- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7944 OF 2026 BETWEEN: SMT. REKHA, W/O. NAGANAGOUDA MARIGOUDR, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/AT SHYABALA TALUK, LAXMESHWAR, GAGAD 582 116. …PETITIONER (BY SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI ARUN NACHAPPA K K, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE BY HARIHARA RURAL POLICE, DAVANAGERE DISTRICT, REP. BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU, BANGALORE 560 001. 2. SRI VACHANANANDA SWAMIJI, S/O DUNDAPPA, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, JAGADGURU OF VEERASHAIVA LINGAYITHA PANCHAMASALI PEETHA, R/OF HARIHARA-SHIVAMOGGA ROAD, HANGAWADI VILLAGE, HARIHARA TALUK, DAVANAGERE DISTRICT 577 601. Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 ALSO AT NO. 108F, MLA LAYOUT, NEAR BUS STOP, BHOOPASANDRA, BENGALURU 560 094. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B N JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1; SRI P H VIRUPAKSHAIAH, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 02.05.2026 PASSED BY THE LD. ADDL.DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC-I DAVANAGERE IN CRL.MISC NO.323/2026 GRANTING ANTICIPATORY BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT NO.2 OFFENCES U/S 4, 6, 8, 10 AND 12 OF THE POCSO ACT (PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A). THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner - complainant in Crime No.83 of 2026, who is the mother of the victim, is before this Court calling in question, the anticipatory bail granted to the respondent No.2 – accused, for the offences punishable under Sections 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act” for short). - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 2. Heard Sri D.R.Ravishankar, learned senior counsel for Sri Arun Nachappa K. K., learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri B N Jagadeesha, State Public Prosecutor - 1 for the respondent No.1 and Sri P H Virupakshaiah, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 3. Since the issue in the lis pertains solely to the grant of anticipatory bail in favour of respondent No.2 - accused, a detailed examination of the facts giving rise to the allegations, does not warrant consideration by this Court. Therefore, it becomes apposite to refer to the impugned order passed by the concerned Court on 02.05.2026, granting anticipatory bail to the respondent No.2. The order reads as follows: “Petitioner has filed this petition under Section 482 of BNSS seeking for an order of anticipatory bail. 2. In the petition it is averred that this petitioner is the Pontiff / Jagadguru of Veerashaiva Lingayatha Panchamasali Peetha 2008 Harihara, Davanagere District, a highly respected spiritual and social leader, actively engaged in religious, educational, and welfare activities for the benefit of entire society and commands the faith and respect of lakhs of followers throughout the state and abroad. The Veerashaiva Lingayata Panchamasali Peetha- 2008 has been established on 18.02.2008 and Veerashaiva Lingayata Panchamasali Peetha 2008, Trust has been registered on 10.04.2008 for administration and supervision of the said Peetha. The first Sthira Jagadguru. Dr. Mahanta Shivacharya Swamiji died on 04.02.2012. The first chara Jagadguru Sri - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 Siddalinga Swamiji was said to be expelled from the Peetha and from the Trust in the year 2015. Then the Trustees have requested this petitioner to take the charge of this peetha as jagadguru and the same is accepted by this petitioner. Then this petitioner is appointed as the Jagadguru of this Veerashaiva Lingayatha Panchamsali Peetha. The petitioner has taken the charge of the Jagadguru Peetha on 24.08.2008. Recently in the month of January 2026, the devotees and the panchamasali community leaders have met the petitioner and discussed about the misappropriation of the amount and the properties and requested to take the lead of Accountability Movement. Hence, the petitioner has taken the lead of Accountability Movement with several community leaders and various devotees of the Peetha. Therefore, there existed dispute in between the petitioner and the Trustees of the Trust. The Trust has conducted a meeting on 13.04.2026 and in the said meeting Trustees have passed the resolution by expelling / terminating this petitioner from the Veerashaiva Lingayatha Panchamsali Peetha -2008, which is illegal, unauthorized, irregular and against the opinion of the Panchmasali community and devotees at large. Then the devotees have conducted a meeting in respect of the misappropriation committed by the Trustees. In that meeting, the resolution has been passed by the devotees and leaders of the communities to retain this petitioner as the Jagadguru of the Peetha and they have requested this petitioner to continue his work. Meanwhile one of the trustee expressed and threatened before the media that they are intending to file POCSO case against this petitioner by instigating the parents of certain minor students who were resided in the matha for their educational purpose. Some of the trustees have met some of the parents of the children and instigated, abetted and forced them to file a false POCSO case against this petitioner. Now, this petitioner reasonably apprehends that the said persons with malafide intention may lodge a false and pseudo complaint such as sexual harassment leading to the apprehension that the petitioner may be arrested at any time. Under such circumstances, this petitioner has genuine, reasonable and imminent apprehension of arrest in respect of a false and motivated complaint, warranting the protection of anticipatory ball. Hence, this petitioner is seeking for anticipatory ball from this Court. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 3. It is further averred in the petition that, this petitioner has actually participated in peaceful democratic protests, demanding reservation for the Lingayath Panchamsali community, due to which certain political interests are allegedly hostile towards him. He has been falsely targeted with a malicious intention to tarnish his reputation and to expel from the Peetha. He is a spiritual leader who has renounced worldly life. This petitioner has deep roots in the society and he is a permanent resident of the aforementioned address and there is no possibility of absconding. He is ready and willing to co-operate with the investigation if any. He will not tamper the prosecution witnesses. If this petitioner is arrested in a false case, his reputation will be tarnished. There is no requirement of custodial interrogation of this petitioner. Hence, prayed for an order of anticipatory bail in respect of any complaint / FIR that may be registered at the instances of the aforesaid trustees or their associates, followers or any children or the parents of the children relating to offences punishable U/s.4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 of the POCSO Act or any other allied provisions. 4. Prosecution contested this petition by filing detailed objection by contending that this petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail for anticipated offences under POCSO Act. These are heinous crimes against children and society. The gravity of such accusations outweighs the personal liberty of the individual. The petitioner is a highly influential Jagadguru with lakhs of followers. If bail is granted, he may tamper the prosecution witnesses or hamper the investigation. Hence, prayed to reject the petition. 5. Heard arguments and perused records as well as the citations relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Now the point for determination is as follows: 1) Whether the petitioner has made out sufficient grounds to grant an order of anticipatory bail by resorting to the special powers vested in his court U/s.482 of BNSS ? 7. On the basis of the materials available on record, finding to the above point is in the Affirmative for the following: - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 -:REASONS:- 8. Point No.1:- I have gone through the entire materials available on record. At the time of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has produced Pralavani Daily News papers dated 24.04.2026 and 28.04.2026. On going through these newspaper reports, prima facle it reveals that, there is a dispute between this petitioner and the devotees on one hand and the trustees of Panchamasali Gurupeeta on the other hand. Further it revelas that one of the trustee has stated that this petitioner has to go out of the Peetha as early as possible. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also produced the colour Xerox copy of social media post by one of the trustee. This social media post reveals that, one of the trustee has stated that, this petitioner is the lover of massaj and there is necessity of filing POCSO case. Under such circumstances. it reveals that there is a prima facie case for grant of anticipatory bail. 9. No doubt, so far case is not registered against this petitioner. But, the registration of FIR is not a condition precedent for grant of anticipatory bail. Apprehension in the mind of the petitioner itself is sufficient for grant of anticipatory bail. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments: 1) Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.2271/2010 (Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre V/s State of Maharashtra and Others) 2) Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia V/s State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1632. 10. In the first Judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under Section 438 of CrPC." 11. In the same judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 12. In the judgment of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia V/s State of Punjab reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1632, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- "It is of paramount consideration to remember that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purpose of the Individual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail. 13. In the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held as follows: "The filing of First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an FIR is not yet filed." 14. On going through the newspaper reports and social media posts, prima facie it reveals that, this petitioner is apprehending his arrest in the POCSO case yet to be filed. It is not in dispute that, this petitioner is the permanent resident of the address mentioned in the case title. There is no criminal antecedents. He is ready to co-operate for investigation. He is ready to abide by the conditions that may be imposed by this Court. Under such circumstances, reasonable conditions will meet the objection of the prosecution. Hence, aforesaid point is answered in the affirmative and proceed to pass the following: -ORDER:- Bail petition filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of BNSS is hereby allowed. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 In the event of arrest of this petitioner, in respect of any complaint / FIR, that may be registered at the instances of the Trustees or their associates, followers or any children or parents of the children, for the offences punishable under Section 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 of the POCSO Act or any other allied provisions, he shall be released on bail on his executing personal bond in a sum of 1,00,000/- with one surety for like sum on the following conditions: 1. If case is registered, he shall cooperate for Investigation. 2. He shall appear before the Investigating Officer or the court as and when directed to do so. 3. He shall not tamper the prosecution witnesses.” (Emphasis added) 4. Challenging the afore-quoted order, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that, in a case involving offences under the POCSO Act, the concerned Court could not have granted an anticipatory bail to the respondent No.2 – accused, that too before the registration of a complaint. Further, the concerned Court has granted a blanket anticipatory bail to the respondent No.2 – accused, extending not only to the cases to be instituted by the petitioner, but also to any cases that may be registered by the trustees, associates, followers, children, or the parents of such children, in respect of - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 the offences punishable under Sections 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 of the POCSO Act or any other allied provisions. 5. The afore-quoted order necessitated the issuance of a notice to the respondent No.2 by this Court, on 16.06.2026, since the allegations in the case at hand were heinous in nature, as they involved offences under the POCSO Act. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 – accused would now submit that, the police after investigation have filed a charge sheet and therefore, the anticipatory bail granted by the concerned Court, cannot be set aside by this Court. Though in law once an anticipatory bail is granted, it would run even after filing of the charge sheet, the present case deserves interference at the hands of this Court. This Court is not examining whether filing of the charge sheet would obliterate the anticipatory bail granted. No, it is not. The manner in which the anticipatory bail is granted, is what troubles this Court, as one week prior to the registration of the complaint itself, an anticipatory bail was granted for the offences punishable under the POCSO Act. - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 7. At this juncture, I deem it appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SUMITHA PRADEEP v. ARUN KUMAR C.K.1, wherein the Apex Court while cancelling the anticipatory bail granted to the accused, in a case involving offences under the POCSO Act, inter alia, observes as follows: “…….. …….. …….. 8. In our considered opinion, the observations made in para 9 of the impugned order [X v. State of Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 5620] are totally unwarranted and have been made overlooking the specific allegations contained in the FIR, duly supported with the statement of the victim girl child under Section 164 of the Code. 9. In a case containing such serious allegations, the High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction in granting protection against arrest, as the investigating officer deserves freehand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion. It goes without saying that appearance before the investigating officer who, has been prevented from subjecting Respondent 1 to custodial interrogation, can hardly be fruitful to find out the prima facie substance in the allegations, which are of extreme serious in nature. The fact that the victim girl is traumatised to such a high degree that her academic pursuits have been adversely impacted alone, coupled with the legislative intent especially reflected through Section 29 of the Pocso Act, are sufficient to dissuade a court from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in granting pre-arrest bail. 1 (2022) 17 SCC 391 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 10. It may be true, as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1, that the charge- sheet has already been filed. It will be unfair to presume on our part that the investigating officer does not require Respondent 1 for custodial interrogation for the purpose of further investigation. 11. Be that as it may, even assuming it a case where Respondent 1 is not required for custodial interrogation, we are satisfied that the High Court ought not to have granted discretionary relief of anticipatory bail. 12. We are dealing with a matter wherein the original complainant (appellant herein) has come before this Court praying that the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court to the accused should be cancelled. To put it in other words, the complainant says that the High Court wrongly exercised its discretion while granting anticipatory bail to the accused in a very serious crime like Pocso and, therefore, the order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to the accused should be quashed and set aside. In many anticipatory bail matters, we have noticed one common argument being canvassed that no custodial interrogation is required and, therefore, anticipatory bail may be granted. There appears to be a serious misconception of law that if no case for custodial interrogation is made out by the prosecution, then that alone would be a good ground to grant anticipatory bail. Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail. There may be many cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required, but that does not mean that the prima facie case against the accused should be ignored or overlooked and he should be granted anticipatory bail. The first and foremost thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment. Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail. 13. Before we close this matter one more clarification is necessary. We have referred to the decision of the Kerala High Court rendered in Joy [Joy V.S. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 783 : (2019) 1 KLT 935] . The case of Joy [Joy V.S. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 783 : (2019) 1 KLT 935] deals with Section 29 of the Pocso Act. When the learned Judge decided the anticipatory bail application, the decision of the coordinate Bench in Joy [Joy V.S. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 783 : (2019) 1 KLT 935] was binding to him. He could not have ignored a binding decision. It is a different thing to say that if he may disagree with the view taken and accordingly refer it to a larger Bench. However, without looking into the dictum as laid in Joy [Joy V.S. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 783 : (2019) 1 KLT 935] , the observations made by the High Court in para 9 of its impugned order [X v. State of Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 5620] referred to above could be said to be absolutely unwarranted and not one befitting a High Court.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court observes that, the first and foremost consideration for a Court dealing with an application for anticipatory bail, is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the accused. Thereafter, the Court must consider the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment prescribed. In addition to taking into account the trauma suffered by the victim, the Apex Court in the afore-quoted case, also notes that the legislative intent underlying Section 29 of the POCSO Act, is sufficient to dissuade the Court - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction for granting an anticipatory bail. 8. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of X v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA2, while cancelling the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court, to the accused in a case of rape, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the victim, observes that, the victim has a right to be heard at the time of grant of bail and such a right cannot be whittled down. The Apex Court observes as follows: “…….. …….. …….. 20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. As can be gathered from a perusal of the impugned order, the primary ground that had persuaded the High Court to grant interim protection to the respondent No. 2/accused is that the appellant/prosecutrix tried to improve her version of the incident from what was first recorded in the FIR in the early hours of 06th August, 2022, by levelling additional allegations in her first Supplementary Statement recorded in the evening on the very same date and in the second Supplementary Statement recorded after one month, on 06th September, 2022. In the words of the High Court, there were “star variations in the narration of the prosecutrix….”. The aforesaid observation has been reiterated in the second impugned order and noting the fact that the respondent No. 2/accused had reported to the investigating officer, his medical examination had been conducted and the mobile phone had been seized, the interim order passed earlier, was made absolute16. 2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 279 - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 21. We propose to take a quick look at the considerations that ought to govern grant of anticipatory bail. There are a line of decisions of this court that have underscored the fact that while deciding an application for bail, the court ought to refrain from undertaking a detailed analysis of the evidence, the focus being on the prima facie issues including consideration of some reasonable grounds that would go to show if the accused has committed the offence or those facts that would reflect on the seriousness of the offence. The self-imposed restraint on delving deep into the analysis of the evidence at that stage is for valid reasons, namely, to prevent any prejudice to the case set up by the prosecution or the defence likely to be taken by the accused and to keep all aspects of the matter open till the trial is concluded. 22. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court had highlighted the factors that ought to be borne in mind while considering the anticipatory bail application and had stated that:— “9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. [See State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi17, Prahlad Singh Bhat v. NCT, Delhi18 and Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh19]” 23. In Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh20, speaking for the Division Bench, Justice D.K. Jain observed that courts ought to refrain from mechanically granting bail and absence of relevant considerations will make such an order susceptible to interference. Para 13 of the said order is relevant and is reproduced herein below:— “13. ……Though at the stage of granting bail an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. (See also State of Maharashtra v. Ritesh21, Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra22, Vijay Kumar v. Narendra23 and Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad24)” [Also refer : Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh25; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT Of Delhi)26 and Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar Alias Polia27] 24. Stressing on the necessity to look into the earlier orders where the bail applications of the accused have been rejected, this Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav28 held thus:— “12. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail should be granted.” 25. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)29, a Constitution Bench comprising of five Judges was confronted with conflicting views of different Benches of varying strength on the following two questions framed for consideration:— “(i) Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the trial court and seek regular bail. (ii) Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court.” 26. After an extensive discussion, the Constitution Bench distilled the Law and answered the above reference in para 91 in the following words:— “91.1. Regarding Question 1, this Court holds that the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it should enure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc. 91.2. As regards the second question referred to this Court, it is held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.” 27. In the light of the answers given to the Reference, the Constitution Bench went on to clarify the factors that would be required to be kept in mind while dealing - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 with applications moved under Section 438 CrPC and observed that:— “92.3. Nothing in Section 438 CrPC, compels or obliges courts to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc. While considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc…… 92.4. Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the court. xxxx xxxx xxxx 92.6. An order of anticipatory bail should not be “blanket” in the sense that it should not enable the accused to commit further offences and claim relief of indefinite protection from arrest. It should be confined to the offence or incident, for which apprehension of arrest is sought, in relation to a specific incident. It cannot operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission of an offence.” [emphasis added] 28. In Myakala Dharmarajam v. State of Telangana30, holding that the Appellate Court or a superior Court can set aside an order granting bail if the concerned Court that granted bail, failed to consider the relevant factors, this Court observed that:— - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 “9. It is trite law that cancellation of bail can be done in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court granting bail ignores relevant material indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused, the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in cancelling the bail.” 29. The aforesaid view has been reiterated in Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra31 30. In Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand32 called upon to deal with a situation where an accused had been bailed out in a criminal case in which new offences were added subsequently and a question arose as to whether it would be necessary to cancel the bail granted earlier for taking the accused in custody, a Division Bench of this Court took pains to examine the view taken by several High Courts including the High Courts of Rajasthan, Madras, Allahabad and Jammu and Kashmir as also the observations made by this Court in previous decisions on this aspect and held thus:— “31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we arrive at the following conclusions in respect of a circumstance where after grant of bail to an accused, further cognizable and non-bailable offences are added: 31.1. The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested. 31.2. The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC for arrest of the accused and his custody. 31.3[Ed. : Para 31.3 corrected vide Official Letter dated 31-7-2020.]. The court, in exercise of power under Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The court in exercise of power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non- bailable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail. 31.4. In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the court which had granted the bail.” 31. As can be discerned from the observations made in Pradeep Ram (supra), addition of a serious offence can be a circumstance where a Court can direct that the accused be arrested and committed to custody even though an order of bail was earlier granted in his favour in respect of the offences with which he was charged when his application for bail was considered and a favourable order was passed. The recourse available to an accused in a situation where after grant of bail, further cognizable and non-bailable offences are added to the FIR, is for him to surrender and apply afresh for bail in respect of the newly added offences. The investigating agency is also entitled to move the Court for seeking the custody of the accused by invoking the provisions of 437(5)33 and 439(2)34 Cr. P.C., falling under Chapter XXXIIII of the Statute that deals with provisions relating to bails and bonds. On such an application being moved, the Court that may have released the accused on bail or the Appellate Court/superior Court in exercise of special powers conferred on it, can direct a person who has been released on bail earlier, to be arrested and taken into custody. 32. Coming back to the facts of the instant case, it is not in dispute that when the respondent No. 2/accused moved an application for bail35 before the learned ACMM on 6th August, 2022, the offences mentioned in the FIR were under Sections 354, 354-B and 506 IPC. Bail was granted to him on the same day primarily on the ground of non- compliance of Section 41-A CrPC. Subsequently, the offence under Section 376 IPC was added to the same FIR and the crime was escalated to offences under Sections 376, 354, 354-B and 506(2) of IPC. On this turn of events, the State moved an application seeking cancellation - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 of bail36 granted to the respondent No. 2/accused stating inter alia that initially, he was charged under Sections 354, 354-B and 506 IPC, but, during the course of recording the statement of the appellant/prosecutrix, the allegations levelled made out an offence under Section 376 which had to be added to the subject FIR and therefore, the bail granted in his favour needed to be cancelled and he was required to be taken into custody. The said application was allowed by the learned ACMM vide order dated 23rd August, 2022. This made the respondent No. 2/accused approach the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Borivalli seeking anticipatory bail. By a well-reasoned order, the said application was rejected and the plea taken by him that he was a victim of honeytrap, was disbelieved. The contention of the respondent No. 2/accused that the appellant/prosecutrix had been improving her version in the supplementary statements37 was also considered and rejected and it was observed that even if the said statements were to be overlooked, there was sufficient prima facie material in the FIR to have made out an offence under Section 376, IPC. 33. Surprisingly, none of the aforesaid aspects have been touched upon in both the impugned orders. The nature and gravity of the alleged offence has been disregarded. So has the financial stature, position and standing of the accused vis-à-vis the appellant/prosecutrix been ignored. The High Court has granted anticipatory bail in favour of the respondent No. 2/accused in a brief order of three paragraphs, having been swayed by the “star variations in the narration of the prosecutrix” implying thereby that what was originally recorded in the FIR, did not make out an offence of rape, as defined in Section 375 IPC, which is an erroneous assumption. Even if the first Supplementary statement of the appellant/prosecutrix recorded in the evening hours of 6th August, 2022, the date on which the FIR had been registered against the respondent No. 2/accused in the first half of the same day, her second Supplementary statement recorded on 6th September, 2022 and the Medico-Legal Report of the doctor who had examined the appellant/prosecutrix on 8th August, 2022, are kept aside for a moment, we find that there was still sufficient material in the FIR that would prima facie attract the provision of Section 376, IPC. In our opinion, these factors ought to have dissuaded the High Court from - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent No. 2/accused for granting him anticipatory bail. 34. Another reason that has weighed with this Court for interfering in the impugned orders is that despite the appellant/prosecutrix having filed an application for intervention38 in the petition for anticipatory bail moved by the respondent No. 2/accused before the High Court, she was not afforded a hearing. At least a perusal of the second impugned order does not reflect the said position. No doubt, the State was present and was represented in the said proceedings, but the right of the prosecutrix could not have been whittled down for this reason alone. In a crime of this nature where ordinarily, there is no other witness except for the prosecutrix herself, it was all the more incumbent for the High Court to have lent its ear to the appellant. 35. Our view is in line with the observations made by a three-Judges Bench of this Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra Alias Monu39 wherein speaking for the Bench, Justice Suryakant made the following pertinent observations relating to the victim's right to be heard and alluding to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its 154th Report that highlighted “the right of the victim or his/her legal representative to be impleaded as a party in every criminal proceedings where the charges are punishable with 7 years' imprisonment or more”, observed thus: “19. It was further recommended that the victim be armed with a right to be represented by an advocate of his/her choice, and if he/she is not in a position to afford the same, to provide an advocate at the State's expense. The victim's right to participate in criminal trial and his/her right to know the status of investigation, and take necessary steps, or to be heard at every crucial stage of the criminal proceedings, including at the time of grant or cancellation of bail, were also duly recognised by the Committee. Repeated judicial intervention, coupled with the recommendations made from time to time as briefly noticed above, prompted Parliament to bring into force the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008, which not only inserted the definition of a “victim” under Section 2(wa) but also - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 statutorily recognised various rights of such victims at different stages of trial. 20. It is pertinent to mention that the legislature has thoughtfully given a wide and expansive meaning to the expression “victim” which “means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir”. 36. It must be remembered that in the present case, the machinery of criminal justice has been set into motion by none other than the appellant/prosecutrix herself. She was the one who had dialled ‘100’ number from the reception area of the Hotel where the crime had allegedly taken place. She was the one who had approached senior officers in the police hierarchy complaining of the apathy and inertia adopted by the investigating officers in her case. Notably, she had moved an intervention application in the anticipatory bail application moved by the respondent No. 2/accused before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and as is reflected from the order passed, her counsel was granted a hearing whereafter the said application was rejected. However, when a similar application for intervention40 was moved by the appellant/prosecutrix before the High Court in the anticipatory bail application moved by the respondent No. 2/accused, it appears that heed was not paid to the pleas taken by her though her counsel's presence does find mention in the order sheet. We are constrained to note that such an approach tantamounts to failure to recognize the right of the prosecutrix to participate in the criminal proceedings that would include a right to oppose the application for anticipatory bail moved by the accused. The appellant/prosecutrix having been denied a meaningful hearing when the first impugned order of anticipatory bail granted in favour of the respondent No. 2/accused was confirmed by the second impugned order, is an additional factor that has prevailed with this Court to interfere in the impugned orders.” (Emphasis supplied) - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 Further, the Apex Court in the afore-quoted case observes that, the High Court while granting the anticipatory bail to the accused therein, disregarded the nature and gravity of the offence and also the financial stature, position and standing of the accused. 9. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the nature of the offences alleged, and the manner in which the anticipatory bail has been granted, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, it warrants the obliteration of the impugned order, and the mere filing of the charge sheet does not bar this Court from cancelling the anticipatory bail so granted. 10. In that light, the impugned order passed by the concerned Court on 02.05.2026 granting anticipatory bail to the respondent No.2 – accused is set aside, reserving liberty to the respondent No.2 – accused to knock at the doors of the appropriate Court seeking regular bail. 11. Since the anticipatory bail is in subsistence today, I deem it appropriate to extend the same for a period of three - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31845 CRL.P No. 7944 of 2026 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, with a direction to the concerned Court that as and when respondent No.2 – accused would file the application seeking regular bail, it shall be considered on its merit and decided expeditiously, without being influenced by the observations made in the course of this order. With the aforesaid observations, this petition stands disposed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE NVJ List No.: 2 Sl No.: 5