- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 8735 OF 2026 BETWEEN: 1. MR. BALAKERTHY PUNYAKOTI, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, SON OF MR. RAMALINGAM PUNYAKOTI, PRESENTLY R/AT 5C, TOWER 1A, SOUTHSIDE OF SOUTHLAND, 11 HEUNG YIP ROAD, WONG CHUK HANG, HONG KONG ISLAND. 2. MRS. PADMAVATHI PUNYAKOTI, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, WIFE OF MR. RAMALINGAM PUNYAKOTI, PERMANENT RESIDENT OF NO. 1/357, RAMALAYAM STREET, UNDAVALLI PANCHAYITHI, REDDY BAZAAR, GUNTUR - 522 501, ANDHRA PRADESH. 3. MR. RAMALINGAM PUNYAKOTI, AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS, SON OF MR. KUPPUSWAMY PUNYAKOTI, NO. 1/357, RAMALAYAM STREET, UNDAVALLI PANCHAYITHI, REDDY BAZAAR, GUNTUR - 522 501, ANDHRA PRADESH …PETITIONERS (BY SMT. KEERTHI.K FOR MR. AZHAR MEER, ADVOCATES) R *Page No.1 is retyped and replaced vide Chamber order dated 02.07.2026 Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA, REP. BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, SOUTH WOMEN POLICE STATION, REP. BY H.C.G.P, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE - 560 001. 2. MRS. POORNIMA BALAWANT WAGMODE, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, WIFE OF MR. BALAKERTHY PUNYAKOTI, PRESENTLY R/AT: NO. B6 0001, L & T SOUTH CITY APARTMENT, AREKERE MICO LAYOUT, BANNERGHATTA ROAD, BENGALURU-560076. EMAIL: poornimaganesa@gmail.com /wagmodepoornima@gmail.com PH: +91 9148227571, 85295596227 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 08/06/2026 PASSED IN C.C. NO.7358/2026 BY THE LEARNED XXXVII ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU INSOFAR AS IT DIRECTS THE PETITIONERS TO FILE A REGULAR BAIL APPLICATION AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioners are before this Court in circumstances as peculiar as they are disquieting, disclosing an episode of palpable illegality—if not a troubling misapprehension of settled legal principles—on the part of the concerned Court. A crime in Crime No.115/2025 came to be registered against the petitioners for offences punishable under Sections 85 and 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Upon registration of the said crime, all the petitioners were enlarged on anticipatory bail, by a competent Court. 2. Thereafter, the police proceeded to conduct investigation and, upon culmination of such investigation, filed the charge-sheet before the jurisdictional Court. Following the filing of the charge-sheet and the taking of cognizance, the concerned Court, by order dated 08.06.2026, passed what can only be described as a rather perplexing - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 direction, calling upon the petitioners to secure regular bail on or before the next date of hearing, notwithstanding the subsistence of an order granting anticipatory bail in their favour. 2.1. The petitioners, instead of seeking regular bail, chose to move an application seeking exemption from personal appearance before the concerned Court. The said application came to be considered by the concerned Court, which, by order dated 16.06.2026, allowed the prayer for exemption subject to payment of costs of Rs.100/- by each of the petitioners. However, while granting such exemption, the concerned Court simultaneously directed the petitioners to remain present on the next date of hearing. In the very same order, the concerned Court further observed that the petitioners had neither secured regular bail nor furnished sureties. 2.2. It is these orders—dated 08.06.2026 and the consequential order dated 16.06.2026—that have driven the petitioners to the doors of this Court. Calling in question the legality, propriety, and sustainability of the aforesaid orders, - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in the present petition. 3. Heard Sri.Keerthi K, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri.B.N.Jagadeesha, learned SPP-I appearing for respondent No.1 and have perused the material on record. 4. Since the entire issue arises form the order directing the petitioners of apply for regular bail, the said order is required to be noticed. The order dated 08.06.2026 reads as follows: "8/6/26 for appearance of A1 to A3 Accused no. 1 to 3 present. Advocate Sri AM filed vaklath for accused along with furnished memo with certified copy of orders passed by Hon'ble LXXI Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Crl.Mis in no. Bengaluru 130/2026. Accused no. 1 to 3 not applied for regular bail Ld. Counsel for accused furnished memo with citations and submitted that no need to obtain regular bail. Accused no. 1 to 3 are permitted to comply the conditions imposed in Crl.Mis no. 130/2026, but no - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 directions to this court to obtain bail bond or surety bond. The submisssion of the Ld. Counsel with regarding no need of regular bail is rejected. Directed to file regular bail application on next date of hearing by 16.06.2026. Sd/- 8/6 XXXVII ACJM, Bengaluru" (Emphasis added) The concerned Court by rejecting the submissions of the petitioners, directs them to apply for regular bail by the next date of hearing, i.e., 16.06.2026. 5. It is now a too well settled principle of law that, the filing of a chargesheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate the anticipatory bail already granted. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, considers this very issue in the case of SUSHILA AGGARWAL v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)1, and observes as follows: 1 (2020) 5 SCC 1 - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 “…. …. …. 7.5. However, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] , despite the specific observations by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] that the normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time, in other words in an appropriate case and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the stage at which the pre-arrest bail application was made, the court concerned can limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time, on absolute misreading of the judgment in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] and just contrary to the observations made in paras 42 and 43 of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , an absolute proposition of law is laid down that the life of the order under Section 438 CrPC granting bail cannot be curtailed. Despite the clear-cut observations made by the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] made in paras 42 and 43, in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court has observed and held that the order of “anticipatory bail” has to be necessarily limited in time-frame. In many cases, subsequently the decision in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] has been followed, despite the specific observations made by the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] made in paras 42 and 43 which, as such, are just contrary to the view taken in subsequent decisions in Siddharam Satlingappa - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] and Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] . At this stage, it is required to be noted that in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] , this Court had not at all considered the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] . It cannot be disputed that the decision of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] is a Constitution Bench decision which is binding unless it is upset by a larger Bench than the Constitution Bench. Therefore, considering the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] and the relevant observations reproduced hereinabove, the decision of this Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] to the extent it takes the view that the life of the order under Section 438 CrPC cannot be curtailed is not a correct law in light of the observations made by the Constitution Bench in paras 42 and 43 in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] . The decision of this Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] which takes an extreme view that the order of “anticipatory bail” has to be necessarily limited in time-frame is also not a good law and is against and just contrary to the decision of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , which is a Constitution Bench judgment. - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 7.6. Thus, considering the observations made by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period only after filing of an FIR in respect of the matter covered by order and the applicant may in such case be directed to obtain an order of bail under Sections 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonable short period after the filing of the FIR. The Constitution Bench has further observed that the same need not be followed as an invariable rule. It is further observed and held that normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time. We are of the opinion that the conditions can be imposed by the court concerned while granting pre-arrest bail order including limiting the operation of the order in relation to a period of time if the circumstances so warrant, more particularly the stage at which the “anticipatory bail” application is moved, namely, whether the same is at the stage before the FIR is filed or at the stage when the FIR is filed and the investigation is in progress or at the stage when the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed. However, as observed hereinabove, the normal rule should be not to limit the order in relation to a period of time. …. …. …. Re Question 2 : Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court. 77. The question here is whether there is anything in the law which per se requires that upon filing of the charge-sheet, or the summoning of the accused, by the court — (or even the addition of an offence in the charge- sheet, of which an applicant on bail is accused of freshly), his liberty ought to be forfeited and that he should be asked to surrender and apply for regular bail. - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 77.1. The observations about the width and amplitude of the power under Section 438, made in answer to the first question, are equally relevant here too. 77.2. In the present context, further, the judgment and observations of this Court in its interpretation of Section 167(2) are telling. It was held in Gurcharan Singh [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] , that the release by grant of bail of an accused under Section 167(2) amounts to “deemed bail”. This is borne out by Section 167(2) which states that anyone released on bail under its provision “shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter”. The judgment in Aslam Babalal Desai [Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 4 SCC 272 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 870] has clarified that when an accused is released by operation of Section 167(2) and subsequently, a charge-sheet is filed, there is no question of the cancellation of his bail. 77.3. In these circumstances, the mere fact that an accused is given relief under Section 438 at one stage, per se does not mean that upon the filing of a charge-sheet, he is necessarily to surrender or/and apply for regular bail. The analogy to “deemed bail” under Section 167(2) with anticipatory bail leads this Court to conclude that the mere subsequent event of the filing of a charge- sheet cannot compel the accused to surrender and seek regular bail. As a matter of fact, interestingly, if indeed, if a charge-sheet is filed where the accused is on anticipatory bail, the normal implication would be that there was no occasion for the investigating agency or the police to require his custody, because there would have been nothing in his behaviour requiring such a step. In other words, an accused, who is granted anticipatory bail would continue to be at liberty when the charge-sheet is filed, the natural implication is that there is no occasion for a direction by the court that he be arrested and further that he had cooperated with the investigation. 77.4. At the same time, however, at any time during the investigation were any occasion to arise calling - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 for intervention of the court for infraction of any of the conditions imposed under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) or the violation of any other condition imposed in the given facts of a case, recourse can always be had under Section 439(2). 78. Section 438(3) states that when a person is granted anticipatory bail, is later arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station “on such accusation”, and is willing to give bail, “he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the court under sub-section (1)”. The order granting anticipatory bail, is also as noticed earlier, and in several previous decisions, a “direction” under Section 438 “that in the event of such arrest” the applicant be released on bail. Therefore, when an accused in fact is granted bail, and the conditions outlined in Section 438(2) are included as part of the direction “to release” him in the event of arrest, all the necessary conditions which he is obliged to follow exist. Section 438(3) outlines the steps to be taken, in the event of arrest of one who has been granted relief under Section 438(1). In the event of non-compliance with any or all conditions, imposed by the court, the agency concerned or the police, a direction can be sought from the court under Section 439(2). 79. The view that this Court expresses about the prosecution's option to apply for a direction to arrest the accused, finds support in Pradeep Ram [Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 17 SCC 326 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 825] wherein this Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 340-45, paras 23, 27, 29-31) “23. Both Sections 437(5) and 439(2) empowers the court to arrest an accused and commit him to custody, who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII. There may be numerous grounds for exercise of power under Sections 437(5) and 439(2). The principles and grounds for cancelling a bail are well settled, but in the present case, we are concerned only with one aspect of the matter i.e. a case where after accused has been granted the bail, new and serious offences are - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 added in the case. A person against whom serious offences have been added, who is already on bail can very well be directed to be arrested and committed to custody by the court in exercise of power under Sections 437(5) and 439(2). Cancelling the bail granted to an accused and directing him to be arrested and taken into custody can be one course of action, which can be adopted while exercising power under Sections 437(5) and 439(2), but there may be cases where without cancelling the bail granted to an accused, on relevant consideration, court can direct the accused to be arrested and committed to custody. The addition of serious offences is one of such circumstances, under which the court can direct the accused to be arrested and committed to custody despite the bail having been granted with regard to the offences with which he was charged at the time when bail was considered and granted. *** 27. We may have again to look into provisions of Sections 437(5) and 439(2) CrPC. Sub-section (5) of Section 437 CrPC uses expression ‘if it considers it necessary so to do, direct that such person be arrested and commit him to custody’. Similarly, sub- section (2) of Section 439 CrPC provides:‘may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody’. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that provision does not mandatorily provide that the court before directing arrest of such accused who has already been granted bail must necessarily cancel his earlier bail. A discretion has been given to the court to pass such orders to direct for such person be arrested and commit him to the custody which direction may be with an order for cancellation of earlier bail or permission to arrest such accused due to addition of graver and non-bailable offences. The two-Judge Bench judgment in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel [Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 332 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1047] uses the word “ordinarily” in para 18 of the judgment which cannot be read as that mandatorily bail earlier granted to the accused has to be cancelled before the investigating officer to arrest him due to addition of graver and non-bailable offences. *** - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 29. Relying on the abovesaid order, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that respondent State ought to get first the order dated 10-3-2016 [Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, 2016 SCC OnLine Jhar 3254] granting bail to the appellant cancelled before seeking custody of the appellant. It may be true that by mere addition of an offence in a criminal case, in which the accused is bailed out, investigating authorities itself may not proceed to arrest the accused and need to obtain an order from the court, which has released the accused on the bail. It is also open for the accused, who is already on bail and with regard to whom serious offences have been added to apply for bail in respect of new offences added and the court after applying the mind may either refuse the bail or grant the bail with regard to new offences. In a case, bail application of the accused for newly added offences is rejected, the accused can very well be arrested. In all cases, where the accused is bailed out under orders of the court and new offences are added including offences of serious nature, it is not necessary that in all cases earlier bail should be cancelled by the court before granting permission to arrest an accused on the basis of new offences. The powers under Sections 437(5) and 439(2) are wide powers granted to the court by the legislature under which the court can permit an accused to be arrested and commit him to custody without even cancelling the bail with regard to earlier offences. Sections 437(5) and 439(2) cannot be read into restricted manner that order for arresting the accused and commit him to custody can only be passed by the court after cancelling the earlier bail. 30. Coming back to the present case, the appellant was already into jail custody with regard to another case and the investigating agency applied before the Special Judge, NIA Court to grant production warrant to produce the accused before the court. The Special Judge having accepted the prayer of grant of production warrant, the accused was produced before the court on 26-6-2018 and remanded to custody. Thus, in the present case, production of the accused was with the permission of the court. Thus, the present is not a case where investigating agency itself has taken into custody the appellant after addition of new offences rather the - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 accused was produced in the court in pursuance of production warrant obtained from the court by the investigating agency. We, thus do not find any error in the procedure which was adopted by the Special Judge, NIA Court with regard to production of the appellant before the Court. In the facts of the present case, it was not necessary for the Special Judge to pass an order cancelling the bail dated 10-3-2016 [Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, 2016 SCC OnLine Jhar 3254] granted to the appellant before permitting the appellant-accused to be produced before it or remanding him to the judicial custody. 31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we arrive at the following conclusions in respect of a circumstance where after grant of bail to an accused, further cognizable and non-bailable offences are added— 31.1. The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested. 31.2. The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC for arrest of the accused and his custody. 31.3. The court, in exercise of power under Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The court in exercise of power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-bailable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail. 31.4. In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it need to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the court which had granted the bail.” 80. Earlier, in the decision in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [Dolat Ram v. State of - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] this Court had observed that : (SCC p. 351, para 4) “4. … bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial.” 81. This decision was followed, and its ratio applied, in Hazari Lal Das v. State of W.B. [Hazari Lal Das v. State of W.B., (2009) 10 SCC 652 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 381] The decision in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat [Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] stated, after culling out the principles in Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] , as follows : (Bhadresh case [Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] , SCC p. 167, para 25) “25.6. It is a settled legal position that the court which grants the bail also has the power to cancel it. The discretion of grant or cancellation of bail can be exercised either at the instance of the accused, the Public Prosecutor or the complainant, on finding new material or circumstances at any point of time. 25.7. In pursuance of the order of the Court of Session or the High Court, once the accused is released on anticipatory bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail. 25.8. Discretion vested in the court in all matters should be exercised with care and circumspection depending upon the facts and circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly, the discretion vested with the court under Section 438 CrPC should also be exercised with caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject the wide power - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 and discretion conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code of self-imposed limitations. 25.9. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of the anticipatory bail because all circumstances and situations of future cannot be clearly visualised for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with legislative intention, the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 82. The three-Judge Bench decision in Sudhir v. State of Maharashtra [Sudhir v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 1 SCC 146 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 234 : (2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 48] noticed the decision in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth [Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] and did not disapprove it. However, the Court did not grant relief, given that anticipatory bail was declined initially, and the application to the High Court was withdrawn, after which a second anticipatory bail was granted. The High Court cancelled the grant of relief. This Court affirmed the High Court's view [Ramesh Manik Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 4994] . In that judgment, Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth [Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] was noticed, while considering the scope of the power under Section 439(2). In another decision, Arvind Tiwary v. State of Bihar [Arvind Tiwary v. State of Bihar, (2018) 8 SCC 475 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 590] the issue was whether the anticipatory bail, granted subject to certain conditions, earlier, which had been considered by this Court, could be cancelled. The conditions included, inter alia, that sums were to be secured by bank guarantee. The aggrieved corporation directed that the “defalcated sum” specified in respect of every accused should be secured through such guarantee. Upon failure to comply with that demand, an order of cancellation was sought. This Court held that cancellation could not be resorted to on the assumption that the applicants were guilty. Similarly, in Chand Nath Yogi v. State of Haryana [Chand Nath Yogi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 326 : 2003 SCC - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 (Cri) 312] , Padmakar Tukaram Bhavnagare v. State of Maharashtra [Padmakar Tukaram Bhavnagare v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 13 SCC 720 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 393] , X v. State of Telangana [X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902] , and several other judgments the same views were expressed. 83. Therefore, unless circumstances to the contrary : in the form of behaviour of the accused suggestive of his fleeing from justice, or evading the authority or jurisdiction of the court, or his intimidating witnesses, or trying to intimidate them, or violate any condition imposed while granting anticipatory bail, the law does not require the person to surrender to the court upon summons for trial being served on him. Subject to compliance with the conditions imposed, the anticipatory bail given to a person, can continue till end of the trial. This answers Question 2 referred to the present Bench.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court has unequivocally declared that once anticipatory bail is granted, such protection ordinarily enures in favour of the accused without being shackled by any artificial or predetermined period of expiry. The mere filing of a charge-sheet, the taking of cognizance by the competent Court, or even the issuance of summons would not, by themselves, eclipse or extinguish the protective umbrella of anticipatory bail, unless the Court, for compelling and exceptional reasons to be recorded in writing, directs otherwise. - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 6. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of SUMIT v. STATE OF U.P.2, observes as follows: “……. ……. ……. 11. A plain reading of the order referred to above would indicate that the anticipatory bail was granted by the High Court as prayed for but the same was limited only upto filing of the chargesheet. Once the chargesheet was filed, the protection earlier granted came to an end and in such circumstances, the appellant once again prayed for anticipatory bail by way of a fresh application which came to be rejected by the High Court. 12. We fail to understand what is the idea in restricting the grant of anticipatory bail upto the stage of completion of investigation and filing of the chargesheet. 13. Either the Court may grant anticipatory bail or may decline. However, once having exercised its discretion in favour of the accused upon consideration of the overall matter, there was no good reason for the High Court to restrict it upto the stage of filing of the chargesheet. 14. In the earlier order passed by the High Court referred to above in para 10 the High Court observed that having regard to the nature of the allegations, the role of the applicant and all the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused could be said to have made out a case for grant of anticipatory bail. 15. If the aforesaid be so, then the High Court should have indicated while declining to grant anticipatory bail by way of the impugned order as to what was so particular or what was so gross that the High Court thought fit not to grant anticipatory bail. 2 2026 SCC OnLine SC 186 - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 POSITION OF LAW 16. In Bharat Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2003) 8 SCC 77, this Court held that there is no restriction in Section 438 Cr. P.C. to grant anticipatory bail even when charge sheet has been filed and cognizance is taken. The relevant part of the said decision reads as thus:— “7. From the perusal of this part of Section 438 of CrPC, we find no restriction in regard to exercise of this power in a suitable case either by the Court of Session, High Court or this Court even when cognizance is taken or a charge-sheet is filed. The object of Section 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a charge-sheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the courts concerned from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important factor to be taken into consideration while granting such anticipatory bail so also the need for custodial interrogation, but these are only factors that must be borne in mind by the courts concerned while entertaining a petition for grant of anticipatory bail and the fact of taking cognizance or filing of a charge-sheet cannot by itself be construed as a prohibition against the grant of anticipatory bail. In our opinion, the courts i.e. the Court of Session, High Court or this Court has the necessary power vested in them to grant anticipatory bail in non-bailable offences under Section 438 of CrPC even when cognizance is taken or a charge-sheet is filed provided the facts of the case require the court to do so.”… [Emphasis supplied] 17. The very same view as aforesaid came to be reiterated in Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC 684. In the said case the High Court had rejected the application seeking anticipatory bail on the ground that the chargesheet had been filed, such approach was held to be erroneous. The Court observed that a Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested: - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 “7. We are of the considered opinion that the approach adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. The application for anticipatory bail has been rejected without considering the case of the appellant solely on the ground that the challan has now been presented. 8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to the grant of anticipatory bail was introduced on the recommendations of the Law Commission of India in its Forty-first Report dated 24-9- 1969. The recommendations were considered by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465]. Upon consideration of the entire issue this Court laid down certain salutary principles to be followed in exercise of the power under Section 438 CrPC by the Sessions Court and the High Court. It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested. When the application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind on the question and decide when the case is made out for granting such relief.” [Emphasis supplied] 18. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, the following questions were referred to the larger Bench of five judges: i. Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the trial court and seek regular bail? ii. Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court? 19. The Constitution Bench answered the reference as under: “91.1. Regarding Question 1, this Court holds that the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 fixed period; it should enure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc. 91.2. As regards the second question referred to this Court, it is held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.” [Emphasis supplied] 20. The following observations made by the Constitution Bench in paras 77.3 and 77.4 respectively of Sushila Aggarwal (supra) are also relevant which reads as under: “77.3. In these circumstances, the mere fact that an accused is given relief under Section 438 at one stage, per se does not mean that upon the filing of a charge- sheet, he is necessarily to surrender or/and apply for regular bail. The analogy to “deemed bail” under Section 167(2) with anticipatory bail leads this Court to conclude that the mere subsequent event of the filing of a charge-sheet cannot compel the accused to surrender and seek regular bail. As a matter of fact, interestingly, if indeed, if a charge-sheet is filed where the accused is on anticipatory bail, the normal implication would be that there was no occasion for the investigating agency or the police to require his custody, because there would have been nothing in his behaviour requiring such a step. In other words, an accused, who is granted anticipatory bail would continue to be at liberty when the charge-sheet is filed, the natural implication is that there is no occasion for a direction by the court that he be arrested and further that he had cooperated with the investigation. 77.4. At the same time, however, at any time during the investigation were any occasion to arise calling for intervention of the court for infraction of any of the conditions imposed under Section 437(3) read with - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 Section 438(2) or the violation of any other condition imposed in the given facts of a case, recourse can always be had under Section 439(2).” [Emphasis supplied] 21. In the High Court of Delhi v. CBI, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 53, somewhat similar question arose whether Section 170 Cr. P.C. prevents the Trial Court from taking a charge-sheet on record unless the accused is taken into custody. The Delhi High Court observed as under: “15. Word “custody” appearing in this section does not contemplate either police or judicial custody. It merely connotes the presentation of accused by the investigating officer before the Court at the time of filing of the charge-sheet whereafter the role of the Court starts. Had it not been so the investigating officer would not have been vested with powers to release a person on bail in a bailable offence after finding that there was sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial and it would have been obligatory upon him to produce such an accused in custody before the Magistrate for being released on bail by the Court. 