1 2026:CGHC:26809-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 530 of 2026 1 - Rajendra Kumar Solanki S/o Bhanwar Lal Solanki Aged About 70 Years R/o Amas Automobile- 5 Madhav Club Station Road Feeganj, Ujjain Tah. And Distt- Ujjain (M.P) ... Appellant Versus 1 - Mukhya Karyapalan Adhikari Bharat Aluminum Company, (Balco Nagar Korba) Tahsil and Distt- Korba Korba (C.G.) 2 - Presiding Officer, Respondent No. 2 Korba District- Korba (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Shri Yogesh Kumar Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Shri Abhishek Sinha, Sr. Advocate along with Shri Ghanshyam Patel, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 01.07.2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1 The present writ appeal has been filed by the appellant/petitioner against the impugned order dated 18.03.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in WPL No.150 of 2026 whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 2 Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was appointed on the post of General Mazdoor with respondent-Balco on 20.03.1979 and his INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.07.02 17:16:33 +0530 2 services were terminated on 03.10.1997 as per Clause 29 (xix) of the Standing Order pursuant to his conviction in Sessions Trial No. 126/1991 for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. The petitioner preferred appeal against his termination before the appellate authority which was dismissed vide order dated 16.05.2000. Subsequently, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges framed against him in Criminal Appeal No.1303 of 1997 vide judgment dated 24.01.2014. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application before respondent-Balco for revocation of his termination order on 24.07.2014 on the ground that he stood acquitted by the Criminal Court before attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years. His application was not considered and therefore an application was moved before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Raipur. Thereafter, a reference was made to the Labour Court, Korba on 27.05.2015; issues were framed parties led their evidence and thereafter an award was passed on 05.08.2022 whereby the statement of claim of the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of delay. Being aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner preferring writ petition before learned Single Judge which also stood dismissed vide order impugned. Hence this writ appeal. 3 Learned counsel for the writ appellant/petitioner would submit that learned Single Judge has not considered the entire facts in its proper perspective. The very basis for termination order was the conviction of petitioner. Once he was acquitted from the charges levelled against him vide judgment dated 24.01.2014 in Criminal Appeal No.1303 of 1997 i.e. prior to attaining his age of superannuation, the respondent- 3 Balco was duty bound to consider his claim for recalling of his termination order, in which, the issue of limitation would not arise. He would further submit that other employees of same respondent company who were convicted under the same offence i.e. U/s 302 IPC, were reinstated in service after their acquittal. Hence the case of present petitioner was also required to be considered on the ground of parity. 4 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- Balco would submit that the petitioner was terminated as per provisions of Clause 29(xix) of the Standing Order after registration of criminal case and his conviction vide judgment dated 17.06.1997. Departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner also got dismissed vide order dated 16.5.2000 and it attains its finality as it was not challenged before any higher forum. The reference was made to decide the issue as to whether termination order is valid or not and whether the termination order was valid from date of its issuance till acquittal of workmen in criminal case. Since departmental appeal stood dismissed on 16.5.2000 and reference being made in the year 2015 i.e. after 15 years, the same was barred by limitation and the issue of limitation was one of the grounds considered by the Labour Court while dismissing the statement of claim of the petitioner. 5 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records annexed with the writ appeal as well as writ petition. 6 It is not in dispute that the appellant was convicted by judgment dated 17.06.1997 for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Consequent upon such conviction, his services 4 came to be terminated by order dated 03.10.1997 in terms of Clause 29(xix) of the Certified Standing Orders, which treats conviction involving moral turpitude as misconduct warranting termination from service. It is equally undisputed that the departmental appeal preferred by the appellant was rejected on 16.05.2000. The said order was never challenged before any competent forum and, therefore, attained finality. Though the appellant was subsequently acquitted by the appellate criminal court on 24.01.2014, no material was placed either before the Labour Court or before the learned Single Judge to establish his contention that he had not attained the age of superannuation on the date of acquittal. The burden to substantiate such plea rested upon the appellant, which he failed to discharge. 7 The record further reveals that while dismissing WPL No. 200 of 2016 on 10.02.2017, the learned Single Judge, though rejecting the challenge to the order refusing to decide the preliminary objection regarding maintainability, expressly reserved liberty in favour of the respondent-employer to raise the plea of limitation before the Labour Court. Pursuant thereto, an additional issue on limitation was framed. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Labour Court recorded a categorical finding that the order of termination dated 03.10.1997 had been questioned only after about 17 years. Even after the order of acquittal dated 24.01.2014, the appellant chose to invoke the industrial adjudicatory mechanism only after about six months. The Labour Court found that there was gross and unexplained delay in raising the industrial dispute. The learned Single Judge, while affirming the award, rightly observed that though the Industrial Disputes Act does not 5 prescribe any specific period of limitation, a stale claim can justifiably be declined where the workman remains inactive for an inordinate period and such delay causes prejudice to the employer. The appellant remained dormant for nearly 14 years even after rejection of his departmental appeal and sought to revive the dispute only after his acquittal. Such unexplained inaction disentitled him to any discretionary relief. 8 We also find that the termination of the appellant was effected strictly in accordance with the applicable Standing Orders on account of his conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. The legality of the termination has to be tested with reference to the circumstances prevailing on the date the order was passed. The subsequent acquittal, by itself, does not automatically obliterate the consequences flowing from a valid order of termination, particularly when the challenge to such order has been made after an extraordinary and unexplained lapse of time. 9 In the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that the findings recorded by the Labour Court, as affirmed by the learned Single Judge, are based on proper appreciation of the material on record and do not suffer from any perversity, jurisdictional error or patent illegality warranting interference in an intra-court appeal. 10 Consequently, we find no merit in the writ appeal. The judgment of the learned Single Judge calls for no interference. The writ appeal accordingly stands dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder