1 2026:CGHC:27119-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2267 of 2024 Radhika @ Geeta Sarathi W/o Late Roshan Sarathi Aged About 30 Years R/o Darripara Ward No. 24, Kawardha, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Kawardha, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Uttam Pandey, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 02.07.2026 1. The present appeal filed under Section 415(2) of the BNSS, 2023 is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.10.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.23/2021, MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.07.04 12:23:44 +0530 2 whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for three months. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the appellant/accused and the deceased, Vikas @ Vishal Yadav, were acquainted with each other and were allegedly in a love relationship. According to the prosecution, the deceased was reluctant to marry the appellant and, on account of the said dispute, on the intervening night of 27/28.12.2020, the appellant allegedly strangulated the deceased with her yellow-coloured shawl inside her house situated at Darri Para, Ward No. 24, Kawardha, District Kabirdham, thereby causing his death. 3. It is further the prosecution case that after the alleged incident, the appellant attempted to conceal the offence by informing her nephew, Raj @ Dauwa Sarathi, that the deceased had consumed liquor and had become unconscious inside her house. Acting on such information, Raj reached the appellant’s house. The appellant allegedly requested him to assist in shifting the deceased from her house. Thereafter, with the help of Raj, the body of the deceased was taken outside and kept behind the house of one Rahul. According to the prosecution, neither Raj nor another person, namely Pappu @ Ajay Sahu, who reached the 3 spot thereafter, was informed by the appellant that the deceased had already died. On receiving information from Raj and Pappu, the family members of the deceased reached the place, shifted him to their house, attempted to revive him by massaging his body and thereafter took him to the District Hospital, Kawardha, where the doctors declared him dead. 4. On 28.12.2020, Arjun Baiga, Ward Boy, District Hospital, Kawardha, submitted a hospital intimation regarding the death of the deceased at Police Station Kawardha, on the basis of which Merg No.107/2020 was registered. During the merg inquiry, an inquest over the dead body was conducted and the body was sent for postmortem examination. As per the postmortem report, the death was found to be homicidal in nature and caused due to asphyxia resulting from strangulation. During the course of merg inquiry, the statements of the father and brother of the deceased, namely Chandu Yadav and Akash Yadav, as well as other witnesses including Ajay Sahu and Raj Sarathi, were recorded. On the basis of the material collected during the inquiry, Crime No.755/2020 was registered against an unknown person for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. During investigation, the Investigating Officer visited the place of occurrence and prepared the spot map. The witnesses were examined and the appellant was interrogated. According to the prosecution, the appellant made a memorandum statement under 4 Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act stating that she had strangulated the deceased with a yellow shawl, concealed the said shawl and the mobile phone of the deceased beneath her pillow, and had thrown the SIM card of the mobile phone into a drain. Pursuant to the said memorandum, a yellow-coloured shawl and the mobile phone of the deceased were allegedly recovered from the house of the appellant, though the SIM card could not be recovered despite search. The appellant was thereafter arrested. The investigating agency also collected the call detail records and customer application forms pertaining to the mobile numbers allegedly used by the appellant and the deceased and obtained the certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act. 6. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions, where charges under the aforesaid provisions were framed against the appellant. The appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 7. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined fourteen witnesses and exhibited documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-29. The appellant, in her examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against her and pleaded false implication. No evidence was adduced in defence. 5 8. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, acquitted her of the charge under Section 201 IPC, and sentenced her accordingly, giving rise to the present appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction is contrary to the evidence available on record and is based on conjectures and surmises. It was contended that the present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, but the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellant. It was argued that there is no eyewitness to the alleged occurrence and the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material inconsistencies and infirmities in the prosecution case. Drawing attention to the evidence of PW-2 Akash Yadav, learned counsel submitted that the prosecution story regarding recovery of the mobile phone from the possession of the appellant is rendered doubtful, as the said witness admitted that the mobile phone of the deceased had been handed over by PW-5 Raj Sarathi to the father of the deceased. It was further submitted that the alleged recovery of the SIM card is wholly unreliable, as no seizure memo or panchnama was prepared, the place from where it was allegedly recovered was not identified in the spot map, and the Investigating Officer failed to disclose who had actually searched and recovered the SIM card. It was also argued that the call detail records relied upon by the prosecution 6 have no evidentiary value, inasmuch as the prosecution itself failed to establish that the mobile numbers in question belonged to or were being used by the appellant and the deceased. The customer application form showed that one of the mobile numbers stood in the name of Shri Ram Sarathi, whose statement was never recorded during investigation. 10. Learned counsel further submitted that the investigation suffers from serious procedural irregularities and lacks fairness. It was argued that the appellant was taken into custody on 28.12.2020 and was not permitted to return to her house until she was produced before the competent Court on 31.12.2020. During this period, according to the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5, the police repeatedly searched the appellant’s house after obtaining its keys from her, thereby rendering the alleged recoveries highly doubtful. It was further submitted that PW-4, PW-5 and PW-8, along with other persons, admitted that they had been detained at the police station for several days during investigation, thereby casting serious doubt on the fairness of the investigation and suggesting that the actual offenders had not been properly investigated. Learned counsel also argued that the memorandum statement and the consequent recoveries do not inspire confidence, as the seizure witnesses admitted that they had signed documents without reading their contents. It was further contended that although the FIR was initially registered against an unknown person, none of the witnesses present at the hospital or during the 7 inquest suspected the appellant’s involvement at the earliest point of time. Lastly, it was argued that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case, as several nail scratch injuries were found on the body of the deceased, yet neither the nail clippings of the deceased nor those of the appellant were collected for forensic examination to ascertain whether any scuffle had taken place. In the absence of reliable evidence establishing every incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, the chain of circumstances remains incomplete and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal. 11. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has recorded a well-reasoned finding of conviction. It was contended that although the case is based on circumstantial evidence, every incriminating circumstance has been duly established by the prosecution. The evidence on record clearly demonstrates that the deceased was last seen alive in the house of the appellant, his dead body was subsequently removed from the appellant’s house with her active participation, and the medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the death was homicidal due to strangulation. It was further submitted that the recovery of the shawl used in the commission of the offence at the instance of the appellant, coupled with her failure to furnish any plausible explanation under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal 8 Procedure as to how the deceased suffered homicidal death inside her house, constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance attracting the principle embodied in Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was argued that the alleged discrepancies pointed out by the defence are minor in nature and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. The chain of circumstances stands fully established and is consistent only with the guilt of the appellant, leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis consistent with her innocence. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased was homicidal in nature ? 14. The prosecution has sought to establish the homicidal nature of death primarily through the testimony of PW-6, Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased, and the postmortem report (Ex.P-12). PW-6 deposed that on external examination he found a ligature mark over the middle of the neck extending towards the right side measuring approximately 13 cm × 3 cm, abrasions below the right ear and over the left cheek measuring about 1 cm × 0.2 cm each, another linear abrasion measuring approximately 3.5 cm × 0.1 cm below the left cheek 9 and bite marks over the lower lip. The doctor further noticed subconjunctival haemorrhage in the eyes. On internal examination, he found haemorrhage in the sternocleidomastoid muscles and soft tissues of the neck, congestion of the lungs, liver, spleen and kidneys, blood within the heart and damage to the tracheal ring. The doctor, however, found that the hyoid bone was intact and not fractured. According to the witness, the internal findings were nevertheless consistent with death due to strangulation and not hanging. He accordingly opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation, the nature of death was homicidal and the time since death was approximately 6 to 12 hours prior to the postmortem. 15. During cross-examination, PW-6 adhered to his opinion and denied the suggestions that the injuries were not consistent with strangulation or that the postmortem report had been prepared falsely. Merely because the hyoid bone was found intact does not, by itself, discredit the medical opinion, particularly when the medical expert has explained that his conclusion was based on the cumulative external and internal findings noticed during autopsy. There is no contrary medical evidence on record to dislodge the opinion of PW-6. 16. In view of the aforesaid evidence, this Court finds no reason to differ from the conclusion that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. However, the proof of homicidal death by 10 itself does not establish the identity of the assailant. The crucial issue that still requires determination is whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that it was the appellant who committed the offence. That aspect is considered separately while dealing with the next point for determination. 17. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellant and excludes every hypothesis consistent with her innocence. 18. It is not in dispute that the present case is founded entirely on circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the alleged occurrence. The law relating to appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well settled. Each incriminating circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be firmly established by cogent and reliable evidence, all such circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, they must be of a conclusive nature and tendency, they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and the chain of circumstances must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any one of the essential links in the chain is not proved or if the proved circumstances are capable of two possible 11 interpretations, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Suspicion, however strong, can never take the place of legal proof. 19. Whether the prosecution has established the circumstance relating to the alleged telephonic contact between the appellant and the deceased? 20. The prosecution has relied upon the call detail records and customer application forms of the mobile numbers allegedly used by the appellant and the deceased to establish their frequent telephonic contact prior to the incident and thereby to prove the alleged motive as well as their relationship. However, on a careful scrutiny of the evidence, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to render such electronic evidence incriminating against the appellant. 21. Shri Chandra Kant Tiwari (PW-11), Assistant Sub-Inspector, Cyber Cell, who produced the call detail records and the customer application forms, has categorically admitted in his cross- examination that the customer application form (Ex.P-18) pertaining to the mobile number allegedly used by the deceased does not stand in the name of the deceased, Vikas @ Vishal Yadav. Likewise, the customer application form (Ex.P-17) relating to the mobile number allegedly used by the appellant is also not in her name. The witness further admitted that neither of the application forms indicates who was actually operating the 12 respective mobile numbers and no panchnama or investigation was conducted to ascertain the actual user thereof. He further admitted that the Aadhaar Card and Voter Identity Card appended with the customer application forms belonged to different persons. Significantly, the Investigating Officer (PW-14) also admitted in paragraph 15 of his cross-examination that he neither investigated the ownership of the SIM cards nor seized any document establishing ownership or possession of the mobile phones allegedly used by the appellant and the deceased. Although one of the customer application forms disclosed that the SIM card stood in the name of Shri Ram Sarathi, his statement was never recorded during investigation to ascertain whether the SIM card had ever been handed over to the deceased or was being used by him. In the absence of any evidence establishing that the appellant and the deceased were the actual users of the mobile numbers in question, the call detail records lose much of their evidentiary value and cannot be treated as a circumstance incriminating the appellant. Consequently, this circumstance cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and does not constitute a reliable link in the chain of circumstantial evidence sought to be established by the prosecution. 22. Whether the prosecution has proved the alleged recovery of the mobile phone and SIM card from the appellant? 13 23. The prosecution has next relied upon the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-5) and the consequential recovery (Ex.P-6) to contend that the deceased’s mobile phone was recovered from the appellant’s house and that she had disclosed having thrown the SIM card into a drain after the incident. According to the prosecution, such recovery constitutes an incriminating circumstance connecting the appellant with the commission of the offence. However, on a careful appreciation of the evidence, this Court finds that the alleged recovery is surrounded by serious contradictions and circumstances which render it wholly unreliable. 24. The memorandum (Ex.P-5) records that the appellant stated she had concealed the mobile phone beneath a pillow in her house and had thrown the SIM card into a drain. However, PW-1 Chandu Yadav, the father of the deceased, categorically admitted in his cross-examination that PW-5 Raj @ Dauwa Sarathi had handed over the mobile phone of the deceased to him, and thereafter he himself delivered the same to the police. This version has been fully corroborated by PW-2 Akash Yadav, the brother of the deceased, who also admitted that the mobile phone was first handed over by PW-5 Raj Sarathi to his father and only thereafter to the police. This evidence creates a direct inconsistency with the prosecution case that the mobile phone was subsequently recovered from the appellant’s house pursuant to her disclosure statement. Further, PW-4 Ajay Sahu and PW-5 14 Raj Sarathi admitted that after the appellant was taken into police custody on 28.12.2020, she was not permitted to return to her house, while the police had obtained the keys of the house and visited it repeatedly during the intervening period before her formal arrest. PW-2 Akash Yadav has also supported this version. These admissions create a serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the alleged recovery from the appellant’s exclusive possession. 25. The prosecution case with respect to the SIM card is equally doubtful. Although it was alleged that the appellant had thrown the SIM card into a drain and that it was recovered during investigation, the Investigating Officer (PW-14) admitted that no seizure memo or panchnama was prepared in respect of such recovery. He further admitted that the spot map does not indicate the location of the drain from where the SIM card was allegedly recovered and there is no material on record to show who had actually searched for or recovered the SIM card. Such omissions assume significance because the recovery of the SIM card was projected as an important incriminating circumstance. In the absence of compliance with the basic safeguards governing recovery proceedings and in view of the material contradictions emerging from the prosecution witnesses themselves, this Court is of the considered opinion that the alleged recovery of the mobile phone and SIM card has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be treated as a reliable 15 circumstance against the appellant. 26. Whether the memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and the consequential recoveries inspire confidence? 27. The prosecution has further relied upon the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and the alleged recoveries made pursuant thereto. It is well settled that a disclosure statement leading to recovery can be relied upon only when the prosecution establishes that the statement was made voluntarily and that the consequent recovery is proved through cogent and trustworthy evidence. Where the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure do not support the prosecution or serious doubts arise regarding the manner in which the memorandum was recorded and the recoveries effected, such evidence cannot safely be made the basis of conviction. 28. In the present case, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses does not inspire confidence regarding the memorandum proceedings. Akash Yadav (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that on 30.12.2020 the police obtained his signatures on four to five documents at the police station without reading over their contents to him and that, in haste, he signed the papers without knowing what had been written therein. PW-4 Ajay Sahu went a step further and categorically stated that no memorandum 16 statement was made by the appellant in his presence and that she was not even interrogated by the police before him. These admissions strike at the very foundation of the prosecution case regarding the voluntary disclosure allegedly made by the appellant. When the attesting witnesses themselves do not support the manner in which the memorandum was recorded and admit that they signed documents without knowing their contents, the evidentiary value of such memorandum becomes highly doubtful. Consequently, the alleged disclosure statement and the recoveries purportedly made pursuant thereto do not inspire confidence and cannot be treated as a reliable incriminating circumstance forming part of the chain of circumstantial evidence. 29. Whether the prosecution has established the circumstance of the deceased having been last seen together with the appellant? 30. The prosecution has sought to rely upon the circumstance that the deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant and that his dead body was subsequently found after being removed from her house. The “last seen together” theory is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence; however, it is equally well settled that such a circumstance must be established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion or possibility cannot substitute proof. Unless the prosecution establishes that the deceased was last seen alive in the exclusive company of the accused within such 17 proximity of time that the possibility of intervention by any other person is completely ruled out, the said circumstance cannot form the basis of conviction. 31. In the present case, no independent witness has deposed that he had seen the deceased entering the house of the appellant on the night of the occurrence or that he remained in her exclusive company immediately prior to his death. On the contrary, the Investigating Officer (PW-14) admitted that the place of occurrence is situated in a thickly populated locality. PW-1 Chandu Yadav, PW-2 Akash Yadav, PW-4 Ajay Sahu and PW-5 Raj Sarathi have also admitted that Sarathi Mohalla is a densely populated residential area. Despite the occurrence having allegedly taken place at about 9.00 p.m. in such a populated locality, the prosecution failed to examine a single independent witness who had seen the deceased entering the appellant’s house or being taken out therefrom. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to establish the foundational fact necessary for invoking the “last seen together” theory. In the absence of reliable evidence proving that the deceased was last seen alive in the exclusive company of the appellant, this important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence remains unproved and cannot be pressed into service against the appellant. 32. Effect of the evidence relating to the physical condition of the deceased and the prosecution version of the occurrence. 18 33. Another circumstance which assumes significance is the evidence relating to the physical build of the deceased. PW-1 Chandu Yadav, the father of the deceased, admitted in his cross- examination that the deceased was physically strong, was habituated to consuming liquor and, even after consuming alcohol, ordinarily did not lose his senses. PW-2 Akash Yadav also supported the aforesaid version by stating that the deceased was a well-built and physically strong person and that the effect of liquor on him was not excessive. PW-4 Ajay Sahu further stated that the deceased was approximately six feet tall, while PW-5 Raj Sarathi also corroborated the fact that the deceased was a hefty and physically robust person. 34. Although the aforesaid evidence by itself cannot lead to an inference that the appellant was incapable of committing the offence, it assumes relevance while appreciating the prosecution case as a whole. According to the prosecution, the appellant, a woman of comparatively smaller stature, single-handedly overpowered the deceased and strangulated him inside her house. However, except the medical evidence proving homicidal death, the prosecution has produced no independent evidence explaining the manner in which such occurrence allegedly took place. Significantly, the postmortem report records multiple abrasions and bite marks suggestive of resistance or a possible scuffle, yet the Investigating Officer admittedly neither collected the nail clippings of the deceased nor those of the appellant for 19 forensic examination. No scientific evidence, such as DNA or other forensic material, was collected to connect the appellant with the alleged struggle. In these circumstances, the prosecution has failed to furnish convincing evidence to establish the manner in which the offence was allegedly committed, thereby leaving another important gap in the chain of circumstantial evidence. 35. Effect of the delay in taking the deceased to the hospital and the conduct of the prosecution witnesses. 36. The evidence adduced by the prosecution further discloses that after the deceased was found lying unconscious, he was not immediately taken to the hospital for medical assistance. PW-1 Chandu Yadav admitted that before informing the emergency services, the family members first massaged the body of the deceased with oil. PW-2 Akash Yadav deposed that after the body was brought home, it remained there for about one to two hours, during this period oil massage was administered and the body was also warmed near a fire before an ambulance was called. PW-4 Ajay Sahu similarly stated that after the body was brought, attempts were made to warm it because it was winter season, thereafter two local doctors were contacted who declined to attend, and only after about one and a half hours was the 112 emergency vehicle summoned. PW-5 Raj Sarathi has substantially corroborated this version. 37. The aforesaid conduct of the prosecution witnesses appears 20 unusual, particularly when, according to them, the deceased was found lying unconscious. Ordinarily, the immediate reaction in such circumstances would be to obtain prompt medical assistance. Instead, the evidence reveals that considerable time was spent in attempting to revive the deceased by oil massage and warming his body before he was taken to the hospital. Though this circumstance alone may not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case, it nevertheless assumes significance while appreciating the entire chain of circumstantial evidence. It introduces an element of uncertainty regarding the sequence of events immediately after the occurrence and further weakens the prosecution case, particularly when no eyewitness account is available and the conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence. 38. Effect of the admitted illegal detention of the appellant and material prosecution witnesses during investigation. 39. Another important circumstance which cannot be overlooked is the manner in which the investigation was conducted. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses themselves reveals that not only the appellant but also several material witnesses were kept at the police station continuously for several days during the course of investigation. PW-2 Akash Yadav admitted that Raj @ Dauwa Sarathi, Ajay Sahu, Ashok Sahu, Raka Sarathi and Gopal Yadav were called to the police station on 29.12.2020 at about 21 9:00 a.m. and were detained there till about 11:30 p.m., and that this practice continued till 31.12.2020. PW-4 Ajay Sahu has substantially reiterated the said fact and further admitted that the appellant remained in the Women’s Cell during this period. PW-5 Raj Sarathi has also supported the prosecution witnesses on this aspect by stating that the appellant remained continuously detained from 28.12.2020 to 31.12.2020 and that the aforesaid witnesses were also kept in the police station for prolonged periods. 40. Such admissions on the part of the prosecution witnesses cast a serious shadow on the fairness and transparency of the investigation. It has also come on record that during the period when the appellant remained in police custody, the police had obtained the keys of her house and visited the premises repeatedly before effecting the alleged recoveries. The cumulative effect of these circumstances renders the prosecution version relating to the memorandum, recoveries and other investigative steps susceptible to doubt. Fair investigation is an integral facet of a fair trial, and where the conduct of the investigating agency itself creates a reasonable apprehension regarding the authenticity of the evidence collected, the Court is required to scrutinize such evidence with greater caution. In the facts of the present case, these circumstances materially dent the credibility of the prosecution case and constitute yet another missing link in the chain of circumstantial evidence sought to be established against 22 the appellant. 41. Whether the cumulative circumstances proved by the prosecution form a complete chain pointing only towards the guilt of the appellant? 42. Having examined each of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution individually, this Court is required to consider whether the cumulative effect of those circumstances forms a complete and unbroken chain leading only to the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant 43. As noticed hereinabove, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. However, the other circumstances relied upon to connect the appellant with the crime do not withstand close judicial scrutiny. The prosecution has failed to establish that the mobile numbers reflected in the call detail records were actually being used by the appellant and the deceased. The alleged recovery of the deceased's mobile phone from the appellant's house is contradicted by the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, who admitted that the mobile phone had earlier been handed over by PW-5 Raj Sarathi to the father of the deceased and thereafter to the police. The alleged recovery of the SIM card is unsupported by any seizure memo, panchnama or reliable evidence regarding the place and manner of its recovery. 44. Further, the memorandum statement under Section 27 of the 23 Indian Evidence Act and the consequential recoveries do not inspire confidence in view of the admissions made by the attesting witnesses that they had signed documents without reading their contents and that no disclosure statement was made in their presence. The prosecution has also failed to establish the "last seen together" circumstance through any independent witness, despite the admitted fact that the locality is a thickly populated area. No scientific or forensic evidence, such as nail clippings, DNA analysis or fingerprints, was collected to connect the appellant with the alleged struggle indicated by the injuries found on the body of the deceased. Moreover, the admitted prolonged detention of the appellant and several prosecution witnesses at the police station during investigation casts a serious doubt on the fairness of the investigation and on the authenticity of the alleged recoveries and statements recorded during that period. 45. In a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, several links remain missing, doubtful or inconsistent. The circumstances proved by the prosecution may create a suspicion against the appellant, but suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. The evidence on record does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellant. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances unerringly pointing towards the 24 guilt of the appellant. 46. Accordingly, Point No. (ii) is answered in favour of the appellant by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who committed the murder of the deceased. 47. It is a settled principle of criminal law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and all such circumstances must form a chain so complete that it leaves no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any link in the chain is found to be missing or doubtful, the benefit thereof must go to the accused. 70. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish: (i) a reliable “last seen” circumstance, (ii) a trustworthy recovery of incriminating articles, (iii) a conclusive forensic link, and (iv) a cogent and compelling motive. 48. Thus, the chain of circumstances is not only incomplete but also suffers from serious infirmities, contradictions, and gaps. 49. In view of the foregoing discussion, although the prosecution has successfully established that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, it has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who committed the offence. The 25 conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is founded on a chain of circumstances which is neither complete nor incapable of any hypothesis other than the guilt of the appellant. Several material circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have remained unproved, while others are rendered doubtful due to material contradictions, procedural lapses and deficiencies in the investigation. 50. It is trite that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution is required to stand on its own legs and prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of every reasonable doubt must necessarily go in favour of the accused. 51. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under Section 302 of the IPC against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. 52. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed. 53. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.10.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Kabirdham (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 23/2021 is hereby set aside. 54. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 55. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), the appellant is directed to furnish a 26 personal bond in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.5,000/- with 2 reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 56. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to transmit the trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment back immediately to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Principal and District Sessions Judge concerned for being communicated to the appellant in jail where she is confined, for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet