1 CGHC010198412026 2026:CGHC:27629-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 549 of 2026 Chandan Singh Patel S/o Shri Pyari Lal Patel Aged About 49 Years R/o Village Bansajhar Block Dharamjaigarh. District Raigarh. C.G. ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Secretary Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur C.G. 2 - The Secretary Department Of School Education Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur C.G. 3 - Director Panchayat Directorate Indravati Bhavan Atal Nagar Mantralay Naya Raipur District Raipur C.G. 4 - Director Public Instruction Indravati Bhavan Atal Nagar Mantralay Naya Raipur District Raipur C.G. 5 - Collector Raigarh District Raigarh C.G. 6 - Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat Raigarh District Raigarh C.G. 7 - District Education Officer Raigarh District Raigarh C.G. 8 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Dharamjaigarh, District Raigarh C.G. 9 - Block Education Officer Dharamjaigarh District Raigarh C.G. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Jeet Patel, Advocate For State : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh, Advocate ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.07.06 18:26:41 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 06.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Jeet Patel, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State and Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.8. 2. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 13.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.6107/2021, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge has been dismissed. 3. The facts before the learned Single Judge were that the appellant/writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Guruji under the Shiksha Guarantee Scheme on a fixed honorarium of Rs.500/- per month vide order dated 02.09.1997. It was the case of the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge that, without holding any enquiry and without affording him any opportunity of hearing, his services came to be discontinued by way of an oral order. 4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant/writ petitioner approached this writ Court by filing the writ petition being WPS No.6107/2021 seeking a direction to the respondent-authorities to consider his 3 claim and grant him appropriate relief in accordance with law, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated13.04.2026. 5. Aggrieved by the order dated 13.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant/writ petitioner has preferred the present writ appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner submits that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground of delay without appreciating that the appellant/writ petitioner’s services were discontinued orally and no formal written order of termination/discontinuance was ever issued. It is contended that in the absence of any written order, the appellant/writ petitioner had no effective opportunity to challenge the action at the relevant time and, therefore, the delay ought not to have been treated as fatal. He would further submit that the discontinuation of service without issuance of notice, without holding any enquiry and without affording any opportunity of hearing is ex facie arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice and contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. According to learned counsel, the learned Single Judge also failed to consider that the appellant/writ petitioner belongs to a rural background and lacked adequate legal assistance, and that no third-party rights would be affected if the appellant’s claim were at least directed to be considered by the competent authority. On 4 these grounds, it is submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel supported the impugned order and submitted that the writ petition, having been filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay, was rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge and no relief could be granted in such a stale claim. 8. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.8 also opposed the appeal and adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of the State, contending that no interference with the impugned order is called for in the present writ appeal. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and have carefully considered their rival submissions. We have also perused the records of the case, including the order dated 13.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.6107/2021. 10. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “6. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Guruji under the Shiksha Gauranty Scheme on a fixed honorarium of Rs. 500/- per month, vide order dated 02.09.1997. The petitioner was appointed at Education Guarantee Center, Bhansajhar, Pradhanpara, 5 and the said center was closed in the year, 1999, and thereafter, services of the petitioner were discontinued. 7. The petitioner preferred this petition on 06.10.2021, and in para 7, the petitioner has declared that there is absolutely no delay in filing the present petition. 8. Though the petitioner has stated that there is no delay in filing this petition, but there is inordinate delay of 21 years. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim 6 will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.”’ 10. Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs.1 held courts cannot use a "liberal approach" to condone inordinate, unjustified delays caused by a party's own negligence. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein below :- “13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the 7 substantial law of limitation. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while 1. [2025] 1 SCR 764 considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and 8 principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of litigant for an indefinite period of time.” 11. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law, in the opinion of this Court, the petitioner has not explained the delay properly, therefore, the instant petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. No order as to cost(s).” 11. The foundational facts are not in dispute. The appellant/writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Guruji under the Shiksha Guarantee Scheme on a fixed honorarium of Rs.500/- per month vide order dated 02.09.1997. It is also not in dispute that the Education Guarantee Centre, where the appellant/writ petitioner was posted, came to be closed in the year 1999 and thereafter his engagement came to an end. The writ petition out of which the present appeal arises, however, came to be filed only on 06.10.2021, i.e. after a lapse of about 21 years from the date when the cause of action, according to the appellant/writ petitioner himself, had arisen. The central question, therefore, is whether such a stale claim, raised after an inordinate lapse of time, deserved to be entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 12. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the appellant/writ petitioner is that since no formal written order of termination/discontinuance was issued and the discontinuation was oral in nature, the appellant/writ petitioner could not 9 effectively challenge the same earlier and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. It has also been urged that the discontinuation of service without notice, enquiry or opportunity of hearing is arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, technical considerations of delay ought not to have defeated substantial justice. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the aforesaid submission in the facts of the present case. 13. It is trite that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and equitable in nature. A person approaching the writ Court is required to do so within a reasonable time and must satisfactorily explain the delay, if any, in invoking the writ jurisdiction. The doctrine of delay and laches is not a mere technical rule of procedure; it is founded on sound principles of public policy, equity and finality in litigation. The Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, cannot ignore a long and unexplained inaction on the part of a litigant and permit revival of stale claims at his convenience, particularly when no plausible or legally sustainable explanation is forthcoming for not approaching the Court within a reasonable time. 14. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has specifically noticed that though the writ petition was filed after about 21 years, the appellant/writ petitioner had stated in paragraph 7 of the writ 10 petition that there was absolutely no delay in filing the petition. Thus, not only was there an extraordinary delay in approaching the Court, but even a candid and satisfactory explanation for such delay was conspicuously absent. The appellant/writ petitioner did not lay any factual foundation in the writ petition explaining the circumstances under which he remained silent for more than two decades. In such a situation, the learned Single Judge was fully justified in examining the issue of delay at the threshold and declining to entertain the writ petition. 15. The contention that since no written order of discontinuance was issued, the cause of action continued indefinitely and the petition could be filed at any point of time, cannot be accepted. Merely because the discontinuance is alleged to have been oral would not, by itself, obliterate the requirement of approaching the Court within a reasonable time once the appellant/writ petitioner was fully aware that he was no longer being continued in service. The very case of the appellant/writ petitioner is that his services stood discontinued and that such discontinuance was illegal. Once that was so, the appellant/writ petitioner was expected to seek legal redress within a reasonable period from the date of such discontinuance. Knowledge of cessation of service is sufficient to trigger the cause of action; the absence of a formal written order cannot be permitted to become a device for indefinitely extending limitation in service matters. 11 16. We are also unable to accept the submission that the plea of violation of principles of natural justice or arbitrariness in State action, by itself, is sufficient to obliterate the doctrine of delay and laches. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that fairness in State action is a constitutional requirement and that an employee cannot ordinarily be visited with adverse civil consequences without adherence to the principles of natural justice. However, even a plea founded on alleged illegality or arbitrariness must be raised before the Court within a reasonable time. The doctrine of delay does not stand excluded merely because the challenge is couched in the language of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. If such a proposition were accepted, every stale service claim could be revived after decades simply by alleging arbitrariness or violation of natural justice, which is plainly impermissible. 17. The learned Single Judge has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh (supra), wherein the principles governing belated service claims have been succinctly summarized. The law laid down therein makes it clear that normally a belated service-related claim would be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, except in cases involving a continuing wrong, and even then the consequential relief would ordinarily be restricted. In the case at hand, the grievance of the appellant/writ petitioner is with regard to discontinuance of service which allegedly took place in the year 12 1999. Such discontinuance constituted a one-time completed action and not a continuing wrong giving rise to a recurring cause of action from day to day. Therefore, the appellant/writ petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the exception carved out in Tarsem Singh (supra). 18. The reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy (supra) is also apposite. The said decision reiterates that concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented approach” and “substantial justice” cannot be invoked to frustrate the law of limitation and to condone inordinate and unexplained delay occasioned by a party’s own inaction. The Supreme Court has emphasized that limitation is not a mere technicality, but a matter of substantive legal policy and equity, and that a litigant cannot be permitted to keep the sword hanging over the opposite party indefinitely. In our considered opinion, the case of the appellant/writ petitioner squarely attracts the said principle. 19. Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner on the socio-economic background of the appellant/writ petitioner, his rural residence and lack of legal assistance. We are not unmindful of the fact that in appropriate cases the Court may adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach while considering delay, particularly where a litigant belongs to a disadvantaged background. However, such considerations cannot 13 wholly eclipse the requirement of furnishing at least some acceptable explanation for a delay of 21 years. A broad plea of poverty, lack of awareness or rural background, without supporting particulars and without any explanation as to what prevented the appellant/writ petitioner from approaching the Court for more than two decades, cannot by itself constitute sufficient ground to entertain an otherwise hopelessly belated writ petition. 20. The further submission that no third-party rights would be affected and, therefore, the doctrine of laches ought not to have been applied rigidly, also does not persuade us to take a different view. The question is not merely whether third-party rights have crystallized, but whether the appellant/writ petitioner has approached the Court within a reasonable time so as to enable the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in his favour. Delay and laches are not confined only to cases involving inter se seniority or promotion disputes. Even in cases where third-party rights may not be directly involved, a stale claim can be declined if the litigant has slept over his alleged rights for an unreasonably long period and has failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for such inaction. 21. Equally unmeritorious is the submission that the learned Single Judge ought to have at least directed consideration of the appellant/writ petitioner’s representation. It is well settled that a stale claim cannot be revived by the simple expedient of filing a 14 representation and then seeking a direction from the Court for its consideration. If the underlying cause of action itself has become stale and unenforceable on account of inordinate delay and laches, issuance of a direction to “consider the representation” would amount to indirectly reviving a dead claim, which the Court ought not to do. The writ Court was, therefore, justified in declining even such limited relief. 22. We may also observe that the present case does not involve a claim of recurring monetary benefit, pensionary dues, or any continuing wrong of the nature noticed in Tarsem Singh (supra). Rather, the grievance pertains to cessation of engagement as Guruji under a Scheme after closure of the Education Guarantee Centre in the year 1999. Such a claim, by its very nature, required immediate challenge if the appellant/writ petitioner intended to seek restoration of service-related rights. The extraordinary delay of 21 years has thus rendered the claim wholly stale and incapable of being examined in writ jurisdiction. 23. The scope of interference in an intra-Court appeal against an order passed by the learned Single Judge is also well-settled. Unless the view taken by the learned Single Judge is shown to be manifestly erroneous, perverse, contrary to settled law, or resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, the appellate Court would not lightly interfere. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has considered the undisputed delay of about 21 years, noticed 15 the absence of any proper explanation therefor, and applied the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the point of delay and laches. We do not find the view so taken to be either perverse or legally unsustainable so as to warrant interference in this intra- Court appeal. 24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge committed no error in dismissing the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay. The appellant/writ petitioner has failed to make out any ground to invoke our appellate jurisdiction under the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006. 25. Accordingly, the writ appeal, being devoid of substance and merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu