2026:HHC:40552 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1002 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.9.2026 Date of Decision: 22.9.2026. Sachin Kumar …. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & anr. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s M.A. Safee, Pranav Kaushal and Saurav, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. dfdf Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 187 of 2025, dated 10.12.2025, registered at Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:40552 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant (name withheld to protect her identity) and the petitioner met on Instagram and started chatting. The petitioner represented that he was an Excise Inspector and was posted at Trichy. The informant revealed that she was residing with her daughter and that her husband had expired. The petitioner told her that he was a bachelor. He expressed a desire to marry the informant. The informant agreed. Later, the petitioner demanded ₹1,00,000/- from the informant, which was paid by the informant. He visited Dharamshala. The petitioner and the informant met in Pine View Hotel on 24th October. The petitioner promised to marry the informant and maintained sexual relations with her. The informant inquired as to when he would marry her, but he put off the matter. The petitioner returned. The informant insisted upon marrying the petitioner, but he prevaricated. The informant made inquiries and found that the petitioner was married, and he had a child aged 2 years. The informant confronted the petitioner, but the petitioner blocked her. The informant had transferred ₹86,000/- to the petitioner by means of UPI. The petitioner and the informant had also taken photographs with 2026:HHC:40552 each other. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The informant’s statement was recorded before the learned Magistrate. The statements of two employees of Hotel Pine View were taken, and the copy of the visitor register was also seized. The financial transactions were found between the petitioner and the informant. The material objects were sent to the FSL, and the report is awaited. The charge-sheet was filed before the Court after the completion of the investigation against the petitioner. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it. It has been asserted that the ingredients of Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita were not satisfied in the present case. The informant is a mature and educated adult woman aged 36 years, whereas the petitioner is aged 29 years. There is a substantial difference in the ages of the parties, and the informant's version that she was deceived is not believable. The Investigating Officer has collected material relating to the communication between the parties, their meetings, hotel records, bank transactions, and call detail records, which does 4 2026:HHC:40552 not establish dishonest intention at the inception of the alleged promise. The parties were known to each other since February 2025, and they remained in regular communication for a considerable period. They were in touch with each other even after the meeting dated 24.10.2025, which falsifies the informant’s version. The petitioner had visited Dharamshala for the treatment of his skin ailment, and it is highly inconceivable that the informant would have entered into a physical relationship with the petitioner because of the prevalent skin ailment. There are various discrepancies in the statements of the informant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 4. I have heard M/s M.A. Safee, Parveen Kaushal and Saurav, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr M.A. Safee, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable 2026:HHC:40552 offence. The informant had got issued a legal notice through her learned counsel on 9.12.2025 demanding ₹3,25,000/- along with interest, and lodged the FIR on the next day. The statements of the employees of the hotel do not corroborate the informant’s version that the informant and the petitioner had visited the hotel. There is no evidence that the petitioner had a dishonest intention right from the beginning. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tilak Raj Vs. State of H.P. (2016) 4 SCC 140 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was already married and could not have married the informant. He had entered into a sexual relationship with the informant without any intention of marrying her, and these facts prima facie satisfy the requirements of Section 69 of the BNS. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court should be left to adjudicate the matter. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:40552 7. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2026:HHC:40552 (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the 8 2026:HHC:40552 accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 2026:HHC:40552 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 10. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of the process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10 2026:HHC:40552 12. The informant had specifically stated in the FIR that she came to know that the petitioner was already married and he had a child. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner could not have married the informant without divorcing the earlier wife. There is no evidence that the marriage between the petitioner and his wife had been dissolved. Hence, prima facie, the representation made by the petitioner that he intended to marry the informant was false. 13. Section 69 of BNS provides that whoever, by making a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling it, has sexual intercourse with her, shall be punished with imprisonment. In the present case, the averments in the FIR show that the petitioner had made a promise to marry the informant, which persuaded her to enter into a sexual relationship. The petitioner was married and could not have married the informant; therefore, he had no intention of fulfilling the promise made by him to the informant. Thus, prima facie, the ingredients of Section 69 of BNS are duly satisfied. 14. The police recorded the statements of Ravi Chander, Manager, Hotel Pine View, and Chaman Lal, employee of Hotel 2026:HHC:40552 Pine View. Ravi Chander stated that the informant visited the hotel on 22.10.2024 and demanded a room on 24.10.2024. He told the informant that a room would be available. He identified the informant as the person who had visited the hotel to make inquiries regarding the room. Chaman Lal stated that the informant visited the hotel with a boy. They demanded a room, and he allotted room number 103 to them. Chaman Lal told them that the entry would be made in the visitor register when the Manager would come. The petitioner and the informant went to Room No. 103. Thereafter, they left. He identified the informant. The payment was made through UPI. 15. It was submitted that the statements of these witnesses are not corroborated by an entry in the visitor register and they are making false statements. This submission cannot be appreciated at this stage. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the 12 2026:HHC:40552 complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 16. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the 2026:HHC:40552 position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23, this Court, while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. 14 2026:HHC:40552 The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 18. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited, as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 19. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 2026:HHC:40552 20. Heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that a legal notice was issued on behalf of the informant on 9.12.2025 demanding an amount of ₹3,25,000/-. It is difficult to see how this notice will help the petitioner. It was specifically asserted in para-2 that the petitioner had forced the informant to maintain a physical relationship after making a promise. Thus, the notice contains the necessary averment regarding the maintenance of a sexual relationship between the parties based on a promise. If the demand for money paid by the informant to the petitioner was made by means of a notice, it will not falsify the allegations of entering into a sexual relationship with the petitioner on the promise to marry. 21. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are inherently improbable. The informant is an educated woman aged 36 years, whereas the petitioner is aged 29 years; therefore, it is highly improbable that the petitioner would have made a false promise to marry the informant. This submission cannot be accepted at this stage. The allegations in the FIR specifically show that the informant is a widow, and she could have fallen for the promise to marry her, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the allegations in the FIR. 16 2026:HHC:40552 22. The judgment in Tilak Raj (supra) related to rape, which is altogether a different offence defined under Sections 63 and 64 of the BNS, having distinct ingredients. Further, the judgment was on merits, and it was found that the allegations of the victim were not probable. Such a finding cannot be recorded in the present case at this stage without recording the evidence. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. 23. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials 2026:HHC:40552 which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 26. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 27. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22nd September, 2026 (Chander)