1 2026:CGHC:25847 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 59 of 2019 1 - Gosaibhai Patel S/o Shri Jogabhai Patel Aged About 49 Years R/o Qr. No. Drg /3-106, Acc Colony Jamul Cement Works, Durg., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Associated Cement Company Ltd. Jamul Cement Works Through The Vice President Jamul Cement Works Durg., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Petitioner : Ms. Suryakawalkar Dangi, Advocate For respondent : Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 24.06.2026 1) By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought following reliefs:- “(7.1) This hon'ble court may be pleased to call for the records of case no. 162/CGIR/05 from the labour court Durg and civil appeal no. 03/CGIR/08 from the industrial court Raipur. (7.2) This hon'ble court may be pleased to set - aside the awards/orders dated 19/03/08 passed by the learned Labour Court Durg & order dated 16/08/09 passed by the learned Industrial court Raipur. (7.3) This Hon'ble court may be pleased to impose a lesser penalty to the petitioner to save the family members of the petitioner from being ruined. (7.4) This hon'ble Court may pleased to pass any other suitable order as it may deem proper looking to the facts & circumstances of the case.” 2 2) The facts in brief are that the petitioner was employed as Machine Tool Operator under the respondent in the year 1979. An FIR was registered against him and he was arrested on 24.11.2003 for commission of offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. He was convicted by the concerned Criminal Court vide judgment dated 16.08.2004. He preferred an appeal and application for suspension of sentence was allowed vide order dated 26.08.2004, thus, the petitioner remained in jail from 24.11.2003 to 26.08.2004 total 273 days, therefore, he could not join duties. The petitioner approached the respondent seeking permission to join the duties but he was not permitted and thereafter, legal notice was sent. The petitioner moved an application under Section 31(3) read with Section 61 of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relations Act, (for short ’the CGIR Act’) on 19.04.2005 before the learned Labour Court seeking a direction to the respondent to permit the petitioner to join the duties. Learned Labour Court passed an order in favour of the petitioner on 05.05.2005 and pursuant to said order, the petitioner was permitted to join his duties on 06.05.2005. The article of charge was issued on 21.05.2005 against the petitioner alleging three misconducts : (i) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection of property of the undertaking; (ii) Drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behavour during working hours and (iii) unauthorized absence from duty for more than 10 consecutive days. He filed reply on 26.07.2005 and denied the allegations. The Inquiry Officer conducted inquiry and found charge No.1 & 2 not proved and charge No.3 proved in its inquiry report dated 05.08.2005. The disciplinary authority inflicted penalty of dismissal from services vide order dated 30.11.2005. 3) The petitioner challenged the said order by filing an application under Section 31(3) read with Section 61 of the CGIR Act on 07.12.2005. The 3 respondent herein filed reply to said application on 08.02.2006, wherein, it has been admitted that the petitioner was in jail for a period of 273 days. During pendency above-stated proceedings, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Sessions Court vide judgment dated 22.11.2006. Learned Labour Court vide order dated 19.08.2008 held that order of dismissal from service to be legal and valid and against said order, this petition has been preferred. 4) Ms. Dangi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that allegations with regard to theft, fraud etc. were not found proved by the Inquiry Officer. She would further submit that absence of petitioner was not unauthorized rather proper communication was made by the petitioner to the respondent authority. It is also contended that the petitioner remained in jail for 273 days in connection with a criminal case registered against him and this fact has been admitted by the respondent in reply to application moved under Section 31(3) read with Section 61 of CGIR Act. She would submit that sentence of the petitioner was suspended by the Appellate Court vide order dated 26.08.2004 and on 30.08.2004, the petitioner approached the respondent to join the duties but he was not permitted. She would further submit that immediately thereafter an application 31(3) of the CGIR Act was moved before the learned Labour Court which was allowed vide order dated 05.05.2005 and thereafter, the petitioner was permitted to join services. It is argued that till 06.05.2005, no article of charge was issued against the petitioner and after joining the services, it was issued on 21.05.2005 making false allegations and thus, initiation of departmental inquiry was outcome of afterthought. She would contend that absence of the petitioner after suspension of sentence was duly communicated and it was within the knowledge of the respondent and therefore, it could not treated as unauthorized absence. It is argued 4 that the learned Labour Court failed to consider these aspects of the matter and held the order of dismissal from service legal and valid. She would pray to allow this petition. 5) On the other hand, Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent would oppose the submissions. Mr. Sinha would submit that the petitioner never informed the respondent that he remained in jail for certain period. It is further contended that during said period, no communication was made by the petitioner from jail and thus, the disciplinary authority rightly held said period as period of unauthorized absence. Mr. Sinha would submit that even after grant of bail, the petitioner did not approach the respondent immediately and moved application before the learned Labour Court after four months from 26.08.2004 and during said period, he did not move application to grant leave and therefore, said period has rightly been treated as unauthorized absence. He would further submit that the matter was settled between the parties before the learned Labour Court and thereafter, according to standing order, article of charge was issued. In departmental inquiry, it is found that absence of the petitioner was unauthorized and therefore, the disciplinary authority rightly inflicted penalty of dismissal from service. He would contend that the order passed by the disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the learned Labour Court holding the departmental inquiry legal and valid. He would further submit that scope of judicial review while interfering with the matter of departmental inquiry is limited. He would contend that order passed in the departmental inquiry can be interfered with if such order has been passed by the authority not competent; principles of natural justice have not been followed and proper procedure contemplated in Rules or Regulations have not been followed. He would contend that in the present case, there is no allegation that principles of 5 natural justice were not followed or disciplinary authority was not competent and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. and another Vs. K. Hanumantha Rao and another, passed in Civil Appeal No.11975 of 2016, where, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found the penalty shockingly disproportionate remitted back the matter to the disciplinary authority to inflict proper penalty. He would submit that the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 6) Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the Record. 7) In departmental inquiry, article of charge was issued against the petitioner which reads as under : CHARGE-SHEET “You remained absent from the duties unauthorizedly w.e.f.22.11.2003. On 18.02.2004 a show-cause notice No. JML/HR/CHR/590 was sent to you to explain and justify your unauthorized absence w. e. f 22.11.2003 and the following charges were leveled against you: (12) 1. (f) Drunkenness riotous or disorderly behavior, during working hours of the undertaking or conduct endangering the life or safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of discipline. (12) 1. (p) Unauthorized absence from duty for more than ten consecutive days. You did not respond to this letter. Another show-cause notice No.JML/HR/CHR/716 was served on you on 27.03.2004 to which you submitted a reply on 02.04.2004 that you were in Durg jail, which was apparently false as your letter did not come through the jail authorities. It was not accompanied with any other documents to substantiate your averment. It is well known that a person in jail could send letter only through the jail authorities. Another show-cause notice NO.JML/HR/CHRG/040 was issued to you on 10.05.2004 asking you to submit document to show that you were in jail within a week's time failing which necessary action would be taken against you. It was explained to you in all the letters that due to your unauthorized absence from the duty the work was heavily suffering. You sent another letter by Reg AD post registered at Durg Head Post Office on 16th July 2004 in which you again repeated " I am at present" at Durg jail. This was again false, as even that letter was not sent through the jail authorities and your registering it from Durg Head Post Office clearly established that you were not in jail. Another letter of invitation was sent to your wife since you had completed 25 years of service and the silver jubilee award was to be given to you in the presence of your wife in a ceremony to be held on 15.08.2004. You received that letter on 07.08.2004 but neither you nor your wife attended the function. Your receiving the letter also shows that you were not in jail on 6 07.08.2004. All the above three letters clearly establish fraud or dishonestly played by you with the Company. All these documents clearly establish that you were out of jail and remained unauthorizedly absent till 06 May 2005, when your allowed to join duty by virtue of an order of the Labour Court, Durg vide their order on 05/05/2005 in the Case No 59/2005/MPIR with liberty given to the Management to take disciplinary action as per rules. Your above acts are of serious misconduct under Rule 12 of the Standing Order as under: (1)(b) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the business or property of the undertaking. (f) Drunkenness riotous or disorderly behavior, during working hours of the undertaking of conduct endangering the life or safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of discipline. (p) Unauthorized absence from duty for more then ten consecutive days.” 8) The Inquiry Officer found allegations No.1 & 2 not proved whereas allegation No.3 was found proved and based on such finding, order of dismissal from service was passed by the disciplinary authority. In the present case, the petitioner was arrested for commission of offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC on 24.11.2003 and he was granted bail by the Appellate Court vide order dated 26.08.2004, thus he remained in jail for a period of 273 days. 9) The petitioner approached the respondent to report duty on 30.08.2004 but he was not permitted, therefore, he moved an application under Section 31(3) read with Section 61 of the CGIR Act before the Learned Labour Court on 19.04.2005 and prior to said date, legal notice was sent. Learned Labour Court passed an order and issued a direction to the respondent to permit the petitioner to join service on 05.05.2005 and immediately, thereafter, on 06.05.2005, the petitioner joined. In said order, the respondent was granted liberty to initiate a departmental inquiry. The Inquiry Officer has found absence of the petitioner unauthorized from 22.11.2003 to 05.05.2005. It is also held by the disciplinary authority that major punishment can be inflicted for unauthorized absence for a period of 10 days or more, according to clause 12.1.(p) of Standing Order. 7 Accordingly, the disciplinary authority inflicted penalty of dismissal from service. 10) It is quite vivid that there is no allegation with regard to corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer, or conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service and therefore, the penalty inflicted by the disciplinary authority appears to be erroneous and requires interference by this Court. 11) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Surekha Domaji Bele Vs. Executive Engineering, Testing Division, MSEDCL, passed in Civil Appeal No.11294 of 2025, dated 11th of June, 2026 while dealing with similar issue in para 110 held as under : “110. Dismissal is ordinarily justified where the misconduct is of such gravity that continuance of the employee would be wholly incompatible with discipline, trust or institutional functioning. Cases involving corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer, or conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service stand on a different footing. However, where the misconduct does not involve corruption, moral turpitude, financial misappropriation or proved loss to the employer, and where there is long service without much blemish, the disciplinary authority must carefully examine whether any lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice.” 12) In the matter of K. Hanumantha Rao (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “8. (ii) Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/ employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the Court, that the Court steps in and interferes. No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a well recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment 8 should appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience. (See State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Kamal Prasad & Ors. 2014(7) SCC 223. It would also be apt to extract the following observations in this behalf from the judgment of this Court in Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain, 2013(10) SCC 106: “8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. (See UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad [(2010) 5 SCC 775 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101] . In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. 9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with the doctrine of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for 9 the Civil Service [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)] in the following words: (AC p. 410 D-E) “…………..Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads of the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’.” 10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] . Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that “all powers have legal limits” invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25) “25...The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 13) Thus, penalty inflicted by the disciplinary authority appears to be disproportionate looking to the misconduct of the petitioner and same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The learned Labour Court also 10 committee error of law while affirming the order passed by disciplinary authority without weighing the accusations, therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court is also not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, order dated 30.11.2005 passed by the disciplinary authority inflicting penalty of dismissal of the petitioner from services and award dated 19.03.2008 passed by the learned Labour Court affirming penalty inflicted by the disciplinary authority are hereby set aside. 14) The petitioner worked under the respondent since 1979, his service career remained unblemished and therefore, the disciplinary authority is directed to inflict a lessor penalty except penalty of dismissal from service. The disciplinary authority shall consider the petitioner’s long service, past record, age, nature and gravity of misconduct, absence or presence of financial loss, and other relevant circumstances while inflicting penalty according to standing order. The claim of the petitioner with regard to back wages shall also be considered and the petitioner would be at liberty to make a detailed representation describing his nature of employment during said period. The entire exercise shall be completed by the respondent within a period of 90 days from the receipt of copy of this order. 15) In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Rekha