16. In case the police/investigating officer thinks it unnecessary to present the accused in custody for the reason that the accused would neither abscond nor would disobey the summons as he has been cooperating in investigation and investigation can be completed without arresting him, the IO is not obliged to produce such an accused in custody. xxxx xxxx xxxx 19. It appears that the learned Special Judge was labouring under a misconception that in every non- bailable and cognizable offence the police is required to invariably arrest a person, even if it is not essential for the purpose of investigation. 20. Rather the law is otherwise. In normal and ordinary course the police should always avoid arresting a person and sending him to jail, if it is possible for the police to complete the investigation without his arrest and if every kind of cooperation is provided by the accused to the investigating officer in completing the investigation. It is only in cases of utmost necessity, where the investigation cannot be completed without - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 arresting the person, for instance, a person may be required for recovery of incriminating articles or weapon of offence or for eliciting some information or clue as to his accomplices or any circumstantial evidence, that his arrest may be necessary. Such an arrest may also be necessary if the investigating officer concerned or officer in charge of the police station thinks that presence of the accused will be difficult to procure because of grave and serious nature of crime as the possibility of his absconding or disobeying the process or fleeing from justice cannot be ruled out.” [Emphasis supplied] 22. The aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court received imprimatur of this Court in Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2022) 1 SCC 676, wherein it was observed as under: “9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the High Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to the said judicial view. It has rightly been observed on consideration of Section 170 CrPC that it does not impose an obligation on the officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the charge-sheet. We have, in fact, come across cases where the accused has cooperated with the investigation throughout and yet on the charge-sheet being filed nonbailable warrants have been issued for his production premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court. We are of the view that if the investigating officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody. The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 CrPC does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the investigating officer before the court while filing the chargesheet. 10. We may note that personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond. Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it [Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172]. If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self- esteem of a person. If the investigating officer has no reason to believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons and has, in fact, throughout cooperated with the investigation we fail to appreciate why there should be a compulsion on the officer to arrest the accused. xxxx xxxx xxxx 12. In the present case when the appellant has joined the investigation, investigation has completed and he has been roped in after seven years of registration of the FIR we can think of no reason why at this stage he must be arrested before the chargesheet is taken on record. We may note that the learned counsel for the appellant has already stated before us that on summons being issued the appellant will put the appearance before the trial court.” 23. Further, this Court in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51 said in clear terms that the mandate laid down in Siddharth (supra) should be strictly complied with. 24. In Md. Asfak Alam v. State of Jharkhand, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 892 under a similar situation where the appellant therein had been granted interim protection by the High Court under Section 438 CrPC and the charge- sheet was filed before the application seeking pre-arrest bail was finally heard, the High Court rejected the pending anticipatory bail and directed the appellant to surrender before the competent authority and seek regular bail. In this backdrop, this Court observed as under: “14. ……What appears from the record is that the appellant cooperated with the investigation both before 8-8-2022, when no protection was granted to him and after 8-8-2022, when he enjoyed protection till the filing of the charge-sheet and the cognizance thereof on 1-10-2022. Thus, once the charge-sheet was filed and there was no impediment, at least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have granted the bail as a matter of course. However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the trial court. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach. The impugned order of rejecting the bail and directing the appellant, to surrender and later seek bail, therefore, cannot stand, and is hereby set aside……” [Emphasis supplied] 25. Thus, the position of law is well settled: once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry. The filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded. The Constitution Bench in the case of Sushila Aggarwal (supra) held that duration is a matter of judicial discretion and cannot be confined by arbitrary timelines. In the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694, this Court similarly cautioned that anticipatory bail should not hinge on procedural milestones. 