1 CGHC010264902023 2026:CGHC:27679 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5752 of 2023 1 - Suresh Kumar Patel S/o Shri Ramu Patel Aged About 52 Years Ex Assistant Teacher, Grade Iii, Primary School, Bazar Char Bhata Block Sahaspur Lohara, District Kabirdham (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, School Education Department Ministry, Mahanadi Bhavan, New Raipur, P.S. Rakhi C.G. District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Ruled Development Ministry Mahanadi Bhavan, New Raipur P.S. Rakhi C.G. District Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Collector District Kabirdham (C.G.) 4 - Zilla Panchayat, Kabirdham Through Chief Executive Officer,kabirdham, District Kabirdham (C.G.) 5 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Sahaspur Lohara, District Kabirdham (C.G.) 6 - District Education Office Kabirdham C.G. 7 - Block Education Officer Sahaspur Lohara, District Kabirdham (C.G.) ... Respondents RUKHSAR BANO Digitally signed by RUKHSAR BANO Date: 2026.07.07 11:41:04 +0530 2 (Cause title, as taken from CIS) For Petitioner : Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, Advocate For State/Resp. No.1, 2, 3, 6 & 7 For Respondent Nos.4 & 5 : : Mr. Vikhyat Arora, Panel Lawyer Mr. Shaleen S. Baghel, Advocate. (Hon'ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order On Board 06/07/2026 1. Heard. 2. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 15.01.2016 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Sahaspur Lohara, District Kabirdham (CG), whereby the petitioner’s appointment to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III has been cancelled and he was removed from service. Subsequently, the appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the Collector, District Kabirdham vide order dated 06.06.2016 (Annexure P-5). Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, which was also dismissed vide order dated 14.03.2023 (Annexure P-1). 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III on 29.07.2006 by the order of the Chief Executive Officer, Kabirdham. While he was posted on aforesaid post at Primary School, Charbhata, his appointment was abruptly cancelled and he was removed from service by respondent No.5 3 vide order dated 15.01.2016 (Annexure P-6). Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Collector, Kabirdham under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, wich was dismissed vide order dated 06.06.2016. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the Commissioner Durg, Division Durg, which was also dismissed vide order dated 14.03.2023 (Annexure P-1). Hence, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order of termination, as well as the orders passed by the Appellate Authorities are bad in law for the reason that, the termination of the petitioner was in total violation of Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1999'). He further submits that, the law in this regard is by now well settled by a catena of decisions wherein it has been held that for the purpose of terminating an employee whose services are governed under the Rules of 1999, the respondent authorities are required to comply with the procedure prescribed under Rule 7. Having not done so, the impugned order is liable to be set-aside on this ground. 5. Respondent Nos.1, 2, 3, 6 & 7/State have filed reply. Learned State counsel, referring to the reply, submits that the petitioner secured appointment on the basis of a forged Class XII marksheet. This conclusion was arrived at after receiving communication from the school where the petitioner had allegedly 4 passed the Higher Secondary Examination i.e. Non-Government Higher Secondary School Sonthi, Development Block Bamhnidih, District Janjgir Champa (CG). He further submits that since the petitioner had obtained employment by practising fraud and mischief, the requirement of compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999 may not be required as it has been duly inquired into by the appointing authorities themselves after issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner. Upon such inquiry, it was found that the petitioner had obtained employment on the basis of a forged and fabricated Class XII marksheet, as such, he was not entitled to the appointment, hence, prayed for rejection of the petition. 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4 & 5 supported the submissions advanced by learned State counsel. 7. It appears that an identical issue arising out of similar set of facts came up for hearing before this Court i.e. WPS No. 1420/2016 and other connected matters. This Court vide order dated 31.10.2018 decided the said writ petitions and while deciding the same had considered the same issues which have been raised by the parties in the present case. 8. It would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the findings of this Court in the said order. For ready reference, paragraphs 9 to 12 are reproduced herein under:- “9. Given the aforesaid admitted factual position of the case as also the judgment of this court in the case similarly situated persons belonging to the other 5 Janpad Panchayat i.e. Janpad Panchayat Saja and also taking note that they were also terminated arising out of the same enquiry and in whose case there already is an order of setting aside of the termination order, this court in exercise of judicial discipline proprietary and precedence is inclined to apply the same analogy in deciding the case of the petitioners as well. In the said judgment of Rohini Jha (Supra), this court has observed in paragraphs 3 to 5 as under : (3) Admittedly, on certain allegations, show cause notice “was issued to the petitioners and when the respondent authority was not satisfied with the reply of present petitioners, their services have been terminated. A Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Rooplal Nayak vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2006(4) M.P.H.T. 99 (C.G.) has held that any of the major penalty prescribed under Rule 5(b) (iv) of the Rules, 1999 cannot be imposed on a member of Panchayat service to whom the said Rules are applicable without conducting regular Departmental Enquiry as envisaged under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999. (4) In the case at hand, no departmental enquiry has been held as contemplated under Rule 7. The said provisions uses the words 'formal inquiry' with further stipulation that when an order for 'formal enquiry' has been made, the disciplinary authority shall frame Definite charges, communicate the same to the delinquent along with the 6 statement of allegations, requiring him to submit within the specified time a written statement of defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. Thereafter, the defence is required to be permitted to inspect and take extracts from the records, which can be refused for reasons to be recorded in writing. On submission of reply by the delinquent, the disciplinary authority may himself enquire or appoint an enquiry officer. Appointment of Presenting Officer and seeking assistance of some other officers by the delinquent is also contemplated therein. The enquiry officer is also enabled to record evidence and thereafter, at the conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer is supposed to prepare enquiry report, the copy of which is required to be furnished to the delinquent. Thus, the 'formal inquiry' envisaged under the Rules is akin to the procedure prescribed for a regular enquiry under Rule 14 of the C.G. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules, 1966. (5) The materials made available to this Court nowhere indicate that any enquiry as contemplated under Rule 7 has been initiated or conducted against the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order of termination is ex facie not sustainable in law and the same deserves to be set aside. 10. In the instant case also learned counsel for the respondents fairly submits that so far as the present 7 petitioners are concerned, admittedly there has not been any Departmental Enquiry as such conducted. It was only a preliminary enquiry conducted and on the basis of the report of the preliminary enquiry the petitioners were issued with show cause notices and thereafter terminated. But, what is admittedly clear is that in the course of conducting of preliminary enquiry also the petitioners were not taken into confidence neither were they granted opportunity to disprove the contentions which had been raised by the department or which the department was investigating upon. 11. XXXXXXXXX 12. Accordingly, all the writ petitions stand allowed and disposed of in terms of Rohini Jha's case. The impugned orders of termination, rejection of their appeals by the appellate authority as well as revisional authority all stand set aside/quashed for similar reasons as had been held in Rohini Jha's case, reserving the right of the department to proceed further, if they intend to do so, in accordance with provisions of law.” 9. Subsequently, WPS No.6351/2019 (Rohit Kumar Sahu & Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) was also disposed of vide order dated 08.11.2021, wherein the issues involved were identical to those considered in WPS No.1420/2016 and other connected matters. The said writ petition was accordingly decided on the same principles laid down in the earlier batch of writ petitions. 8 10. During the course of submissions, when specific question was posed to learned State counsel as to whether the order dated 31.10.2018 passed by this Court in WPS No.1420/2016 and other connected matters, as well as the order dated 08.11.2021 passed in WPS No.6351/2019 had been challenged before the learned Division Bench, he submits that he is not aware of the same. However, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that neither of the aforesaid orders had been challenged before the Division Bench and, therefore, both have attained finality. 11. Having considered the view of this Court in the aforesaid writ petitions and the fact that it has based upon the earlier decision of this Court wherein it has been specifically held that for terminating an employee from service whose services are governed under the Rules of 1999, it is incumbent upon the respondents to have initiated the proceedings as is required under Rule 7. 12. Non-compliance of the said rule vitiates the entire action on part of the respondents. Consequently, the impugned orders in the instant case dated 15.01.2016 (Annexure P-6), 06.06.2016 (Annexure P-5) and 14.03.2023 (Annexure P-1) are, thus, unsustainable and the same deserve to be and are accordingly set-aside/quashed with consequences to follow. 13. However, this Court is of the view that since the petitioner has not discharged his duties during the intervening period, he shall not be entitled to back wages for the said period. Nevertheless, the 9 intervening period shall be counted for the purpose of continuity of service. 14. Needless to mention that since the writ petition is being allowed on the ground of non-compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999, the right of the department would stand reserved if they feel so may initiate appropriate proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with the said rules. 15. With the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition stands allowed and disposed of. 16. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) JUDGE Rukhsar