1 2026:CGHC:27023-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 536 of 2026 Director General Of Chattisgarh Council Of Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan, Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Seoni Raipur (C.G.) PIN- 492001 --- Appellant versus 1 - Aryahind Yadav S/o Shri Sitaram Yadav Aged About 40 Years Working As Peon Chhattisgarh Council Of Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Seoni, Raipur R/o Trishul Chowk, Baiga Para City Kotwali District Durg (C.G.) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Higher Education Technical Education, Science And Technology Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) WA No. 539 of 2026 Director General Of Chattisgarh Council Of Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan, Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Deoni, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. PIN-492001. ---Appellant Versus 1 - Bhojeshwar Chandrakar S/o Shri Arun Chandrakar Aged About 33 Years Working As Peon, Chhattisgarh Council Of Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan, Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Seoni, Raipur, R/o Village Baigapara, City Kotwali, Durg, Distt. Durg, Chhattisgarh. BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.07.02 17:59:03 +0530 2 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Council Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan, Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Seoni, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) For Appellant : Dr.Saurabh Kumar Pande, Advocate For Respondent No.1 For Respondent No.2 : : Mr.Ravi Kumar Bhagat, Advocate Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 02.07.2026 1. Since the aforesaid two writ petitions are arising out of the common order dated 15.04.2026, they were clubbed & heard together and being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Heard Dr.Saurabh Kumar Pande, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr.Ravi Kumar Bhagat, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for respondent No.2/State. 3. The appellant has filed these writ appeals against the order dated 15.04.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in WPS Nos. 4741/2021 and 4676/2021 by which learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioners / respondent 3 No.1 herein. 4. The facts, as projected by the writ petitioners before learned Single Judge are as under:- (i) Initially the writ petitioners were appointed on Collector rate between the period 2011-2012. Looking to the services rendered by the writ petitioners, they have been regularized on the post of Peon in the regular pay scale of Rs. 4700-4750-7440/- + Grade Pay Rs.1300/- in the year 2014. On the completion of probation period, when their services were not confirmed, the petitioners moved representations and prayed for confirmation of their respective services. In the meanwhile, on account of reduction of salary, the writ petitioners preferred WPS No.3094/2017 which was allowed by this Court holding that the manner of reduction from salary of the writ petitioners from July 2017 is held illegal as such, the writ petitioners are entitled for salary in accordance with the contract of appointment. In the said writ petition, this Court reserved liberty to the respondents observing that it would be open for the respondents to take appropriate decision in the service matter of the writ petitioners on the basis of enquiry report collected by the respondents and due consideration of reply to the 4 show cause notices, by a speaking order in respect of each of the writ petitioners. Subsequently, the respondent authorities issued notices to the writ petitioners and sought explanation. (ii) After receipt of the said notices, the respective writ petitioners submitted their reply. In response to the further correspondence also, the writ petitioners submitted their reply and submitted the requisite information/documents sought for by the respondent authorities. Thereafter, the writ petitioners approached this Court by filing WPS No.5220/2019 and sought a direction towards the respondents authorities to consider their candidature for confirmation on the posts. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 17.07.2019 by directing the respondents authorities to consider the case of the writ petitioners with respect to their confirmation at the earliest preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the order. (iii) Thereagainst, the respondent No.2 preferred WA No.543/2019 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. Subsequently, the department preferred MCC No.226/2020 for extension of time to comply with the order of this Court passed in WPS 5 No.5220/2019, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 04.03.2020 and granted further 45 days time for deciding the claim of the writ petitioners. (iv) Subsequently, the respondent No.2 asked the writ petitioners to submit their respective marksheets of Class-VI and Class-VIII, Caste certificate issued by the High Power Committee, Domicile certificate duly attested by the Gazetted Officer, Police Verification Form etc. In respect of the said letter, the writ petitioners submitted all the documents, however, all of a sudden, vide order dated 21.09.2020, terminated the services of the writ petitioners. Being aggrieved, the petitioners moved the Departmental Appeal, however, the same has been rejected on 17.03.2021 in an illegal and arbitrary manner, that too, by a non-speaking and unreasoned order. (v) Thus, the petitioners had filed writ petitions, which were allowed by learned Single Judge by the impugned order. Hence, these writ appeals. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order dated 15.04.2026 passed by learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside as it suffers from serious errors of law and misappreciation of facts on record. Learned Single Judge has proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the Respondent 6 No. 1 had attained the status of a regular employee, whereas the record clearly demonstrates that his initial appointment was dehors the recruitment rules of the appellant organization and was therefore illegal and void ab initio. The finding that the Respondent No.1 had acquired service protection is contrary to the factual and legal position governing the case. The so-called temporary regularization of the Respondent No. 1 was also wholly without authority of law, having been made unilaterally by the then Director General, Chhattisgarh Council of Science and Technology (DG-COST), without any approval of the competent authority. Such an act could not have conferred any enforceable right in favour of the Respondent, nor could it cure the fundamental illegality attached to his initial engagement. Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate this foundational illegality, which vitiates the entire chain of service benefits claimed by the Respondent No.1. 6. It is further submitted that the Respondent No. 1 never attained confirmation in service and continued only as a probationer. A duly constituted Five-Member Committee had specifically recommended not to end his probation, which was duly approved by the competent authority. In absence of any order of confirmation or successful completion of probation, there could be no deemed regularization in law. Consequently, the protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India was not attracted, and there was no mandatory requirement of conducting a formal 7 departmental enquiry prior to passing the termination order. It is submitted that the Respondent was afforded adequate opportunity before two enquiry committees, thereby complying with the principles of natural justice. Learned Single Judge has also failed to consider the complete procedural and judicial history of the matter. In WPS No. 5220 of 2019, this Hon’ble Court had only directed consideration of the Respondent’s claim regarding probation, and in Writ Appeal No. 543 of 2019 dated 21.01.2020, the Division Bench categorically held that no right of confirmation exists and the matter was to be decided in accordance with law. Pursuant to the said directions, a Five-Member Committee was constituted on 25.11.2019, which again recommended against ending the probation of the Respondent. Despite these binding developments, learned Single Judge has erroneously proceeded on the basis of deemed confirmation. 7. He also submits that the finding recorded in paragraph 8 of the impugned order that the Respondent had already attained the status of a regular employee is perverse and contrary to the record, as no order of confirmation was ever issued and the probation period was never successfully completed. The consequential conclusion that Article 311(2) of the Constitution was attracted is therefore legally unsustainable. Similarly, the observations that termination was passed without compliance of mandatory enquiry proceedings are based on an incorrect assumption of confirmed status. Learned Single Judge has further 8 erred in ignoring the correct legal position emerging from earlier proceedings, wherein it was clearly held that the employer is entitled to examine the legality of appointment and take appropriate action after due process. Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that mere continuation in service or temporary engagement cannot override statutory recruitment rules or create a vested right of regularization, particularly when the initial appointment itself was illegal and beyond sanctioned strength. It is also relevant that the orders dated 02.08.2017, 17.08.2020, and 21.09.2020 passed by the competent authorities were all based on the categorical finding that the appointment and regularization of the Respondent were illegal. Learned Single Judge has failed to give due weight to these administrative determinations, which were taken after due application of mind and in accordance with the governing service framework of the appellant organization. The reliance placed by learned Single Judge on the principle that employees should not suffer for mistakes of the employer is misplaced in the facts of the present case. The appointment itself being illegal and contrary to constitutional requirements under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, no equity can be invoked to perpetuate such illegality. It is well settled that irregularity may sometimes be condoned, but illegality in initial appointment cannot be validated by passage of time or long service. 8. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that learned Single Judge has 9 failed to properly appreciate the earlier judgment passed in WPS No. 3094 of 2017, wherein it was clearly observed that while salary may be payable during subsistence of appointment, the employer is always entitled to take a decision regarding legality of appointment after conducting due enquiry and considering the response of the employees. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from non-consideration of material facts, misapplication of legal principles, and erroneous findings, and is liable to be set aside. He placed reliance in the matters of State of MP & Ors. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, (2007) 1 SCC 575, State of MP & Ors v. Yogesh Chandra Dubey, (2006) 8 SCC 67, Mahendra L. Jain & Ors. v. Indore Development Authority & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 639, R.S. Garg v. State of UP & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 430, Principal, Mehar Chand Polytechnic v. Anu Lamba, (2006) 7 SCC 161 and Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya and Another, (2021) 13 SCC 151. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1, while supporting the impugned order dated 15.04.2026 passed by learned Single Judge, submits that the same is well-reasoned and does not call for any interference by this Court. It is submitted that learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the material on record and has rightly held that the Respondent had completed the requisite period of probation and, in the absence of any valid order extending probation, he was to be treated as a regular employee. The finding of learned Single Judge is thus based on 10 settled principles of service jurisprudence and cannot be termed as perverse or erroneous. 10. It is further submitted that once the Respondent had continued in service beyond the probation period without any specific order extending or successfully terminating probation, the employer is deemed to have accepted his services, thereby conferring upon him the status of a regular employee. In such circumstances, the protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India was rightly held to be applicable, and learned Single Judge has correctly concluded that termination without conducting a proper departmental enquiry is vitiated in law. It is also submitted that the reliance placed by the appellant on alleged illegality in initial appointment or irregularity in process of engagement is misconceived and cannot be used to penalize the employee after long years of service. Learned Single Judge has rightly observed that any procedural lapse or irregularity in appointment is attributable to the employer, and the employee cannot be made to suffer for the fault of the administration, particularly when the employee has rendered continuous service. 11.t is further submitted that the reliance placed by the appellant on committee reports or administrative decisions cannot override constitutional safeguards and principles of natural justice. Learned Single Judge has correctly held that in the absence of any valid enquiry or justification for termination, the action of the appellant 11 was arbitrary, unjustified, and violative of due process. It is also submitted that the findings recorded by learned Single Judge are consistent with earlier judicial directions, which required the respondents to consider the case of the employee in accordance with law. Learned Single Judge has rightly found that despite such directions, the appellant proceeded to terminate the Respondent without proper justification or adherence to procedural safeguards. 12.Lastly, it is submitted that the impugned order is based on a correct appreciation of facts and law, particularly the settled position that long continuation in service coupled with completion of probation entitles an employee to protection of service jurisprudence. As such, the writ appeals deserve to be dismissed. 13.We have learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 14.Upon consideration of the material on record and the submissions advanced, this Court finds no infirmity in the well-reasoned order passed by learned Single Judge warranting interference in the present writ appeals. Learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the factual matrix and has rightly held that the writ petitioners had initially been engaged during the years 2011–2012 and were subsequently regularized in the year 2014 on the post of Peon in the regular pay scale. It is further an admitted position that after such regularization, the writ petitioners continuously discharged their duties for a substantial period of time, thereby 12 acquiring the status of regular employees in service jurisprudence. 15.Learned Single Judge has also rightly recorded a clear finding that the writ petitioners had completed the prescribed period of probation and that no order extending their probation period was ever placed on record by the respondents. In the absence of any such extension or adverse order during probation, the conclusion drawn that the writ petitioners attained the status of regular employees is fully justified. Consequently, the protection guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India was rightly held to be applicable, and learned Single Judge has correctly concluded that the respondents were bound to conduct a proper departmental enquiry before passing any order of termination having civil consequences. 16.Learned Single Judge has correctly applied the test that where an employee has a right to hold the post and is visited with civil consequences, termination without compliance of principles of natural justice and without proper enquiry cannot be sustained. The Court has rightly found that mere issuance of notices or seeking explanations cannot be equated with a full-fledged departmental enquiry as mandated under law. 17.The contention of the appellant regarding alleged illegality or irregularity in initial appointment/regularization has also been rightly rejected by learned Single Judge. It has been correctly held that any procedural irregularity, if at all, is attributable to the 13 employer and cannot be used to penalize employees who have served for years, particularly in the absence of any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation against them. Learned Single Judge has further correctly observed that long continuation in service pursuant to regularization cannot be lightly unsettled without following due process of law. As such, the reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant is distinguishable to the facts of the present case. 18.The finding that the impugned termination was passed in violation of such directions and without any justifiable basis is based on proper appreciation of record and cannot be termed perverse or arbitrary. Learned Single Judge has further rightly held that the orders of termination dated 21.09.2020 and the appellate order dated 17.03.2021 suffer from violation of principles of natural justice. The record clearly indicates that no proper departmental enquiry was conducted, no definite charges were framed, and no effective opportunity of hearing was granted to the writ petitioners before visiting them with civil consequences. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioners, having been regularized in service and having completed probation, were entitled to constitutional protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, is fully supported by law and facts. 19.In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered opinion that learned Single Judge has taken a correct, lawful, and 14 balanced view of the matter. The findings recorded are neither perverse nor contrary to record and do not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal error warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. 20.Accordingly, the writ appeals are devoid of merit and are hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu