2026:HHC:41035 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4250 of 2013 Reserved on: 15.09.2013 Date of Decision: 24.09.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Tarsem Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr. Vinod Thakur, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 04.06.2013, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.02.2007, passed by the learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were set aside and the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the charged 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:41035 offence. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. It was asserted that ASI Yograj (PW-7), ASI Hem Raj, HC Madan Lal (PW-1), and Constable Sushil Kumar were going towards Hadsar on 28.05.2003 in an official vehicle being driven by Constable Shiv Charan Singh. They found a Mahindra Jeep bearing registration No. HP-54-2388 parked at Basantpur at about 10:00 PM. One person was standing outside the vehicle, and another was sitting on the driver's seat. The police became suspicious and checked the Mahindra Jeep. 3. The police found 58 boxes of country liquor bearing the brand Patiala Orange, each containing 12 pouches having 750 ml of country liquor, and 5 boxes of Thunderbolt beer, each containing 650 ml of beer. The driver identified himself as 3 2026:HHC:41035 Ravinder Singh, and the person standing outside revealed his name as Tarsem Singh. The police demanded documents for transporting the liquor, but they could not produce any permit. The police took out one pouch each from 10 boxes of country liquor and one bottle each from 5 bottles of beer for chemical analysis. 10 pouches were put in a cloth parcel. The parcel and 5 bottles were sealed with seal 'A' on the spot. The boxes and samples were seized vide memo (Ext. PW-1/A). 4. ASI Yograj prepared the rukka (Ext. PW-7/B) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW-3/A) was registered. ASI Yograj investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-7/C) and recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their versions. The case property was handed over to HC Rakesh Kumar (PW-4), who deposited them in the Malkhana. He handed over the sample pouches and bottles to HHC Dev Raj (PW-5) with a direction to carry them to CTL Kandaghat for chemical analysis vide RC No. 66 of 2003. HHC Dev Raj deposited all the samples at CTL Kandaghat and handed over the receipt to the MHC on return. The results of the analysis (Ext.PW-6/A to Ext.PW-6/E) were issued, in which it was mentioned that the samples of beer contained 6.97% v/v and samples of country 4 2026:HHC:41035 liquor contained 50% proof alcohol each. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 5. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. HC Madan Lal (PW-1) is the witness to the recovery of the liquor. Dilbag Singh (PW-2) witnessed the recovery of the driving licence. SI Daya Nand (PW-3) signed the FIR. HC Rakesh Kumar (PW-4) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. HHC Dev Raj (PW-5) carried the samples to CTL Kandaghat. ASI Surender Thakur (PW-6) prepared the challan. ASI Yograj (PW-7) investigated the matter. 7. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure denied the 5 2026:HHC:41035 prosecution case in its entirety. The accused Tarsem Singh claimed that a false case was made against him because of enmity. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 8. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on material particulars. The police had recovered the liquor without any prior information, and no independent witness could have been associated in the present case. The testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded merely because they happened to be official witnesses. The cross-examination of the witnesses did not show that the police officials had any motive to depose against the accused. The integrity of the case property was proved. The accused had failed to produce any permit to transport the liquor. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, and sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each, pay a fine of ₹2,000/- each, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for one month each for the commission of the aforesaid offence. 6 2026:HHC:41035 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the statements of official witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The case property did not bear any seal or the FIR number. Some of the pouches were empty. The incident had taken place on a public highway/State highway, and it was possible to associate independent witnesses; however, no independent witness was associated. The learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The incident had taken place at a secluded place, and no independent witness could have been present. The samples were sent to the CTL, Kandaghat, and they were found to be country liquor and beer after the analysis. Hence, the mere fact that the case property was not bearing any 7 2026:HHC:41035 seal was not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, and Mr Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent-accused. 12. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The incident had taken place at a secluded place. The police had no prior information, and it was a case of chance recovery; therefore, it was not possible to associate any independent witness. The absence of the seal on the case property could not have been used to discard the prosecution case because the police had sent the samples to CTL Kandaghat, which were found to be liquor and beer after the analysis. The learned Appellate Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 8 2026:HHC:41035 13. Mr Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent-accused, submitted that the prosecution is required to prove the recovery of the pouches and the bottles, which could have been done by producing the case property before the Court. There were no seals on the boxes even though the recovered boxes were sealed on the spot. The incident had taken place on a State highway as the police were proceeding in a vehicle. It is inconceivable that no vehicle would have crossed the spot during the investigation. The learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with it. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: 9 2026:HHC:41035 Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein 10 2026:HHC:41035 one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the 11 2026:HHC:41035 power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. HC Madan Lal (PW-1) stated in his cross-examination that the place of incident fell within the jurisdiction of Jawali on a State Highway and many vehicles use the highway. He remained 12 2026:HHC:41035 on the spot for 1/½ to 2 hours, but did not notice how many vehicles had crossed the spot. 18. ASI Yograj (PW-7) stated that the place of incident fell within the jurisdiction of Kehrian Panchayat. He denied that many vehicles use the road on which the incident had taken place. He stated that no vehicle had crossed during the investigation. 19. It is apparent from the statements of these witnesses that they have made different statements regarding the place of the incident. HC Madan Lal stated that the place of incident was located in Jawali, whereas ASI Yograj stated that the place of incident was located within the jurisdiction of Kehrian Panchayat. HC Madan Lal stated that the place of incident was located on a State highway and many vehicles used the road, whereas ASI Yograj denied that many vehicles used the road. Thus, it is difficult to conclude from these statements that they are deposing about the same place. Any discrepancy in the place of incident is closely connected to the recovery, and the benefit of the discrepancy has to be given to the accused. 13 2026:HHC:41035 20. HC Madan Lal (PW-1) stated that ASI Yograj had counted the bottles and the pouches. ASI Yograj (PW-7) stated that the police officials with him had counted the bottles and the pouches. Thus, the witnesses are not sure about the person who had counted the bottles. 21. HC Madan Lal (PW-1) stated that 5-7 pouches were empty. ASI Yograj (PW-7) stated that the case property did not have any identification slip or the seal, and many pouches were empty. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the identification of the case property was not proper, and it was doubtful that the bottles and pouches recovered on the spot were produced before the Court. It was laid down by this Court in Amandeep Singh & Ors. Vs State of HP, 2010 (3) Shim LC 39, that when the case property was not produced before the Court, the conviction of the accused cannot be recorded. It was observed:- 9…So far as the statement of PW1 Chaman Lal is concerned, no sample of liquor or any seal of the seized liquor has been produced and proved in Court. The bottles from which the samples were taken have also not been proved in Court. Learned trial Court, as also the Appellate Court, had presumed as a matter of fact that what the witnesses had stated was the correct state of affairs without considering that facts were to be proved from documents which admittedly existed but were not produced in Court. There is no presumption in law that 14 2026:HHC:41035 oral evidence can override documentary proof. The existence of a seal can be proved by its production. The Court cannot presume that the sample was kept in safe custody, more especially when such a fact is established by a written document, namely register (s) and certificate in Register No. 21, which is not produced. What the prosecution tried to prove remains unclear. Merely saying that liquor was seized is insufficient without establishing its quantity and safekeeping.” 22. While dealing with the case of non-production of case property in forest case, It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2019) 4 SCC 182: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 39: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 359that when the seized wood and the vehicle were not produced, and only one sample was produced, the accused could not have been convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 379 of the IPC and Section 42 of the Forest Act. It was observed at page 183: - “4. We have heard the learned counsel for the respondent in opposition to the appeal and considered the nature of the evidence available. Non-production of the seized wood and the vehicle, the primary evidence of the offence, renders the prosecution's case fragile and unsustainable. Mere production of the seizure memo does not tantamount to the production of the seized wood and the lorry. Unless the seized wood was produced, mere production of a sample, and there is no material in support that the sample was out of the same 22 logs, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellants.” 15 2026:HHC:41035 23. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case due to the non-production of the case property. 24. HC Rakesh Kumar (PW-4) stated that ASI Yograj handed over 58 boxes of country liquor, 5 boxes of beer, and one parcel containing sample pouches and sample beers. He sent the sample liquor and bottled beers for chemical analysis to CTL Kandaghat through HHC Dev Raj. 25. HHC Dev Raj (PW-5) stated that MHC Rakesh Kumar handed over one parcel to him, stated to be containing 10 pouches of Patiala Orange sealed with seal 'A' and 5 bottles of beer Thunderbolt sealed with seal 'A', with a direction to carry them to CTL Kandaghat vide RC No. 66 of 2003. He deposited all the articles in safe condition at CTL Kandaghat. 26. Both the witnesses have not stated that any sample seals were handed over to them or that any sample seal was sent to CTL Kandaghat. Therefore, the report of the analysis, stating that the sample seal on the pouches and bottles was compared with the specimen seal sent separately, becomes doubtful. 16 2026:HHC:41035 27. It was laid down by this Court in Kishan Chand & Another Vs. State 2009 (2) HLJ 925 that where the person carrying the case property did not say anything about the carrying of the sample seal, link evidence is missing. The endorsement made by CTL Kandaghat in these circumstances that seal impressions were compared with the sample seal will lose their significance. It was observed:- “6. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused were in possession of an incriminating article or an offensive material before they are convicted for keeping in possession the contraband or the offensive material. From its recovery and taking samples, the chain of evidence until the samples are analysed in the laboratory should be complete. In case of breach of the chain of evidence, it gives rise to a reasonable doubt that the samples were tampered with, to the benefit of which goes to the accused. 7. In the instant case, PW-6 A.S.I. Churamani, however, did not state about the deposit of the case property in the Malkhana. But PW-5 MHC Hukam Singh stated that on 19.6.2000 A.S.I. Churamani had deposited the case property sealed with seal impression 'N' in the Malkhana with him. But he nowhere stated that the sample of the seal was also deposited with him in the Malkhana. Even the extract of the Malkhana Register was not placed and proved on record. Thus, it cannot be said that the sample of the seal was also deposited in the Malkhana with him along with the case property. Even PW-2 constable Rajinder Kumar also did not say anything about handing over the sample of the seal to him when he had taken the samples for examination to C.T.L. Kandaghat. The copy of R.C. No.55/2000, vide which he 17 2026:HHC:41035 took the sample for analysis, has also not been placed and proved on record. Had it been there, it could have thrown some light on this aspect of the matter, whether the sample of the seal was also entrusted to him, which was further handed over by him to the person who received the samples in the laboratory, for its comparison with the seal found on samples sent for analysis. 8. The lithographic impression on the report Ext. PW-4/A, of course, shows that seals on the samples were found intact and unbroken and tallied with the impression seal sent separately, but it loses its importance in view of the fact that no witness has stated to have either deposited the sample seal along with case property in the Malkhana or sent it separately to the Laboratory when the samples were taken for analysis. Then how the sample of the seal could be available in the Laboratory for its comparison? The lithographic stamp is mechanically put on the report. 9. Further, the case of the prosecution is that the seal, after its use, was given to PW-1 Ravinder Kumar, but he did not say that the seal was ever entrusted to him. Thus, where the seal used on the samples is not known, in these circumstances a substantial doubt has arisen, and the prosecution could not exclude the possibility of tampering with the samples. Thus, the link evidence in the instant case is found missing. There is no evidence on record regarding the entrustment of seal and no entry in the R.C. and Malkhana register; therefore, reasonable doubt is cast on the probity of the prosecution case, which fact was lost sight of by the courts below. Therefore, in these circumstances, the benefit of the doubt should have been given to the petitioners.” 28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Rakesh Kumar 2018 (1) HLJ 73wherein it was held: - 18 2026:HHC:41035 “7. Interestingly, there is no mention, if any, regarding the handing over of the seal by this witness to CTL Kandaghat, for comparison. It has come in his statement that he had taken samples, but he has not stated that a specimen seal was also given to him for depositing in CTL Kandaghat. Samples were sent to CTL Kandaghat through Jai Singh (PW- 6), who simply deposed that he had sent samples through PW-5 DurgaDutt. Interestingly, he nowhere stated that the specimen seal impression was also sent separately for chemical analysis. 18. True it is that reports of CTL, Ext. PW-7/G to Ext. PW- 7/K show that the specimen seal impression allegedly separately sent, tallied with the seal impressions on the samples; however, link evidence is missing as to how the specimen seal impression reached the chemical analyst. Similarly, it emerges from the record that there is no mention, if any, in the Challan with regard to sending of specimen seal to CTL Kandaghat. This certainly creates doubt with regard to the genuineness of the prosecution case. 19. This Court, in a case titled State of H.P. vs. Pankaj Sood, Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 727, has held that in such a case, by no stretch of the imagination, it can be presumed that the samples were sent along with the sample seal for comparison, and it was held that the prosecution case was doubtful on this count. It was further held by this Court in the aforesaid case that the prosecution is obliged to prove that the article recovered from the possession of the accused is contraband within the meaning of the Act. For that, from the time of recovery till the examination of the samples, the link is required to be completely proved. Seals used on the samples must be intact and unbroken, and the said seals should tally with the sample of the seal taken separately at the time of sampling by the Investigating Officer to overrule every possibility of tampering with the contents of the samples.” 19 2026:HHC:41035 29. Similar is the judgment in Jagdev Singh v. State of H.P., 2015 SCC OnLine HP 2520wherein it was observed: 36. Thus, there is no link evidence establishing the factum of receipt of the sample from the doctor till such time it was handed over to the police official who got it deposited in the laboratory. Whether it was kept in safe custody and not tampered with remains unproven on record. 37. The SHO/Investigating Officer has not deposed that the sample was deposited in the police station. Where the sample was kept between the 13thand 17th June 2009 remains unexplained on record. Also, seal-H with which the alleged sample was sealed has not been produced in Court. Crucially and significantly, even the Road Certificate has not been produced on record, which would have only thrown light as to with whom and where the sample was kept at the police station. 38.No doubt MLC (Ext.PW-6/G) records the sample to be that of Jagdev (accused), but then the Doctor does not specifically state that the sample was sealed. All that he states is that the sample was handed over to the police in a sealed bag. But then who sealed the same and with which seal, he does not state, and Constable Roshan Lal (PW-5) is also silent about the same. In fact, he is silent about the seal impression. As already observed, ASI Om Prakash and HC Nup Ram are silent with regard to the sample, much less sealing thereof. It is in this backdrop that it was necessary for the prosecution to have produced the original seal or impression thereof, with which the sample was sealed, for it cannot be said with certainty that the sample was not tampered with. 20 2026:HHC:41035 30. Therefore, the report of analysis could not have been used to conclude that the bottles and pouches contained country liquor and beer in them. 31. Thus, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused, even if another view is possible. 32. No other point was urged. 33. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 34. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on 21 2026:HHC:41035 receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th September, 2026 (Chander)