1 2026:HHC:40675 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 594 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.9.2026 Date of Decision: 23.9.2026. Phool Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of HP ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioners : Mr Sudhir Thakur, Senior Advocate with Mr Karun Negi, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the order dated 3.8.2026 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which charges were framed against the petitioner and the co-accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 115(2), 117(2), and 109 read with Section 190 of 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:40675 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 115(2), 190, 109, and 117(2) of BNS. It was asserted that the police had received information on 22nd October, 2025, that some persons were brought to the hospital for treatment in a case of beating. The police went to the hospital and found Lekh Raj, Rupinder Singh, Chuna Devi, Sudesh, Somti Devi, and Nisha Kumari to be injured. Rekha Devi made a complaint that Somti Devi was cleaning her courtyard at about 6:30 AM. Chhoti Devi, Sanju Ram, Phool Singh, Ravi Kumar, Bala Devi, Pawan Kumar, and Kamlesh Devi attacked Somti Devi, Lekh Raj, Rupinder Singh, and Chuna Devi with sticks, bricks, and Kassi (pickaxes/spades). Lekh Raj sustained serious injury to his head. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police seized the recording of the CCTV camera and found that Phool Singh had hit Chuna Devi, Lekh Raj, and Rupinder Singh with a Kassi (pickaxe/spade) 8–10 times. The Medical Officer 3 2026:HHC:40675 found the injuries sustained by Lekh Raj, Rupinder Singh, and Chuna Devi to be grievous. The police recovered the Kassi (pickaxe/spade), blood-stained clothes, and other material objects. Blood was not found on the Kassi (pickaxe/spade) recovered by the police after analysis. The police filed the charge-sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 115(2), 117(2), and 109 read with Section 190 of BNS against all the persons. 4. Being aggrieved by the charges framed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner/accused Phool Singh has filed the present petition asserting that the injuries were not life- threatening, and no case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of the BNS was made out. The MLC only mentioned that the nature of the injury was grievous and did not mention that there was any danger to life. The weapon of offence was the Kassi (pickaxe/spade), and no blood was found on it. The statements of the witnesses that the petitioner had 4 2026:HHC:40675 inflicted 8-10 blows with the pickaxe are contrary to the MLC. There was nothing on record to show that the petitioner had abused the complainant or passed any caste-based remarks. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5. I have heard Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Karun Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 6. Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in framing the charges for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of the BNS. The MLCs of the victims do not show that any serious injury was caused to them. Thus, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the Kassi (pickaxe/spade) was used to inflict injuries on the head, which is a vital part of the body. Had the death been caused, the 5 2026:HHC:40675 petitioner would have been guilty of murder. The learned Trial Court had rightly framed the charges for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of the BNS, and no interference is required with the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582, that the Court framing the charges has to see a prima facie case. It is impermissible to examine the material threadbare to determine whether the accused is likely to be convicted or not. It was observed: - “12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court, by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, has held that the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of the prima facie case. It is also held that, at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion on the 6 2026:HHC:40675 existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to a conviction at the conclusion of the trial. 10. It was held in Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 651: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 253: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1709 that the Court can sift and weigh the evidence to determine if a prima facie case exists against the accused. It was observed at page 661: “24. In the light of the decisions referred supra, it is thus obvious that it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused concerned has been made out. We are of the considered view that a caution has to be sounded for the reason that the chances of going beyond the permissible jurisdiction under Section 227CrPC, and entering into the scope of power under Section 232CrPC, cannot be ruled out, as such instances are aplenty. In this context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1014. Taking note of the language of Section 227CrPC, which is in negative terminology and that the language in Section 232 CrPC is in positive terminology and considering this distinction between the two, this Court held that it would not be open to the Court, while considering an application under Section 227CrPC, to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence, alleged improbability and then proceed to discharge the accused, holding that the statements existing in the case therein are unreliable. It is held that doing so would be practically acting under Section 232 CrPC, even though the said stage has not been reached. In short, though it is permissible to 7 2026:HHC:40675 sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused, on appreciation of the admissibility and the evidentiary value, such materials brought on record by the prosecution are impermissible as it would amount to denial of opportunity to the prosecution to prove them appropriately at the appropriate stage, besides amounting to exercise of the power coupled with obligation under Section 232 CrPC, available only after taking the evidence for the prosecution and examining the accused. 11. It was held in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, that the Court is not to undertake a threadbare analysis of the material but to see if there is sufficient material to frame charges. It was observed: “16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge, the court is only required to consider whether there are sufficient materials that can justify the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. 8 2026:HHC:40675 Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on the benefit of doubt, or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused.” 12. The present petition has to be adjudicated as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. Section 109 of the BNS corresponds to Section 307 of the IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, that grievousness of the injury or the possibility of injury which could have led to death is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307 of the IPC. It was observed: 7. We are of the opinion that the grievousness of the injuries or the possibility of injury which could have led to death is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307. Section 307 reads thus: — ‘S. 307 Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.’ 8. It has two limbs, insofar as the punishment is concerned, but only one regarding the culpability. The culpability being found if there is commission of any act 9 2026:HHC:40675 with such intention or knowledge that the act could result in death, making the perpetrator guilty of murder. As regards punishment, the accused shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to a fine; which is the first limb. The second limb provides that if such act, caused with intention or knowledge, results in hurt to any person, then the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as provided in the first limb. Hurt, grievous or simple, is not a precondition to attract Section 307, but if there is hurt, be it simple or grievous, and the act causing such hurt is with the intention or knowledge that such act could have caused death, making the perpetrator guilty of murder, then a graver punishment is provided. 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kashiram (2009) 4 SCC 26 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 40, this Court held that to justify the conviction under Section 307, it would be sufficient if there is intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that there should be a bodily injury capable of causing death or even an injury in the nature of simple hurt. Relying on a number of decisions, it was held that the intention to kill or knowledge that death will occur is a question of fact depending on a given case to find culpability under Section 307. The mere fact that the injury inflicted was simple or minor will not by itself rule out the application of Section 307, since the determining question is the intention or knowledge. 10. Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat(2009) 11 SCC 273 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1323 found the ingredients under Section 307 to be; (i) the overt act of the accused, (ii) the intention or knowledge; to cause a bodily injury, which he knew would likely cause death, or such bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature would lead to death, or that act is so imminently dangerous that in all probability death would be occasioned and (iii) that the accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing 10 2026:HHC:40675 such death or injury. Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh(2014) 5 SCC 369; (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 584 differentiated the punishments, as we found in the first and second limbs. One, the intention alone leads to a punishment of 10 years, and if it is accompanied by hurt, then extending to life imprisonment. State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru (2005) 5 SCC 554: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329 categorically held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, there is no necessity for a bodily injury capable of causing death. A simple injury caused would not, as a corollary, mean absence of intention to cause death, which intention or knowledge has to be discerned from the circumstances surrounding the crime. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha alias Omprakash (2019) 3 SCC 605 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 247 and Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 366: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425 held that the absence of a fatal injury would not dislodge Section 307, but the nature or gravity of the injury and the nature of the weapon used could lead to an inference of intent and knowledge. 14. In the present case, it was specifically mentioned in the statements recorded by the police that the petitioner Phool Singh was armed with a Kassi (pickaxe/spade) and inflicted a blow on Lekh Raj’s head. Lekh Raj fell, but the petitioner continued hitting him. Rupinder Singh also stated that accused Phool Singh had used a Kassi (pickaxe/spade) to cause injury. Lekh Raj had sustained an injury on his head. The report of Indus Super Speciality Hospital mentions a depressed fracture on the parietal region with extradural haemorrhage. Therefore, the injury was caused to the head, a vital part of the body, by 11 2026:HHC:40675 means of a Kassi (pickaxe/spade), a deadly weapon; and had death taken place, the accused would have been guilty of committing murder, because causing injury to a vital part of the body by means of a deadly weapon can prima facie lead to an inference that the injury was caused with an intention to cause death2. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court that the material on record justified framing of charge for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 read with Section 190 of the BNS. 15. It was submitted that the injury would have been graver had the Kassi (pickaxe/spade) been used, and no blood was found on the pickaxe, showing that it was not used for the commission of the offence. These submissions cannot be appreciated at this stage because the Court has to see a prima facie case while framing the charges and is not expected to appreciate the evidence at this stage. Hence, it would be open for the petitioner/accused to make these submissions at the time of the conclusion of the trial, which will be appreciated based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. However, prima facie, the statements are to be accepted as correct, and even if 2 It was held in Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P., (2010) 9 SCC 799 that causing a single injury by crowbar on the head amounts to murder. 12 2026:HHC:40675 the pickaxe used by the accused was not recovered, it would be a case of defective investigation, which will not result in the acquittal of the accused3. 16. It was also stated in the revision petition that charges were wrongly framed under the SC and ST Act, which is factually incorrect because no charge has been framed under the SC and ST Act. 17. No other point was urged. 18. In view of the above, there is no error in the order passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the present revision fails and is dismissed. 19. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and shall have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. 20. A copy of this judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be transmitted forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd September, 2026 (Chander) 3 Edakkandi Dineshan v. State of Kerala, (2025) 3 SCC 273