justice. 2) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned First Information Report dt. 14.06.2025 bearing crime no. 69/2025 lodged u/ss 294, 186, 353, 323, 341, 427, 34 I.P.C. against the petitioners at police station Baramkela, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). 3) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the entire Final Report No. 79/2025 dt. 09.08.2025 of P.S. Baramkela, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) submitted before Special Court (Atrocities Act) Raigarh (C.G.) u/ss 294, 186, 353, 323, 341, 427, 34 I.P.C. & S. 3(2)(V)(a) & S. 3(1)(r)(s) of Schedule Caste & Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1988. (Annexure P-1) 4) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the entire criminal proceedings pending in Special Criminal Case (Atrocities Act) No. 24/2025 titled as State of Chhattisgarh vs Khemsagar Yadav & 03 others against the petitioners for offences. 5) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside impugned order dt. 12.08.2025 of taking cognizance of impugned final report by Ld. Special Judge (Atrocities Act) Raigarh (C.G.) passed in Criminal Case No. 24/2025. (Annexure P-2) 6) Any other relief/reliefs which the Hon'ble may deem fit under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2 Brief facts of the case are that, the complainant Ajambar Singh Sidar is the brother of Sanjay Sidar (Petitioner in CrMP No.1634 of 2026). Sanjay Sidar was posted as Peon in Tehsil office. Sidharth Anant (Petitioner in CrMP No.1634 of 2026) was Tehsildar under whom Sanjay Sidar was posted. The complainant herein made a written complaint on 15.12.2022 at Police Station, Baramkela, stating that while his brother Sanjay Sidar was performing his official duty at Tehsil Office, the petitioners herein came there seeking some revenue records. On the said issue some hot talk in the name of caste took place between them resulting into scuffling. Annoyed with the said incident, when his brother was going to lodge police complaint along 3 with Tehsildar Sidharth Anant, in front of Computer shop of the petitioners herein, they again started Marpeet on account of which main road was blocked for a couple of hours and therefore they could not lodge FIR on the same day. Later on, on 14.06.2025 and FIR was lodged under Sections 294,186,353,323,341,427,34 IPC in Crime No.69 of 2025 and charge sheet has been filed on 09.08.2025 under Sections 294,186,353,323,341,427,34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(v)(a) and 3(1)(r)(s) of The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 3 Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that false and fabricated belated FIR has been lodged by the brother of one of the accused in Crime No.397 of 2022 as a counter blast. Firstly, the petitioners herein lodged the FIR in Crime No.397 of 2022 on the same day against Sanjay Sidar, Sidharth Anant and three others under Sections 452,307,34 IPC alleging that they assaulted Nilamber Nayak, the father of Surendra Nayak in their Computer Shop. On that day the complainant herein only made a written complaint to the police on 15.12.2022, however, FIR has been lodged on 14.06.2025 with a delay of 2 and ½ years. Therefore, FIR No.69 of 2025 for the aforesaid offences lodged at the behest of Sidharth Anand, Tehsildar, being false and malicious, is a sheer abuse of process of law and power. Thus, consequential Charge sheet No.79 of 2025 dated 09.08.2025 and cognizance order dated 12.08.2025 in Special Case (Atrocities Act) No.24 of 2025 deserves to be quashed. Further, the FIR does not disclose any ingredients of the offence under the Atrocities Act. The said provisions were added at a later stage to harass the petitioners. 4 Further, the coordinate Bench of this court in MCrCA No.234 of 2023 while granting anticipatory bail to accused Sidharth Anant in FIR No.397 of 2022 on 05.04.2023 had directed to examine the written complaint made by the complainant herein (Ajambar Singh Sidar i.e. Brother of Sanjay Sidar) which clearly shows that present FIR has been lodged only as a consequence of the said order dated 05.04.2023. 4 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 5 It is not in dispute that the incident is alleged to have occurred on 15.12.2022. It is also not disputed that on the very same day the petitioners had lodged Crime No.397 of 2022 against Sanjay Sidar, Tehsildar Sidharth Anant and others alleging commission of serious offences including under Section 307 IPC. It is equally undisputed that the present complainant had only submitted a written complaint on the same date and no FIR was registered thereon. The FIR in the present case came to be registered only on 14.06.2025, after an unexplained delay of about two and a half years. The explanation offered in the FIR that the complainant could not lodge the report because the road remained blocked for a few hours on the date of occurrence cannot, by any stretch of imagination, explain the extraordinary delay of more than two and half years. Such inordinate delay assumes significance particularly when the complainant admittedly had already approached the police by submitting a written complaint on the date of occurrence itself. 5 6 The sequence of events further assumes importance. The Coordinate Bench of this Court while considering the anticipatory bail application of accused Sidharth Anant in Crime No.397 of 2022 passed an order on 05.04.2023 directing examination of the written complaint submitted by the present complainant-Ajambar Singh Sidar. The FIR in question was thereafter registered on 14.06.2025. The chronology supports the contention of the petitioners that the impugned prosecution is a sequel to the earlier criminal case and has been initiated as a counterblast. 7 This Court also finds substance in the submission of the petitioners regarding invocation of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Except a bald allegation that some altercation took place in the name of caste, the FIR and the charge-sheet do not disclose the foundational facts necessary to attract the offences under the Atrocities Act. There is no specific allegation indicating intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate the victim on the ground of caste in a place within public view. Likewise, the ingredients necessary for attracting Section 3(2)(v) (a) are also absent. 8 What also cannot be lost sight of is the fact that, since CrMP No.3014 of 2025 and CrMP No.1634 were clubbed together as both the cases were arising out same incident and considering the fact that a compromise have already been taken place between the parties in Crime No.397 of 2022 (in CrMP No.1634 of 2026, Annexure A/4), this Court is of the opinion that once when the complainant and the accused have settled their matter and buried the dispute and differences, it would be an important consideration for the High Court 6 while exercising the powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 to compound the offence. The opinion of this Court stands fortified from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Another [2012 (10) SCC 303] and also in the case of Narinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Another [2014 (6) SCC 466]. 9 The Supreme Court in Gian Singh (Supra) has observed in para 49, 52, 53 and 57 as under: “49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, 'nothing in this Code which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 52. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided. 53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 57. 57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a 7 criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such 5 like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding” 10 Accordingly, since the present petition was clubbed with CrMP No.1634 of 2026 and in that case compromise have already been taken place between the parties (Annexure A/4 in CrMP No.1634 of 2026), the 8 present petition also deserves to be and is hereby allowed. FIR No.69 of 2025 registered against the petitioners at Police Station Baramkela for offences under Sections 294, 186, 353, 323, 341, 427 and 34 IPC and Sections 3(2)(v)(a) and 3(1)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the consequential Charge-sheet No.79 of 2025 dated 09.08.2025, the order dated 12.08.2025 taking cognizance and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom in Special Case (Atrocities Act) No.24 of 2025, pending before the Special Judge (Atrocities Act), Raigarh, are hereby quashed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder