1 2026:CGHC:27018-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1600 of 2026 Nagesh Naidu S/o Late K. Naidu Aged About 55 Years R/o Quarter No. 102, Block No. Ga, 1st Batallion CAF (Chhattisgarh Armed Forces) Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Durg Kotwali, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 2 - Balkishan Yadav S/o Shri Gokul Prasad Yadav Aged About 46 Years Address - Shankar Nagar, Mohan Nagar, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Dyna Bajrang, Advocate For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 02.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Dyna Bajrang, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashish ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent No.1. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘B.N.S.S.’) with the following relief(s):- “A. Quash and set aside the FIR No. 79/2025 dated 12.02.2025 i.e. Annexure P-1, registered at Police Station Durg Kotwali, District Durg, Chhattisgarh, wherein, allegations under Section 420 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 have been framed against the petitioner; B. Pass such other and further order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case;” 3. Brief facts of the case are that complainant/Respondent No. 2 and the petitioner were serving in the Police Department and were posted at the Office of the Inspector General of Police, Durg. On the basis of a written complaint, Crime No. 79/2025 was registered at Police Station Durg Kotwali, District Durg, for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner and his son, namely, Rahul Naidu wherein it has been alleged that in the year 2018, the complainant came into contact with one Rajendragiri, who informed him that he had earned substantial returns after investing money in the poultry business of the petitioner's son, Rahul Naidu. Allegedly influenced by such representation, the complainant withdrew money from his bank account and, on the request of the petitioner, invested a total sum of Rs.12,10,000/- in two installments in the poultry business of 3 Rahul Naidu. It is further alleged that when the complainant demanded the return of the invested amount, the petitioner and his son avoided repayment and thereby cheated him. During the pendency of the investigation, the petitioner was granted anticipatory bail by this Court in MCRC (A) No. 417 of 2025 by order dated 26.03.2025. Being aggrieved by the impugned FIR, the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned First Information Report is a gross abuse of the process of law and has been registered without any material disclosing the commission of the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is contended that the complainant's own version in the First Information Report reveals that the amount in question was voluntarily invested by him in the poultry business of the petitioner's son, Rahul Naidu, after being informed by one Rajendragiri about the profits earned from the said business. There is no allegation that the petitioner or his son had any dishonest or fraudulent intention at the inception of the transaction or that any false representation was made to induce the complainant to part with his money. It is further contended that at the highest, the allegations disclose a commercial or financial transaction arising out of an investment, the non-return of which may give rise to a civil dispute but does not constitute the offence of cheating. 5. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the essential 4 ingredients of Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code are conspicuously absent, as the First Information Report does not disclose any deception or dishonest inducement at the inception of the transaction. Mere failure to return the invested amount or breach of a promise, in the absence of fraudulent intention from the very beginning, cannot attract criminal liability. It is argued that the criminal proceedings have been initiated only to exert pressure upon the petitioner for recovery of the alleged amount and are, therefore, liable to be quashed. It is also submitted that this Court, while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner in MCRC (A) No. 417 of 2025 vide order dated 26.03.2025, has already taken note of the complainant's own admission that the amount was invested in the poultry business of the petitioner's son. In these circumstances, continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned First Information Report and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that the impugned First Information Report discloses the commission of cognizable offences and that the allegations made therein, if taken at their face value, clearly constitute a prima facie case against the petitioner. It is contended that the complainant has specifically alleged that he was induced to invest a substantial amount in the poultry business of the petitioner's son on the representations made by the 5 petitioner and that, despite repeated demands, the amount has neither been returned nor accounted for. Upon receipt of the complaint, the investigating agency registered the crime, conducted a lawful investigation, and found sufficient material to proceed against the accused persons. At this stage, the disputed questions of fact sought to be raised by the petitioner cannot be adjudicated in proceedings invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 7. Learned State counsel further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that the dispute is purely civil in nature is a matter of defence which can be examined only during trial after appreciation of the evidence. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to conduct a roving enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the First Information Report. Since the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged offences, no ground is made out for quashing the criminal proceedings. It is also submitted that an identical issue arising out of the similar offence and involving a similarly situated co-accused has already been considered by this Court in CRMP No. 1602 of 2026, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 01.07.2026. The petitioner stands on the same footing, and no distinguishing feature, either on facts or in law, has been pointed out so as to warrant a different view. Therefore, the present petition also deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 6 9. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.). 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 7 11. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self-restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 12. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court 8 cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Court reaffirmed the test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor and observed that criminal proceedings can be quashed at the threshold only when the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely demolishes the prosecution case, remains incapable of being refuted by the prosecution, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 13. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the allegations contained in the First Information Report, the material collected during the course of investigation and the charge- sheet filed by the investigating agency cannot be said to be so absurd, inherently improbable or wholly devoid of substance so as to warrant exercise of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. The prosecution case is not founded merely upon bald allegations made by the complainant. Rather, the Investigating Agency, after registration of the FIR, has undertaken a detailed investigation by recording the statements of the complainant and other investors, inspecting the place of occurrence, seizing the cheque allegedly issued by the co-accused Rahul Naidu, recovering the notebook containing the details of investments, and obtaining the bank 9 account statements of the complainant, his family members, the other investors and the accused persons. Upon consideration of the aforesaid material, the Investigating Agency has formed an opinion that a prima facie case is made out against both the petitioner and the co-accused Rahul Naidu for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 IPC. Whether the prosecution ultimately succeeds in establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt is a matter which necessarily falls within the exclusive domain of the trial Court. 14. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that he has been falsely implicated merely because he happens to be the father of the principal accused Rahul Naidu and that the entire business transaction was carried on exclusively by his son. It has also been contended that the complainant voluntarily invested money in the poultry trading business with an expectation of earning higher returns and, therefore, the dispute is purely civil in nature arising out of a failed commercial venture. This Court is unable to accept the said submission at this stage. The FIR specifically alleges that the petitioner, by taking advantage of his acquaintance and official relationship with the complainant, persuaded and induced him to invest money in the poultry trading business of his son by assuring him of lucrative returns. The prosecution has further alleged that similar inducements were extended to several other investors. Whether the petitioner had actively participated in inducing the complainant, whether he shared the common intention with the co-accused and whether he possessed the requisite dishonest intention from the inception are all disputed 10 questions of fact which can only be adjudicated after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence during trial. 15. Equally untenable is the submission that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 IPC. A plain reading of the FIR coupled with the material collected during investigation reveals specific allegations that the complainant was induced to invest substantial amounts in the poultry trading business upon assurances allegedly extended by both the petitioner and his son. The prosecution case further discloses that after collecting investments from the complainant and several other persons, neither the principal amount nor the promised returns were paid and the cheque allegedly issued towards repayment was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. Whether these allegations are ultimately proved and whether the ingredients constituting the offences alleged stand established are matters which can only be adjudicated upon during the course of trial and not in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. 16. The submission that the petitioner never received any money in his personal bank account and that the entire amount was transferred to the account of Rahul Naidu also cannot be accepted as a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings. The prosecution does not rest its case solely upon the transfer of money into the petitioner's account. Rather, it is the specific allegation that the petitioner played an active role in inducing the complainant and other investors to invest their 11 money in the business of his son by extending assurances regarding safety of investment and payment of attractive returns. Whether such allegations are ultimately established and whether the petitioner had any active role in the alleged transaction are matters which require appreciation of evidence and cannot be conclusively determined at this preliminary stage. 17. The grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by this Court also does not advance the case of the petitioner. The observations made while granting anticipatory bail are only prima facie in nature and cannot be construed as recording any finding on the merits of the prosecution case. It is well settled that the considerations governing grant of anticipatory bail are entirely different from those applicable while exercising inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings. Merely because the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail would not render the FIR or consequential charge-sheet liable to be quashed. 18. In the present case, the allegations contained in the First Information Report, if accepted at their face value, prima facie disclose the ingredients of the alleged offence. The defence sought to be projected by the petitioner, namely that the transaction was merely an investment in a business venture and gave rise only to a civil dispute, is a matter to be established before the trial Court on the basis of evidence. The existence of a possible civil remedy does not, by itself, bar criminal proceedings where the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. 12 19. This Court also finds that the petitioner, arising out of the similarly situated offence, had approached this Court by filing CRMP No. 1602 of 2026. The said petition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 01.07.2026. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any distinguishing feature in the present case which would justify taking a view different from the one already adopted by this Court in the aforesaid matter. Judicial discipline and the principle of consistency also warrant the same conclusion. 20. In view of the foregoing discussion and the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned First Information Report cannot be said to be an abuse of the process of law so as to warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner has failed to make out any exceptional case for quashing the criminal proceedings. 21. Accordingly, the petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. 22. It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra