- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 4900 OF 2025 BETWEEN: PARVATHAMMA, W/O MARISWAMY, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, R/AT KURUBHARAHALLI VILLAGE, KASABHA HOBLI, BALIGUMBHA POST, RAMANAGARA DISTRICT, PIN NO.562 1106. …PETITIONER (BY SMT. KEERTHI REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SHARATH J.M, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY JNANABHARATHI POLICE STATION, REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BULDING, BENGALURU-560 001. 2. VINAY R C, W/O CHANDRASHEKHAR, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/AT NO.25, WARD NO.05, NEAR GANESH TEMPLE, KAYISAPANA BEEDI, RAMANAGARA, PIN 562159. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. WAHEEDA M.M, HCGP FOR R-1; SRI. K.R.SATHISH, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) R Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS) TO CALL FOR THE RELEVANT RECORDS; QUASH THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IN SC.NO.349/2025 OF THE JNANABHARATHI POLICE, ON THE FILE OF THE LXXI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH-72), FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE U/S 108, 85 OF BNS, IN RESPECT OF PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.2. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner-accused No.2 is before the Court calling in question the proceedings in S.C.No.349/2025 registered for offences punishable under Sections 108 and 85 of the BNS, 2023. 2. Heard Smt.Keerthi Reddy appearing for the petitioner, Smt.Waheeda M.M., learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1, Sri.K.R.Satish, representing respondent No.2. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: The accused No.1 and the sister of the complainant get married on 04.05.2012 and reside separately and from the - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 wedlock, two children are said to have been born. The relationship between the husband and the wife was floundering and on the floundering of relationship or the allegations of grave torture by the husband on demand of dowry or otherwise, the wife dies by committing suicide. The axe of abetment of suicide has now fallen upon the husband-accused No.1 and the petitioner-mother-in-law-accused No.2. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The matter is then committed to the Court of Session and is registered as S.C.No.349/2025. Registration of S.C.No.349/2025 is what has driven the petitioner-mother-in-law to the doors of this Court, calling in question the said proceeding. 4. Learned counsel Smt.Keerthi Reddy appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the allegations against the petitioner would not touch upon any of the ingredients that would become necessary to be proved for an offence of abetment of suicide. It is the submission that the definition of abetment is not even met in the case at hand. The learned counsel would take this Court through the transcript of the voice note which also is indicative of the fact that all the - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 allegations are against the husband and the mother-in-law did not even reside with the husband or the wife, as the marriage had taken place 12 years prior to the date of death of the sister of the complainant. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant would vehemently refute the submission to contend that there is clear demand of dowry by the mother-in-law at certain intermittent intervals. All that put together has led for the commission of suicide. Therefore, the petitioner-accused No.2 also should come out clean in a full-blown trial. The learned counsel seeks dismissal of the petition. 6. The learned HCGP would also toe the lines of the counsel for the complainant in seeking dismissal of the petition on the score that the allegations of demand of dowry is present in the summary of the charge sheet and therefore, it is for the petitioner to come out clean in a full-blown trial. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 8. The relationship between the sister of the complainant who is now no more and the accused No.1 are that they are husband and wife. They get married on 04.05.2012. 12 years pass by and the wife on a fateful day, commits suicide. The commission of suicide leads the brother of the deceased to register a complaint before the jurisdictional police which becomes a crime in Crime No.334/2024 for offence punishable under Sections 85 and 108 of the BNS. Since the entire issue has triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows: ರವೆ,,,,  ೕ ಇ  ೆಕ , ಾನಾರ  ೕ ಾೆ, ೆಂಗಳರು ನಗರ. ಇಂದ, "#ೕ $ನ% ಆ.' ( ಆ ಎಂ ಚಂದ#+ೇಖ, ವಯಸು 36 ವಷ2, 3ಾಸ ನಂ 25, 3ಾ62 ನಂ 5. ಗೇಶ 8ೇವ9ಾ:ನದ ಹ<ರ, =ಾ>ಸಪ@ನ AೕB, Cಾಮನಗರ, EFೆG-562 159 KೈM:9008544455/9980544455. Sಾ: ಒಕUಲಗ WಾನXCೇ, - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 $ಷಯ:- ನನY Zಯ ತಂ\]ಾದ "#ೕಮ ಆ.' ಪ#ಾ 34 ವಷ2ದವ^ೆ ವರದ_ೆ `ರುಕುಳವನುY aೕ(, ಅತXಹcೆXೆ =ಾರಣ3ಾದ ನನY ತಂ\ಯ ಗಂಡ ನಂBೕf ಮತು< ಆತನ cಾ>]ಾದ "#ೕಮ ಾವ2ತಮg ನವರ $ರುದh ದೂರು. *** kಾನು ಈ mೕ ನ $nಾಸದ G ತಂ8ೆ, cಾ>]ಾದ "#ೕಮ ಸುFೋಚನ ರವCೊಂBೆ 3ಾಸ3ಾ\ದುo=ೊಂಡು, ಮkೆಯ ಹ<ರ$ರುವ "#ೕCಾಮ pMq rsೕಟ ಒಳೆ ೇಕಯನುY ನuೆ'=ೊಂ(ರುcೆ<ೕkೆ. ನನY ತಂ8ೆ-cಾ>ಯವೆ ಒಟು ಮೂವರು ಮಕU^ದುo. Kದಲkೇಯವನು' kಾನು. ಎರಡkೇಯವಳw ಮೃತ ನನY ತಂ\]ಾದ ಆ.' ಪ#ಾ ಮೂರkೇಯವಳw ನನY `ಯ ತಂ\]ಾದ "#ೕಮ mೕಘkಾ ಮೂವಗೂ ಮದು3ೆ]ಾ\ದುo ಪ#cೆXೕಕ3ಾ\ 3ಾಸ3ಾ\ರುcೆ<ೕ3ೆ. ನನY Zಯ ತಂ\]ಾದ "#ೕಮ ಆ.' ಪ#ಾ^ೆ ಈೆz 2012 kೇ ಇಸ$ಯ G Cಾಮನಗರ a3ಾ'ಗnಾದ ಮ9ಾ{| ರವರ Zಯ ಮಗkಾದ ನಂBೕf ರವCೊಂBೆ ಗುರು-Zಯ ಸಮುgಖದ G Cಾಮನಗರದ Gರುವ }ೊನYಮg ~ೌ€#ಯ G Zಂದೂ ಸಂಪ#8ಾಯದಂcೆ ಅದೂoಯ\ ಮದು3ೆಯನುY Wಾ(=ೊ€ರುcೆ<ೕ3ೆ. ಆಗ kಾವ• ವರದ_ೆ]ಾ\ 150 ಾ#ಂ ನಷು ‚kಾYಭರಣಗಳನುY }ಾಗೂ ಒಂದು ೈ„ ನುY ಾವನವೆ aೕ(ರುcೆ<ೕ3ೆ. ಇ8ಾದ ನಂತರ 300 ಾ#ಂ ‚kಾYಭರಣವನುY =ೊಡುವಂcೆ ೇ(=ೆ ಇ€ದoರು. ನನY ತಂ\ೆ ಮದು3ೆ]ಾ\ ಎರಡು ವಷ2ದ ಬ^ಕ ಒಬ† }ೆಣು‡ ಮಗಳw ಜa'ದುo ಆ=ೆಯ }ೆಸರು ಕು॥ ಅ"#cಾ ಈಗ 9 ವಷ23ಾ\ರುತ<8ೆ. Kದ ೆ }ೆಣು‡ ಮಗು ಜa'ದ ನಂತರ ನನY ತಂ\ೆ ಾವkಾದ ನಂBೕf ಮತು< ಅವರ cಾ> ಾವ2ತಮg ಇಬ†ರೂ ‚ತ#Zಂ9ೆ aೕಡು<ರುವ•8ಾ\ ^'ರುcಾ<nೆ. kಾವ• ಸಂ9ಾರದ G ಇ3ೆFಾG ಸಹಜ ಅನುಸ'=ೊಂಡು Eೕವನ Wಾಡುವಂcೆ ಬುBo3ಾದವನುY }ೇ^ ಾವನವಗೂ ನನY ತಂ8ೆ-cಾ> ಳwವ^=ೆಯನುY aೕ( }ೆಣು‡ ಮಗ^ೆ ‚kಾYಭರಣಗಳನುY '=ೊಟು Sೊcೆಯ G Eೕವನ Wಾಡುವಂcೆ ^'ರುcಾ<Cೆ. ಇ8ಾದ ನಂತರ ನನY ತಂ\ಯು ಮಗು$kೊಂBೆ ೆಂಗಳನ ಾನಾರಯ Gರುವ 3ಾಸ ನಂ 36, 1kೇ ಮಹ(, 17kೇ ಎ =ಾ#. kಾಗ8ೇವನ ಹ^Šಯ Gರುವ ಮkೆೆ ಬಂದು ಆ=ೆಯ ಗಂಡkೊಂBೆ ಸಂ9ಾರ Wಾಡು<8ಾoಗ ಆಗಲೂ ಸಹ ಅಕ#ಮ ಸಂಬಂಧ$8ೆ ಎಂದು ಸುಳwŠ }ೇ^ Wಾನ'ಕ3ಾ\ }ಾಗೂ 8ೈZಕ3ಾ\ ‚ತ#Zಂ9ೆ aೕಡು<ರುವ $~ಾರವನುY ನನೆ ೕ Wಾ( ^'ರುcಾ<nೆ. ಮcೊ<mg ನನY ತಂ\ಯು ಗŒ2•]ಾ\ದುo, ಆಗ ಾವ ಮತು< ಅವರ cಾ> ಾವ2ತಮg ಇಬ†ರೂ 9ೇ=ೊಂಡು ]ಾCೋ +ಾಸŽ }ೇಳwವವರ WಾತನುY - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 ನಂA=ೊಂಡು ಮcೊ<mg }ೆಣು‡ ಮಗು3ಾಗುತ<8ೆಂದು ಾ$' ಸುWಾರು 3 ಂಗಳ ಗŒೕ2•]ಾ\ದo ನನY ತಂ\ೆ Wಾcೆ#ಗಳನುY =ೊಟ ಗಭ2ಾತ Wಾ('ರುcಾ<Cೆ. ಆಗ ನನY ತಂ\ಯ ಆCೋಗXದ G ಏರುೇರುವ•ಂ•ಾ\ದoಂದ kಾವ• ತಂ\ಯನುY ಮkೆೆ ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ಆCೈ=ೆ Wಾ( ಕಳwZ'ರುcೆ<ೕ3ೆ. ಈೆz 3 ವಷ2ದ Zಂ8ೆ ನನY ತಂ\ೆ ಒಬ† ಗಂಡು ಮಗ ಜa'ದುo ಾಣಂತನ=ೆU ಮkೆೆ ಬಂB8ಾoಗ ಾವ ಮತು< ಆತನ cಾ> ಾವ2ತಮg ಇಬ†ರೂ ಮkೆೆ ಬಂದು ಗFಾ•ೆ Wಾ(=ೊಂಡು ನನY ತಂ\ಯನುY ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು }ೋ\ರುcಾ<Cೆ. ಮkೆಯ G ಪ# Bನ ಸಣ‡-ಪ•ಟ $~ಾರಗ^ೆ ಾವkಾದ ನಂBೕಶನು ನನY ತಂ\ೆ ಸೂnೆ ಎಂದು ೈಯುX<ದುo, aೕನು ನನY Sೊcೆ ಾಳಲು kಾFಾಯಕುU. aೕkೇ }ೋ\ 9ಾ> ಇಲGBದoCೆ kಾkೇ aನYನುY 9ಾ>ಸುcೆ<ೕkೆ ಇಲGBದoCೆ aನYನುY uೈವ2 Wಾ( ಮkೆೆ ಕಳwZಸುcೆ<ೕkೆಂದು ೆದ=ೆ }ಾ` aನY ತಂ8ೆ-cಾ>ಯ Wಾನ ಮ]ಾ2‘ಯನುY cೆೆಯುcೆ<ೕkೆಂದು }ೊuೆಯು<ರುವ $~ಾರವನುY ನನY ತಂ\ಯ ಮಗಳw ಸಹ ^'ರುcಾ<nೆ. Bkಾಂಕ:16/08/2024 ರಂದು ವರಮ}ಾಲ’“ೕ ಹಬ†=ೆU ನನY ತಂ\ಯು ಗಂಡನ ಮkೆೆ }ೋ\8ಾoಗ ಅ G ಾವ ಮತು< ಆತನ cಾ> ಾವ2ತಮg ಇಬ†ರೂ 9ೇ=ೊಂಡು ನನY ತಂ\ೆ `ರುಕುಳವನುY aೕ(ರುcಾ<Cೆ. ಆಗ ಗFಾ•ೆ]ಾ\ದುo ನನY ತಂ\ಯನುY ಾವ ನಂBೕಶನು =ೈಗ^ಂದ ಹFೆG Wಾ( =ಾನ G ೆಂಗಳೆ Bkಾಂಕ: 17/08/2024 ರಂದು ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು ಬಂBದುo. ನನY ಾವkಾದ ನಂBೕಶನು ನನೆ ೕ Wಾ( $~ಾರವನುY ^' aನY ತಂ\ಯ Sೊcೆ ಾಳಲು 9ಾಧX$ಲG ಬಂದು ತವರು ಮkೆೆ ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು }ೋ\ ಎಂದು ^'ರುcಾ<kೆ. kಾನು ಸಹ ಬಂದು ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು }ೋಗುವ•8ಾ\ ^'ರುcೆ<ೕkೆ. ಈ Bನ Bkಾಂಕ:19/08/2024 ರಂದು ಮುಂSಾkೆ 4-20 ಗಂ•ೆೆ ನನY ತಂ\ಯ ಮಗnಾದ ಅ"#cಾ ನನೆ ೕ Wಾ( "Wಾಮ ಅಪ@-ಅಮgaೆ ಜಗಳ3ಾ\ದುo, ಅಪ@, ಅಮgaೆ }ೊuೆದು ಾಯWಾ(ರುcಾ<Cೆ. ಅಮg ೇ6 ರೂ• ನ G ಾX ೆ kೇಣು }ಾ`=ೊಂ(ರುcಾ<nೆ" ಎಂದು ^'ದಳw. kಾನು ಕೂಡFೆ ತಂ8ೆ-cಾ> }ಾಗೂ ತಂ\ೆ WಾZಯನುY ^'ರುcೆ<ೕkೆ. ನಂತರ kಾವ• ೆಂಗಳೆ ೆ^ೆz 5-30 ಗಂ•ೆೆ ಬಂದು ೆಂಗಳನ =ೆಂೇ ಆಸ@cೆ#ೆ }ೋ\ kೋಡFಾ\ ನನY ತಂ\ಯು ಮೃತಪ€ರುವ•ದು ಕಂಡುಬಂBರುತ<8ೆ. ನಂತರ ನನY ತಂ\ mೕಘkಾ^ೆ ಮೃತ ತಂ\ ಪ#ಾಳw 3ಾ–ಆ— ನ G 3ಾ% m9ೇ˜ ಕಳwZ'ದುo, ಅದರ G ನನY 9ಾ$ೆ ನನY ಗಂಡkೇ "=ಾರಣ" ಆತaೆ =ಾನೂನು ಪ#=ಾರ "™ೆ ಆಗFೇ ೇಕು }ಾಗೂ ನನY ಮಕU^ೆ kಾXಯ 'ಗೇ=ೆಂದು" ಎಂದು ಕಳwZ'ರುವ 3ಾ% Cೆ=ಾ62 ಇರುತ<8ೆ. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 ಆದoಂದ ನನY ತಂ\ ಆ.' ಪ#ಾ^ೆ ವರದ_ೆ `ರುಕುಳದ Sೊcೆೆ ಅಕ#ಮ ಸಂಬಂಧ$8ೆ ಎಂದು 8ೈZಕ3ಾ\ ಮತು< ಮತು< Wಾನ'ಕ3ಾ\ ‚ತ#Zಂ9ೆ aೕ( ಆ=ೆಯ ಆತgಹcೆXೆ =ಾರಣ3ಾದ ನಂBೕf ಮತು< ಆತನ cಾ> ಾವ2ತಮg ರವರ $ರುದh ಸೂಕ< =ಾನೂನು ಕ#ಮ 'ಜರು\ಸೇ=ೆಂದು =ೋರುcೆ<ೕkೆ." The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in column No.17 reads as follows: "17.=ೇ'ನ ಸಂ’ಪ< 9ಾCಾಂಶ =ಾಲ0 ನಂ 12 ರ G ನಮೂB'ರುವ ಎ-1 ಆCೋšಯು, 9ಾ’-8 ಮತು< 9ಾ’-9 ರವರ ಮಗnಾದ ಆ.' ಪ#ಾಳನುY Zಂದೂ ಸಂಪ#8ಾಯದಂcೆ Bkಾಂಕ:04/05/2012 ರಂದು Cಾಮನಗರದ Gರುವ "#ೕ }ೊನYಮg ~ೌ€# ಕFಾXಣ ಮಂಟಪದ G ಅದೂo]ಾ\ ಮದು3ೆ]ಾ\ದುo, ಆ ಸಮಯದ G ಎ-1 ಆCೋšಯು ವರದ_ೆ]ಾ\ ಸುWಾರು 150 ಾ#ಂ ನಷು ಬಂಾರವನುY ಪuೆದು=ೊಂ(ರುcಾ<kೆ. ನಂತರ ಎ-1 ಆCೋšಯು ಪ#ಾಳ Sೊcೆ ೆಂಗಳರು ನಗರದ, ಾನಾರ  ೕ ಾಾ ಸರಹBoೆ ಒಳಪಡುವ, kಾಗ8ೇವನಹ^Š, 17kೇ "ಎ" =ಾ# ನ Gರುವ ಮkೆ ನಂ: ಮkೆ ನಂ: 36 ರ ಆCೋšಯ ಸ}ೋದರkಾದ ನšೕ ರವರ ಮkೆಯ Kದಲkೇ ಮಹ(ಯFೆG. ಇಬ†ರೂ ಮಕUnಾದ ಕು|| ಆ"#cಾ 9 ವಷ2 ಮತು< ಸಮgದ ೌಡ 3 ವಷ2ದವkೊಂBೆ 3ಾಸ3ಾ\8ಾoಗ, ಆCೋšಯು }ೆಂಡ ಪ#ಾಳ Sೊcೆೆ ಸಣ-ಪ•ಟ $~ಾರಗ^ೆ ಗFಾ•ೆ Wಾಡು<ದುo, ಆಾಗ ಸ}ೋದ ಪ#ಾಳನುY kೋಡಲು ಬರು<ದo 9ಾ’-7 ರವರ ಕೆ‡ೕದುCೆ ಎ-1 ಆCೋšಯು ಪ#ಾ^ೆ ಹFೆ, Wಾ(, ವರದ_ೆ ತರುವಂcೆ Wಾನ'ಕ3ಾ\ ಮತು< 8ೈZಕ3ಾ\ `ರುಕುಳವನುY aೕ(, uೈœೕ2 =ೊಡುವಂcೆ ೆದ=ೆ }ಾಕು<ದುo, ಈ $~ಾರವನುY ಮೃcೆ ಪ#ಾಳw ತವರು ಮkೆೆ ^' ತವರುಮkೆ>ಂದ ಸುWಾರು 300 ಾ#ಂನಷ: ಬಂಾರ }ಾಗೂ ಹಣವನುY =ೇ^8ಾಗFೆFಾG, 9ಾ’-1 ರವರ }ೆ•.(.ಎž.'.ಾXಂ„ Ÿಾcೆ>ಂದ ಆCೋšಯ ಾXಂ„ Ÿಾcೆೆ ಮತು< ಪ#ಾಳ ಾXಂ„ Ÿಾcೆೆ ಹಣ ವಾ2ವೆ Wಾ(ದುo, ಆದರೂ ಸಹ ಆCೋšಗಳw `ರುಕುಳವನುY ಮುಂದುವCೆ'ರುcಾ<Cೆ. Bkಾಂಕ:16/08/2024 ರಂದು ಮ}ಾಲ’“ೕ ಹಬ†ದ ಪ#ಯುಕ< ಏ-1 ಆCೋšಯು ಮೃತ ಪ#ಾಳನುY ಸ{ಂತ ಊCಾದ Cಾಮನಗರ EFೆG, ಕುರುಬರಹ^Šೆ ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 }ೋ\8ಾoಗ ಎ-2 ಆCೋšcೆಯು ಇನೂY 10 ಲ_ ಹಣ ವರದ_ೆ ತರುವಂcೆ ಮೃcೆ ಪ#ಾಳ Sೊcೆ ಗFಾ•ೆ Wಾ( ಅವWಾನಪ('ದoಂದ Bkಾಂಕ:18/08/2024 ರಂದು ಎ-1 ಆCೋšಯು ಪ#ಾಳನುY 3ಾಪಸು ೆಂಗಳೆ ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು ಬರು3ಾಗಲೂ ಹFೆG, Wಾ( ಕCೆದು=ೊಂಡು ಬಂBದುo, ಎ-1 ಆCೋšಯು ಸುWಾರು ವಷ2ಗ^ಂದ aೕಡು<ದo ‚ತ#Zಂ9ೆ cಾಳFಾರ8ೇ ಮನkೊಂದು Bkಾಂಕ:19/08/2024 ರಂದು ೆ^ೆz, ಸುWಾರು 4-25 ಗಂ•ೆಯ ಸುWಾೆ 9ಾಯುವ =ೆಲವ• a|ಷಗಳ Zಂ8ೆ ಮcೆ ಪ#ಾಳw ಸ}ೋದ]ಾದ 9ಾ’-07 ರವರ 3ಾ– ಆž ನ G 3ಾ% m9ೇ˜ ಕಳwZ'ದುo, 9ಾ$ೆ ಎ-1 ಆCೋšsೕ =ಾರಣ3ೆಂದು ಸ@ಷ3ಾ\ ^', ಆತaೆ =ಾನೂನು ಪ#=ಾರ "™ೆ]ಾಗ ಎಂದು ^' ನಂತರ 3ಾಸದ ಮkೆಯ ೆ6 ರೂ• ನ ಅಳವ('ದುo 'ೕ ಂ¡ ಾX ೆ ಪ#ಾಳw 3ೇಲನುY ಕ€ ಕು<ೆ A\ದು=ೊಂಡು ಆತgಹcೆX Wಾ(=ೊಂ(ದುo, ಆದoಂದ ಮೃcೆಯ 9ಾ$ೆ =ಾರಣCಾದ ಎ-1 ಮತು< ಎ-2 ಆCೋšಗಳ $ರುದh ಈ mೕಲUಂಡ ಕಲಂಗಳ ಅ(ಯ G 8ೋ¢ಾCೋಪೆ ಪ€. a3ೇದkೆ:- ಸದ ಪ#ಕರಣದ G ಅWಾನತು< ಪ('=ೊಂ(ರುವ š,$ž, ನಂ:129/2024 ಮತು< š.ಎž ನಂ:166/2024 ರ G,ನ KೈM ೕ ಗಳ Gರುವ 3ಾ% Cೆ=ಾ62 ಗಳನುY ೇCೆ 3ಾ% 9ಾXಂಪM ಸಂಗ#Z' ಎž.ಎ.ಎM ೆ ತ£ರ ಪೕ™ೆೆ ಒಳಪ(' ವರBಪuೆಯುವ•ದು ಾ` ಇರುತ<8ೆ ಮತು< KೈM ಐ.š.(.ಆ ಪ"ೕ ಸೇ=ಾ\ರುವ•ದು ಾ` ಇರುತ<8ೆ ಇನೂY }ೆ‚¥ನ 9ಾ™ಾ¦8ಾರಗಳw ಲಭX3ಾದ G WಾನX kಾX]ಾಲಯ=ೆU ಕಲಂ 193(3) A.ಎ .ಎ.ಎ ಪ#=ಾರ }ೆಚು¥ವ 8ೋ¢ಾCೋಪೆ ಪ€ಯನುY WಾನX kಾX]ಾಲಯ=ೆU ಸ GಸFಾಗುವ•ದು." 9. In the light of the offences being the ones punishable under Sections 108 and 85 of the BNS, I deem it appropriate to notice those provisions. Sections 108, 45, 85 of the BNS, 2023, read as follows: "108. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 45. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— (a) instigates any person to do that thing; or (b) engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or (c) intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act. …. …. …. 85. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.” The interpretation of Section 108 of the BNS/Section 306 of the IPC, Section 45 of the BNS/Section 107 of the earlier regime, the IPC, need not detain this Court for long or - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 compel a deep excavation into settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The law on abetment of suicide has, over decades, attained doctrinal clarity through a catena of pronouncements of the Apex Court. What emerges from those pronouncements is unmistakable: mere allegations of harassment, generalized discord in matrimonial life, or omnibus assertions of cruelty, without a proximate and live nexus to the act of suicide, would not ipso facto constitute abetment. 10. Abetment, in its legal connotation, is not a loose or amorphous concept. It carries with it the indispensable element of mens rea—a deliberate mental process involving instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid that nudges, drives, or compels the victim toward self-destruction. The statutory framework contemplates something far more serious than passive presence or incidental association. There must exist active complicity; there must be a discernible conduct that can reasonably be said to have created circumstances so - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 oppressive and immediate that the deceased was left with no option but to take the extreme step. 11. Courts cannot permit criminal prosecution to travel beyond the boundaries drawn by statute merely because the allegations evoke sympathy or because the death involved is tragic. Every suicide within a matrimonial home, however unfortunate, cannot automatically transform every relative of the spouse into an accused for abetment. Jurisprudence is replete with the judgments of the Apex Court on the issue of what would constitute an abetment for it to become an offence punishable for abetment to suicide. I therefore, deem it appropriate to notice the Judicial landscape. Judicial landscape: - Section 108 of BNS/Section 306 of IPC: 12. The Apex Court in a plethora of judgments has considered and interpreted as to what would become the ingredients for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 IPC/Section 108 of the BNS. I deem it appropriate to quote a few. 12.1. The Apex Court in the case of GEETA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA1, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 17. For the purpose of examining whether the ingredients of Section 306 are attracted, we take the prosecution case as it is. Taken at its highest, there is definitely evidence on record to show that over a period of few months the neighbours were at loggerheads. While the victim felt that her tuition classes were being disturbed, the appellant's family have also had a grievance about the victim and her family scolding the children of the appellant's household. There is no doubt that not only were there heated exchanges, but physical blows were also alleged to have been administered by the appellant's party. Insofar as delivering of physical blows are concerned, today the appellant stands acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 323. She stands acquitted even for the offences punishable under Section 504 and 506. The State has not preferred any appeal. 18. Even if we were to assume that physical blows were administered, will that per se constitute abetment to suicide? This Court in a case where the accused told the deceased “go and die” and when thereafter, the deceased committed suicide, absolved the accused of the charge under Section 306 by holding as under: “3. …Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. …” 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1938 - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 [Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438] 19. This Court in Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628, held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306. 20. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707, this Court held that the harassment meted out to the victim should have left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to his/her life. 21. In M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626, this Court followed the dictum in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, wherein it was held as under: “41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar has examined different shades of the meaning of “instigation”. Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record wherefrom an inference of the appellant-accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.” Thereafter, this Court in Mohan (supra) held:— 45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.” 22. This Court in Mahendra Awase v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 INSC 76, after analyzing the long line of precedents held as under:— “18. As has been held hereinabove, to satisfy the requirement of instigation the accused by his act or omission or by a continued course of conduct should have created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. It was also held that a word uttered in a fit of anger and emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 23. Applying the tests laid down hereinabove, we are not able to persuade ourselves to hold that when the appellant's family and the victim's family had heated exchanges, there was any intention to abet or to cause any member of either family to take their own life. These quarrels occur in everyday life, and on facts we are not able to conclude that there - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 was an instigation on the part of the appellant to such an extent that the victim was left with no other option but to commit suicide.” 12.2. The Apex Court in the case of YADWINDER SINGH ALIAS SUNNY v. STATE OF PUNJAB2, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 15. By now the position of law insofar as abetment of suicide is concerned is well settled. Even if we accept the entire case put up by the prosecution as it is without adding anything or subtracting, we are of the view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 of the IPC are borne out. 16. This Court in the case of “Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4091 has succinctly explained the Principles of law governing abetment. We quote the relevant observations as under:— “13. The law governing Section 306 of the IPC is well settled. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:— “306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 14. Thus, the basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Abetment of a thing is defined under Section 107 of the IPC as under:— “107. Abetment of a thing.— A person abets the doing of a thing, who— 22025 SCC OnLine SC 2332 - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 First. — Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.— Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.— Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.— A person who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.— Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” 17. This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144, after considering the provisions of Section 306 of the IPC along with the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, has observed as under:— “14. Section 306 of IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same. 15. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘instigate’ is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088, has defined the word ‘instigate’ as under: - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. 16. The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its co-relation with Section 306 IPC has been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In the case of S.S. Cheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465, it was observed as under:— “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC would stand fulfilled if the suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming encouragement/incitement by the accused leaving no option but to commit suicide. The act of instigation as alleged must be with the intention to push the deceased into such a situation that she is left with no other option but to commit suicide. 18. In the case on hand, even if we believe that the appellant due to opposition and pressure from his family declined to get married with the deceased, it could not be said that he led to a situation by which the deceased was left with no other option but to - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 commit the suicide. The appellant could not be said to have intended the consequences of his act namely suicide. It is very sad to note that a young girl took the extreme step of ending her life. It is possible that she might have felt hurt. One sensitive moment took away the life of a young girl. However, as judges we should not allow our minds get boggled with such thoughts. We are obliged to decide the matter on the basis of the evidence on record. In other words whether the allegations levelled constitute any offence. Mere refusal to marry even if true by itself would not amount to instigation as explained under Section 107 of the IPC.” 12.3. The Apex Court in the case of BALAJI JAISWAL v. STATE OF CHATTISGARH3, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 10. The charge as framed against the appellant is under Section 306 and in alternate under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. In this regard, we may refer to a recent decision in Prakash (supra) to which one of us (K.V. Viswanathan, J.) was a party. Therein, the appellants had sought discharge from the criminal proceedings filed under Section 306 of the Penal Code. Dealing with the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107 of the Penal Code, it was held as under: “13. Section 306 of the IPC has two basic ingredients-first, an act of suicide by one person and second, the abetment to the said act by another person(s). In order to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, it must necessarily be proved that the accused person has contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. To prove such contribution or involvement, one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied. 3 2026 SCC OnLine SC 602 - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. 15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide. xxxxxxxxxxxx 18. More recently, in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat10, this Court has relied on S.S. Chheena (supra) to hold that the element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred, instead it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law, that is deliberate and conspicuous intention to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide, would remain unfulfilled. This Court observed as follows: “18. For a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, it is a well- established legal principle that the - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 presence of clear mens rea—the intention to abet the act—is essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct action by the accused that led the deceased to take his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide.” 19. It is, therefore, evident that the positive act of instigation is a crucial element of abetment. While dealing with an issue of a similar nature, this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh11, laid down the parameters of what would be constituted to be an act of instigation. This Court observed as follows:— “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 20. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. It has been held that in order to satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence, however, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Applying the law to the facts of the case, this Court went on to hold that a word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. Xxxxxxxxxxx 26. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person is the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. However, it has been clarified on many occasions that in order to link the act of instigation to the act of suicide, the two occurrences must be in close proximity to each other so as to form a nexus or a chain, with the act of suicide by the deceased being a direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person.” 11. From the aforesaid decision, it becomes clear that for sustaining a charge under Section 306 of the Penal Code, it has to be shown that the accused persons had contributed to the suicide by the deceased through some direct or indirect act. Section 107 of the Penal Code has thereafter been referred to hold that there ought to be some instigation or incitement that would reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide, thus, leading the victim to such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. There ought to be some material to indicate a positive act of instigation, which is a crucial component of abetment. Instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person has been held to be the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. The act of instigation also has to be in close - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 proximity to the act of suicide so as to form the nexus or a chain to indicate that the act of suicide was the direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person. Incidentally, the decision in Ramesh Kumar (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent has been considered and relied upon in Prakash (supra). 12. The material forming part of the charge sheet would, therefore, have to be examined keeping in mind the above perspective. Existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence would be necessary. On going through the various statements recorded by the prosecution, the same indicate that deceased Komal was addicted to liquor and that the appellant and Komal used to have liquor together. The son of the deceased, Aakash, had stated that whenever his father used to drink from his money, Revati Bai used to scold him. However, when the appellant used to bring liquor for him, she did not object. In his subsequent statement recorded after about five months from the incident, he suspected that there were illicit relations between his mother and the appellant. Statements of other family members and neighbours indicate the addiction of Komal to liquor. Except such statements and general allegations of illicit relationship between Revati Bai and the appellant, there is no material whatsoever to indicate any instigation or incitement at the instance of the appellant that could lead to Komal committing suicide. On 05.05.2024, the appellant had been to the house of Komal and they had liquor together between 09 : 00 P.M. to 10 : 00 P.M. There is no material whatsoever indicating any act of instigation or incitement or abetment by the appellant. The suicide was stated to have been committed in the morning of 07.05.2024. No material whatsoever as regards the proximity between the meeting of the appellant and the deceased, and his committing suicide is available on record. It, thus, will have to be held that the requirements of Section 107 of the Penal Code are not satisfied in the present case. 13. Even if we proceed on the premise that there were illicit relations between the appellant and the wife of the deceased, the clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide by Komal is absent. As held, to bring home a charge under Section 306 of the Penal Code, the act - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 of abetment would require some positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. There is no allegation that the appellant had instigated Komal to commit suicide or that he had in some way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide. Further, there is no material on record to infer that Komal was left with no other option except to commit suicide. In the absence of such mens rea on the part of the accused being apparent from the face of record, the charge under Section 306 of the Penal Code cannot be sustained. 14. We, therefore, find that even after accepting the entire material on record at its face value, the ingredients of Section 306 of the Penal Code are not satisfied. Continuation of such criminal proceedings would, therefore, be a futile exercise resulting in the absence of process of law. We may reiterate what this Court said in paragraph 9 in Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat12 are as follows:— “In the prosecution under Section 306, IPC, much more material is required. The Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for cross-examination by the appellant/accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant/accused to face the trial.” The proceedings, therefore, deserve to be quashed. The High Court failed to examine the material on record in the light of the law laid down in this regard. It, therefore, erred in not quashing the proceedings. The ratio of the decision in Dammu Sreenu (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent is clearly distinguishable as it arises from a challenge to the conviction of the appellant therein based on the evidence on record.” - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 13. The other offence alleged is the one punishable under Section 85 of the BNS. The complaint is noticed hereinabove, so is the summary of the chargesheet. The two read in tandem would not indicate any specific overt acts against the petitioner-accused No.2—the Mother-in-law even for offences under Section 85 of the BNS/Section 498A of the IPC. In such circumstances, it becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of DR. SUSHIL KUMAR PURBEY v. STATE OF BIHAR4, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 7. Having considered the submissions advanced by the parties and upon a careful perusal of the material on record, we are of the view that the High Court fell into error in restricting the quashing of criminal proceedings only to the sister-in-law (Respondent 3). A comparative reading of the FIR reveals that the allegations levelled against the sister-in-law and those against the present appellants are, in all material particulars, identical. The FIR does not assign any specific or overt act to either appellant; there are no particular dates, places, or individual acts attributed to them. The lone allegation that stands separately against the present appellants is that they would quarrel. This, however, does not constitute a criminal offence and cannot, by itself, sustain cognizance of the offences under Sections 341, 323, 498A & 34 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Act for which the appellants have been summoned. The standard applied by the High Court in quashing proceedings against the sister-in- 4 2026 SCC OnLine SC 338 - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 law, on the ground that the allegations against her were general and omnibus, applies with equal force to the present appellants, and there is no principled basis for distinguishing between them. 8. It is further pertinent to note that the marriage was solemnised in July 2019, and the husband filed the divorce petition as early as March 2021. The criminal complaint against the appellants was, however, lodged only in March 2022, nearly a year after the filing of the divorce petition. Though this delay, standing alone, would not constitute a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellants. However, viewed in conjunction with the absence of any specific allegations attributable to them, the delay lends credence to the submission that the criminal complaint against the in-laws may have been instituted by way of a counter-blast to the divorce proceedings initiated by the husband. When these two considerations are read together, we are satisfied that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present appellants cannot be sustained. 9. Before moving forward, we consider it necessary to clarify that the observations made hereinabove are confined to the question of the maintainability of the criminal proceedings against the present appellants, and must not be construed as an expression of any opinion on the merits of the case as a whole. The criminal proceedings against the husband shall continue in accordance with law. We note, in this context, that the husband did not seek quashing of the proceedings against him before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC; it was only the present appellants and the sister-in-law who did so. The husband is also not before this Court in the present appeal. We therefore find no occasion to comment upon the allegations levelled against him, and the proceedings against him shall be governed by law. 10. In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in applying different standards to persons who stand on an identical footing insofar as the nature of the allegations against them is concerned. Since the - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 allegations against the present appellants and the sister-in-law are, in substance, the same, the reasoning that led the High Court to quash the proceedings against the sister-in-law ought equally to have led to the quashing of proceedings against the present appellants. The impugned order, to the extent that it declined to extend such relief to the appellants, cannot be sustained.” 13.1. The Apex Court in its latest judgment in ARTI MEHTA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH5, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 21. As regards the present appellants, namely, Arti Mehta, Shrivati Bai Dhakad, Manisha Dhakad and Vikram Dhakad, the allegations are essentially omnibus and generalised in nature. In the FIR, the complainant merely states that the husband and the in-laws “started abusing me and would tell me to go and live with my parents” and that the appellants “would demand dowry from me every day and would tell me that if I did not bring dowry, I should go back to my parental home.” Beyond these broad and sweeping assertions, no specific incident, date, overt act or particular role has been attributed individually to any of the appellants. The allegations do not disclose as to which appellant made what demand, on which occasion, in whose presence, or in what manner any specific act constituting cruelty under Section 498A IPC was committed. 22. Significantly, even in the elaborate divorce petition subsequently filed by the complainant/wife, the allegations continue to remain substantially vague insofar as the present appellants are concerned. The detailed allegations of cruelty, harassment and mental trauma 5 2026 SCC OnLine SC 933 - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 overwhelmingly revolve around the conduct of the husband at Sheopur, where admittedly the complainant was residing with him in the government accommodation allotted to him. The complainant herself states in paragraph 2 of the divorce petition that “after some time of marriage, the non-applicant took the applicant to live in his government quarter in Sheopur.” She further reiterates in paragraph 3 that during the second Karva Chauth, “the applicant and the non-applicant lived in the government quarters of Sheopur.” These pleadings clearly indicate that the matrimonial residence of the parties was at Sheopur and not at Shivpuri, where the present appellants were residing. The complainant, however, in the counter affidavit as well as in the written submissions filed before this Court, has attempted to explain the aforesaid position by contending that while she was residing with her husband at Sheopur, the husband along with the present appellants used to harass her for dowry and that whenever the husband left her at the in-laws' house at Shivpuri, the appellants also used to harass her and prevent her from residing peacefully in the matrimonial home. It has further been contended on behalf of the complainant that these aspects are also reflected in the translated divorce petition and the prosecution's story. Even if the aforesaid explanation is accepted at its face value, the allegations against the present appellants nevertheless remain broad, generalised, and bereft of specific particulars. Neither in the FIR nor in the divorce petition nor even in the subsequent pleadings before this Court has the complainant specified any particular date, incident or overt act attributable individually to any of the present appellants which would prima facie constitute cruelty or unlawful demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 498A IPC or Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The allegations essentially remain collective assertions that the appellants “used to harass” the complainant or “supported” the husband, without any clear delineation of the precise role allegedly played by each of them. Mere use of omnibus expressions - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 against all family members, in the absence of specific factual assertions, would not by itself justify continuation of criminal proceedings against the present appellants. 23. In fact, the complainant's own pleadings substantially dilute the allegations sought to be levelled against the appellants in the FIR. While the FIR creates an impression of continuous harassment by all in-laws collectively, the divorce petition narrates specific acts, almost entirely concerning the husband. Even the allegation regarding the demand for money is primarily against the husband, wherein the complainant states that “the non-applicant told the applicant that my entire salary is spent on my father's treatment, and now I am unable to bear your expenses. … now bring some money from your parents.” The subsequent allegation that the husband became angry and started abusing and slapping her is also directed solely against him. The appellants are not alleged to have actively participated in any specific demand or act of cruelty. 24. The allegations against the appellant No. 4 - Vikram Dhakad are also of a generalised nature and do not disclose any criminal intent or overt act constituting an offence under Section 498A IPC. In paragraph 6 of the divorce petition, the complainant merely states that Vikram Dhakad remarked that “guests keep coming to our house” and questioned why she was residing at Shivpuri while her husband was staying in Sheopur. Even if the said allegations are accepted at their face value, they merely indicate a domestic disagreement regarding her stay at the matrimonial house and do not amount to cruelty or unlawful dowry demand within the meaning of the penal provisions invoked. 25. Similarly, the allegations against the appellant No. 1 Arti Mehta are confined to assertions that the complainant had informed her regarding the conduct of the husband and that she did not react in the manner expected by the complainant. In paragraph 9 of the divorce petition, the complainant states that “The non-applicant's elder sister Aarti Mehta also came to Sheopur many times. The - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 applicant informed her regarding all types of acts, such as beating and abuse by the non-applicant. No statement was made on the incident told by the applicant.” Mere failure to intervene in a matrimonial dispute between spouses, without any specific allegation of active participation in cruelty or dowry demand, cannot by itself attract criminal liability. 26. It is also pertinent to note that the complainant herself states in paragraph 9 of the divorce petition that she travelled from Sheopur to Shivpuri on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan along with the appellant No. 1 Arti Mehta. The relevant portion states that “the applicant came from Sheopur to Shivpuri on 8.9.2022 on the festival of Raksha Bandhan with the non-applicant's sister.” This circumstance assumes significance because it becomes difficult to readily accept that the complainant would voluntarily travel with the very same appellant whom she alleges to have been continuously harassing and tormenting her for dowry. Though this circumstance by itself may not be determinative, it certainly weakens the allegation of persistent and active cruelty attributed to the appellant No. 1. 27. Further, the complainant's own pleadings demonstrate that there was no continuous shared household with the present the appellants. The repeated references in the divorce petition indicate that the complainant was residing with her husband at Sheopur in his government accommodation and that the visits to Shivpuri were occasional and temporary in nature. Thus, even on the complainant's own showing, the principal matrimonial relationship and the alleged acts of cruelty were centred around the husband at Sheopur. 28. What, therefore, emerges from a cumulative reading of the FIR and the divorce petition is that while there are specific allegations against the husband relating to physical assault, verbal abuse, neglect and suspicious conduct, the allegations against the present appellants remain bald, generalised, and devoid of material particulars. No independent or specific role has been attributed - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 to any of the present appellants so as to disclose prima facie commission of offences under Sections 498A/34 IPC or Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The allegations against them appear to be omnibus assertions made on account of their relationship with the husband rather than on the basis of any distinct criminal acts allegedly committed by them. 29. It is a matter of common judicial experience that matrimonial disputes are often accompanied by heightened emotions, strained relationships and deep- seated personal grievances. In such circumstances, complaints alleging cruelty and harassment frequently tend to implicate not only the spouse but also the entire family of the spouse, including those relatives who may have had little or no active role in the matrimonial discord. Quite often, family members who may have remained passive spectators, failed to intervene, or merely sided with one party in a domestic disagreement, are also arrayed as accused. However, mere familial association with the husband, or failure to support the complainant in a marital dispute, cannot by itself constitute a criminal offence in the absence of specific allegations disclosing active participation in acts amounting to cruelty, harassment or unlawful demand of dowry. 30. It must also be borne in mind that when matrimonial relationships deteriorate and bitterness sets in, there is a natural tendency for allegations to be amplified or broadly worded out of anger, frustration or emotional distress. While the anguish of a complainant in a failed marriage cannot be lightly disregarded, equally, criminal law cannot be permitted to be set in motion against every relative of the husband merely on the basis of generalised and omnibus allegations lacking a specific factual foundation. Courts, therefore, are required to exercise greater caution and carefully scrutinise whether the allegations genuinely disclose the commission of cognizable offences against each accused individually, lest the criminal process itself becomes a tool of harassment and misuse. - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 …. …. …. 34. Insofar as the present appellants are concerned, the allegations in the DV complaint remain broadly worded and largely collective in nature. The complainant states that due to refusal to bring money from her parental home, “my husband and in-laws … used to get angry with me. In this way they started torturing me physically and mentally.” However, beyond the use of such omnibus expressions, the complaint does not disclose any specific incident, date, act or conduct individually attributable to any of the appellants which would constitute “domestic violence” within the meaning of the DV Act. 35. Even the allegations concerning the complainant's brother-in-law, namely, Vikram Dhakad (Appellant No. 4), are essentially in the nature of statements allegedly advising the complainant regarding her matrimonial life. The complaint states that Vikram Dhakad questioned why the complainant was staying at Shivpuri while the husband was residing at Sheopur and allegedly told her that “you bring money from your maternal home as per our demand and either stay in Sheopur or stay in your maternal home in Guna.” Thereafter, it is alleged that Vikram Dhakad, along with Manisha Dhakad and Ganesh Dhakad, did not permit her to continue residing at Shivpuri. Even if these allegations are accepted at their face value, they do not disclose any specific act of physical violence, criminal intimidation or overt conduct of such nature as would independently attract criminal liability under the provisions of the DV Act. 36. Similarly, the allegations against the complainant's mother-in-law, namely, Shrivati Bai Dhakad (Appellant No. 2) and the wife of the complainant's brother-in-law, namely, Manisha Dhakad (Appellant No. 3), are confined to broad assertions that “they used to insult me on small matters and demand money.” The complaint is conspicuously silent regarding the particulars of such alleged demands, the time and place where such incidents occurred, or the manner in which such demands were allegedly made. General - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 allegations of “insult” or “harassment” without supporting particulars cannot by themselves form the basis for continuation of criminal proceedings. 37. As regards the complainant's sister-in-law Arti Mehta (Appellant No. 1), the allegation is essentially that when the complainant informed her about the husband's conduct, she allegedly scolded the complainant and advised her to remain quiet and fulfil the family's demands. The relevant allegation reads that “I told his sister Aarti Mehta about his activities many times, then she scolded me and said that you should keep quiet, otherwise it will not be good.” The allegation, even if accepted in entirety, merely suggests that appellant No. 1 sided with her brother in the matrimonial dispute. Mere failure to support the complainant, or advising her to continue in the matrimonial relationship, without any further overt act, would not ipso facto amount to domestic violence so as to justify criminal prosecution. …. …. …. 39. What ultimately emerges from a cumulative reading of the DV complaint is that while the complainant has narrated several detailed allegations concerning the husband's conduct and the strained matrimonial relationship between the spouses, the allegations against the present appellants remain generalised and derivative in character. The complaint does not disclose any specific or direct act individually attributable to the appellants constituting domestic violence, physical abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse or economic abuse within the meaning of the DV Act. The allegations against them are essentially that they supported the husband, failed to intervene in the matrimonial dispute, or asked the complainant to adjust to the situation. Such omnibus and broadly worded allegations, in the absence of clear particulars and specific overt acts, would not justify continuation of proceedings against the present appellants. - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 40. We have also taken note of the fact that during the pendency of the present proceedings, the marriage between the complainant and her husband already stood dissolved by a decree passed by the competent Family Court. In such circumstances, continuation of the proceedings under the DV Act qua the present appellants, in the absence of specific and substantiated allegations against them as of now, would serve no useful purpose. It is, however, clarified that the complainant would be at liberty to avail such remedies against the husband as may be permissible to her in accordance with law. 41. It is further required to be stated that the invocation of the criminal process is not a matter of course. The coercive machinery of criminal law carries serious civil and personal consequences and, therefore, can be legitimately set in motion only where the allegations disclose specific acts constituting offences punishable under the penal law. This principle assumes even greater significance in cases arising out of matrimonial and domestic discord. Family relationships are founded upon emotional bonds, mutual trust, affection and shared responsibilities, and cannot be viewed through the same lens as ordinary commercial, civil disputes or criminal cases. It is not uncommon that when matrimonial relationships deteriorate, allegations are made in the heat of emotional turmoil and bitterness, often resulting in the entire family of the spouse being drawn into criminal litigation. However, criminal law cannot be permitted to become an instrument for venting personal grievances or settling familial scores in the absence of clear, specific and legally sustainable allegations. Courts must therefore exercise a heightened degree of caution and judicial scrutiny before permitting criminal prosecution against relatives who are sought to be implicated merely by virtue of their relationship with the spouse. 42. At the same time, this Court is equally conscious of the reality that genuine cases of cruelty and domestic violence do occur within the confines of the matrimonial home and often remain concealed from public gaze. Acts of emotional, verbal, economic or physical - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 abuse within the domestic sphere may not always leave behind readily available evidence or independent witnesses, and the absence of such evidence at the threshold cannot by itself be a ground to disbelieve a victim. It is precisely to address this social evil that legislations such as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the penal provisions relating to cruelty and dowry harassment have been enacted with wide amplitude and protective intent. The object of such statutes is to ensure meaningful legal protection to women subjected to domestic abuse and harassment within the matrimonial home. 43. However, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of victims of domestic violence remains of paramount importance, courts are simultaneously required to ensure that the rigours of criminal law are not indiscriminately extended to every member of the family without a clear factual foundation. In prosecutions arising out of matrimonial disputes, the allegations against each accused must be specific, distinct and supported by prima facie material indicating active involvement in the alleged acts of cruelty, harassment or unlawful demand of dowry. Mere allegations that family members “supported” the husband, failed to intervene, or advised the complainant to adjust in the matrimonial relationship, without anything further, would not ipso facto attract criminal liability. There may indeed be situations where certain relatives remain passive spectators or fail to come to the aid of the complainant; however, such conduct, though morally questionable, cannot automatically be elevated to the status of criminal culpability unless the surrounding circumstances clearly disclose their active complicity or participation in the alleged offences. 