1 2026:CGHC:26766-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 492 of 2026 1 - Shamshad Khan S/o Sikandar Khan, Aged About 37 Years, R/o Ward No. 07 Lalpur Road, Bagbahra, Ps. And Tehsil Bagbahra, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ... Applicant versus 1 - B.P. Gupta S/o Lalan Prasad, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Devendra Nagar, Near Bijli Office, Ps Civil Lines, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Idrish S/o Late Ibrahim Hauji Shakur, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Near Noori Masjid, Nanidaman, Alafariya, Post Daman, Ps Daman, Union Territory Of Daman Diu. 3 - Shabbir S/o Ibrahim Hauji, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Near Noori Masjid, Nanidaman, Alafariya, Post Daman, Ps Daman, Union Territory Of Daman Diu. 4 - Haneef S/o Ibrahim Hauji Shakur, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Near Noori Masjid, Nanidaman, Alafariya, Post Daman, Ps Daman, Union Territory Of Daman Diu. 5 - Wahid S/o Ibrahim Hauji Shakur, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Near Noori Masjid, Nanidaman, Alafariya, Post Daman, Ps Daman, Union Territory Of Daman Diu. 6 - Narayan Singh Dhruw S/o Ledgaram Dhruw, Aged About 57 Years, R.I. Pithora, R/o Ward No. 2, Shanti Nagar, Bagbahra, P.S. Bagbahra, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. 7 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Sho Ps Bagbahra, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Adil Minhaj, Advocate For the State : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer SOURABH PATEL Digitally signed by SOURABH PATEL Date: 2026.07.02 10:22:45 +0530 2 Division Bench Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal (Order on Board) (01.07.2026) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J, 1. This revision is directed against the judgment dated 03.01.2026 passed in Criminal Appeal No. H-22/2025 by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, whereby the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bagbahara in Criminal Case No. 1053/2023, by which the accused/respondents herein were acquitted of the charges under Sections 418, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Facts of the case, in short, are that on 02.12.2001, a written complaint was lodged by Sajjan Singh Netam, the then SDO Revenue Mahasamund, at P.S. Bagbahara, inter-alia, stating that a mutation case No. 31/A/06/1998-99, Fatima Begum vs. Idrees and others, in respect of land measuring 27858 sq. ft. of Late Ibrahim situated at P.H. No. 119/66 was pending in the Court of Additional Tehsildar, Bagbahara. Despite pendency of the aforesaid case, Patwari Narayan Singh Dhruw effected mutation of the said land in favour of four sons of the first wife of Late Ibrahim and the said mutation was certified by the then Additional Tehsildar B.P. Gupta. Thereafter, on the basis of the aforesaid order, the accused persons sold 1775 sq. ft. out of the said land to one Harilal Singh on 01.10.2001. In the meanwhile, on 3 19.09.2001, the Additional Tehsildar cancelled the aforesaid order. Thereafter, the learned JMFC though firstly took cognizance of the matter, but after conducting full-fledged trial acquitted the accused persons vide order dated 07.02.2025 on the ground that no charges under Sections 418, 420, 467, 468, 471/34 of IPC were found proved against them. Against which, the applicant herein preferred appeal before the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Mahasamund, which was also dismissed vide impugned order dated 03.01.2026. Feeling aggrieved by the said orders, this revision has been filed before this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that both the Courts below were absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused/respondents for the aforesaid offences by recording findings which are perverse and contrary to the record and, therefore, the same are liable to be set aside. Thus, this revision be allowed. 4. Learned counsel for the State supported the impugned orders and prays for dismissal of this revision. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 6. At the very outset, it would be profitable to notice relevant decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand¹, whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the scope of interference in an order of acquittal is very limited and observed as under: 4 "11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: "38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) '42. From the above decisions, in considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate 5 court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) "8. 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 6 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence a on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record." 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 7. In the case at hand, a careful perusal of the record reveals that the learned trial Court, after conducting a full-fledged trial, came to the conclusion that in the absence of cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence with regard to the alleged offences, the accused/respondents were entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondents of the aforesaid offences. The said findings have also been affirmed by the learned Appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 03.01.2026. Even otherwise, it is settled law that the appellate/revisional Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal where two views are 7 reasonably possible on the evidence on record, even if the view of the appellate/revisional Court may be the more probable one, unless the view taken by the trial Court is perverse, illegal or otherwise unsustainable. The concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below are neither perverse nor contrary to the record. As such, we do not find any merit in this revision and the same is liable to be dismissed. 8. In view of aforesaid discussion, we do not find any good ground to invoke our revisional jurisdiction against the impugned orders. Accordingly, this revision is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge $ourabh