26. Risk management can be taken care of by way of imposing conditions of cooperation, attendance, and non-tampering, not by imposing time limits. Where circumstances change, modification or cancellation may be sought under the BNSS, 2023, but expiry clauses inserted at inception are unsustainable. 27. In such circumstances referred to above, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. 28. We order that in the event of arrest of the appellant in connection with the offence enumerated above, he shall be released on anticipatory bail subject to the terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer deem fit to impose. 29. Once the appellant is released by the Investigating Officer, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail bond. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 30. Before we close this matter, we would like to clarify something important. Take a case, wherein an accused has been released on bail, pending the investigation, and later upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet is filed with addition of new cognizable and non-bailable offences, then what would be the position? 31. The aforesaid question was looked into and answered by this Court in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, 2019 Cri LJ 3801, wherein this Court after discussing various decisions, more particularly, the decision in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280 held that with the addition of a new cognizable and non-bailable offence more particularly of a serious nature, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty earlier granted to him in relation to the offences for which the FIR came to be registered. 32. In such circumstances, the correct approach of the Court concerned should be to apply its mind afresh as to whether the accused is entitled for grant of bail in the changed circumstances. 33. In Prahlad Singh Bhati (supra), the FIR initially was registered under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC respectively. But, subsequently, the chargesheet showed that the accused had committed offence under Sections 302 of the IPC. This Court took the view that with the change of the nature of the offence, the accused could be said to have become disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to the offence for which the FIR was registered, more particularly, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. 34. In such circumstances referred to above, we arrive at following conclusions in respect of a circumstance whereafter the grant of bail to an accused, further cognizable and non-bailable offences are added:— - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 (i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested. (ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr. P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his custody. (iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr. P.C. respectively, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail. (iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. If the principles so authoritatively enunciated by the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments are juxtaposed with the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what unmistakably emerges is that the concerned Court, in directing the petitioners to seek regular bail solely upon - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 the filing of the charge-sheet, has proceeded in complete disregard of the most elementary and settled canons governing anticipatory bail. The direction issued betrays an alarming obliviousness to rudimentary principles of criminal jurisprudence that stand crystallized by binding precedent. 8. In the light of the aforesaid, the order dated 08.06.2026, insofar as it compels the petitioners to secure regular bail, becomes unsustainable in law and is liable to be obliterated. The order dated 13.01.2026, whereby anticipatory bail was granted to the petitioners, shall continue to operate in full force and vigour, unaffected by the subsequent filing of the charge-sheet. The protective shield of anticipatory bail granted to the petitioners stands restored and shall endure throughout the pendency of the trial, subject, of course, to compliance with the conditions already imposed. As an inevitable corollary, the consequential order dated 16.06.2026, passed by the concerned Court, also cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and accordingly stands set aside. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) The order dated 08.06.2026, passed by the concerned Court in C.C.No.7358/2026, qua the petitioners, stands quashed. (iii) The anticipatory bail granted by the concerned Court, vide orders dated 13.01.2026, in Crl.Misc.No.130/2026 and Crl.Misc.No.132/2026, qua the petitioners, stands restored and would continue throughout the trial, unless circumstances of breach of conditions should warrant. (iv) All other conditions stipulated by the concerned Court, while granting the anticipatory bail, in the orders dated 13.01.2026, passed in Crl.Misc.No.130/2026 and Crl.Misc.No.132/2026, qua the petitioners, remain intact and are not disturbed. (v) Consequently, the order dated 16.06.2026, passed by the concerned Court in C.C.No.7358/2026, qua the petitioners, stands quashed. - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:31213 CRL.P No. 8735 of 2026 (vi) Registry is directed to circulate this order to all the concerned Courts which handle bail applications to follow the observations rendered in the course of the order, failing which, the matter would be viewed seriously. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE CBC List No.: 2 Sl No.: 36