1 CGHC010124902024 2026:CGHC:27341-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 749 of 2024 Ramphal Paikra S/o Dandu Paikra Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Sarnadih P.S. Sankargarh, District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, P.S. Sankargarh District Balrampur - Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 03.07.2026 1. In compliance with the order of this Court dated 18.06.2026, a report has been submitted by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.). As per the report dated 24.06.2026, the co-accused, namely, Budhram MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.07.07 11:19:27 +0530 2 Pankra, was convicted under Section 363 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years along with a fine of Rs.500/- by judgment dated 06.03.2024 passed in Special Sessions Case No. 26/2022. It has further been reported that on the very same day, i.e., 06.03.2024, the said co-accused preferred an application under Section 389(3) of the Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of sentence, which was allowed, and he was released on bail. However, thereafter, he neither appeared before the concerned Court nor preferred any appeal against the judgment of conviction. The present appellant, on the other hand, stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years under the provisions of the POCSO Act. In view of the aforesaid facts, we proceed to hear and decide the present appeal on merits on behalf of the present appellant. 2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.03.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, First (F.T.S.C.), Special Judge (POCSO Act), Ramanujganj, District- Balrampur-Ramanujganj in Special Sessions Case No. 129/2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offences as under:- 3 Conviction under Section Sentence Fine Additional Imprisonment in default of payment of fine Section 363/34 of the IPC R.I. for 5 years Rs. 500/- 01 month R.I. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 5 years Rs. 500/- 01 month R.I. Section 6 of the POCSO Act R.I. for 20 years Rs.25,000/- 2 months R.I. All sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 14.03.2022, a written report (Ex. P-3) was lodged by the father of the victim (PW-2) at Police Station Shankargarh alleging that his minor daughter, aged about 13 years, had gone to attend the weekly market at Shankargarh but did not return home. It was further alleged that the appellant had taken her away without the consent of her lawful guardian. On the basis of the said report, FIR (Ex.P-4) was registered for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC and investigation was taken up. 4. During investigation, the victim was traced and recovered on the very same day from Village Rakiya. Her statement was recorded, wherein she levelled allegations against the appellant regarding the commission of offences during the period she remained in his company. The victim was thereafter medically examined and the medical report was obtained as part of the investigation. 4 5. The Investigating Officer also collected the school records of the victim for determination of her age, seized the articles relevant to the investigation, recorded the memorandum statement of the appellant, pursuant to which certain belongings of the victim were recovered, and caused the appellant to undergo medical examination. The seized articles were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory for scientific examination. During investigation, the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. were also recorded. 6. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the appellant and the co-accused for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 392, 376(2)(d) read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. 7. The learned Special Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 363/34, 366/34 and 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and against the co-accused under Section 363 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 17 of the POCSO Act. The accused denied the charges and claimed trial. 8. In support of its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses and exhibited the relevant documentary evidence. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against 5 them, pleaded false implication and did not adduce any evidence in defence. 9. The defence contended that the prosecution had failed to establish the age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt, that the evidence suffered from material contradictions and omissions, and that the allegations had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that the oral and documentary evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the accused and prayed for their conviction. 10. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is illegal, perverse and contrary to the evidence available on record. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident, as PW-4, the Headmaster, admitted that no documentary proof of her date of birth had been furnished at the time of her admission, while PW-2, the father of the victim, stated that the date of birth entered in the school records was based merely on his estimation and not on any authentic document. It is further argued that the testimonies of the victim (PW-1) and her father (PW-2) suffer from material omissions and contradictions vis-à-vis 6 their previous statements, thereby rendering their evidence unreliable. Learned counsel also points out that the independent seizure witness, PW-3 Pradeep Kumar, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. It is further submitted that although the father of the victim alleged that he had received a phone call informing him that the victim had been taken away, the prosecution neither established the ownership of the mobile number nor connected it with the appellant. Referring to the evidence of PW-5, Dr. Shashikala Toppo, it is contended that the medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution case, as the doctor was unable to give any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse. It is also urged that no test identification parade was conducted, the prosecution has failed to adduce any cogent or independent evidence connecting the appellant with the alleged offences, and the trial Court failed to appreciate these material infirmities in their proper perspective. It is, therefore, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellant is entitled to acquittal by setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. 12. Learned State counsel, supporting the impugned judgment, submits that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt through cogent and reliable oral as well as documentary evidence. It is contended that the testimony of the victim is natural, consistent and inspires 7 confidence, and is duly corroborated by her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances. It is further submitted that the age of the victim has been duly established from the school records collected during the investigation, and the trial Court has rightly held her to be a minor on the date of the incident. Learned State counsel argues that the minor discrepancies and omissions pointed out by the defence are inconsequential and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. It is further submitted that the evidence on record clearly establishes that the appellant had taken the victim away from the lawful guardianship of her parents and thereafter committed the offence alleged against him. The findings recorded by the learned Special Court are based on proper appreciation of the evidence and settled principles of law, warranting no interference by this Court in the present appeal. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 14. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the testimony of the victim deserves acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 8 15. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 16. The next issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the age of the victim on the date of commission of the offence concerned, was below 18 years of age. 17. Regarding the age of the victim, the first contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the prosecution has failed to establish that the child victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the incident. Learned counsel has submitted that the school record cannot be safely relied upon as PW-4, the Headmaster, admitted that no document relating to the date of birth had been produced at the time of admission and PW-2, the father of the victim, also stated that the date of birth was entered in the school records on the basis of his estimation. 18. We have carefully considered the aforesaid submission and perused the evidence available on record. PW-1, the child victim, has stated that her date of birth is 04.07.2009. Significantly, this part of her testimony remained unshaken during cross- 9 examination. PW-2, the father of the child victim, has also deposed that at the time of the incident, his daughter was about 14 years of age. Although, during cross-examination, he stated that he was not aware of the exact date of birth and that no birth certificate had been furnished at the time of admission in the school, such admission, by itself, is not sufficient to discard the documentary evidence otherwise brought on record. 19. PW-4 Dashrath Ram, the Headmaster of the concerned school, proved the admission register and the certified extract thereof (Ex. P-10C). He categorically deposed that the child victim was admitted to Class-I on 02.07.2014 and that her date of birth was recorded in the admission register as 04.07.2009. Though he admitted that he had not himself made the relevant entry and that the register does not disclose the document on the basis of which the date of birth was recorded, nothing substantial could be elicited in his cross-examination to doubt the authenticity of the school records maintained in the ordinary course of official business. 20. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 prescribes the manner in which the age of a child is to be determined. The provision accords primacy to the matriculation or equivalent certificate and, in its absence, to the birth certificate issued by the school first attended. It is only in the absence of such documentary evidence that recourse can be 10 taken to medical opinion. The principles governing determination of age under the aforesaid provision have been recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 (7) SCC 263 wherein it has been held that the documents enumerated under the statutory scheme constitute the primary evidence for determination of age. 21. It is equally well settled that entries made in public or official records maintained in the discharge of official duties are relevant under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 584 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that entries in official registers maintained in the ordinary course of business constitute relevant evidence unless their authenticity is successfully impeached. 22. Tested on the aforesaid principles, we find no reason to discard the school records relied upon by the prosecution. The admission register pertains to the first school attended by the child victim and has been duly proved through the Headmaster. Merely because the document on the basis of which the date of birth was initially entered was not available, the evidentiary value of the school record does not stand effaced, particularly when there is no material to suggest that the entry was manipulated or fabricated. The oral testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 substantially corroborates the documentary evidence. 11 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are satisfied that the prosecution has successfully established that the date of birth of the child victim is 04.07.2009. Consequently, on the date of the incident, i.e., 14.03.2022, she was about 12 years and 8 months of age and, therefore, was a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The finding recorded by the learned Special Court on this aspect is based on proper appreciation of the evidence and does not warrant interference 24. The next crucial aspect for consideration is the testimony of the child victim (PW-1). 25. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the testimony of the child victim (PW-1). In her examination-in-chief recorded on 12.07.2022, she deposed that since the year 2019, while she was attending school, the appellant had been repeatedly approaching her, stopping her on the way and asking for her mobile phone number. She further stated that on the date of the incident, she was travelling from Manoharpur to Shankargarh by an auto- rickshaw for the purpose of getting her Aadhaar Card corrected. According to her, when the auto-rickshaw reached near Khairadih forest, the appellant contacted her on her mobile phone, threatened her with a knife and directed her to get down from the vehicle. Owing to the threat extended by the appellant, she 12 alighted from the auto-rickshaw near Khairadih forest and started walking back towards her village. 26. PW-1 further deposed that shortly thereafter, the appellant and co- accused Budhram arrived on a motorcycle from the direction of Shankargarh. According to her, they covered her mouth, forcibly made her sit on the motorcycle and took her to Pendardih forest. She stated that co-accused Budhram was driving the motorcycle, she was seated in the middle and the appellant sat behind her while restraining her. She further deposed that after taking her to the forest area, the appellant subjected her to penetrative sexual assault. PW-1 further deposed that after the occurrence, she was assaulted and her hands were tied behind her back with her dupatta. She stated that when the appellant moved away for a short while, she managed to escape from the place of occurrence, ran for about two kilometres and reached the house of a Pahadi Korwa family. From the mobile phone of the lady residing therein, she contacted her father and informed him about her whereabouts. She further stated that the police thereafter reached the said place and recovered her. This part of her testimony is corroborated by the recovery memo (Ex.P-1) as well as by the testimony of Laxmania (PW-8), in whose house the victim had taken shelter. 27. PW-2, the father of the victim, deposed that after receiving information from the appellant over the telephone that the victim 13 had been taken away, he searched for his daughter and subsequently received a telephone call from the victim informing him about her location. Thereafter, he lodged the written complaint (Ex.P-3) at Police Station Shankargarh, on the basis of which the First Information Report (Ex.P-4) was registered. He further proved that the Investigating Officer prepared the spot map (Ex.P-5) in his presence and also stated that he had given his consent for the medical examination of the victim. 28. Laxmania (PW-8), an independent witness, supported the prosecution case by deposing that the victim had reached her house after escaping from the place of occurrence and that the police subsequently recovered the victim from her house under the recovery memo (Ex.P-1). 29. The prosecution has further examined Pradeep Kumar (PW-3), who is a witness to the memorandum and seizure proceedings. He supported the prosecution case regarding the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-7) recorded by the Investigating Officer and the consequent seizure of the victim’s Aadhaar Card, bank passbook, mobile phone and cash amounting to Rs.680/- from the possession of the appellant under seizure memo (Ex.P- 8). Although PW-3 stated during cross-examination that the contents of the memorandum and seizure memo were not read over to him, he categorically denied the suggestion that no 14 memorandum proceedings had taken place in his presence or that no recovery had been effected from the appellant. 30. Amit Gupta (PW-7), the Investigating Officer, deposed that during investigation he recorded the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-7) in accordance with law, pursuant to which the articles belonging to the victim were recovered and seized under seizure memo (Ex.P-8). He further proved the seizure of the school admission register under seizure memo (Ex.P-9), the recovery of the victim under recovery memo (Ex.P-1), the registration of the First Information Report (Ex.P-4), preparation of the spot map (Ex.P-5), and the other investigative steps undertaken during the course of investigation. He further stated that, on the basis of the disclosure made by the appellant, the involvement of co-accused Budhram came to light. Although no Test Identification Parade was conducted, the victim (PW-1), during her deposition before the trial Court, identified co-accused Budhram in Court as the person who had accompanied the appellant on the date of the incident. 31. The medical evidence has been adduced through Dr. Shashikala Toppo (PW-5), who examined the victim on 15.03.2022 at the Community Health Centre, Shankargarh. She deposed that, upon clinical examination, she noticed abrasions measuring approximately 0.5 cm × 0.5 cm on both lower limbs of the victim, which, in her opinion, could have been caused by a hard and 15 blunt object within about twenty-four hours prior to the examination. She further found that the hymen was old torn. During the examination, vaginal smear slides and pubic hair samples were collected and sealed for forensic examination. The medical examination report has been proved as Ex.P-11. 32. PW-5 further deposed that, on the basis of the clinical examination alone, she was not in a position to express any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse and, therefore, advised that the samples collected during examination be forwarded for forensic analysis. She also examined the undergarment of the victim, on which a whitish stain was noticed, and recommended its forensic examination. The said report has been proved as Ex.P-12. Nothing material has been elicited during her cross-examination so as to discredit either the medical examination conducted by her or the findings recorded in the medical reports. 33. The prosecution further examined Dr. Anil Singh (PW-10), who medically examined the appellant on 15.03.2022. He deposed that, upon examination, the appellant was found physically capable of performing sexual intercourse. The medical examination report has been proved as Ex.P-15. PW-10 further deposed that he examined the undergarment of the appellant and, although no visible stain was noticed thereon, the same was sealed and forwarded for forensic examination. The relevant 16 report has been proved as Ex.P-16. His testimony has also remained substantially unchallenged during cross-examination. 34. The prosecution has also relied upon the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex.P-17). The said report indicates the presence of human spermatozoa on the vaginal smear slides collected during the medical examination of the victim. The scientific evidence, therefore, lends assurance to the prosecution version and corroborates the testimony of the child victim regarding the commission of penetrative sexual assault. 35. Though PW-5 did not express any conclusive opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse solely on the basis of clinical examination, such circumstance, by itself, does not weaken the prosecution case. Medical evidence is essentially corroborative in nature and cannot override otherwise cogent and reliable ocular testimony. In the present case, the medical evidence, when read conjointly with the forensic report (Ex.P-17) and the consistent testimony of the child victim (PW-1), provides substantial corroboration to the prosecution case. 36. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as under:- “22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any 17 hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of 18 the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 37. In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as under: “14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority that the Pocso Act is a gender legislation. This Act has been divided into various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of “Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor” contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal with various situations, circumstances and categories of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual assault would take the character of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” 19 “20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed well in the formative years of his life. He must receive education, acquire knowledge of man and materials and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man who matters so far as the society is concerned.” 38. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided on 8.2.2022 has held as under:- “10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and to achieve what has been provided under Article 15 and 39 of the Constitution to protect children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, the POCSO Act, 2012 has been enacted. Any act of sexual assault or sexual harassment to the children should be viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be dealt with in a stringent manner and no leniency should be shown to a person who has committed the offence under the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable punishment commensurate with the act of sexual assault, sexual harassment, a message must be conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual assault, sexual harassment or use of children for pornographic purposes they shall be punished suitably and no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of 20 sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children are instances of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such debased sexual pleasure. Children are precious human resources of our country; they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position. There are different modes of her exploitation, including sexual assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of children in such a manner is a crime against humanity and the society. Therefore, the children and more particularly the girl child deserve full protection and need greater care and protection whether in the urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. In the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 21 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law.” 39. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar (2004) 8 SCC 153 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:“ “21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.” 40. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed as follows: 22 “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 41. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : “12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as 23 modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.” 42. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the entire evidence available on record, we find that the testimony of the child victim (PW-1) inspires confidence and is wholly reliable. Her narration of the occurrence has remained consistent on all material particulars from the inception of the prosecution case till her deposition before the trial Court. She has unequivocally stated that the appellant threatened her, compelled her to alight from the auto- rickshaw, forcibly took her to the forest area and thereafter committed penetrative sexual assault upon her. Despite lengthy cross-examination, nothing substantial could be elicited so as to impeach her credibility or create any reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence as narrated by her. 43. We find that the evidence of the child victim receives substantial corroboration from the testimony of her father (PW-2). PW-2 has deposed regarding the information received by him over the 24 telephone, the prompt lodging of the written complaint (Ex.P-3), registration of the First Information Report (Ex.P-4) and the subsequent recovery of the victim. His testimony also establishes that immediately upon receiving information from the victim regarding her whereabouts, he informed the police, which ultimately led to her recovery. The promptness with which the criminal law was set into motion excludes any possibility of false implication after deliberation. 44. The prosecution version also finds independent corroboration from the testimony of Laxmania (PW-8), who has categorically deposed that the victim reached her house after escaping from the place of occurrence and sought shelter there. PW-8 has further proved that the police recovered the victim from her house under Recovery Memo (Ex.P-1). The testimony of this witness, who has no animus against the appellant, lends considerable assurance to the prosecution case. 45. The memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-7) and the consequential recovery effected under Seizure Memo (Ex.P-8) constitute another important incriminating circumstance. Amit Gupta (PW-7), the Investigating Officer, has proved that pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the appellant, the victim’s Aadhaar Card, passbook, mobile phone and cash were recovered from his possession. Though Pradeep Kumar (PW-03) was subjected to cross-examination, he has not denied his presence 25 during the memorandum proceedings or the recovery effected pursuant thereto. Merely because he stated that the contents of the documents were not read over to him cannot render the memorandum or the consequential recovery inadmissible or unreliable. 46. The criticism advanced on behalf of the appellant that PW-3 did not fully support the prosecution case is also misconceived. It is well settled that the testimony of a witness is not liable to be discarded in toto merely because he has not supported every part of the prosecution version. The Court is entitled to rely upon that part of the testimony which is otherwise found to be credible and is corroborated by other evidence available on record. In the present case, the material portion of the evidence of PW-3 regarding the memorandum proceedings and recovery stands duly corroborated by the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-7). 47. Equally significant is the medical and scientific evidence brought on record. Dr. Shashikala Toppo (PW-5), who examined the victim, noticed abrasions over both lower limbs and proved the medical examination report (Ex.P-11). Though she did not express any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse solely on clinical examination, she collected vaginal smear slides, pubic hair and other biological samples for forensic examination. The supplementary medical report (Ex.P-12) further records that a 26 whitish stain was noticed on the undergarment of the victim, which was preserved and forwarded for forensic analysis. 48. Dr. Anil Singh (PW-10), who medically examined the appellant, proved the medical examination report (Ex.P-15) and opined that the appellant was physically capable of performing sexual intercourse. He also proved the report relating to the articles collected from the appellant (Ex.P-16). Nothing has been elicited during his cross-examination so as to cast any doubt upon the medical examination conducted by him. 49. The Forensic Science Laboratory Report (Ex.P-17) assumes considerable significance. The report confirms the presence of human spermatozoa on the vaginal smear slides collected during the medical examination of the victim. The scientific evidence thus lends strong corroboration to the ocular testimony of the child victim and completely rules out the argument that the prosecution case is unsupported by medical or scientific evidence. 50. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on the submission that PW-5 did not give a conclusive opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse. In our considered opinion, the said contention deserves to be rejected. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that medical evidence is essentially corroborative in nature. Where the testimony of the victim is trustworthy and inspires confidence, absence of a definite medical opinion or even absence of injuries cannot by itself be a ground to 27 discard the otherwise reliable ocular evidence. In the present case, the medical evidence, scientific evidence and documentary evidence, when read conjointly with the testimony of PW-1, furnish complete assurance to the prosecution case. 51. We also do not find any substance in the submission that the absence of a Test Identification Parade is fatal to the prosecution. The victim herself has categorically deposed that she had known the appellant since the year 2019 as he used to repeatedly approach and harass her while she was going to school. The identity of the appellant was, therefore, never in dispute and no Test Identification Parade was required. So far as the co-accused Budhram is concerned, the victim identified him before the trial Court during her deposition. It is well settled that Test Identification Parade is only an investigative aid and not substantive evidence. 52. Likewise, the contention regarding non-establishment of the ownership of the mobile number through which the alleged calls were made does not persuade us to take a different view. The prosecution case does not rest upon the call details alone. The conviction is founded primarily upon the direct evidence of the child victim, which is duly corroborated by the testimony of PW-2, PW-7 and PW-8, the prompt FIR, the recoveries effected during investigation, the medical evidence and the forensic report. 28 53. Therefore, upon a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire oral, documentary, medical and scientific evidence available on record, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant had kidnapped the child victim from the lawful guardianship of her father and thereafter committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon her. The testimony of the child victim (PW-1) is wholly reliable, inspires confidence and stands duly corroborated by the evidence of PW-2, PW-7 and PW-8, the prompt lodging of the First Information Report (Ex.P-4), the recovery proceedings, the medical evidence (Ex.P-11 and Ex.P- 12) and the Forensic Science Laboratory Report (Ex.P-17). The minor discrepancies and omissions pointed out by the defence are natural and do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. We find that the learned Special Court has appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded the conviction on the basis of cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence. No perversity, illegality or infirmity has been demonstrated which would warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 54. In the result, this Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellant. The conviction and sentence as awarded by the trial court to the appellant is hereby 29 upheld. The present criminal appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. 55. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the trial Court. 56. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet