1 2026:CGHC:26227 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 13 of 2023  Dharmendra Kumar Kurre S/o Shri Ramcharan Kurre Aged About 43 Years R/o Near Pani Tanki, Badi Koni, Village And Post Koni, Police Station Koni, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Forest, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Divisional Forest Officer Forest Division Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3. Forest Ranger Forest Range Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4. In-Charge Of Flying Scott Forest Division Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. S.P. Kale, Advocate For State : Mr. T.L. Bareth, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 29.06 .2026 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the award passed by the learned Labour Court in Case No. 32/IDACT/REF/2017 dated 03.11.2022, whereby, the statement of claim filed by the petitioner was rejected and reference was answered in negative. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner was engaged under the respondent SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2026.07.01 16:04:19 +0530 2 No. 3 as daily wage labourer on 11.11.2010. His services were terminated by respondent No. 4 on 01.01.2015. The petitioner herein approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner and after 45 days, the petitioner filed a statement of claim before the learned Labour Court. He pleaded that he was engaged under the respondent No. 3 on 11.11.2010 and his services were discontinued without following procedure contemplated under Sections 25 F and 25 G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 01.01.2015. 3. The respondents herein filed reply and denied allegations made in statement of claim. The petitioner examined himself and he was cross-examined by the respondents at length, but this witness remained firm. It was admitted by the petitioner that with regard to engagement, no document has been placed on record. He also admitted that he was deployed orally by the respondent No. 3, where he worked for four years. 4. The respondents examined H.C. Sharma, Forest Range Officer (Flying squad), who stated that the petitioner worked under the respondents for 182 days only, and therefore, the provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act would not attract. He stated in para 7 of cross-examination that the documents with regard to payment of wages from 01.07.2012 till 31.01.2013 are forged documents. This witness further admitted that Shyam Khairwar and Dinesh Thakur, who were engaged in the year 2013 are still working in the department. 5. The learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the petitioner did not work for 240 days in a calendar year preceding date of discontinuation of service, therefore, provisions of Section 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act would not attract, accordingly, the learned Labour Court dismissed the claim 3 of the petitioner. 6. Mr. S.P. Kale, Advocate would argue that in the matter of retrenchment it is mandatory on the part of the workman to plead and prove fact that he worked for continuous 240 days in a calendar year preceding date of discontinuation of service, but there is no such requirement to prove such engagement under Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He would submit that the employer is under obligation to retrench the workman, who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded by the employer. He would submit that respondents No. 3 & 4 failed to record reasons and the workmen, who were appointed in the year 2013 are still working with the department. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in (2010) 3 SCC 192. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Bareth would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Kale. Mr. Bareth would submit that as the petitioner did not work for 240 days in a calendar year preceding date of discontinuation of service, therefore, learned Labour Court rightly dismissed the claim of the petitioner. He would contend that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. Perusal of record would show that the petitioner placed sufficient material to demonstrate that he worked for 240 days in a calendar year. He exhibited payment receipts issued by the department from time to time, which have been alleged forged documents by the witness examined by the respondents. The learned Labour Court has recorded categorical finding that the petitioner worked for 182 days in a calendar year. The chart has been prepared, which 4 shows that the petitioner only worked for 182 days. Such finding is a finding of fact recorded after due appreciation of documentary and oral evidence and such finding does not require interference by this Court. 10. Now coming to the next submission made by Mr. Kale. Section 25 G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under :- “25G. Procedure for retrenchment. - Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.” 11. Bare reading of this provision would make it clear that the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded. In the present case, no written order with regard to retrenchment was passed by the respondent No. 4 and orally services of the petitioner were discontinued. The witness examined by respondents admitted the fact that the workmen, namely, Shyam Khairwar and Dinesh Thakur were employed in the year 2013, and they are still working in the department. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Harjinder Singh (supra), while dealing with the provisions of Section 25G held that to attract provisions of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer 5 violated the rule of ‘last come first go’ without any tangible reason. Relevant para 13 and 15 are reproduced herein below :- “13. It is true that in the writ petition filed by it, the corporation did plead that the dispute raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute because he had not worked continuously for a period of 240 days, the learned Single Judge rightly refused to entertain the same because no such argument was advanced before him and also because that plea is falsified by the averments contained in para 2 of the reply filed on behalf of the corporation to the statement of claim wherein it was admitted that the appellant was engaged as work charge Motor Mate for construction work on 5.3.1986 and he worked in that capacity and also as Work Munshi from 3.10.1986 and, as mentioned above, even after expiry of the period of three months' specified in order dated 5.2.1987, the appellant continued to work till 5.7.1988 when first notice of retrenchment was issued by the Managing Director of the corporation. Therefore, it was not open for the corporation to contend that the appellant had not completed 240 days service. Moreover, it is settled law that for attracting the applicability of Section 25-G of the Act, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of `last come first go' without any tangible reason. In Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam (1996) 5 SCC 419, this Court considered an analogous issue in the context of Section 25-H of the Act, which casts a duty upon the employer to give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re-employment on a preferential basis. It was argued on behalf of the bank that an offer of re-employment envisaged in Section 25-H should be confined only to that category of retrenched workmen who are covered by Section 25-F and a restricted meaning should be given to the term `retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo). While rejecting the argument, this Court analysed Section 25-F, 25-H, Rules 77 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, referred to Section 25-G and held: "Section 25-H then provides for re-employment of retrenched workmen. It says that when the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons. Rules 77 6 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 prescribe the mode of re-employment. Rule 77 requires maintenance of seniority list of all workmen in a particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to seniority of their service in that category and publication of that list. Rule 78 prescribes the mode of re-employment of retrenched workmen. The requirement in Rule 78 is of notice in the manner prescribed to every one of all the retrenched workmen eligible to be considered for re-employment. Shri Pai contends that Rules 77 and 78 are unworkable unless the application of Section 25-H is confined to the category of retrenched workmen to whom Section 25-F applies. We are unable to accept this contention. Rule 77 requires the employer to maintain a seniority list of workmen in that particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service. The category of workmen to whom Section 25-F applies is distinct from those to whom it is inapplicable. There is no practical difficulty in maintenance of seniority list of workmen with reference to the particular category to which they belong. Rule 77, therefore, does not present any difficulty. Rule 78 speaks of retrenched workmen eligible to be considered for filling the vacancies and here also the distinction based on the category of workmen can be maintained because those falling in the category of Section 25-F are entitled to be placed higher than those who do not fall in that category. It is no doubt true that persons who have been retrenched after a longer period of service which places them higher in the seniority list are entitled to be considered for re-employment earlier than those placed lower because of a lesser period of service. In this manner a workman falling in the lower category because of not being covered by Section 25-F can claim consideration for re- employment only if an eligible workman above him in the seniority list is not available. Application of Section 25-H to the other retrenched workmen not covered by Section 25- F does not, in any manner, prejudice those covered by Section 25-F because the question of consideration of any retrenched workman not covered by Section 25-F would arise only, if and when, no retrenched workman covered by Section 25-F is available for re-employment. There is, thus, no reason to curtail the ordinary meaning of "retrenched workmen" in Section 25-H because of Rules 77 and 78, even assuming the rules framed under the Act could have that effect. The plain language of Section 25-H speaks only of re- employment of "retrenched workmen". The ordinary meaning of the expression "retrenched workmen" must relate to the wide meaning of `retrenchment' given in Section 2(oo). Section 25-F 7 also uses the word `retrenchment' but qualifies it by use of the further words "workman ... who has been in continuous service for not less than one year". Thus, Section 25-F does not restrict the meaning of retrenchment but qualifies the category of retrenched workmen covered therein by use of the further words "workman ... who has been in continuous service for not less than one year". It is clear that Section 25-F applies to the retrenchment of a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year and not to any workman who has been in continuous service for less than one year; and it does not restrict or curtail the meaning of retrenchment merely because the provision therein is made only for the retrenchment of a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year. Chapter V-A deals with all retrenchments while Section 25-F is confined only to the mode of retrenchment of workmen in continuous service for not less than one year. Section 25-G prescribes the principle for retrenchment and applies ordinarily the principle of "last come first go" which is not confined only to workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year, covered by Section 25-F." (emphasis supplied) 15. The distinction between Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act was recently reiterated in Bhogpur Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Harmesh Kumar (2006) 13 SCC 28, in the following words: "We are not oblivious of the distinction in regard to the legality of the order of termination in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies on the one hand, and a situation where Section 25-G thereof applies on the other. Whereas in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies the workman is bound to prove that he had been in continuous service of 240 days during twelve months preceding the order of termination; in a case where he invokes the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H thereof he may not have to establish the said fact. See: Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam, Samishta Dube v. City Board, Etawah, SBI v. Rakesh Kumar Tewari and Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai." 13. In the present case, the petitioner proved the fact that the employer failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 25G of the Act of 1947, and therefore, in opinion of this Court the learned Labour Court committed 8 error of law while dismissing the statement of claim of the petitioner. Accordingly, award passed by the learned Labour Court dated 03.11.2022 is hereby set-aside. The respondents shall reinstate the petitioner forthwith with 50% backwages. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE $iddhant