Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 6646 of 2025 In / And L.P.A. No. 570 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, P.O., P.S. & District – Koderma. 3. District Sub- Registrar, Koderma, P.O., P.S. & District – Koderma. ... Respondents/Appellants Versus 1. Rajeev Kumar Singh, aged about 52 years, Son of Late Shivji Prasad Singh, Resident of Ranchi-Patna Road, Near Krishna Hotel, P.O. Jhumri Telaiya, P.S. Telaiya, District-Koderma. 2. Ankit Kumar Choudhary, aged about 42 years, Son of Kailash Kumar Chaudhary, Resident of Ward No.9, Vandana Sweets Campus, Ranchi Patna Road, P.O. Jhumri Telaiya, P.S. Telaiya, District- Koderma ... Petitioners/Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Appellants: Mr Yogesh Modi, A.C. to A.A.G.-IA --------- 02/Dated: 24.08.2026 1. Heard Mr Yogesh Modi, learned A.C. to A.A.G.-1A, appearing for the appellants/State. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 236 days in filing the appeal against the judgment dated 19.08.2024 made by the learned Single Judge disposing of W.P. (C) No. 3070 of 2024. 3. From a perusal of the averments made in the I.A., it appears that the appellants have failed to disclose any sufficient cause to explain the inordinate delay of 236 days. The I.A., in substance, contains only broad and general assertions regarding the obtaining of the certified copy, taking a decision to prefer the appeal, obtaining legal opinion, Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB preparation and vetting of the grounds of appeal, and thereafter approaching the Advocate for filing the appeal. No particulars whatsoever have been furnished to explain the time consumed at any of these stages. 4. To begin with, the I.A. states that the appellants applied for the certified copy of the impugned order and that the same was made available to them on a later date. However, no date has been disclosed either for the application for the certified copy or its receipt. More importantly, there is no explanation as to what prevented the appellants from taking steps thereafter with due expedition. 5. Thereafter, the I.A. merely states that the appellants were required to take a “proper decision” before preferring the appeal. Such an assertion, by itself, does not constitute an explanation for delay. The application does not disclose what consideration was required, what occasioned the alleged delay in taking the decision, or why such decision could not have been taken within the prescribed period. 6. Moving forward, the application states that the appellants consulted their Advocate and obtained his opinion regarding the impugned order. It is then stated that a conscious decision was taken to assail the order before this Court. These are, however, only statements of steps which were eventually taken. The application does not disclose when the Advocate was consulted, when the opinion was obtained, or how much time was consumed in taking the alleged decision to prefer the appeal. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB 7. After this, the I.A. in paragraph 8 states that the concerned department approached the panel Advocate for preparation of the grounds of appeal, which “also consumed time”. This expression is particularly vague. The application does not disclose how much time was consumed in preparing the grounds, why such time was required, or what prevented the appellants from taking prompt steps to file the appeal thereafter. It is equally silent as to when the grounds were vetted by the department and when the final decision was taken to approach the Advocate for filing the appeal. 8. Thus, the entire explanation provided in the I.A. is nothing more than a narration of the broad steps the appellants claim to have taken before filing the appeal. The I.A. does not provide a continuous or coherent chronology of the 236 days of delay. It does not identify the periods during which the matter remained unattended, nor does it disclose any circumstances that prevented the appellants from prosecuting the matter with due diligence. 9. What is more perplexing is that the manner in which the I.A. has been drafted reflects a lack of due diligence. The averments are couched in vague and repetitive terms and merely state that the delay was “not intentional” and that the steps taken by the department “consumed time”. Such assertions cannot substitute for an explanation of the delay. An applicant seeking condonation is required to place before the Court the facts which prevented it from acting within limitation; a mere statement that the delay was not intentional is not sufficient. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB 10. The learned Advocate for the appellants, in the alternative, submits that the appellants have a very good case on merits. We are, however, unable to accept this submission as a ground for condoning the delay. 11. Besides, from a perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that the case of the appellants rests essentially upon the restriction on transfer of land brought about by an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma. However, the record suggests that this Court had already quashed the very order imposing such a restriction in W.P.(C) No. 4089 of 2013, a decision thereafter affirmed in L.P.A. 12. It is further evident from the impugned order dated 19.08.2024 that, in identical matters, other writ petitions had been allowed, and the State had carried the matter before the Hon’ble SC, where the Special Leave Petition was also dismissed. In these circumstances, the submission that the appellants have a good case on the merits does not, prima facie, merit acceptance. Rather, the material noticed in the impugned order indicates that the very foundation upon which the appellants seek to challenge the order no longer subsists. 13. In any event, the merits of the proposed appeal cannot be permitted to substitute for a satisfactory explanation of the delay. The question at this stage is not whether the appellants may have an arguable case, but whether they have shown sufficient cause for not approaching Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB this Court within the prescribed period. On the facts placed before us, the answer is clearly in the negative. 14. The further assertion that irreparable loss and injury would be caused to the appellants if the delay is not condoned is equally general in nature. No particulars have been furnished to demonstrate what irreparable prejudice would be caused by refusal to condone the delay. Such a bald assertion cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause. 15. What emerges from the above is that the appellants have failed to place before the Court any convincing explanation for the 236 days of delay. The I.A. does not disclose any circumstance beyond the control of the appellants which prevented them from filing the appeal within time. The explanation is neither specific nor continuous and, in our considered view, does not disclose the diligence expected of a litigant seeking condonation of such delay. 16. The law is well settled that casual averments and formulaic bureaucratic explanations do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay of this magnitude. The mere recitation that files moved through proper channels, that legal opinion was sought and obtained, that service records were called for, and that the appeal was eventually prepared, cannot, without more, justify the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellants. 17. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof. 18. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 20. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:25515-DB State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending paraphernalia. 23. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown, and consequently, we dismiss this I.A., seeking condonation of the delay of 236 days in filing the accompanying appeal. 24. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.) August 24, 2026 A.F.R. Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 25.08.2026