1 2026:CGHC:27167 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 151 of 2026 1 - Noor Mohmmed (Since Died Through Legal Heirs) 1. Akil Gori S/o Late Noor Mohmmed Aged About 58 Years R/o Samshudin Jaan Mohmmed Firm, Hatri Bazar, Durg Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh 2 - Mohammad Salim Gori S/o Late Noor Mohmmed Aged About 56 Years R/o Samshudin Jaan Mohmmed Firm, Hatri Bazar, Durg Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh 3 - Kalim Gori S/o Late Noor Mohmmed Aged About 53 Years R/o Samshudin Jaan Mohmmed Firm, Hatri Bazar, Durg Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh 4 - Rashid Gori S/o Late Noor Mohmmed Aged About 48 Years R/o Samshudin Jaan Mohmmed Firm, Hatri Bazar, Durg Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Applicants versus 1 - Smt. Jaya Verma W/o Kantilal Verma Aged About 37 Years R/o Berpara Kasaridih Durg, Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Durg (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title, as taken from CIS) For Applicants For State/Resp. No.2 : : Ms. Sweksha Sharma, Advocate Mr. Anish Tiwari, Dy. Govt. Adv. RUKHSAR BANO Digitally signed by RUKHSAR BANO Date: 2026.07.06 17:30:39 +0530 2 (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 02/07/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No.02/2026, an application for permission to file the instant revision through legal heirs of the deceased. 2. On due consideration and for the reasons mentioned in the application, which is well supported by an affidavit, the same is allowed. The present applicants, being the legal heirs of deceased Noor Mohammad (original defendant No.1), are permitted to file present civil revision. 3. Also heard on admission. 4. The present civil revision has been preferred by the applicants under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC), challenging the order dated 02.04.2026 passed by the learned Fifth District Judge, Durg (C.G.) in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal (MCA) No.46/2023, whereby the learned appellate Court allowed the application filed by respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC by setting aside the order dated 27.06.2023 passed by the learned 9th Civil Judge, Class-II, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) in MJC No. 23/2020, whereby the said application had been rejected. 5. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 (plaintiff) filed Civil Suit No.233A/2016 seeking a declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit land. The suit came to be dismissed for want of prosecution on 05.02.2020. Thereafter, on 3 05.03.2020, the plaintiff filed an application under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC for restoration of said civil suit, but the same has been rejected by the 9th Civil Judge, Class -II, Durg vide order dated 27.06.2023 (Annexure A-3), holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish sufficient cause for her non-appearance. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.46/2023, which was allowed by the learned Fifth District Judge, Durg vide impugned order, which has been assailed in instant petition. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants (defendants) submits that though the restoration application was filed by respondent No.1 (plaintiff) within the prescribed period of limitation of thirty days, no sufficient cause was shown for her absence on the date when the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. She further submits that the learned trial Court rightly rejected the restoration application and that the learned appellate Court erred in setting aside the said order without assigning appropriate reasons. Hence, she prays that the present civil revision may be allowed, the impugned order dated 02.04.2026 be set aside, and the order dated 27.06.2023 (Annexure A-3) passed by the trial Court be upheld. 7. Learned State counsel submits that the State is a formal party in the present case. 4 8. The record reveals that Civil Suit No.233A/2016, filed by respondent No.1 (plaintiff) for declaration and permanent injunction, was dismissed for want of prosecution on 05.02.2020. A perusal of the orders passed by the Courts below shows that, in restoration application, the plaintiff has stated that she could not remain present before the trial Court on the said date i.e. 05.02.2020 as she was medically unfit and was also unable to inform her counsel of her inability to attend the proceedings. It was further stated that her counsel was also unwell on the said date and, therefore, he could not appear before the Court. 9. Having considered the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and particularly considering the fact that the restoration application was filed within the prescribed limitation period of thirty days, it cannot be said that there was any inordinate delay in seeking restoration of the suit. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Dwarika Prasad (D) through Lrs. vs. Prithvi Raj Singh, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3828, has held as under:- “9. ………….It is well settled that Courts should not shut out cases on mere technicalities but rather afford opportunity to both sides and thrash out the matter on merits. Further, we cannot let the party suffer due to negligent or fault committed by their counsel. This principle has been enunciated by this court in the case of Rafiq v Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788, quoted as follows :- 5 "3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through advocate, brief him. pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned Advocate to do the rest of the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court’s procedure. Alter engaging a lawyer, the party may a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job Mr AK Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. Maybe, we 6 do not know, he is better informed in this matter Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate If we reject this appeal, as Mr A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned Advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order.…”” 7 11. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: {Maniben Devraj Shah case (supra)}, SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) “ 23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and Justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly 8 negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 12. As has been observed above, that restoration application under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC filed by respondent No.1 (plaintiff) was well within the prescribed limitation period of 30 days. Nothing has been brought on record by the applicants to demonstrate the fact that the explanation furnished by the plaintiff was mala fide or lacking in bona fides. In the absence of any such material, and in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 02.04.2026 passed by the learned Fifth District Judge, Durg (C.G.) does not suffer from any perversity or illegality, hence the same is upheld. 13. Consequently, the present civil revision is dismissed at the motion stage. 14. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Rukhsar