GAHC010113252024 2026:GAU-AS:4867-DB IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH) CRL.A.(J) NO. 55 OF 2024 Bhugesh Mali S/o: Late Gunasagar Mali Vill: Hollung Gaon, Near L.P. School, P.S: Phillobari, District: Tinsukia State: Assam. …….Appellant -Versus- 1. State of Assam, Represented by Public Prosecutor, Assam. 2. Nirmal Tanti S/o- Late Tike Badan Tanti, R/o- Bishnupur, P.S: Phillobari, District: Tinsukia, State: Assam. ……. Respondents – B E F O R E – HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI For the Appellant(s) : Ms. B.R.A. Sultana, Legal Aid Counsel. For the Respondent(s) : Ms. A. Begum, Additional Public Prosecutor. Date on which judgment is reserved : N/A. Date of pronouncement of judgment : 02.04.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment ? : No. Whether the full judgment has been pronounced : Yes. JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL) (Kaushik Goswami, J) Heard Ms. B.R.A. Sultana, learned Legal Aid Counsel, appearing for the appellant. Also heard Ms. A. Begum, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent No.1. 2] The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.04.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (POCSO), Tinsukia (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), in Sessions Case No. 174/2023, whereby the accused/appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six years. 3] The prosecution case, in brief, is that the informant, Nirmal Tanti (PW-2), lodged an FIR before the Officer-in- Charge of Phillobari Police Station stating that his daughter, aged about 25 years, had married the accused/appellant about three years prior to the occurrence, and out of the said wedlock, a male child aged about three months was born. Both the deceased and the accused were working in a tea garden owned by Goutam Tamang at Bishnupur Phillobari, under Phillobari Police Station in the district of Tinsukia. 4] On 06.06.2023, at about 7:00 p.m., while they were at the tea garden labour camp, the accused/appellant allegedly assaulted his wife after she expressed anger over his consumption of alcohol. It is alleged that the accused severely beat the deceased and also struck her on the neck and back with a stick, causing serious injuries. The victim was subsequently taken to Tinsukia for medical treatment but succumbed to her injuries on the way to the hospital. 5] Accordingly, the police registered Phillobari P.S. Case No. 25/2023 under Section 302 IPC and took up investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted before the trial court under Section 302 IPC. The accused having pleaded not guilty, the trial court framed charge under Section 302 IPC and proceeded with the trial. 6] During trial, the prosecution examined six witnesses, including the medical officer, Dr. Palash Jyoti Dutta (PW-1); the informant, Sri Nirmal Tanti (PW-2); Smt. Shanti Tanti (PW-3); Sri Goutam Tamang (PW-4); Sri Babul Kalita (PW-5); and the Investigating Officer, Sri Bongshi Timung (PW-6). 7] After completion of recording of evidence, all incriminating circumstances were put to the accused/appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”), wherein he generally denied the same. He did not adduce any defence evidence. 8] The trial court, after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, rendered the impugned judgment and order, which is under challenge in the present appeal, whereby the accused/appellant was held guilty of the offence charged and sentenced accordingly. 9] Ms. B.R.A. Sultana, learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that there is no evidence whatsoever of the accused/appellant having assaulted the deceased resulting in her death. She further submits that the accused/appellant has categorically stated in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he was not present at home at the time of the occurrence and, upon returning home and seeing his wife lying on the ground, he informed PW-3. It is contended that the impugned conviction, being based on surmises and conjectures, cannot be sustained in law. 10] Per contra, Ms. A. Begum, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submits that it stands established from the prosecution evidence that the accused/appellant was present at his residence at the time of the occurrence. The medical evidence clearly establishes that the deceased was assaulted, resulting in her death. The explanation offered by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has not been substantiated by any evidence. On the contrary, it was the accused/appellant who immediately informed PW-2 and PW-3 that the deceased was vomiting blood. Hence, the conviction and sentence warrant no interference. 11] We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. 12] PW-1 deposed that on 07.06.2023, he conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased at about 2:30 p.m. On examination, he found multiple injuries, including abrasions, contusions, comminuted fractures, and intracranial hemorrhage. In his opinion, death was due to coma as a result of the injuries sustained. All injuries were ante-mortem in nature, caused by blunt force impact, and the death was homicidal in nature. His cross-examination was declined. 13] PW-2, the informant, deposed that the accused is his son-in-law and the deceased is his step-daughter. He stated that on the day of the incident, the accused assaulted the deceased with a bamboo lathi on her head and chest. Thereafter, the accused came and informed him that the deceased was vomiting blood. He went to the place of occurrence and found the victim lying unconscious with blood on the ground. The victim was taken for treatment but succumbed to her injuries. 13.1] In cross-examination, he clarified certain discrepancies regarding the timing of his visit to the place of occurrence but denied material contradictions. Page 6 of 13 14] PW-3, the mother of the deceased, deposed that the accused informed her at about 3:00 a.m. that her daughter was vomiting blood. She went to the place of occurrence and found severe injuries on the body of the deceased. A bamboo lathi was found near the place of occurrence. The victim later succumbed to her injuries. 14.1] In cross-examination, she denied the suggestions that she had not stated the above facts before the police. 15] PW-4 deposed that the accused was residing in his garden quarter. Upon receiving information, he went to the place of occurrence and saw the accused carrying his wife to the hospital. He also stated that PW-2 informed him about the incident. 15.1] In cross-examination, he clarified that he had not personally witnessed the incident and that certain statements were not made before the police. 16] PW-5, a neighbour, deposed that he came to know about the incident and that the accused showed the police a bamboo stick stating that he had assaulted his wife with it. 16.1] In cross-examination, he clarified that he did not witness the occurrence and that several persons were present at the place of occurrence. 17] PW-6, the Investigating Officer, deposed regarding the steps taken during investigation, including registration of the case, recording of statements, seizure of bamboo sticks, and submission of charge-sheet. 17.1] In cross-examination, he admitted certain lapses, including non-mentioning of details in the sketch map, non- sending of seized articles to FSL, and non-recording of disclosure statements. 18] In his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused stated that he was not present at the time of the incident and, upon returning home, found the deceased lying on the ground and informed PW-3. 19] From the evidence on record, it stands established that the deceased died in her matrimonial home where she resided with the accused. The medical evidence clearly establishes that the death was homicidal in nature and caused by blunt force injuries. It is further evident that the accused/appellant immediately informed PW-2 and PW-3 and carried the deceased to the hospital. It is also evident that the accused/appellant has furnished a false explanation during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., which constitutes an additional link in the chain of circumstances already established by the prosecution. 20] The circumstances, taken cumulatively, point towards the accused/appellant being responsible for the death of the deceased, excluding the involvement of any other person. However, the conduct of the accused, as reflected from the prosecution case itself, assumes significance. There is no evidence of prior cruelty, harassment, or premeditation. Page 8 of 13 21] In such circumstances, although the prosecution has proved that the accused caused the death of the deceased, the intention to cause death is not established. The occurrence appears to have arisen out of a domestic quarrel, and there is no evidence of premeditation or prior animosity. 22] The distinction between culpable homicide and murder is well settled. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382, the Apex Court explained that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is its species, and that the determining factor lies in the degree of probability of death and the existence of intention. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not viceversa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to. murder'. For the pur- pose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degress of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in s. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the 1st part of s. 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree.' This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second Part of s. 304. 13. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minutae abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various clauses of ss. 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide of the act by which the death is caused is done- Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder the act by which the death caused is done-- INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing death: or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE © with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that at must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury as is mentioned above 14. Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with cls. (2) and (3) of s. 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under cl. (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offend- er regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that' such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of el. (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of cl. (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to s. 300. 15. Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowl- edge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under cl. (2) of s. 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to. cause death or bodily injury sufficient 'in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. 16. In clause (3) of s. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding el. (b) of s. 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if over- looked, may result 'in miscarriage of justice. The difference between cl. (b) of s. 299 and cl. (3) of s. 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in cl. (b) of s. 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 17. For cases to fall within cl. (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, So long as death ensues from the intentional. bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and anr. v. State of Kerala(2) is an apt illustration of this point. 18. In Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, (2) Vivian Bose j. speaking for this Court, explained the meaning' and scope of Clause (3), thus (at p. 1500): ‘The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, 3rdly'. First, it must establish, quite objective- ly, that a bodily injury is present;. secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say,. that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and, fourthly it must be, proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." 19. Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra) even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to s. 300 clearly brings out this point. 20. Clause (c) of s. 299 and cl. (4) of s. 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that cl. (4) of s. 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general--as distinguished from a particular person or persons---being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not. amounting to murder,' on ,the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in s. 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of s. 300, Penal Code is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of murder' contained in s. 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of s. 304, depending. respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of s. 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes, within any of the Exceptions enumerated in s. 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' punishable under the First Part of s. 304, Penal Code. 22. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so inter- twined and the second and the third stages so tele- scoped into each other, that it may not be convenient, to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.” 23] Applying the principles laid down in Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra) to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that although the accused had caused the death of the deceased, the case does not fall within the ambit of “murder” as defined under Section 300 IPC. The prosecution has established the causal connection between the act of the accused and the death of the deceased, thereby satisfying the first stage indicated in Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra). However, the evidence on record clearly brings the case within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The assault, having arisen out of a sudden domestic quarrel without premeditation, coupled with the conduct of the accused in immediately attempting to secure medical aid, clearly indicates absence of intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is also no material to suggest that the accused acted in a cruel or unusual manner so as to exclude the applicability of the said Exception. In such circumstances, while the act of the accused would amount to culpable homicide, it falls within the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Further, the facts disclose that the accused had the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, but lacked the intention contemplated under Section 300 IPC. Accordingly, the case falls within the third degree of culpable homicide as explained in Punnayya (supra), punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC, justifying the alteration of conviction and corresponding reduction of sentence. 24] Accordingly, the conviction of the accused/appellant under Section 302 IPC is set aside. In its place, the accused/appellant is convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. 25] The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. 26] The period of detention already undergone shall be set off in accordance with law. 27] Let the trial court records be returned. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant Pranab Chand ra Das Digitally signed by Pranab Chandra Das Date: 2026.04.06 15:59:10 +05'30'