[2026:RJ-JP:16357] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1494/2026 Smt. Shashi Sahu W/o Shri Sampatraj Sahu, R/o 81, Rajnivas, Teliyan Chaupad, Near Radhakrishna Mandir, Beawar, District Beawar. ----Appellant/Plaintiff Versus 1 Smt. Jashoda Sharma W/o Shri Devendra Kumar Sharma, R/o 120, Saravgi Mohalla, Chipa Gali, Beawar District Beawar, Rajasthan. 2 Tarun Sharma S/o Shri Devendra Kumar Sharma, R/o 120, Saravgi Mohalla, Chipa Gali, Beawar District Beawar, Rajasthan. 3 Varun Sharma S/o Shri Devendra Kumar Sharma, R/o 120, Saravgi Mohalla, Chipa Gali, Beawar District Beawar, Rajasthan. 4 Mahendra Kumar Sharma S/o Shri Surendra Kumar Sharma, R/o Saravgi Mohalla, Beawar. Presently Residing At House No. 4/34, Pratap Colony, Near Sabji Mandi, Beawar District Beawar, Anohter Residence Mahendra Kumar Sharma S/o Shri Surenra Kumar Sharma C/o Deepak Mishthan Bhandar, Near Rohit Shoe And Fancy Store, Medical Dispensary, Saroth Chauraha, Devata, Jawaja, District Beawar. 5 Jitendra Sharma S/o Shri Surendra Kumar Sharma, R/o Saravgi Mohalla, Beawar. Presently Residing At House No. 34/4, Shyamsidh Pratap Colony, Beawar District Beawar. 6 Arun Kumar Mootha, S/o Late Shri Parasmal, R/o Girdavar Gali, Naya Baas, Beawar, District Beawar. 7 Partnership Firm M/s Navkar Developers, Beawar Through Partner Shri Neeraj Lodha S/o Shri Devraj Ji, R/o Fatehnagar Colony, Mewari Gate Outer, Beawar District Beawar. 8 Navkar Mahima Developers, Llp Beawar, Registered Partnership Firm Through Authorized Partner Devraj Lodha S/o Shri Jugraj Ji Lodha, R/o Fatehnagar Colony, Mewari Gate Outer, Beawar District Beawar. ----Respondents/Defendants [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (2 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] 9 Sub-Registrar, Beawar. 10 Tehsildar, Beawar. 11 State Of Rajasthan, Through District Collector, Beawar. ----Performa Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Naman Pareek For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit Singh Shekhawat Ms. Suruchi Kasliwal HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA Judgment Reportable Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 08.04.2026 Date on which the judgment was reserved 08.04.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced Full Judgment Date of pronouncement 18.04.2026 1. The present civil misc. appeal has been filed assailing the order dated 27.01.2026, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.3, Beawar, District-Beawar, in Civil Misc. Application No.104/2025, whereby the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff-appellant has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for specific performance against the defendants- respondents, contending therein that the land belonging to defendant Nos. 1 to 5 is their khatedari land situated in the Revenue Village Naya Nagar, Tehsil Beawar. The defendants- respondents assured the plaintiff-appellant that the land in dispute was free from all encumbrances and that they had complete rights to transfer the same. [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (3 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] 2.1 On the basis of these assurances, it was agreed that the plaintiff-appellant would purchase the land at the rate of Rs. 1,20,00,000/- per bigha, and an agreement to sell was executed on 26.07.2021, which was notarized by Notary Public Ganga Agrawal, Advocate. Under the said agreement, an advance payment of Rs. 21,00,000/- was received by the defendants- respondents, out of which Rs. 4,00,000/- was paid in cash and Rs. 17,00,000/- was paid through various cheques. 2.2 As per the agreement, the period for performance was fixed as 12 months. During this period, it was incumbent upon the defendants-respondents to get the land demarcated through the Revenue Officer in the presence of the plaintiff-appellant to his satisfaction. It was also agreed that the period of the agreement would commence from the date of completion of demarcation at the site. Further, it was agreed that in case any dispute arises regarding the way to the disputed land, the responsibility to resolve the same would lie with the defendants-respondents. 2.3 It was further stated that another agreement was executed on 29.09.2021 with respect to Khasra Nos. 545 and 531 between the plaintiff-appellant and defendant Nos. 2 to 5, as these lands were left out in the earlier agreement dated 26.07.2021. The said agreement was executed on the same terms and conditions and was also notarized by Notary Public Ganga Agrawal, Advocate. 2.4 The defendants-respondents were not willing to perform their part of the contract, and therefore, the plaintiff-appellant are constrained to file a suit for specific performance. Along with the suit, a temporary injunction application is filed, praying that [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (4 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] during the pendency of the suit, the defendants-respondents be restrained from making any construction on the disputed land and from alienating or creating any third-party interest therein. 2.5 It was further prayed that, in the event it is found during the pendency of the suit that the land has been transferred to any third party or possession has been handed over, such sale deeds be declared as void by way of mandatory injunction and possession be restored. It was also prayed that no mutation be entered in the names of defendant Nos. 6 to 8. 2.6 To the said application, defendant-respondent Nos. 2, 4, and 5 filed a reply, contending that the plaintiff-appellant herself stated that she had agreed to purchase 14 Khasra numbers ad measuring 17 bigha 12 biswa at the rate of Rs. 1,20,00,000/- per bigha, making the total sale consideration Rs. 21,12,00,000/-. It was further contended that the plaintiff-appellant had not properly valued the suit with respect to the second agreement relating to Khasra Nos. 545 and 531. It was also contended that the plaintiff- appellant had neither valued the relief of declaration nor paid the requisite court fees. 2.7 The defendant Nos. 6 and 7 filed a separate reply, contending that the suit was filed based on photocopies of the agreements dated 26.07.2021 and 29.09.2021, which were false, fabricated, and incomplete. It was further contended that the plaintiff- appellant had suppressed material facts and was never ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. It was submitted that due to non-performance by the plaintiff-appellant, the agreements [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (5 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] stood automatically cancelled, and the original documents were destroyed by the plaintiff-appellant herself. 2.8 It was further contended that the present suit had been filed on the basis of photocopies by playing fraud. It was also submitted that, in respect of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 537 and 544, the recorded tenants are necessary parties. It was further contended that despite issuance of notices dated 29-11- 2021 and 15.01.2022, the plaintiff-appellant did not approach the Court promptly and filed the suit belatedly on 19.07.2025, therefore the suit itself was time barred. 2.9 It was also contended that the agreements to sell were insufficiently stamped and unregistered, and only photocopies had been placed on record. Such documents cannot be considered even prima facie for deciding the temporary injunction application. 2.10 The agreements to sell dated 26.07.2021 and 29.09.2021 are insufficiently stamped, photocopies thereof cannot be read in evidence, even for prima facie case, unless the original documents are produced, impounded, and proper stamp duty is paid. It was submitted that an insufficiently stamped original document cannot be relied upon, and consequently, its photocopy cannot be admitted in secondary evidence. Therefore, in the absence of the original documents, no prima facie case can be said to exist in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 2.11 The learned Trial Court, after hearing both parties, rejected the temporary injunction application vide order dated 21.07.2026. 3. Hence, aggrieved by the said order, the present civil misc. appeal has been filed. [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (6 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] 4. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant at the outset submitted that the learned Trial Court committed an illegality in rejecting the temporary injunction application. He submitted that the agreements to sell have not been denied by the defendants- respondents; rather, they have been admitted. He also submitted that the issue of readiness and willingness is a matter to be decided during trial and not at the interim stage. 4.1 Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant further submitted that once the agreements and receipt of Rs. 21,00,000/- (through cash and cheques) are admitted, the learned Trial Court erred while not restraining the defendants-respondents from alienating the disputed property. He argued that the learned Trial Court conducted a mini-trial while deciding the temporary injunction application, which is impermissible in law. 4.2 Therefore, he prayed that the present civil misc. appeal be allowed, the impugned order be set aside, and the defendants- respondents be restrained from alienating or creating any third- party interest in the disputed property, and that status quo be maintained. 4.3 Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant relied upon the following judgments to advance his arguments: (i) Ramakant Ambalal Choksi vs Harish Ambalal Choksi and Ors.; (2024) 11 SCC 351. (ii) Azhar Sultana vs B. Rajamani and Ors.; (2009) 17 SCC 27. (iii) Anand Prasad Agarwalla vs Tarkeshwar Prasad and Ors.; (2001) 5 SCC 568. [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (7 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] (iv) Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot vs Baldev Dass; (2004) 8 SCC 488. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the defendants–respondents submitted that the plaintiff–appellant has not approached this Hon’ble Court with clean hands and was never ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. 5.1 Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff-appellant failed to maintain sufficient funds in her bank account, which resulted in the dishonor of cheques amounting to Rs. 3,79,00,000/- which were issued towards part consideration. He further contended that despite exchange of notices between the parties in the year 2021 and 2022, the plaintiff-appellant did not promptly institute the suit and instead filed the same belatedly in the year 2025, by which time the property in dispute had already been transferred to respondent No. 7. 5.2 He has also asserted that the agreement in question stood canceled in the year 2022 and the original document was also destroyed by the plaintiff-appellant herself. 5.3 Learned counsel for the defendants–respondents further submitted that the present suit as well as the application for temporary injunction have been filed on the basis of a mere photocopy of the alleged agreement, which is not admissible in evidence, even for prima facie purposes, as the same is insufficiently stamped. 5.4 The plaintiff-appellant has deliberately concealed material facts, particularly the dishonor of the cheques, and has failed to assign any cogent reason in the injunction application regarding [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (8 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] the effect thereof, merely referring to exchange of notices. In such circumstances, he contended that no prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 5.5 The balance of convenience also does not lie in her favour, and no irreparable loss would be caused to her, especially in light of her own conduct, lack of readiness and willingness, and failure to adhere to the terms and conditions of the contract. By her actions, the plaintiff-appellant has dis-entitled herself from claiming any equitable relief of injunction. 5.6 Accordingly, he prayed that the present civil misc. appeal be dismissed, and the order dated 27.01.2026 be upheld. 6. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and scanned the material available on record submitted by parties. 6.1 On perusal of the record, this Court finds that, undisputedly, the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants-respondents entered into an agreement to sell dated 26.07.2021. Under the said agreement, a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- was paid in cash and Rs. 17,00,000/- was paid through various cheques by the plaintiff- appellant. It is also not in dispute between the parties that, in furtherance of the agreement to sell, four post-dated cheques amounting to Rs. 3,79,00,000/- were issued by the plaintiff– appellant in favour of the defendants-respondents. As per the terms of the agreement, the said cheques were required to be honored, and it is reflected from the record that the last cheque was dated 01.12.2021. Admittedly, three cheques were dishonored. [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (9 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] 6.2 The plaintiff-appellant has neither disclosed any reason for the dishonor of the said cheques nor placed on record any communication, if any, sent by her to the defendants-respondents requesting that the cheques may not be en-cashed for any valid reason. On the contrary, when the cheques were dishonored, the defendants–respondents issued a notice dated 29.11.2021 calling upon the plaintiff-appellant to adhere to the terms and conditions of the agreement. Despite such intimation, the fourth cheque dated 01.12.2021 for a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- was also dishonored on account of insufficient funds in the plaintiff’s account. Thereafter, the defendants-respondents issued a registered notice dated 15.01.2022, in response to the plaintiff- appellant’s earlier notice, clearly informing the plaintiff-appellant’s that due to non-compliance of the terms and conditions, the agreement to sell dated 26.07.2021 stood canceled. 6.3 This Court further finds that, despite the categorical cancellation of the agreement vide notice dated 15.01.2022, the plaintiff-appellant did not approach the Court immediately. Instead, the parties continued exchanging notices, wherein the defendants-respondents consistently maintained that the agreement stood canceled. The plaintiff-appellant, however, chose to file the present suit only on 19.07.2025, after an inordinate delay of more than three years. It is also pertinent to note that during this intervening period, the suit property came to be sold to defendant Nos. 7 and 8, thereby creating third-party rights. 6.4 It is a settled principle of law governing the grant of temporary injunction that the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (10 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of such relief. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai and Others ; (2006) 5 SCC 282 succinctly laid down the principle governing the grant of temporary injunction which reads as under: "30. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands." 6.5 In the present case, it is evident that the performance of the agreement was expressly denied by the defendants-respondents through notice dated 15.01.2022 and informed that the agreement is cancelled. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to promptly institute a suit for specific performance. However, the plaintiff failed to do so and allowed considerable time to elapse without affording any satisfactory [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (11 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] explanation. Such delay assumes significance, particularly in equity, as it reflects lack of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his contractual obligations. 6.6 Moreover, the conduct of the plaintiff–appellant in allowing the cheques issued towards part consideration to be dishonored, without any justification, further dis-entitle her from seeking equitable relief. The creation of third-party rights during the period of delay also tilts the balance of convenience against the plaintiff- appellant, as any injunction at this stage would adversely affect the rights of purchasers who have purchased on payment of entire sale consideration. It is settled that a party who is guilty of delay and laches, and whose conduct is not free from blame, cannot seek the discretionary relief of injunction. In these circumstances, no prima facie case is made out, nor does the balance of convenience lie in favour of the plaintiff–appellant, and no irreparable loss would be caused to her if the injunction is refused. 6.7 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Jain vs. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors.; (2000) 6 SCC 420 had extensively dealt with the point that in a matter concerning grant of injunction, apart from the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, the conduct of the party seeking the equitable relief of injunction is also very essential to be considered. The Court observed and held as under: “6. The first ground which the High Court took note of is the delay in filing the suit. It may be apt to bear in mind the following aspects of delay which are relevant in a case of specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property: [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (12 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] (i) delay running beyond the period prescribed under the Limitation Act; (ii) delay in cases where though the suit is within the period of limitation, yet: (a) due to delay the third parties have acquired rights in the subject matter of the suit; (b) in the facts and circumstances of the case, delay may give rise to plea of waiver or otherwise it will be inequitable to grant a discretionary relief.” 6.8 Further, in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co.; (1995) 5 SCC 545, the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the issue of injunction held that in the grant of temporary injunction, being an equitable relief, the conduct of the applicant is of paramount consideration. The party seeking such relief must approach the Court with clean hands, demonstrating fairness and absence of blame. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under: “47. … Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest.” [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (13 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] 6.9 Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a bunch of cases led by Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Limited and Ors. Vs. KS Infraspace LLP Limited and Ors.; (2020) 5 SCC 410 while dealing with a similar factual matrix reiterated the principle of taking into consideration the conduct of the parties and held as under: 21. We are therefore of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and the nature of the materials placed before us at this stage, whether there existed a concluded contract between the parties or not, is itself a matter for trial to be decided on basis of the evidence that may be led. If the Plaintiff contended a concluded contract and/or an oral contract by inference, leaving an executed document as a mere formality, the onus lay on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the parties were ad-idem having discharged their obligations as observed in Brij Mohan (supra). The Plaintiff failed to do show the same on admitted facts. The draft MoU dated 30.03.2018 in Clause C contemplated payment of the income tax dues of Rs. 18.64 crores as part of the consideration amount only whereafter the agreement was to be signed relating back to the date 29.03.2008. Had this amount been already paid or remitted by the Plaintiff, entirely different considerations would have arisen with regard to the requirement for execution of a written agreement remaining a mere formality. Needless to state the balance of convenience is in favour of the Defendants on account of the intervening developments, without furthermore, inter-alia by reason of the Plaintiff having waited for seven months to institute the suit. The question of irreparable harm to a party complaining of a breach of contract does not arise if other remedies are available to the party [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (14 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] complaining of the breach. The High Court has itself observed that from the negotiations between the parties that "some rough weather was being reflected between the Plaintiff and the Defendant ..........". The Special Civil Judge failed to address the issue of delay. The High Court noticed the arguments of the Defendants with regard to delay in the institution of the suit but failed to deal with it. 7. So far as the judgment in the case of Ramakant Ambalal (supra) as relied upon by the plaintiff-appellant is concerned, the same does not advance his case as therein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deprecated the interference by the Appellate Court where the Trial Court has exercised its discretion in granting injunction on sound principles. Thus, unlike the said case, where the Appellate Court had substituted its own view without justification, the present case involves affirmation of a well- reasoned discretionary order, strictly within the contours of law. 7.1 The reliance placed on the judgment in Azhar Sultana (supra) is also of no assistance to the plaintiff-appellant and is clearly distinguishable as therein the case pertained to the final adjudication of a suit for specific performance and after due appreciation of evidence, the relief was declined on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. In contrast, the present case pertains only to the grant of temporary injunction at an interlocutory stage, where the Court is required to assess the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Even at this preliminary stage, the conduct of the plaintiff-appellant particularly the [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (15 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] dishonour of substantial cheques, unexplained delay of more than three years in instituting the suit despite cancellation of the agreement, and the intervening creation of third-party rights prima facie demonstrates lack of readiness and willingness. Therefore, the ratio of the said judgment, rendered in the context of final relief, does not advance the case of the plaintiff-appellant in seeking temporary injunction. 7.2 The reliance placed on the aforesaid judgment Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot (supra) is also clearly distinguishable in the facts of the present case. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the grant of temporary injunction primarily on the ground that the contesting respondents had established a strong prima facie case based on a valid sale certificate, coupled with entries in the record of rights reflecting their possession, thereby giving rise to a presumption of lawful possession. However, in the present case, no such cogent or legally enforceable document establishing possession or subsisting rights in favour of the plaintiff-appellant is forthcoming. On the contrary, the material on record prima facie indicates that the agreement to sell stood cancelled as early as in the year 2022, the plaintiff-appellant failed to honour substantial financial obligations leading to dishonour of cheques, and there is an unexplained delay of more than three years in approaching the Court. Hence, the ratio of the said judgment does not advance the case of the plaintiff-appellant. 7.3 The reliance placed on the judgment in Anand Prasad Agarwalla (supra) is likewise distinguishable and does not [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (16 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] advance the case of the plaintiff-appellant. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court restored the order of the Trial Court granting injunction and maintaining status quo, primarily on the ground that the defendant had failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances or irreparable injury warranting a change in the nature of the suit property during the pendency of the suit. However, the factual matrix of the present case stands on an entirely different footing. Here, the plaintiff-appellant has failed to establish even a prima facie case in her favour, in as much as the agreement to sell stood cancelled in the year 2022. Moreover, third-party rights have already been created in the intervening period. Thus, this is not a case where a lawful and subsisting claim requires protection by maintaining status quo; rather, the conduct of the plaintiff-appellant disentitled her from equitable relief. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has not committed any illegality or perversity in passing the impugned order. The order is well-reasoned and does not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 9. However the parties will be governed by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which embodies the doctrine of lis pendens. Accordingly, the defendants- respondents are directed to disclose before the learned Trial Court in regard to any sale, transfer, or creation of third-party rights in respect of the property in question before entering in any such agreement. Such disclosure is necessary to ensure transparency [2026:RJ-JP:16357] (17 of 17) [CMA-1494/2026] and to safeguard the rights of the parties during the pendency of litigation. 10. Lastly, it is made clear, that any discussion made in this order is only for the purpose of the disposal of the appeal and the same shall not be construed as any finding and the learned Trial Court shall decide the suit independently on its own merits, in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations made under this order. 11. Consequently, this Court does not deem it appropriate to interfere with the order dated 27.01.2026. Accordingly, the present civil miscellaneous appeal is hereby dismissed, with aforesaid observations. 12. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (BIPIN GUPTA),J Anand Tanwar/