1 2026:CGHC:27469-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ARBA No. 38 of 2022 The Union Of India Through Its Principal Chief Engineer (Engineering), South East Central Railway, Gms Building, 3rd Floor Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner versus M/s Orissa Concrete And Allied Industries Ltd. Through Its Director, Mr. Navin Agrawal, S/o Shri Cv Agrawal, Age 50 Years, At Plot No. 53, Bhanpuri Industries Area, P. O. Birgaon Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant (Cause title is taken from CIS system) For Appellant : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy.S.G. For Respondent : Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate with Mr. Rishabh Garg (Through V.C.) & Mr. Shahurun Siddiqui, Advocates Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Hon'ble Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, Judge Order On Board (01.07.2026) Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J 1. Heard on I.A. No.1 & 4, application for condonation of 263 days delay in filing this arbitration appeal. BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN 2 2. Appellant has preferred this appeal U/s. 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’) read with Section 13 (2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (for short ‘the Act of 2015’) questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned order dated 01.12.2021, passed in Arb. MJC No.15 of 2019, by the Commercial Court (District Level), Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Raipur, whereby Commercial Court has allowed the application filed by respondent U/s.34 of the Act of 1996 setting aside the award passed by the sole arbitrator for the reasons assigned therein. 3. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that delay occurred in filing of this appeal is on account of administrative reasons. He contended that after passing of the impugned order by the Commercial Court on 01.12.2021, after obtaining certified copy, opinion has been sought from Advocate representing railways. After receipt of opinion from the Advocate representing railways before Commercial Court, appellant thought it proper to take opinion from Mr. R.K. Gupta, Advocate representing the railway department at High Court (Ex- standing Counsel). The concerned Advocate thereafter has instructed to collect the information and to discuss the matter along with officers, who is well versed with the facts of the case. On the date of appointment, the officers of the department attended and discussed the issue with Mr. Gupta and thereafter, opinion has been forwarded by concerned Advocate through e-mail. He contended that in the application, specific dates have also been mentioned as to why some extra time took for taking administrative decision of filing of this appeal. There was sufficient cause for not filing of appeal within limitation as prescribed under law. He also contended that once the document and 3 Vakalatnama has been forwarded on 25.03.2022 for preparing the appeal and thereafter again Vakalatnama and document has been resend. He submits that as sufficient cause has been shown, delay in filing of appeal be condoned. In support of his contention, the counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/s. SAB Industries Limited Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 21111 of 2024, decided on 07.02.2025. 4. Learned counsel for respondent opposes the submission of learned counsel for appellant and would submit that appeal has been filed with inordinate delay. The period of limitation prescribed for filing of appeal before the High Court is 60 days that will start from 01.12.2021. He contended that when first opinion has been sought for and received on 27.12.2021, pleadings multiple dates showing process that they have taken the other favourable opinion would not be a good and sufficient ground for condoning inordinate delay. He also pointed out that object of promulgation of the legislation of the Act of 2015 was to provide speedy disposal of the high level commercial disputes, so that early resolution of commercial dispute shall create a positive image. He also contended that Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Cube Engitech Consultants (P) Limited, in ARBA No. 53 of 2023, decided on 20.12.2024 has dismissed the application for condonation of delay of 42 days and consequently the appeal was also dismissed. 4 5. We have heard learned counsel for parties and also perused the application I.A.No.1 and I.A. No.4 and the reply submitted by respondent. 6. In the facts of the case, where appellant has pleaded the dates and events to show sufficient cause, is relevant therefore, I find it appropriate to extract those paragraphs, which reads as under :- “2. That, the Ld. Commercial Court has passed the order dated 01.12.2021 and set aside the Sole Arbitrator Shri Biplav Kumar's award dated 25.02.2019 and the certified copy of instant order dated 01.12.2021 alongwith opinion of the contesting Railway Advocate Shri Rajesh Kumar Dubey dated 22.12.2021 received in the office of PCE/SECR/BSP on 27.12.2021. Thereafter, on 28.12.2021, the opinion given by the Railway Advocate Shri Rajesh Kumar Dubey on order dated 01.12.2021 wherein it was opined that the chances of success in the Hon'ble High Court were less. Therefore, opinion was again obtained from Railway Advocate of HC/CG Shri R.K.Gupta. Shri R.K.Gupta Ex. Standing Counsel for Railway has informed that he want to discuss in the matter. 3. That, a note was put up by the concerned CLA who deals the office of PCE/SECR/BSP on 31.12.2021 for taking administrative decision. 4. It is further submitted that, on 04.01.2022, the XEN/TS endorse the note and forwarded to concerned dealer to put up detailed note with remarks. Thereafter, on dealer put up detailed note with remarks. Thereafter on 07.01.2022, concerned dealer put up a detailed note for further administrative decision and obtaining candid opinion from Sr. LO/SECR/HQ. The Sr. LO/HQ/SECR has informed vide 11.01.2022 for arranging arranging 5 to depute a well conversant official alongwith desired information to the chamber of Ld. Ex Standing Counsel for Railway Shri R.K. Gupta for discussion vide his email dated 28.12.2021. 5. That, on 12.01.2022, the Competent Authority has deputed a competent official, Shri Imran, SSE/Estimate, for discussion with Ex. Standing Counsel Shri R.K.Gupta. The Ex Standing Counsel, Shri R.K. Gupta has given appointment on 21.01.2022 for discussion in the matter. The competent official has attended the chamber of Shri R.K.Gupta on 21.02.2022. Due to busy schedule of Shri R.K. Gupta, Ex. Standing Counsel, for Railway he sent his candid opinion through email on 05.02.2022. 6. The case file was returned by Shri R.K.Gupta Ex Standing Counsel for Railway on 18.02.2022. Thereafter, after obtaining legal opinion from Ex. Standing Counsel Shri R.K. Gupta, the file was further put up on 21.02.2022 through XEN/TS, Dy.CE/TS & CTE/SECR/BSP to Sr. LO/HQ/SECR/BSP. 7. That, on 21.02.2022, the Sr. LO/HQ has opined that Ld. Standing Counsel of Hon'ble High Court/CG appears to be in order. On 28.02.2022, the file was further put up to CTE/SECR/BSP. Further, on 03.03.2022, the official PCE/SECR/BSP office further put up a note for taking approval of PCE/SECR/BSP. Thereafter, the note was forwarded through CTE/SECR/BSP for approval of PCE/SECR/BSP on 04.03.2022. 8. The PCE/SECR/BSP has approved the proposal on 05.03.2022 for challenging the order of Ld. Commercial Court/Raipur's order dated 01.12.2021. Thereafter, on 10.03.2022, with the approval of PCE/SECR/BSP, the 6 matter was sent to FA&CAO/SECR/BSP for concurrence. 9. The Finance has provided concurrence on 11.03.2022. Due to change of policy for appointment of Central Government Advocate in lieu of Railway Advocate, a detailed note was further put up to 22.03.2022. 10.That, on 25.03.2022 all the relevant documents and Vakalatnama was sent to the office of Dy. SG/HC/CG for preparing appeal on behalf of Railway Administration and all the documents and Vakalatnama were again sent on 19.07.2022. Draft appeal was received from Dy.SG/HC/CG by the office of PCE/SECR/BSP necessary correction and signature of Competent Authority and the same was sent to the office of Dy. S.G./HC/CG on 09.09.2022 after signature of Competent authority.” 7. Perusal of the application in which the pleadings have been made to assign reasons for delay would show that the order of Commercial Court was passed on 01.12.2021. Copy of order of Commercial Court along with opinion of Advocate of department, who appeared before the Commercial Court, received on 22.12.2021. From the pleadings it is also apparent that Mr. R.K. Gupta, Advocate (Ex. Standing Counsel for Railway) forwarded the opinion on 05.02.2022 and according to pleadings the records kept were returned back on 18.02.2022. It is also appearing that proposal for challenging the order of Commercial Court is dated 05.03.2022. Even these pleading made, is not supported by any documents. The respondent may have recorded a proceeding in writing for events, which is pleaded in the application but chose not to file any documents in support of the pleadings. In the 7 month of March, 2022, i.e. 10.03.2022 matter was sent for concurrence to finance department. Appellant department is well aware with regard to provisions of law and the limitation as provided under the Act of 2015 of filing of appeal before High Court. 8. The object of promulgation of the Act of 1996 as also the Act of 2015 is to decide the commercial dispute between the parties at the earliest. The reasons assigned in the application seeking condonation of delay, whether to be sufficient cause or not is to be considered keeping in mind the object of the Act of 2015. 9. If the pleadings made in the application is to be considered along with the provisions of the Act of 2015 and its object, we are of the view that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay of 263 days in filing of this appeal. Perusal of the application would also show that there is no sufficient cause for not filing the appeal immediately after getting the opinion of filing of appeal in the month of February and concurrence of Finance Department 25.03.2022. From the date as mentioned in the memo of appeal it is apparent that appeal is filed only on 21.10.2022 challenging the order dated 01.12.2021 of the Commercial Court. 10. This appeal is filed under Section 13 (1) of the Act of 2015 read with Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Limitation prescribed under Section 13 (1A) of the Act of 2015 for filing an appeal is 60 days from the date of judgment or order. 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court In case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Private Limited, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 has 8 observed that sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the Act of 2015 provides the forum for appeals as well as limitation period to be followed. Section 13 of the Act of 2015 being a special law as compared with the Limitation Act, which is a general law, which follows from a reading of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13 (1-A) of the Act of 2015 lays down a period of limitation of 60 days uniformly for all appeals that are preferred under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has also considered as to whether delay can be condoned or not, if appeal under Section 13 (1-A) of the Act of 2015 is filed with delay, and observed thus:- “34. The vexed question which faces us is whether, first and foremost, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, as has been argued by Dr George. The first important thing to note is that Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain any provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act only provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order appealed against, without further going into whether delay beyond this period can or cannot be condoned. * * * 41. Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act was also pressed into service stating that the non obstante clause contained in the Commercial Courts Act would override other Acts, including the Limitation Act, as a result of which, the applicability of Section 5 thereof would be excluded. This argument has been addressed in the context of the IBC in B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates [B.K. 9 Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 528] , as follows : (SCC p. 664, para 41) “41. Shri Dholakia argued that the Code being complete in itself, an intruder such as the Limitation Act must be shut out also by application of Section 238 of the Code which provides that, ‘notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force’, the provisions of the Code would override such laws. In fact, Section 60(6) of the Code specifically states as follows: ‘60. Adjudicating authority for corporate persons.—(1)-(5)*** (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which such moratorium is in place shall be excluded.’ This provision would have been wholly unnecessary if the Limitation Act was otherwise excluded either by reason of the Code being complete in itself or by virtue of Section 238 of the Code. Both, Section 433 of the Companies Act as well as Section 238-A of the Code, apply the provisions of the Limitation Act “as far as may be”. Obviously, therefore, where periods of limitation have been laid down in the Code, these periods will apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Limitation Act. From this, it does not follow that the baby must be thrown out with the 10 bathwater. This argument, therefore, must also be rejected.” 42. For all these reasons we reject the argument made by Shri George that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded given the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act. * * * 50. From this paragraph, what was sought to be argued was that the limitation of power on a civil court at the initial stage can be read as a limitation onto the appellate court, as was done in the aforesaid judgments. We are afraid that we are unable to agree. This sentence was in the context of a decree passed in a civil suit for a sum of rupees 3.09 lakhs with interest, without taking into consideration the fact that an amount of rupees 2.10 lakhs had already been deposited by the appellant in criminal proceedings. The Court relied upon Section 357(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to hold that “the court” shall take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation at the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter. “The court” would obviously include an appellate court as well. It was only in this context that the aforesaid observation of limitation of power on a civil court being “borne in mind” by the appellate court, was made. 51. Shri George's reliance upon the judgment of this Court in P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar [P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 773] (at paras 36.2-36.3) on the doctrine of unbreakability when applied to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, also does not carry the matter much further, as the question is whether this doctrine can be bodily lifted and engrafted onto an appeal provision 11 that has no cut-off point beyond which delay cannot be condoned. 52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating arguments made in these appeals, we are of the view that N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] has been wrongly decided and is therefore overruled. 53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which any amount of delay can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes that we have to steer a middle course.” 12. In the aforementioned case Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law as to when delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 13 of the Act of 2015 can be condoned. It was observed as follows:- “55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause” 12 means in the context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 56. The expression “sufficient cause” contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield different results depending upon the object and context of a statute. Thus, in Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab [Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 381] , this Court, in the context of Section 11(5) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, held as follows : (SCC pp. 386-87, paras 10-11) “10. Permitting an application under Section 11(5) to be moved at any time would have disastrous consequences. The State Government in which the land vests on being declared as surplus, will not be able to utilise the same. The State Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely before putting the land to use. Where the land is utilised by the State Government, a consequence of the order passed subsequently could be of divesting it of the land. Taking the facts of the present case by way of an illustration, it would mean that the land which stood mutated in the State Government in 1982 and which was allotted by the State Government to third parties in 1983, would as a result of reopening the settled position, lead to third parties being asked to restore back the land to the State Government and the State Government in turn would have to be divested of the land. The land will in turn be restored to the landowner. This will be the result of the land being declared by the Collector as not surplus with the landowner. The effect of permitting such a situation will be that the land will remain in a situation of flux. There will be no finality. The very purpose of the legislation will be 13 defeated. The allottee will not be able to utilise the land for fear of being divested in the event of deaths and births in the family of the landowners. Deaths and births are events which are bound to occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to read a time- limit in sub-section (5) of Section 11. The concept of reasonable time in the given facts would be most appropriate. An application must be moved within a reasonable time. The facts of the present case demonstrate that redetermination under sub-section (5) of Section 11 almost 5 years after the death of Kartar Kaur and more than 6 years after the order of the Collector declaring the land as surplus had become final, has resulted in grave injustice besides defeating the object of the legislation which was envisaged as a socially beneficial piece of legislation. Thus we hold that the application for redetermination filed by Daya Singh under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act on 21-6-1985 was liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector was wrong in reopening the issue declaring the land as not surplus in the hands of Daya Singh and Kartar Kaur. 11. The above reasoning is in consonance with the provision in sub-section (7) of Section 11 of the Act. Sub-section (7) uses the words ‘where succession has opened after the surplus area or any part thereof has been determined by the Collector…’. The words “determined by the Collector” would mean that the order of the Collector has attained finality. The provisions regarding appeals, etc. contained in Sections 80- 82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made applicable to proceedings under the Punjab Land 14 Reforms Act, 1972, show that the maximum period of limitation in case of appeal or review is ninety days. The appeal against the final order of the Collector dated 30-9-1976 whereby 3.12 ha of land had been declared as surplus was dismissed on 27-3-1979. The order was allowed to become final as it was not challenged any further. Thus the determination by the Collector became final on 27-3-1979. The same could not be reopened after a lapse of more than 6 years by order dated 23-7-1985. The subsequent proceedings before the Revenue Authorities did not lie. The order dated 23-7-1985 is non est. All the subsequent proceedings therefore fall through. The issue could not have been reopened.” (emphasis supplied) * * * 58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15) “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that 15 which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770] , Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this 16 Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] , whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex 17 which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266: ‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.’ An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. 18 Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 19 * * * 59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] [“Postmaster General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29) “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation 20 undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Borse Brothers (supra), has considered unexplained delay of 75 days to be long delay and further observing that reasons assigned in the application seeking condonation of delay to be short of making out sufficient cause and the delay condoned by High Court was set aside. Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Cube Engitech Consultants (P) Ltd. (supra) has dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay of 42 days. 14. In case of Chief Engineer Public Works Department, National Highway Zone Vs. Rohit Sidar and Ors. In Arb. No.75 of 2025, decided on 23.02.2026, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay observing that obtaining legal opinion, administrative approvals, superannuation of 21 the officer-in-charge and procedural delays did not constitute sufficient cause. 15. In case of East Central Railway & Ors. Vs. Pratibha Royal (JV), reported in MANU/BH/0146/2026, the High Court of Patna has refused to condone the delay of 85 days observing that explanation based on the file movement, inter-departmental deliberations, legal opinions and multi-level administrative approvals were vague, routine and did not constitute bonafide or sufficient cause. 16. In case of Postmaster General vs Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. The decision in Postmaster General (supra) has been followed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in cases of State of Rajasthan vs Balkishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592; State of UP vs Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422; State of T.N. vs. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) SCC 11 709 and State of MP vs Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654. 22 17. For the foregoing discussions in the facts of the case and also in view of the law enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed above we are of the considered view that appellant failed to make out a case of sufficient cause to condone the delay of 263 days in filing of appeal. 18. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 and 4, application seeking condonation of delay of 263 days is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal filed U/s. 37 of the Act of 1996 read with Section 13 (2) of the Act of 2015 is also dismissed as barred by limitation. Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Judge Balram