44. It must therefore be emphasised that each case arising out of matrimonial discord or allegations of domestic violence must necessarily turn on its own peculiar facts and the nature of allegations levelled against the accused concerned. The observations made herein should not be construed to mean that relatives of the husband can never be prosecuted under the relevant penal - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 provisions. Where the material on record discloses specific overt acts, active participation, or direct involvement in perpetrating cruelty, harassment or domestic violence, such relatives would undoubtedly be liable to face prosecution in accordance with the law. What the Court is required to carefully examine is whether the allegations are genuine, specific and supported by foundational facts, or whether they are merely a consequence of matrimonial acrimony resulting in sweeping and omnibus implication of all family members. In the absence of such specific allegations and prima facie material, continuation of criminal proceedings against such relatives would amount to abuse of the process of law. 45. Having given our anxious consideration to the allegations contained in the FIR, the complaint under the DV Act, the pleadings exchanged between the parties in the matrimonial proceedings and the material placed on record, we find that the substratum of the allegations primarily concerns the matrimonial discord between the complainant and her husband. The allegations relating to physical assault, abusive conduct, emotional neglect, suspicion regarding extramarital relationship, threats, restriction on movement and denial of marital companionship are overwhelmingly directed against the husband. Insofar as the present appellants are concerned, the allegations remain generalised, omnibus and lacking in material particulars. As discussed hereinabove, neither the FIR nor the DV complaint nor even the subsequent pleadings before the Family Court disclose any specific overt act individually attributable to the present appellants so as to prima facie constitute offences punishable under Sections 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act or the provisions of the DV Act. The allegations against the appellants essentially proceed on broad assertions that they “supported” the husband, “used to harass” the complainant, or advised her to either adjust with the husband or return to her parental home. However, no distinct incident, date, specific demand, act of physical cruelty, unlawful intimidation or active participation in the alleged harassment has been - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 clearly attributed to any of the appellants individually. 46. Though their behaviour as projected in the complaint appear to be reproachable otherwise, yet these may not be sufficient to attract criminal liabilities. Permitting the proceedings to continue against the appellants in the absence of specific and legally sustainable allegations would amount to an abuse of the process of law.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) 14. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the material against accused No.2—the Mother-in-law—becomes conspicuously fragile. The complaint, read in its entirety, narrates prolonged matrimonial discord primarily between the deceased and her husband. Every allegation of physical assault, verbal abuse, threats of divorce, humiliation, accusations of infidelity, and instigation to die is directed singularly against accused No.1. The voice message allegedly left by the deceased moments before her death also attributes responsibility only to the husband. It is this aspect that assumes considerable significance. 15. Thus, insofar as the petitioner-accused No.2 is concerned, the allegations qua Sections 108 and 85 of BNS, are - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 strikingly sparse. What is attributed to her is no more than generalized allegations of dowry demand said to have been made at the time of marriage and at certain intermittent periods thereafter. Save and except a bald assertion that during the Varamahalakshmi festival she demanded an additional sum of ₹10 lakhs, there is no specific overt act attributed to the petitioner demonstrating instigation, intentional provocation, or active participation in the mental cruelty allegedly suffered by the deceased immediately preceding the suicide. 16. The allegations against the petitioner, thus remain omnibus, sweeping, and bereft of particulars. Criminal law, particularly in offences alleging abetment of suicide and dowry harassment, cannot rest upon such nebulous assertions. The requirement is not merely the existence of strained relations, but the presence of proximate conduct capable of being legally characterized as instigation or intentional aid. - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 17. It has become almost commonplace in matrimonial prosecutions, particularly those arising out of unnatural deaths and dowry harassment, for every member of the matrimonial household to be roped into the criminal net. Courts have repeatedly cautioned against such indiscriminate implication of relatives on the strength of generalized accusations. Permitting prosecution on such frail foundations would amount to converting suspicion into proof and accusation into culpability—an approach wholly alien to criminal jurisprudence. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R [I] Criminal Petition is allowed. [II] Proceedings in S.C.No.349/2025 pending before the LXXI Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, stands quashed qua the petitioner- accused No.2. [III] It is made clear the observations made in the course of the order is only for the purpose of - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26178 CRL.P No. 4900 of 2025 considering the case of the petitioner-accused No.2- the Mother-in-law and would not become applicable to any other accused in the subject proceeding. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE CBC List No.: 2 Sl No.: 44