1 2026:CGHC:27330-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 541 of 2026 Satish Kumar Kannoje S/o Late Shri Ganga Prasad Kannoje Aged About 59 Years R/o Ward No. 20, Civil Line Khairagarh District Khairagarh Chuikhadan Gandai C.G. ... Appellant(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through- Under Secretary Water Resources Department Mantrataya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar New Raipur District Raipur C.G. 2. Chief Engineer Water Resources Department Shivnath Bhawan Naya Raipur Atal Nagar District Raipur C.G. 3. Executive Engineer Water Resources Division Chhuikhadan District Khairagarh Chuikhadan Gandai C.G. ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Smita Jha, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.07.03 15:51:36 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 03 .07.2026 1. Heard Ms. Smita Jha, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State. 2. The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner against the order dated 06.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 12982 of 2025 (Satish Kumar Kannoje vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant came to be dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was initially appointed as an Assistant Grade-III (Clerk) in the Water Resources Department and had been serving sincerely and diligently. By order dated 13.08.2019, he was transferred from Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon, to the office of the Executive Engineer, Water Resources Division, Raipur, where he continuously discharged his duties for about six years without any complaint. She further submitted that considering the appellant's personal and family circumstances, he submitted a representation dated 09.06.2025 before respondent No. 1 stating that his 76-year-old mother and his unmarried brother of unsound mind are wholly dependent upon him. It was further pointed out that the appellant 3 belongs to a middle-class family and was facing considerable hardship in looking after his dependents while posted at Raipur. The appellant also brought to the notice of the authorities that a sanctioned vacant post was available at Chuikhadan, which is near his native place. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that accepting the aforesaid request, respondent No. 1 issued a transfer order dated 30.06.2025 transferring the appellant from Raipur to Chuikhadan, District Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai. Pursuant thereto, the appellant was relieved from Raipur on 04.07.2025 and joined his duties at Chuikhadan on 11.07.2025, where he started discharging his duties. She also submitted that, to the utter surprise of the appellant, within merely twenty days of the earlier transfer order and hardly ten days after he had joined at Chuikhadan, respondent No. 1 issued another transfer order dated 21.07.2025 transferring the appellant from Chuikhadan to Rajnandgaon. She submits that the impugned transfer was made abruptly, without assigning any reason and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. It is contended that such repeated transfers within a span of twenty days are wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and amount to harassment of the appellant. 5. It is further contended by the learned counsel, appearing for the appellant that aggrieved by the second transfer order, the appellant approached the Hon'ble High Court by filing a writ petition. The High Court, by order dated 31.07.2025, directed the appellant to submit a 4 fresh representation and directed the competent authority to decide the same within two weeks. However, despite the specific direction of the Court, the representation was not decided within the stipulated period, compelling the appellant to initiate contempt proceedings. Only thereafter was the representation rejected on 26.09.2025. she also contended that thereafter the appellant again approached the Hon'ble High Court by filing another writ petition, wherein, by interim order dated 16.10.2025, the operation of the transfer order dated 21.07.2025 was stayed and the appellant was permitted to join at Chuikhadan even if he had already been relieved. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further stated that despite the interim protection granted by the Hon'ble High Court, the respondents failed to release the appellant's salary for several months, compelling him to file another writ petition. Although the State assured the Court that the appellant's salary would be released, only a part of the salary, namely for the period from 01.07.2025 to 21.07.2025 and from 22.10.2025 to 31.10.2025, was paid, while the salary for the remaining period continued to be withheld despite repeated representations and communications issued by the departmental authorities. She submitted that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, held that since the appellant had not worked during the period from 22.07.2025 to 21.10.2025 after being relieved on 21.07.2025, he was not entitled to salary for the said period by applying the principle of "No Work No Pay." She further contended that the aforesaid finding is legally unsustainable as the appellant was never unwilling to discharge 5 his duties. According to learned counsel, the appellant was prevented from working solely because of the arbitrary actions of the respondents. Immediately after the second transfer order, the appellant approached the appropriate forum and pursued the remedies available to him. During the pendency of his representation and the proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court, the respondents themselves did not permit him to continue at Chuikhadan, while at the same time the legality of the second transfer order was under challenge. 7. It is further submitted that the respondents cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own illegal actions. Having issued two transfer orders within a period of twenty days and having failed to decide the appellant's representation within the time prescribed by the Hon'ble High Court, the respondents cannot subsequently deny the appellant his legitimate salary by invoking the principle of "No Work No Pay." It is contended that the said principle has no application where an employee is kept away from work due to the fault or arbitrary action of the employer and not because of any unwillingness on the part of the employee. She also submits that the appellant, being a Class-III employee, is entirely dependent upon his monthly salary for maintaining himself and his dependent family members. The prolonged withholding of salary has caused severe financial hardship to the appellant. It is further submitted that if the disputed period is not treated as duty or otherwise regularised in accordance with law, the appellant's leave account, pensionary benefits and other retiral dues would be seriously prejudiced in future. 6 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, submits that the impugned order is liable to be interfered with in the present appeal, as the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the material facts and the settled principles of law governing the issue. It is accordingly prayed that the appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned order and granting the appellant all consequential monetary and service benefits in accordance with law. 9. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and submits that the same is well- reasoned and does not warrant any interference by this Court in the present intra-Court appeal. It is submitted that the appellant was relieved from his place of posting at Chuikhadan on 21.07.2025 pursuant to the transfer order and thereafter he neither joined at his transferred place of posting at Rajnandgaon nor discharged any official duties till 21.10.2025. It is further submitted that the appellant resumed his duties at Chuikhadan only on 22.10.2025 pursuant to the interim order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly applied the principle of "No Work No Pay" and has correctly held that the appellant is not entitled to claim salary for the period during which he admittedly did not perform any work. It is, thus, prayed that the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 11. The controversy involved in the present appeal lies in a narrow 7 compass. The sole issue that arises for consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to salary for the period from 22.07.2025 to 21.10.2025, during which admittedly he did not discharge any official duties. 12. The admitted factual position is that pursuant to the transfer order dated 21.07.2025, the appellant was relieved from Chuikhadan on the same day. Though the appellant challenged the said transfer order before this Court, admittedly, he did not join at his transferred place of posting at Rajnandgaon. It is also not in dispute that by interim order dated 16.10.2025, the learned Single Judge stayed the operation of the transfer order and permitted the appellant to join at Chuikhadan. In pursuance thereof, the appellant resumed his duties only on 22.10.2025. 13. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant was prevented from discharging his duties due to the arbitrary action of the respondents in issuing successive transfer orders within a short span of time and, therefore, he cannot be deprived of his salary for the aforesaid period. Though the submission appears attractive at first blush, the same cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. 14. It is well settled that salary is ordinarily payable for the period during which an employee actually renders service, unless the employee is unlawfully prevented from working under circumstances which would legally entitle him to claim wages despite non-performance 8 of duties. In the present case, admittedly, after being relieved on 21.07.2025, the appellant neither joined at the transferred place of posting nor discharged any duties till 21.10.2025. Merely because the transfer order was under challenge before this Court would not, by itself, confer upon the appellant a right to claim salary for the period during which no work was performed. Until the interim order dated 16.10.2025 was passed, there was no order protecting the appellant's continuance at Chuikhadan. 15. The learned Single Judge has taken note of the admitted factual position that the appellant remained absent from duty during the period from 22.07.2025 to 21.10.2025 and, therefore, rightly applied the principle of "No Work No Pay" while declining the relief of salary. We do not find any error in the appreciation of facts or in the application of the aforesaid principle warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 16. We also find that while declining the claim for salary, the learned Single Judge has balanced the equities by granting liberty to the appellant to submit an application/representation before the competent authority for treating the period from 22.07.2025 to 21.10.2025 as leave, if he is otherwise entitled to any nature of leave available in his leave account under the applicable service rules. The learned Single Judge has further directed that, if such an application is submitted, the competent authority shall consider and decide the same in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months from the 9 date of its receipt. In our considered opinion, the said direction adequately safeguards the interest of the appellant. 17. Upon a careful consideration of the rival submissions and the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the factual as well as legal aspects of the matter. The impugned order does not suffer from any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error so as to warrant interference by this Court in the present writ appeal. 18. Accordingly, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. However, it is observed that if the appellant submits an application/representation pursuant to the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge, the competent authority shall consider and decide the same strictly in accordance with the applicable service rules and in terms of the directions contained in the impugned order, without being influenced by any observations made in this judgment. 19. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan