1 2026:CGHC:27037-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3298 of 2026 1 - M/s K.K. Agrawal, a proprietorship firm, through its proprietor Krishna Kumar Agrawal S/o Late Shri Narphool Agrawal, Aged About 67 Years, R/o In front of Vijaya Talkies T.P. Nagar, Korba District- Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - Chhattisgarh State Power Generation Company Limited, Through- its Chairman, CS Power Companies Campus, Daganiya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Chief Engineer (S & P; Gen), Chhattisgarh State Power Generation Company Limited, Daganiya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Executive Director (S & P; Gen), Chhattisgarh State Power Generation Company Limited, Daganiya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Amit Soni, Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 02-07-2026 1. The petitioner by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.07.06 15:55:33 +0530 2 Constitution of India prays for following relief(s):- “i. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ / direction to quash and set aside Tender No. HW-136/26-27 [RFx No. 8100051766), insofar as the same illegally clubs three distinct works into one composite tender and imposes composite consideration for all three line items. ii. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ / direction to quash and set aside the new restrictive eligibility conditions incorporated in Annexure-B of Tender No. HW-136/26-27, being arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. iii. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to declare that the action of the respondents in (i) clubbing three separate works into one composite tender, and (ii) adding new restrictive conditions in Annexure-B as compared to Annexure-B of Tender No. HW-535/24-25, is arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. iv. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ / direction commanding the respondents to restructure / recast the tender in a fair and non- discriminatory manner by either separating the works or permitting item-wise competition, and by framing reasonable eligibility conditions based on experience 3 of similar nature of cleaning work. v. Cost of the petition may also be granted to the petitioner. vi. Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 2. The facts as mentioned in the petition in brief are that, the petitioner is a proprietorship firm engaged in contractual cleaning, manpower supply and maintenance works, having experience in executing similar works for the respondent authorities. The respondents issued Tender No. HW-136/26-27 (RFx No. 8100051766) for daily cleaning works relating to the boiler areas of PH-I (Units 1 & 2), PH-II (Units 3 & 4) and PH-III at HTPS, Korba (West). Unlike previous years, when separate tenders were floated for different units, the respondents have, for the first time, clubbed the three independent works into a single composite tender and provided that the successful bidder would be determined on the basis of the composite offer for all three line items. According to the petitioner, such bundling has artificially increased the size and financial threshold of the contract, thereby excluding small and medium contractors who are otherwise capable of executing one or more of the individual works. The petitioner has further challenged the revised eligibility criteria contained in Annexure-B of the 2026 NIT, whereby the earlier requirement of experience in "similar nature of cleaning work" has been replaced with the more restrictive condition of experience in "cleaning work at power houses" in thermal 4 power plants, coupled with prescribed turnover and experience thresholds. It is contended that these restrictive conditions have no rational nexus with the nature of the work, are arbitrary, discriminatory and intended to limit competition in favour of a select class of bidders. Relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Another, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 971 it is submitted that the impugned tender conditions create artificial barriers to participation, violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and therefore warrant interference under Article 226. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although the scope of judicial review in contractual and tender matters is limited, the Court is empowered to examine the decision-making process where the action of the State is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or intended to favour a particular class of bidders. It has been argued that the respondents, being instrumentalities of the State, are under a constitutional obligation to act fairly, reasonably and transparently in public procurement. However, in the present case, the respondents have, without any rational basis, clubbed three distinct works relating to PH-I, PH-II and PH-III into a single composite tender and made the composite bid the basis for determining the successful bidder, thereby creating an artificial barrier against contractors who are otherwise capable of executing one or more of the individual works. According to the petitioner, the combined effect of such bundling and composite bidding has unfairly excluded small and medium contractors from 5 meaningful participation and has restricted competition in favour of a select few. It has been further submitted that the respondents have, for the first time, narrowed the eligibility criteria by replacing the earlier requirement of experience in "similar nature of cleaning work" with the restrictive requirement of experience in "cleaning work at power houses" in thermal power plants, despite the nature of the work substantially remaining the same. Learned counsel has contended that the impugned condition bears no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, as the tender itself contains adequate safeguards regarding labour deployment, supervision, safety and performance. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Another (supra), it has been argued that tender conditions creating artificial barriers, denying a level playing field and excluding otherwise competent bidders are violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Therefore, it is prayed that the impugned tender conditions and the composite tender process be quashed as being arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents submits that all the three works are interrelated, therefore, they have been clubbed and the impugned conditions apply uniformly to all prospective bidders and do not favour any particular contractor or class of bidders. It has also been submitted that the process of the subject tender has already been completed yesterday. 5. However, learned counsel for the petitioner disputed the fact of completion of tender process and submitted that as per instruction 6 received, it has been extended till 7th July, 2026. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and documents appended in the writ petition. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Motors Limited v The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (Best) and Others passed in Civil Appeal No. 3897 of 2023 vide judgment dated 19.05.2023 held as follows : “48. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders 7 and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. (See: Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489). 52. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Others, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 679. 53. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its 8 own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. 54. As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Others, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.” 8. In the present matter, the respondents have floated a composite tender for cleaning works relating to PH-I, PH-II and PH-III of HTPS, 9 Korba (West), and have prescribed eligibility conditions requiring experience in cleaning works at thermal power plants along with the requisite financial capacity. Merely because, in earlier years, separate tenders were invited for different units or because the revised eligibility criteria render the petitioner ineligible, it cannot be said that the tender conditions are arbitrary or unconstitutional. The respondents have explained that the three works are interrelated and that the impugned conditions are uniformly applicable to all prospective bidders. The petitioner has failed to place any cogent material to establish that the decision to issue a composite tender or to prescribe the impugned eligibility criteria is actuated by mala fides, intended to favour any particular bidder, or is so arbitrary as to warrant judicial interference. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussions and also the abovementioned law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we do not find any scope for interference in the matter and accordingly, the present petition is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil