1 2026:CGHC:26537 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 88 of 2022 1. Union Of India Through The General Manager, South East Central Railway, New G M Building, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 495004 2. Sr. D.E.E (O P) S.E.C. Railway Opp D R M, Building Bilaspur Division Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 3. Chief Crew Controller S.E.C. Railway, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. General Secretary Scewastamb Union, H.No. 145/2, Keshar Awas, Smriti Van, Turning Point Rajkishor Nagar, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 2. Ganish Kumar S/o Late Sant Kumar Pradhan Aged About 65 Years R/o Taar Bahar, Near F C I Chowk, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy. S.G. along with Mr. Abhishek Banjare, CGC For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Indrajeet S. Thakur, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 30.6.2026 2 1) By way of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought following reliefs:- i. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the impugned order dated 25/04/2017 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal on case No. CGIT/LC/R/28/2012. ii. Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice. 2) Facts of the present case are that respondent No. 2 – workman was working on the post of Loco Pilot (Goods) under the petitioners at the relevant time. On 3.1.2008, the workman was handed over call book for working out Train No. N/BOXT .O.O.9.30 hours but he turned up on duty at 9.30 hours. Train arrived at 9.05 hours and departed at 9.15 hours. The workman was instructed to work in down train but he refused to attend it and without obtaining permission signed off in the register. Show-cause notice and article of charges were issued to the workman on 18.3.2008 wherein following allegations were made :-  Article I : On 3.1.2008, he was served call book for Train No. N/BOXT .O.O.9.30 hours, but he turned up late on duty i.e. at 9.30 hours.  Article II : He disobeyed the orders of superiors.  Article III : He remained unauthorized absent from duty from 3.1.2008 till 29.2.2008, without furnishing any sort of valid documents or any information to the working spot or to the Railway Administration. 3 3) Workman filed reply ; disciplinary authority appointed inquiry officer and presenting officer on 3.4.2008. Inquiry Officer after conducting full fledged inquiry, submitted the inquiry report on 29.8.2008 wherein it found all charges proved. Thereafter, disciplinary authority issued second show-cause notice on 3.9.2008 which was replied by the workman on 17.9.2008. Disciplinary authority concurred with the inquiry report and inflicted penalty of reversion from the post of Loco Pilot (Goods) to Loco Pilot (Shunting) for period of three years without cumulative effect. 4) Workman preferred departmental appeal on 4.7.2010 which was time barred therefore he was advised to furnish justification for the delay but the same was not given by the workman. On 20.1.2012, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi referred the dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal -cum- Labour Court, Jabalpur [hereinafter to be referred as ‘learned Tribunal’]. Learned Tribunal after affording due opportunity of hearing to the interested parties found the first two charges proven and the third charge unproven. Accordingly, the claim of workman was partly allowed and award was passed whereby penalty of reversion was modified to penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. 5) Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing for the petitioners/ Union of India submits that as per Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short ‘Act of 1947’], 4 learned Tribunal or Labour Court can grant appropriate relief(s) in case(s) of dismissal or discharge whereas there was no penalty of dismissal from services in the present case therefore the claim of workman was not maintainable and the learned Tribunal committed error of law while substituting its opinion on the quantum of punishment. He contends that when learned Tribunal found the penalty disproportionate looking to the misconduct, the appropriate course should have been to remit back the matter to the disciplinary authority. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. and another Vs. K. Hanumantha Rao and another.1 He prays to set aside the award impugned. 6) On the other hand, Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent – workman has referred Section 10 (d) of Act of 1947 which states that the appropriate Government may refer the dispute, or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication. He submits that according to the Second Schedule, the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders should be adjudicated by the Tribunal or Labour Court and in the present case, learned Tribunal exercised the power conferred upon it under Section 10 (d) read 1. (2017) 2 SCC 528 5 with the Second Schedule. He contends that learned Tribunal after appreciating the material available on record, found it justifiable to modify the punishment. He argues that this petition is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. 7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8) Admittedly, disciplinary authority inflicted the penalty of reversion from the post of Loco Pilot (Goods) to Loco Pilot (Shunting) upon the workman and the learned Tribunal partly allowed the statement of claim filed by the workman and interfered with the penalty and modified it to stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. 9) It is well settled principle of law that when a Court finds penalty inflicted by the disciplinary authority to be disproportionate, course available to such Court or Tribunal is to remit back the matter to the disciplinary authority to inflict lesser penalty. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Hanumantha Rao (supra) while dealing with the similar issue held as under :- “8. (ii) Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/ employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it 6 shakes the conscience of the Court, that the Court steps in and interferes. No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a well recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment should appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience. (See State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Kamal Prasad & Ors. 2014(7) SCC 223. It would also be apt to extract the following observations in this behalf from the judgment of this Court in Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain, 2013(10) SCC 106: “8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. (See UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad [(2010) 5 SCC 775 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101] . In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the 7 opinion of the court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. 9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with the doctrine of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)] in the following words: (AC p. 410 D-E) “…………..Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads of the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review.The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’.This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’.” 8 10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] . Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that “all powers have legal limits” invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25) “25...The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 10) In my opinion, learned Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction while modifying the quantum of punishment and acted as an appellate authority. Instead, the learned Tribunal should have remitted back the matter to the disciplinary authority to inflict a lesser penalty after finding the first and second allegation proved. 11) In view of the discussion made herein-above, a strong case is made to interfere with the award impugned. Accordingly, the 9 award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified to the extent that appropriate penalty shall be inflicted by the disciplinary authority instead of the penalty of reversion passed earlier. 12) With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition stands disposed. 13) The disciplinary authority shall consider the petitioner’s long service, past record, age, nature and gravity of misconduct, absence or presence of financial loss, and other relevant circumstances while inflicting penalty and the entire exercise shall be completed by the authority concerned within a period of 60 days from the receipt of copy of this order. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE A j i n k y a Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2026.07.01 13:48:29 +0530