1 2026:HHC:40675 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 549 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.9.2026 Date of Decision: 23.9.2026. Kishori Lal ...Petitioner Versus State of HP ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Sandeep Sharma, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 18.9.2021, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 6.3.2020 and order of sentence dated 12.3.2020, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla, District Shimla (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:40675 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the accused Kishori Lal was convicted for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act) by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, in Sessions Trial No. 11 of 2013 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and pay a fine of ₹40,000/- with default clause. The convict applied for parole on 24.11. 2014. The Additional Director General of Prisons, Shimla, sanctioned 40 days' parole to the accused. He was released on parole on 13.4.2015. He was to surrender before the Jail authorities on 27.5.2015. A wireless message was sent to SHO Police Station, Sadar, for arresting the accused. The PO Cell of Hamirpur Police arrested the accused on 2.2.2019. The accused had overstayed parole by 03 years, 08 months, and 03 days. Hence, a complaint was filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 9 read with Section 8 of the H.P. Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (Prisoners Act) before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused. 3 2026:HHC:40675 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prisoners Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined Sushil Kumar (PW-1) to prove its case. 5. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) that he was convicted by the learned Special Judge for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. He admitted that he was released on parole and that parole was sanctioned to him by the Additional Director General of Prisons. He denied the rest of the prosecution case and claimed that he was innocent. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimony of Sushil Kumar proved that the accused was sentenced to imprisonment and parole was sanctioned to him. He was released from prison and failed to surrender within time. The accused claimed that his mental condition was not stable; 4 2026:HHC:40675 however, he had not produced any record. The accused had appeared before the Court, the notice of accusation was put to him, his statement was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and there was nothing to show that his mental condition was not proper. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prisoners Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of two years for the commission of the aforesaid offence. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur. He had applied for parole, which was sanctioned to him. He was released on parole and failed to return on time. The plea taken by the accused that he was mentally ill was not proved. No jail record was summoned to prove that the Medical Officer had diagnosed the accused with any mental ailment during his stay. The learned Trial Court had rightly 5 2026:HHC:40675 convicted and sentenced the accused, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court did not require any interference. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The prosecution examined only one witness, who had no personal knowledge of the overstay. The prosecution case rested upon official documents, but these were not properly proved. The explanation provided by the accused that he was suffering from mental illness and family difficulties, due to which he could not surrender in time, was highly probable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Sandeep Sharma, learned legal aid counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 10. Mr Sandeep Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below 6 2026:HHC:40675 erred in appreciating the material on record. The documents were not properly proved, and the explanation provided by the accused that he was suffering from a mental ailment, due to which he could not surrender in time, was wrongly rejected. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The accused had applied for parole, which was sanctioned to him, and he failed to surrender within time. These are pure findings of fact, and this Court should not interfere with pure findings of fact while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7 2026:HHC:40675 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate upon the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section397of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973(now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. 8 2026:HHC:40675 (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the 9 2026:HHC:40675 well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the 10 2026:HHC:40675 conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjibij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to 11 2026:HHC:40675 upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Sushil Kumar (PW-1) stated that accused Kishori Lal was convicted by learned Special Judge (POCSO), Hamirpur, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. He had applied for parole on 24.11.2014 and 40 days' parole was sanctioned to him. He was released on parole on 14.4.2015, with a direction to surrender before the jail authorities on 27.5.2015. However, he failed to do so. He was subsequently arrested by the PO Cell. He stated in his cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge about the 12 2026:HHC:40675 conduct of the accused. He admitted that convicts are told about the parole by the jail authorities. He admitted that convicts are treated by jail authorities. He was not aware whether the accused had undergone any treatment for mental ailment. He denied that the accused was suffering from any mental ailment and that he was not aware of what was happening around him. He denied that a false case was made against the accused regarding the non-surrender within the stipulated period. 16. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur. His application was sent for consideration, and parole was sanctioned by the Additional Director General of Prisons in his favour. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner/accused was undergoing imprisonment, had applied for parole, and that parole was sanctioned to him is not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700; 1992 SCC (Cri) 705; 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: 13 2026:HHC:40675 “51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution 14 2026:HHC:40675 have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him, the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstances appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub- section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub- section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 15 2026:HHC:40675 Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961 negates both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of 16 2026:HHC:40675 the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one, as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post- mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 18. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, 17 2026:HHC:40675 can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 19. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: - 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court, in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933, held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, 18 2026:HHC:40675 the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court, in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514, held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185; and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The above-mentioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 20. Sushil Kumar (PW-1) stated that he was not aware of the fact that the accused was treated for a mental ailment before releasing him on parole. This statement does not prove that the 19 2026:HHC:40675 accused suffered from mental ailment. No other evidence was produced to show that the accused was suffering from any mental ailment. Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly rejected the defence propounded by the accused that he was suffering from mental ailment and was unable to appear before the Court. 21. Sushil Kumar stated that the accused had not surrendered before the Jail authorities after he was released on parole. This is duly corroborated by wireless messages (Ext.PW- 1/H and Ext.PW-1/J), in which intimation was given to the Sub- Divisional Magistrate and District Magistrate, Hamirpur, that the accused had not surrendered after the expiry of the period of parole. 22. It was submitted that no police official had visited the house of the accused to take him into custody. This submission will not help the accused. This Court held in State of H.P. v. Ram Lal,2006 Cri LJ 3070, that the prisoner is supposed to surrender himself to the Superintendent of the jail from which he was released after the expiry of the parole, and in case of 20 2026:HHC:40675 failure to surrender within 10 days without any sufficient cause, he is liable to be punished. It was observed: “7. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the prisoner, on expiry of the period for which he is released under the Act, shall surrender himself to the Superintendent of the jail from which he was released. In case he does not surrender within 10 days from the due date, he can be arrested by a police officer without a warrant. In case the prisoner surrenders within a period of 10 days after the due date and satisfies the Superintendent of the concerned Jail that he was prevented by sufficient cause from surrendering on the due date, no action is to be taken against him. In case he fails to satisfy the Superintendent that he was prevented by any sufficient cause, he will be liable to be awarded specified penalties by the Superintendent. In case surrender was not within 10 days, the prisoner will further be liable to be punished under S. 9 of the Act. In view of the scheme of the aforesaid sections, I am of the view that the accused will be liable to be punished under S. 9 read with S. 8(2) of the Act only if he has failed to surrender on the due date without any sufficient cause preventing him from surrendering himself. However, in case the prisoner is prevented by a sufficient cause from surrendering himself on the due date, he cannot be convicted and punished under S. 9 of the Act. 23. Therefore, the burden is upon the accused to establish that he had a reasonable cause for not surrendering, and he cannot claim that no person had visited his native place to take him into custody. 21 2026:HHC:40675 24. It was submitted that witness Sushil Kumar did not have any personal knowledge regarding the circumstances of the case. This submission will not help the accused because he has not disputed the fact that he was undergoing imprisonment and had applied for parole, which was sanctioned to him. It was also proved that he was released on parole and that he had not surrendered on the due date. Therefore, the burden was upon the accused to explain the circumstances which prevented him from surrendering before the authorities on the due date. He has provided an explanation that he was suffering from a mental ailment, which has not been proved. Thus, the fact that Sushil Kumar did not have any personal knowledge will not make the prosecution case suspect. 25. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had overstayed without any valid reason. 26. It was submitted that the sentence of two years' imprisonment imposed by the learned Trial Court is excessive. This submission cannot be accepted. Parole is a privilege designed to help inmates maintain societal ties, granted on the strict condition of their timely return. Any leniency toward 22 2026:HHC:40675 parole violations creates a dangerous precedent, encouraging widespread non-compliance and threatening the stability of the penal system. This jeopardises the availability of parole for truly deserving inmates. In this case, the accused overstayed his parole by 03 years, 08 months, and 03 days without reasonable justification. He did not surrender and was arrested by PO Cell. Considering the adverse impact of such defiance, the imposition of two years’ imprisonment is justified and proportionate. 27. No other point was urged. 28. In view of the above, the present revision petition fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 29. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd September, 2026 (Chander)