APHC010480162021 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] MONDAY,THE NINTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 7112/2021 Between: 1.CHEKATLA VENKATESWARA RAO,, S/O. SUBBARAO AGED 53 YEARS, CASTE- SETTIBALIJA DATTA ESTATE, VEMAGIRI VILLAGE, KADIYAM MANDAL 2.ARATLA MURALI KRISHNA,, S/O. APPARAO, AGED 55 YEARS, CASTE- PADMASALI, R/O. NEAR VINAYAKA TEMPLE, SURYARAOPETA, RAJANAGARAM MANDAL ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S) AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP. THROUGH STATION HOUSE OFFICER DEVIPATNAM POLICE STATION, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT 2.AKIRI NAGAVARALAKSHMI, , W/O VENKANNABABU, D/O GUDUPU SATYANARAYANA @ GURUMURTHY, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, CASTE- KAPU, R/O GARLAMPADU VILLAGE, KORUKONDA MANDAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S): 1.K V ADITYA CHOWDARY Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1.P RAJESH BABU 2 2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: ORDER: The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) seeking to quash proceedings against Petitioners/Accused Nos.4 & 5 in C.C.No.79 of 2021 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rampachodavaram, East Godavari District. 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for Respondent No.2. 3. The Petitioners, it is manifest, do not fall within the ambit of “relatives of the husband” as contemplated under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C.’ They are admittedly mere acquaintances and friends of Accused No.1, who himself is the husband of Respondent No.2. A meticulous perusal of the FIR lodged by Respondent No.2, her statement recorded under Section 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ as well as the averments of the charge-sheet filed by the Investigating Officer, reveals that the allegations against the Petitioners are confined to the assertion that, being friends of Accused No.1, they allegedly instigated the in- laws of Respondent No.2 to subject her to quarrels, physical assault, and eventual expulsion from the matrimonial home. 4. The imputations levelled are omnibus in nature, devoid of specific particulars, and bereft of any concrete instances of overt acts attributable to the Petitioners. Though the charge-sheet purports to invoke Section 498-A read with Section 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ it is axiomatic that Section 498-A of ‘the 3 I.P.C.,’ by its very tenor and legislative intent, is restricted to the husband or his relatives. By no interpretative stretch can the provision be extended to encompass friends or unrelated third parties. 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in U. Suvetha v. State1, at paragraph Nos.18 to 24 held as under: “18. By no stretch of imagination would a girlfriend or even a concubine in an etymological sense be a “relative”. The word “relative” brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise. 19. We may notice that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajeti Laxmi v. State of A.P. [(2007) 1 DMC 797 (AP)] held as under: (DMC p. 798, para 4) “4. The entire reading of the charge-sheet and the statements of LWs 1 to 7, goes to show that it is nobody's case of the accused or the prosecution that A-6 is the relative of husband of LW 1. She is only concubine of A-1 and having illicit intimacy with him. Therefore, in the absence of any averment in the charge-sheet or any statement that she is a relative of A-1, I am of the opinion that the offence under Section 498-A IPC does not attract to A-6. Even as per the dictionary meaning ‘relative’ means a person connected by blood or marriage or ‘a species related to another by common origin’. Simply because A-6 is having illicit intimacy with A-1, it cannot be said that she is a relative of A-1. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed quashing the proceedings in CC No. 233 of 2004 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, against the petitioner A-6. Insofar as the other offences are concerned, it may go on.” 20. A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Bench at Aurangabad, in Swapnaja v. State of Maharashtra [ Criminal Application No. 388 of 2008 decided on 21-4-2008] opined: “… Even assuming that due to her extramarital relation with husband of Respondent 2, she is being ill-treated or subjected to harassment by her husband and his relatives, then also it is difficult to say that the applicant is accountable to answer the charge for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. For, she is not related to husband of Respondent 2 nor can be regarded as the person, who can fall within Explanation (a) or (b) of Section 498-A IPC.” To the similar effect is the law laid down by the same High Court in Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v. State of Maharashtra [2007 Cri LJ 3866 (Bom)] . 21. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, however, preferred to follow Shivcharan Lal Verma5 in preference to Reema Aggarwal6 to hold that precedentially the former is binding on the High Court, stating: 1 (2009) 6 SCC 757 4 “Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma5 will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema Aggarwal6. That being the case, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners would have to be accepted that the provisions of Section 498-A IPC would not be attracted inasmuch as the marriage between Mohit Gupta and Shalini was null and void and Mohit Gupta could not be construed as a ‘husband’ for the purposes of Section 498-A IPC. Clearly, therefore, the charge under Section 498-A IPC cannot be framed and the Metropolitan Magistrate had correctly declined to frame any charges under Section 498-A IPC.” 22. Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of the same High Court in Capt. Rajinder Tiwari v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ Criminal Revision Petition No. 872 of 2006 decided on 14-12-2006] stating: “9. As already indicated above, insofar as the charge under Section 498-A IPC is concerned, that issue is no longer open for debate. The same has been decided by this Court in Mohit Gupta [Mohit Gupta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2006) 3 JCC 1923] applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma5. Since the marriage between Rajinder and Meenakshi was a nullity in view of the pendency of Rajinder's divorce proceedings qua his first wife, the offence under Section 498-A, which is specific to ‘husband’, would not be maintainable, therefore, the impugned order needs to be corrected on this ground also.” 23. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in John Idiculla v. State of Kerala [2005 MLJ (Cri) 841 (Ker)] relying on Reema Aggarwal6 gave a wider meaning to the word “second wife” to hold: “25. The test under Section 498-A IPC is whether in the facts of each case, it is probable that a woman is treated by friends, relatives, husband or society as a ‘wife’ or as a mere ‘mistress’. If from the pleadings and evidence the Court finds that the woman concerned is regarded as wife and not as a mere mistress, she can be considered to be a ‘wife’ and consequently as ‘the relative of the husband’ for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC. Proof of a legal marriage in the rigid sense as required under civil law is unnecessary for establishing an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The expression ‘marriage’ or ‘relative’ can be given only a diluted meaning which a common man or society may attribute to those concepts in the common parlance, for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC. A second wife who is treated as wife by the husband, relatives, friends or society can be considered to be ‘the relative of the husband’ for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC. If she inflicts cruelty on the legally wedded wife of the husband, an offence under Section 498-A IPC will not lie against her.” 24. Applying the principles laid down in various decisions referred to above, we have no doubt in our mind, that the appellant is not a relative of the husband of the first informant. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.” 6. In the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the continuation of criminal proceedings against the Petitioners would constitute a manifest abuse 5 of the process of law and an unwarranted harassment. The Petitioners, not being relatives of the husband, are clearly outside the purview of Section 498- A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and the allegations against them, being vague and general, cannot sustain a criminal trial. 7. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.C.No.79 of 2021 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rampachodavaram, East Godavari District, are hereby quashed insofar as they pertain to the Petitioners/Accused Nos.4 and 5 alone. As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 09.03.2026 VTS