1 2026:CGHC:27212 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1218 of 2026 Judgment Reserved on 25.06.2026 Judgment Delivered on 02.07.2026 1. Vinod Agrawal @ Maghu Agrawal, S/o Jogiram Agrawal, aged about 50 Years, R/o -Mahuapara, Raipur, Mainroad, Police Station Rajpur, District- Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. 2. Praveen Agrawal, S/o Jogiram Agrawal, aged about 45 Years, R/o Mahuapara, Rajpur, Mainroad, Police Station Rajpur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. ...Appellants versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through- Police Station Rajpur, Disrict Balrampur Ramanujganj C.G. 2. Santram, S/o Late Bahira, aged about 30 Years, R/o Bhaski Chowki Bariyo, Tehsil Rajpur, District -Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Rishabh Gupta, Advocate. For State/Respondent No.1 : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General. For Objector/Respondent No.2 : Mr. K. Rohan, Advocate. (Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal) CAV Judgment AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.07.02 16:58:38 +0530 2 1. This appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short, ‘the Act, 1989’) has been preferred against the order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh, in Special S.T. (Atrocities) Case No. 28/2025, whereby the application filed by the present appellants under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short, ‘BNSS’) seeking discharge has been rejected and charges have been framed against them for offences punishable under Sections 108 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNS’) and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that deceased, Bahira, father of the complainant- Santram, committed suicide by hanging himself in a cattle shed situated within his residential premises during the intervening night of 21.04.2025 and 22.04.2025. On 22.04.2025, a merg intimation was recorded, wherein the complainant- Santram stated that his father had committed suicide due to unknown reasons and did not express any suspicion against any person. Subsequently, on 05.05.2025, an FIR bearing Crime No.103/2025 was registered on the basis of a report made by the complainant, alleging that the appellants and other co-accused persons had been continuously pressurizing and threatening the deceased to vacate certain land on the basis of a sale deed allegedly executed in their favour, and that due to such pressure, the deceased committed suicide. After completion of the investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet as well 3 as a supplementary charge-sheet against the appellants and other co-accused persons for offences punishable under Sections 108 and 3(5) of the BNS and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. The appellants filed an application under Section 250 of the BNSS seeking discharge, however, the learned trial Court rejected the said application, holding that a prima facie case is made out against them. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the entire prosecution case is founded upon a land dispute. It is argued that the earliest version of the complainant- Santram, as reflected in the merg intimation, completely demolishes the subsequent allegations, inasmuch as the complainant himself stated that the deceased had committed suicide due to unknown reasons and did not express any suspicion against any person. It is further submitted that FIR No. 90/2025 was registered by the same complainant on 23.04.2025 against the present appellants and others in relation to the alleged fraudulent sale transaction of the land. However, no allegation of abetment of suicide was made therein, despite the fact that the said FIR was lodged much after the death of the deceased. He further submits that FIR No. 90/2025 has subsequently been quashed by this Court in W.P. (Cr.) No. 540/2025 vide order dated 14.10.2025 on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties. It is contended that the very dispute, which is projected by the prosecution as the reason for the suicide, already stands settled between the parties. It is 4 also submitted that there is an unexplained delay of about fifteen days in lodging the present FIR, which was registered on 05.05.2025. There was also no suicide note of the deceased. He also submits that none of the examined prosecution witnesses has supported the allegation that the appellants instigated or abetted the deceased to commit suicide. Particular reliance is placed upon the deposition of the complainant, Santram (PW-1), who has admitted in his cross- examination that at the time of lodging the merg intimation and during the inquest proceedings, he had not raised any suspicion against any person and had not disclosed any allegation of harassment or instigation by the appellants. It is also submitted that no witness has stated that any caste-related act was committed by the appellants, therefore, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 is also not attracted. On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the appellants be discharged from all the offences levelled against them. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of Supreme Court in the matters of Balaji Jaiswal vs State of Chhattisgarh and Anr., 2026 SCC Online SC 602; Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 SCC Online SC 1725; Ram Prakash Chadha vs State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 651; Shabbir Hussain vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors, (2021) 17 SCC 807; Dr. Anand Rai vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. 2026 SCC Online SC 187 & Patan Jamal Vali vs State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 16 SCC 225. 5 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposed the appeal and supported the impugned order. He has raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the present appeal. It is submitted that the impugned order pertains to the rejection of the discharge application and framing of charges, and therefore, is in the nature of an interlocutory order. According to the State counsel, in view of Section 14-A(1) of the Act, 1989, such an order is not appealable, and hence, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. On merits, it is submitted that the material collected during investigation prima facie discloses the commission of the alleged offences. The statements of the witnesses recorded during investigation indicate that the appellants had continuously harassed and threatened the deceased in connection with a land dispute, which ultimately led him to commit suicide. It is further submitted that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is only required to examine whether a prima facie case exists and is not expected to undertake a detailed appreciation of the evidence. In such circumstances, no interference with the impugned order is warranted. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellants, on the issue of maintainability, submits that an order refusing discharge or framing charges is neither a purely interlocutory order nor a final order. It is argued that such an order substantially affects the valuable right of the accused to seek discharge from criminal proceedings and, therefore, cannot be treated as an interlocutory order. In support of 6 the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2022) 15 SCC 720. 6. Counsel for the Objector/complainant has not raised any objection on the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellants. 7. I have considered the rival submissions on the issue of maintainability. 8. Section 14-A(1) of the Act, 1989 provides a right of appeal against any judgment, sentence, or order passed by a Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, except an interlocutory order. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether an order rejecting a discharge application and framing charges can be treated as an interlocutory order, so as to bar an appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the Act, 1989. 9. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Rai (supra), after considering the earlier Constitution Bench judgment in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, has clearly held that an order framing charges or refusing discharge is neither an interlocutory order nor a final order. It has further been held that discharge is a valuable right of the accused. Where the material on record does not disclose the commission of any offence, the superior courts have the power to interfere to prevent misuse of the legal process and to secure the ends of justice. Paragraphs 14 and 17 of the said judgment are relevant and are reproduced hereinbelow: ““14. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory 7 nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) of CrPC. That apart, this Court in the above-cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases. As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its afore-stated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law. xxxx xxxx xxxx 17. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused. In line with the fact that the High Court and the court below have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this case and other related aspects concerning improvement of witness statements, it is necessary for the High Court to reconsider the entire matter and decide the revision petition afresh. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order dated 28.11.2018 and remand the case back to the High Court for its reconsideration in accordance with law.” 10. The above legal position laid down in Sanjay Kumar Rai (supra) clearly applies to the present case. The order rejecting the discharge application compels the appellants to face a full criminal trial. Such an order affects important rights of the accused and, therefore, cannot be treated as a mere interlocutory order. 8 11. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the preliminary objection raised by the learned State counsel has no merit. The impugned order, by which the discharge application has been rejected and charges have been framed, is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 14-A(1) of the Act, 1989. Therefore, the bar contained in the said provision does not apply. The present criminal appeal is thus held to be maintainable and is accordingly considered on merits. 12. Having held that the appeal is maintainable, this Court now proceeds to examine the case on merits. 13. The allegation against the appellants is of abetment of suicide punishable under Section 108 of BNS, which corresponds to Section 306 of IPC. To establish an offence under Section 108 BNS, the prosecution must first prove that there was abetment by the accused, as defined under Section 45 BNS (which corresponds to Section 107 IPC), which led the deceased to commit suicide. Section 45 BNS provides as follows:– “45. Abetment of a thing- A person abets the doing of a thing, who- (a) Instigates any person to do that thing; or (b) Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if any act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or (c) Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” 9 14. In light of the above legal position, the facts of the present case are required to be examined carefully. 15. In the matter of Balaji Jaiswal (supra), the Supreme Court has held in paras 10 to 12, which read as under:- ““10.The charge as framed against the appellant is under Section 306 and in alternate under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. In this regard, we may refer to a recent decision in Prakash (supra) to which one of us (K.V. Viswanathan, J.) was a party. Therein, the appellants had sought discharge from the criminal proceedings filed under Section 306 of the Penal Code. Dealing with the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107 of the Penal Code, it was held as under: "13. Section 306 of the IPC has two basic ingredients-first, an act of suicide by one person and second, the abetment to the said act by another person(s). In order to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, it must necessarily be proved that the accused person has contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. To prove such contribution or involvement, one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied. 14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. 15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive 10 act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide. xxxx xxxx xxxx 18. More recently, in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, (2025) 2 SCC 116, this Court has relied on S.S. Chheena (supra) to hold that the element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred, instead it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law, that is deliberate and conspicuous intention to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide, would remain unfulfilled. This Court observed as follows: "18. For a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, it is a well- established legal principle that the presence of clear mens rea- the intention to abet the act is essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct action by the accused that led the deceased to take his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide." 19.It is, therefore, evident that the positive act of instigation is a crucial element of abetment. While dealing with an issue of a similar nature, this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, laid down the parameters of what would be constituted to be an act of instigation. This Court observed as follows:- 11 “20.Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." 20. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". It has been held that in order to satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence, however, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Applying the law to the facts of the case, this Court went on to hold that a word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. xxxx xxxx xxxx 26.Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person is the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. However, it has been clarified on many occasions that in order to link the act of instigation to the act of suicide, the two occurrences must be in close proximity to each other so as to form a nexus or a chain, with the act of suicide by the deceased being a direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person." 11.From the aforesaid decision, it becomes clear that for sustaining a charge under Section 306 of the Penal Code, it has to be shown that the accused persons had 12 contributed to the suicide by the deceased through some direct or indirect act. Section 107 of the Penal Code has thereafter been referred to hold that there ought to be some instigation or incitement that would reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide, thus, leading the victim to such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. There ought to be some material to indicate a positive act of instigation, which is a crucial component of abetment. Instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person has been held to be the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. The act of instigation also has to be in close proximity to the act of suicide so as to form the nexus or a chain to indicate that the act of suicide was the direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person. Incidentally, the decision in Ramesh Kumar (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent has been considered and relied upon in Prakash (supra). 12.The material forming part of the charge sheet would, therefore, have to be examined keeping in mind the above perspective. Existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence would be necessary. On going through the various statements recorded by the prosecution, the same indicate that deceased Komal was addicted to liquor and that the appellant and Komal used to have liquor together. The son of the deceased, Aakash, had stated that whenever his father used to drink from his money, Revati Bai used to scold him. However, when the appellant used to bring liquor for him, she did not object. In his subsequent statement recorded after about five months from the incident, he suspected that there were illicit relations between his mother and the appellant. Statements of other family members and neighbours indicate the addiction of Komal to liquor. Except such statements and general allegations of illicit relationship between Revati Bai and the appellant, there is no material whatsoever to indicate any instigation or incitement at the instance of the appellant that could lead to Komal committing suicide. On 05.05.2024, the appellant had been to the house of Komal and they had liquor together between 09: 00 Ρ.Μ. to 10: 00 P.M. There is no material whatsoever indicating any act of instigation or incitement or abetment by the appellant. The suicide was stated to have been committed in the morning of 07.05.2024. No 13 material whatsoever as regards the proximity between the meeting of the appellant and the deceased, and his committing suicide is available on record. It, thus, will have to be held that the requirements of Section 107 of the Penal Code are not satisfied in the present case.”” 16. Similarly, in Abhinav Mohan Delkar (supra), the Supreme Court has held as paras 20 to 23 which read as under:- ““20. Again, the ingredients under Sections 107 and 306 of the I.P.C. was interpreted by one of us in Prakash v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SC Online SC 3835 (B.R.Gavai J., as he then was) in the following manner: “14.Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well-established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. 15.The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide." 21.It was held that abetment involves the mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing, and without a positive act on the part of the accused, in aiding or instigating or 14 abetting the deceased to commit suicide, a conviction cannot be sustained. 22. What comes out essentially from the various decisions herein before cited is that, even if there is allegation of constant harassment, continued over a long period; to bring in the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107, still there has to be a proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide was the direct consequence of such continuous harassment, the last proximate incident having finally driven the subject to the extreme act of taking one's life. Figuratively, 'the straw that broke the camel's back'; that final event, in a series, that occasioned a larger, sudden impact resulting in the unpredictable act of suicide. What drove the victim to that extreme act, often depends on individual predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively and demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is the test to find mens rea. Merely because the victim was continuously harassed and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his life cannot by itself result in finding a positive instigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of the victim. 17. The scope of consideration at the stage of discharge has also been explained by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Prakash Chadha (supra), wherein it has been held in paras 24 & 25 which read as under:- “24.In the light of the decisions referred supra, it is thus obvious that it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused concerned has been made out. We are of the considered view that a caution has to be sounded for the reason that the chances of going beyond the permissible jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, and entering into the scope of power under Section 232 CrPC, cannot be ruled out as such instances are aplenty. In this context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679. Taking note of the language of Section 227 CrPC, is in negative terminology and that the language in Section 15 232 CrPC, is in the positive terminology and considering this distinction between the two, this Court held that it would not be open to the Court while considering an application under Section 227 CrPC, to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence alleged improbability and then proceed to discharge the accused holding that the statements existing in the case therein are unreliable. It is held that doing so would be practically acting under Section 232 CrPC, even though the said stage has not reached. In short, though it is permissible to sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused, on appreciation of the admissibility and the evidentiary value such materials brought on record by the prosecution is impermissible as it would amount to denial of opportunity to the prosecution to prove them appropriately at the appropriate stage besides amounting to exercise of the power coupled with obligation under Section 232 CrPC, available only after taking the evidence for the prosecution and examining the accused. 25. Even after referring to the aforesaid decisions, we think it absolutely appropriate to refer to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kaushalya Devi v. State of M.P., 2003 SCC Online MP 672 It was held in the said case that if there is no legal evidence, then framing of charge would be groundless and compelling the accused to face the trial is contrary to the procedure offending Article 21 of the Constitution of India. While agreeing with the view, we make it clear that the expression "legal evidence" has to be construed only as evidence disclosing prima facie case, "the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith."” 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Shabbir Hussain (supra), has also reiterated in paras 3 & 4 which read as under:- “3.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the High Court committed an error in allowing the criminal revision, especially after 10 witnesses had already been examined. He referred to the suicide notes that were written by the deceased Firoz Khan, to support his submissions that Firoz was harassed by Respondents 2 to 4, due to which he took his own life. 16 He argued that abetment of the offence of suicide by Respondents 2 to 4 is prima facie made out as the harassment by Respondents 2 to 4 facilitated the act of suicide by the deceased. 4. In order to bring a case within the provision of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigating or by doing a certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide.” 19. The aforesaid principles make it abundantly clear that even at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is required to satisfy itself that the material collected during investigation discloses the essential ingredients constituting the alleged offence. Mere existence of suspicion is not sufficient unless such suspicion arises from material disclosing the ingredients of the offence. 20. After examining the material on record in light of the above principles, this Court finds that the earliest statement of the complainant, Santram, is of great importance. Immediately after the death, a merg intimation was recorded on 22.04.2025, in which the complainant- Santram clearly stated that the deceased had committed suicide for unknown reasons. At that time, he did not express any suspicion against the present appellants or any other person. It is also important to note that the complainant himself lodged an FIR (Crime No. 90/2025) on 23.04.2025 regarding the alleged fraudulent sale of the same land. Even in that FIR, no allegation was made that the appellants had instigated or abetted the deceased to commit suicide. Subsequently, the said FIR was quashed by this Court on 14.10.2025 in W.P.(Cr.) No. 540 of 2025 on 17 the basis of a compromise between the parties. This indicates that the land dispute, which is alleged to be the reason for harassment, was already settled. The present FIR was filed on 05.05.2025, about 15 days after the incident, and no satisfactory explanation for this delay has been provided. It is also not disputed that there was no suicide note of the deceased. It is further important to note that at the time of merg intimation and during the inquest proceedings, the complainant did not raise any suspicion against the appellants, nor did he state that the deceased was being harassed or instigated by them. If there had been any such continuous harassment or instigation, it would have been naturally disclosed at the earliest stage or reflected in some material. However, no such material is available on record. There is also no indication that the deceased had communicated any such allegation either through a suicide note or to his family members. Further, none of the witnesses examined so far have stated that the appellants instigated or abetted the deceased to commit suicide. At the most, the material indicates that there was a land dispute and that the appellants were asking the deceased to vacate the land. It is also pertinent to note that the present appellants were neither the purchasers nor parties to the alleged sale deed executed by the wife of the deceased, namely, Jubaro Bai. Additionally, no objection has been raised by the counsel for the objector/complainant- Santram to the prayer made by the appellants. In these circumstances, the material on record is not sufficient to constitute the offence of abetment of suicide. 18 21. Therefore, this Court finds that none of the essential ingredients of Section 108 of the BNS are made out against the appellants in the present case. There is no material to show any instigation, intentional aid, conspiracy, or active involvement on the part of the appellants. There is also no evidence of any proximate act immediately preceding the suicide which compelled the deceased to take such an extreme step. Mere asking the deceased to vacate the land or asserting rights over the property does not amount to abetment of suicide. 22. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that even if the entire prosecution case is accepted as true, the basic requirements of Section 108 of the BNS (which is similar to Section 306 of the IPC) are not satisfied. The learned Special Judge failed to properly consider these essential aspects and rejected the discharge application without adequate reasoning. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in respect of the offence under Section 108 of the BNS. 23. With regard to the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989, the Supreme Court in Dr. Anand Rai (supra) has held in para 10 which reads as under:- ““10.We must turn back to the application for discharge and examine the averment regarding changes under the SCST Act. The relevant portion of the application is extracted as under:- "h) Charges levied under SC/ST Act Applicant was charged under Section 3(1)(r) 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The essential ingredient to constitute this offence are- There must be victim of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 19 ii.Use of casteist or derogatory word in Public place against the victim. iii. Knowledge of accused regarding the caste of the victim. iv. Physical Presence of accused at the time of Incident. That, it is essential to mention here that the FIR and Final Report both are silent pertaining to use of derogatory word or casteist term. Further, there is no specific averment pertaining to use of casteist word against the original complainant. None of the above mentioned ingredient is available in the present matter, hence the applicant may kindly be discharged from this charge." In its judgment on the application, the learned Trial Court dealt with the proposed charge under the SCST Act alongside a number of provisions of IPC. For a charge under the above quoted provisions of the SCST Act to be established, several elements must be present. The accused must first commit an offence under the IPC, such as assault, robbery, or any other crime punishable with ten or more years of imprisonment. The act must be directed against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, or against property that belongs to them, reflecting the special protection the law affords to historically marginalized communities. In addition, the accused must have knowledge that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that the property belongs to such a person. This requirement of awareness is essential to the application of the law. Finally, the punishment prescribed under this sub-section is life imprisonment along with a fine, underscoring the gravity of offences committed against vulnerable communities. Section 3(va) deals with specific atrocities listed in the Schedule of the Act, including forced labour, harassment, social exclusion, or damage to property that target SC or ST persons. To attract liability under this provision, the accused must commit one of the scheduled offences against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or their property. The offender must know the caste identity of the victim or that the property belongs to 20 them, ensuring that the law applies to deliberate acts of caste-based harm. The punishment for these offences is as specified under the Penal Code, 1860 along with an additional fine, providing flexibility to address a range of atrocities that may not carry ten years or more of imprisonment but still require special protection for the victim. The question that then arises, is who were present before the learned Trial Court that, in its appreciation of the material on record, met the standard required for framing of charge? 24. Similarly, the Supreme court in the matter of Patan Jamal Vali (supra), has held in paras 54 to 57 which read as under:- ““54.The key words are "on the ground that such person is a member of an SC or ST". The expression "on the ground" means "for the reason" or "on the basis of". The above provision (as it stood at the material time prior to its amendment, which will be noticed later) is an example of a statute recognising only a single axis model of oppression. As we have discussed above, such single axis models require a person to prove a discrete experience of oppression suffered on account of a given social characteristic. However, when oppression operates in an intersectional fashion, it becomes difficult to identify, in a disjunctive fashion, which ground was the basis of oppression because often multiple grounds operate in tandem. Larrisa Behrendt, an aboriginal legal scholar from Australia, has poignantly stated the difficulty experienced by women facing sexual assault, who are marginalised on different counts, to identify the source of their oppression: “"When an Aboriginal woman is the victim of a sexual assault, how, as a black woman, does she know whether it is because she is hated as a woman and is perceived as inferior or if she is hated because she is Aboriginal, considered inferior and promiscuous by nature?" 55. Being cognizant of the limitation of Section 3(2) (v)- as it stood earlier- in dealing with matters of intersectionality, we are however bound to apply the standard that has been laid down in the law. The expression "on the ground" was considered in a two- Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Dinesh v. 21 State of Rajasthan, (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 1, where the Court speaking through Arijit Pasayat, J. held: (SCC p. 777, para 15) “15. Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2) (v) is that an offence must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim since she was a member of Scheduled Caste." (emphasis supplied) 56.The Court held that in the absence of evidence to that effect, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) would not stand established. This principle was subsequently followed in a two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170 where it was held that merely because a woman belongs to the SC & ST community, the provisions of the SC & ST Act would not be attracted in a case of sexual assault. This Court observed that there was no evidence to prove the commission of offence under Section 3(2) (v) of the SC & ST Act. 57. The contours of the terms "on the ground of" have been explicated by this Court in the following cases. In Asharfi v. State of U.P.47 ("Asharfi"), a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act cannot be sustained because the prosecution could not prove that the rape was committed only on the ground that the woman belonged to the SC & ST community. This Court speaking through R. Banumathi, J. held: (SCC p. 745, para 9) "9. The evidence and materials on record do not show that the appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act can be pressed into service only if it is proved that the rape has been committed on the ground that PW 3 Phoola Devi belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In the absence of evidence proving intention of the appellant in committing the offence upon PW 3 Phoola Devi only because she belongs to 22 Scheduled Caste community, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cannot be sustained."” (emphasis supplied) 25. Applying the above principles to the present case, this Court finds that neither the FIR, nor the merg intimation, nor the statements of witnesses contain any allegation that any act was committed against the deceased on account of his caste. There is no allegation of any caste-based abuse. No witness has stated that the appellants targeted the deceased because of his caste. The entire case of the prosecution is based on a alleged land dispute. The mere fact that the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Caste is not sufficient to attract Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. There must be material to show that the offence was committed on that ground, which is completely absent in the present case. Therefore, prima facie, Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 is not attracted. 26. The learned Trial Court, while rejecting the discharge application, failed to consider important aspects, namely that the earliest version of the complainant did not contain any allegation against the appellants, there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, there was no suicide note of the deceased, and the alleged land dispute forming the basis of the case had already been settled and the related FIR had also been quashed. The material on record does not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offences. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 23 27. In the opinion of this Court, even if the entire prosecution case is accepted as true, no grave suspicion arises against the appellants for the offences under Sections 108 and 3(5) of the BNS and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. Continuation of the criminal proceedings in the absence of the basic ingredients of the offences would amount to abuse of the process of law. 28. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Balrampur-Ramanujganj, C.G. in Special S.T. (Atrocities) Case No.28/2025, rejecting the appellants’ application under Section 250 BNSS, is set aside. Consequently, the order framing charges under Sections 108 and 3(5) of the BNS and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 is also set aside. Appellants, Vinod Agrawal @ Maghu Agrawal and Praveen Agrawal, are discharged from the said offences. 31. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Akhilesh 24