1 2026:CGHC:27118-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1518 of 2024 Shami Akhtar @ Chand S/o Late Kainul Hassan Aged About 20 Years R/o - Ward No. 05, Mouharpara Police Station Manendragarh, Manendragarh-Chirmiri- Bharatpur (C.G) ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Manendragarh, District Manendragarh, District Manendragarh- Chirmiri- Bharatpur (C.G) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer For Objector : Mr. Ravi Kumar Banjare, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 02.07.2026 1. This criminal appeal under Section 415 of the BNSS is directed against the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.S.C. (POCSO), MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.07.03 15:59:42 +0530 2 Manendragarh, District- Koriya (C.G.) in Special Criminal Cae (POCSO) No. 63/2022 whereby learned trial Court has convicted the appellant as under :- Conviction under Section Sentence Fine Additional Imprisonment in default of payment of fine Section 376(3) of the IPC R.I. for 20 years Rs. 1000/- 2 months R.I. Section 6 of the POCSO Act R.I. for 20 years Rs. 1000/- 2 months R.I. Both sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 05.06.2022, the victim lodged a written complaint at Police Station Manendragarh alleging that on 20.03.2020, while she had gone to her friend’s house, the appellant allegedly took advantage of an opportunity when she was alone and committed penetrative sexual assault upon her against her will. It was further alleged that thereafter the appellant threatened to kill her and also threatened to circulate her photographs, thereby compelling her to maintain physical relations with him on subsequent occasions. The complaint further alleged that the appellant induced the victim with a promise of marriage and continued to establish physical relations with her on that pretext. It was also alleged that the appellant obtained a sum of Rs.40,000/- from the victim on the pretext of purchasing a mobile phone. As the victim was stated to be a minor at the relevant time, 3 FIR No. 209/2022 was registered for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3) and 506 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 3. During investigation, the statements of the victim and her mother were recorded. The victim was medically examined after obtaining the requisite consent, and the spot map of the place of occurrence was prepared. During the course of investigation, the memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded, and various articles, including biological samples, the appellant’s clothing, and a mobile phone allegedly used in connection with the offence, were seized in accordance with law. The seized articles were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. 4. The investigating agency also collected the school admission and birth records of the victim for determination of her age. Her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded before the jurisdictional Magistrate. Upon completion of the investigation and after receipt of the forensic reports, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 4 5. The appellant denied the charges and claimed trial. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and pleaded false implication. 6. In support of its case, the prosecution examined eight witnesses, including the victim, her parents, the concerned teacher, the medical experts, and the Investigating Officer. The defence examined one witness in support of its case 7. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are contrary to the evidence available on record and are liable to be set aside. It was contended that the appellant has been falsely implicated and is innocent of the charges. It was further argued that there are material contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. and in her deposition before the Trial Court, particularly regarding the place of occurrence and her date of birth, thereby rendering the prosecution case doubtful. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident, especially in view of the discrepancies in the evidence of her 5 parents and the school records relating to her age. It was also urged that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of more than four years from the alleged first incident, which casts serious doubt on the prosecution version. Referring to the medical evidence, it was submitted that the medical examination does not corroborate the allegation of forcible sexual assault. It was further contended that the appellant has no criminal antecedents and that the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record, resulting in an erroneous finding of guilt based on conjectures and surmises rather than legally admissible and reliable evidence. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside, and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. 9. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court and submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record. It was contended that the testimony of the victim is cogent, trustworthy and inspires confidence, and the same stands duly corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence on record. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution has successfully established the age of the victim and proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that the alleged discrepancies pointed out by the appellant are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the prosecution 6 case so as to discredit the otherwise reliable evidence. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Trial Court be affirmed. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the objector opposed the appeal and supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and has rightly convicted the appellant. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 12. The first question which arises for consideration is, “whether the prosecution has been able to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident” ? 13. To prove the age of the victim, the prosecution examined PW-3, the concerned teacher of St. Patrick’s Academy, Manendragarh, who produced the original admission register (Ex.P/10) and its certified copy (Ex.P/10C). As per the said register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 23.04.2004 and the date of her admission in KG-II is shown as 28.06.2008. However, in his cross- examination, PW-3 categorically admitted that he had neither made the entry relating to the date of birth nor was he aware of 7 the basis on which the said date of birth came to be recorded in the admission register. He further admitted that the same date of birth is also reflected in the Class-X marksheet of the victim. 14. On the other hand, the oral evidence led by the prosecution itself presents a different picture. The victim (PW-2), in her examination-in-chief, stated that her date of birth is 11.07.2006. Her mother (PW-1), in her cross-examination, also stated that the victim was born on 11.07.2006, whereas her father (PW-5) deposed that the victim was born in the year 2006. Thus, the oral testimony of the victim and her parents is not consistent with the documentary evidence relied upon by the prosecution. 15. It is, therefore, evident that there exists a discrepancy regarding the exact date of birth of the victim. While the school records indicate her date of birth as 23.04.2004, the victim herself and both her parents have stated that she was born in the year 2006, the victim and her mother specifically mentioning the date as 11.07.2006. Although no birth certificate has been exhibited during trial, the evidence on record consistently indicates that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. The controversy, therefore, is confined to her exact date of birth and not to her minority. 16. It is settled law that although an entry in a school admission register is relevant under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, its evidentiary value depends upon proof of the source from which 8 such information was derived. Where the witness producing the register is unable to disclose the basis of the entry and the entry itself is contradicted by the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the Court is required to scrutinize such evidence with greater caution before acting upon it. 17. The learned Trial Court, while considering the aforesaid evidence, observed that irrespective of whether the date of birth of the victim is taken to be 23.04.2004, as reflected in the school records, or 11.07.2006, as stated by the victim and her parents, she would still be below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. Proceeding on the said premise, the learned Trial Court concluded that the victim was a minor at the relevant point of time. 18. During the course of hearing, learned State counsel submitted that the Investigating Agency had also subsequently seized the birth certificate of the victim, which also reflects that she was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident, though the said document does not form part of the paper-book transmitted to this Court. Be that as it may, upon an overall appreciation of the evidence available on record, we find that notwithstanding the discrepancy regarding the exact date of birth, the evidence of PW-2, PW-1 and PW-5, coupled with the school admission register (Ex.P/10), consistently indicates that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding of the 9 learned Trial Court to the extent that the prosecution has established that the victim was a minor within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. However, having regard to the inconsistency regarding the exact date of birth, we refrain from affirming the finding that the victim was below sixteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident, as the evidence in that regard is not free from doubt. 19. This leads naturally into the next point that having held that the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily establish the age of the victim, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has nevertheless succeeded in proving the charges against the appellant under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt. 20. The star witness of the prosecution is the victim (PW-2). In her examination-in-chief, she deposed that she had known the appellant since the year 2019. According to her, on the date of the first incident, she had gone to the house of the appellant’s sister for applying mehendi. After having refreshments, when she went to wash her hands, the appellant allegedly took advantage of the situation and committed penetrative sexual assault upon her. She further stated that the appellant took her photographs and threatened to make them viral, because of which she did not disclose the incident to anyone. She further deposed that 10 thereafter the appellant continued to establish physical relations with her on several occasions by extending threats and on the pretext of marriage. She identified the written complaint (Ex.P/3), the First Information Report (Ex.P/4) and also proved her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 21. In her cross-examination, the victim admitted that several residential houses are situated adjacent to the house of the appellant. She further admitted that despite the alleged occurrence having taken place in the house of the appellant, she neither raised any alarm nor informed any of the neighbouring persons about the incident. She also admitted that she had voluntarily gone to the house of the appellant’s sister on her invitation. She denied the suggestion that the report was lodged falsely on account of a monetary dispute between her family and the appellant. 22. A careful scrutiny of the testimony of the victim reveals certain inconsistencies on material particulars. In the written complaint and in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the allegation is that the first incident occurred inside the room of the appellant. However, in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as in her deposition before the Trial Court, she stated that the first incident occurred in the courtyard of the 11 appellant’s house. The prosecution has not offered any explanation for the aforesaid variation regarding the place of occurrence. 23. It is true that every discrepancy occurring in the testimony of a witness cannot be treated as fatal to the prosecution case. Minor inconsistencies arising from lapse of memory or passage of time are liable to be ignored. However, where the inconsistencies relate to the genesis of the prosecution case or to material particulars having a bearing on the occurrence itself, the Court is required to examine such evidence with greater circumspection. The contradiction regarding the place where the first alleged incident occurred assumes significance in the facts of the present case, particularly when the prosecution seeks conviction primarily on the sole testimony of the victim. 24. PW-1, the mother of the victim, deposed that the victim used to work as a mehendi artist and had gone to the house of her friend on the date of the alleged incident. According to her, the victim subsequently informed her that the appellant had committed sexual assault upon her and had threatened to circulate her photographs if she disclosed the incident to anyone. She further stated that the appellant continued to call the victim and establish physical relations with her. In her cross-examination, she denied the defence suggestion that she had received money from the 12 appellant or that a false case had been lodged due to a monetary dispute. 25. The testimony of PW-1 is, however, not based on her personal knowledge of the occurrence. Her evidence is entirely founded upon what was allegedly narrated to her by the victim after the incident. Consequently, her testimony is corroborative in nature and does not constitute direct evidence of the alleged occurrence. 26. PW-5, the father of the victim, did not claim to have any direct knowledge of the alleged incident. He deposed that he came to know about the incident through his wife. During his cross- examination, he denied the defence suggestion that a false case had been lodged against the appellant on account of a monetary dispute. Thus, the testimony of PW-5 is also hearsay insofar as the occurrence is concerned and does not materially advance the prosecution case. 27. PW-6, Woman Head Constable Sunita Ekka, proved the registration of the First Information Report and the procedural steps taken during investigation, including forwarding the victim for medical examination. Her testimony is formal in nature. 28. PW-7, Dr. Archana Kumhare, medically examined the victim on 06.06.2022 after obtaining the requisite consent. She proved the medical examination report (Ex.P/13). In her deposition, she stated that secondary sexual characteristics were present, the hymen was found torn and there were no external or internal 13 injuries over the body or genitalia of the victim. Vaginal slides were prepared, sealed and handed over to the police for forensic examination. The doctor opined that there were signs suggestive of sexual intercourse, however, she did not express any opinion regarding the time, manner or identity of the person with whom such intercourse may have taken place. 29. PW-4, Dr. Aditya Dubey, examined the appellant pursuant to the requisition sent by the Investigating Officer and proved his medical examination report (Ex.P/11). He opined that the appellant was physically capable of performing sexual intercourse. His testimony is confined to the physical capability of the appellant and does not establish the commission of the alleged offence. 30. PW-8, Hiralal Kujur, the Investigating Officer, deposed regarding the various steps undertaken during investigation. He proved the spot map (Ex.P/5), the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/18), seizure memos relating to the vaginal slides, the appellant’s underwear and the mobile phone (Exs.P/20 to P/22), the requisitions for medical examination (Exs.P/12 and P/19), the forwarding letter sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex.P/24), the acknowledgment thereof (Ex.P/25) and the Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P/26). He further deposed regarding the collection of the school admission records and the filing of the charge-sheet. 14 31. The prosecution has also relied upon the medical and forensic evidence to corroborate its case. The medical report (Ex.P/13) does not record any external or internal injury on the person of the victim. Though the doctor noticed that the hymen was torn and opined that there were signs of sexual intercourse, no opinion could be expressed regarding the age of the injury or the identity of the person responsible. 32. The articles seized during investigation, including the vaginal slides of the victim, the semen slides and underwear of the appellant, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur. The FSL report (Ex.P/26) did not detect semen stains or human spermatozoa on the exhibits forwarded for examination. While it is true that a negative FSL report by itself is not conclusive to discard the prosecution case, at the same time it does not lend any corroboration to the allegations levelled against the appellant. 33. Having considered the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, it is evident that the prosecution case rests substantially upon the testimony of the victim (PW-2). It is well settled that conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided her evidence is of sterling quality, wholly reliable and inspires confidence. However, where material discrepancies or circumstances creating reasonable doubt emerge from the record, the Court is duty-bound to examine such evidence with greater care before recording a conviction. 15 34. In the present case, the victim, in her examination-in-chief, deposed that the first incident occurred in the courtyard of the appellant’s house when she had gone there for applying mehendi. However, from the written complaint (Ex.P/3), the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, it appears that the prosecution version regarding the place of the first alleged occurrence has not remained consistent throughout. While one version indicates that the alleged incident took place inside a room of the appellant’s house, another version refers to the courtyard. The prosecution has not offered any satisfactory explanation for this inconsistency, which relates to the very place of occurrence. 35. The First Information Report was admittedly lodged on 05.06.2022, whereas the first alleged incident is stated to have taken place on 20.03.2020. Although delay in lodging an FIR in cases of sexual offences cannot, by itself, be treated as fatal to the prosecution, such delay is nevertheless a relevant circumstance while appreciating the evidence on record. The explanation furnished by the prosecution is that the victim remained silent due to threats allegedly extended by the appellant. The said explanation has to be tested in the light of the overall evidence and surrounding circumstances. 16 36. It is also noteworthy that the medical evidence and the forensic evidence do not furnish any independent corroboration connecting the appellant with the alleged offence. As noticed hereinabove, no external or internal injuries were found on the person of the victim and the FSL report (Ex.P/26) did not detect any incriminating biological material on the exhibits examined. Though such evidence is not conclusive by itself, its absence assumes significance when the prosecution case is otherwise attended with material inconsistencies. 37. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the medical and forensic evidence does not provide the degree of assurance necessary to sustain the conviction of the appellant. 38. In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Supreme Court observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be 17 understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a 18 car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 39. In the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: 19 “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of 20 the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 21 40. Having given our anxious consideration to the entire evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been able to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 41. As discussed hereinabove, although the prosecution has established that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident, it has failed to conclusively establish that she was below sixteen years of age. In such circumstances, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tilku @ Tilak Singh (supra), that a girl between sixteen and eighteen years of age is capable of understanding the nature and consequences of her acts, assume relevance while appreciating the overall evidence on record. The said circumstance, however, is not by itself decisive, but is one of the factors to be considered along with the other evidence available on record. 42. In the present case, the testimony of the victim is attended by material inconsistencies with regard to the place of the first alleged occurrence. The FIR came to be lodged after a considerable lapse of time. The medical evidence does not disclose any injuries and the FSL report does not furnish any incriminating material connecting the appellant with the alleged offence. Though each of these circumstances, taken individually, may not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case, their 22 cumulative effect creates a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution version. 43. Criminal jurisprudence mandates that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence leaves room for two possible views, the one favourable to the accused must prevail. On an overall appreciation of the oral, documentary, medical and forensic evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 44. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2024 passed by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. The accused / appellant is acquitted of the said charges levelled against him. 45. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 23 46. The trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet