1 2026:CGHC:26206-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 521 of 2026 Pardeshi Ram S/o Late Khelandas Aged About 50 Years R/o Village- Ganiyari, Tahsil- Nawagarh, District- Bemetara (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Panchayat And Rural Development Department, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 2 - The Board of Revenue Bilaspur, Circuit Court Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 3 - The Commissioner Durg Division, District Durg (Chhattisgarh) 4 - The Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Nawagarh, District Bemetara (Chhattisgarh) 5 - The Tahsildar Nawagarh, District Bemetara (Chhattisgarh) 6 - Rambihari Sahu S/o Tirithram Sahu, R/o Village Ganiyari, Tahsil Nawagarh, District Bemetara (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Renu Kochar, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 5/State : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General For Respondent No.6 : Mr. Rajkumar Pali, Advocate ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.06.30 10:17:24 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 29.06.2026 1. Heard Ms. Renu Kochar, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 5 and Mr. Rajkumar Pali, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.6. 2. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 28.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 7497 of 2023 (Pardeshi Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge has been dismissed. By filing the present writ appeal, the appellant has prayed for following relief(s):- “1. That this Hon'ble High Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari and quash the judgment and order dated 28.02.2026 (Annexure A/1) passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 7497 of 2023, in the interest of justice. 2. That any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may also be granted in favour of the Appellant.” 3. The facts, in brief, are that the father of the appellant/writ petitioner, namely Khelan Das Panika, was serving as Kotwar of 3 Village Ganiyari and expired on 06.11.2010, resulting in a vacancy on the said post. Pursuant thereto, applications were invited for appointment to the post of Kotwar. The Gram Panchayat recommended the name of the appellant/writ petitioner; however, the Tahsildar appointed one Laxman Singh as Kotwar. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant/writ petitioner challenged the said appointment before the competent authority. During the pendency of the proceedings, Laxman Singh expired and, consequently, the proceedings came to be dismissed as having become infructuous. 4. Thereafter, the Tahsildar issued a fresh proclamation inviting applications for appointment to the post of Kotwar. The appellant/writ petitioner as well as respondent No.6 submitted their respective applications. The Tahsildar appointed respondent No.6 as Kotwar. Challenging the said appointment, the appellant/writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), who allowed the appeal holding that the mandatory procedure prescribed under Rule 4(1) and Rule 4(2) of the applicable Rules and Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code had not been followed, particularly inasmuch as there was no recommendation of the Gram Panchayat nor any character verification from the Police, and accordingly remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.6 preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, who allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The appellant/writ petitioner thereafter preferred a revision before 4 the Board of Revenue, which came to be dismissed by order dated 16.07.2021 with a direction to appoint respondent No.6 as permanent Kotwar. The review petition preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner also came to be dismissed on 23.06.2023. 5. Assailing the aforesaid orders, the appellant/writ petitioner instituted the writ petition bearing WPS No. 7497 of 2023, which has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 6. Feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid order dated 28.02.2026 passed in WPS No.7497 of 2023, the appellant/writ petitioner has filed the instant writ appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the appointment of respondent No.6 as permanent Kotwar was made in complete violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under Rule 4(1) and Rule 4(2) governing such appointments. It is contended that the Sub-Divisional Officer had specifically recorded a finding that neither the recommendation of the Gram Panchayat was obtained nor were the mandatory character verification reports of the appellant/writ petitioner and respondent No.6 called for before making the appointment. It is further submitted that even the Commissioner, while passing the order dated 12.09.2019, had directed strict compliance with the statutory procedure before making appointment to the post of permanent Kotwar. Despite such directions, respondent No.6 5 came to be appointed without adherence to the mandatory provisions, rendering the appointment illegal and unsustainable. 8. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge has also failed to appreciate that the Board of Revenue, while affirming the appointment of respondent No.6 by order dated 16.07.2021, erroneously held that procedural irregularities could not be made a ground for cancellation of the appointment merely because the dispute had remained pending for a long time. It is argued that statutory requirements cannot be dispensed with on the ground of delay and an appointment made in violation of mandatory rules is void ab initio. It is further contended that the appellant was denied a fair opportunity and the principles of natural justice stood violated throughout the selection process. 9. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Single Judge committed an error in drawing an adverse inference against the appellant solely on the basis that proceedings under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had once been initiated against him. It is submitted that such preventive proceedings neither constitute a criminal conviction nor can they be treated as determinative of a person's character or suitability for public appointment. The appellant's candidature, therefore, could not have been rejected on that basis. 10. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the appellant has been continuously challenging the illegal appointment of respondent 6 No.6 since the year 2012 and has diligently pursued his remedies before every forum. His claim could not have been rejected merely on the ground that he is presently about 54 years of age while respondent No.6 is younger. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside and appropriate directions be issued for appointment of the appellant to the post of Kotwar in accordance with law. 11. On the other hand, learned State counsel as well as learned counsel appearing for respondent No.6 support the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and submit that the appointment of respondent No.6 has been made in accordance with law after due consideration by the competent authority. It is contended that no illegality or procedural irregularity warranting interference has been committed and that the findings recorded by the Board of Revenue as affirmed by the learned Single Judge do not call for interference in the present writ appeal. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 12. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents placed on record and the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 13. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single 7 Judge, while referring Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 as well as the judicial precedents i.e. Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate, (2019) 10 SCC 738 as also Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair, (2020) 5 SCC 421, has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “15. From perusal of the aforementioned statutory provisions, it clearly transpires that the post of Kotwar is not a contractual, casual, or hereditary engagement, but a statutory post created, regulated, and controlled exclusively by the provisions of the Code, 1959 and the Rules framed thereunder. The Code and the Rules comprehensively occupy the field with regard to the eligibility criteria, mode of appointment, duties, disciplinary control, suspension, dismissal, and termination of a Kotwar. 16. The power to appoint a Kotwar vests solely in the competent Revenue Authorities, namely the Collector and other Revenue Officers duly empowered under the Rules, and such appointment is required to be made strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed, including consideration of the resolution of the concerned Gram Sabha. Likewise, continuance in service, imposition of penalties, and removal from service are matters falling entirely within the statutory control of the appointing authority, subject to the satisfaction of the conditions enumerated 8 under the Rules and observance of principles of fairness. 17. The scheme of Section 230 and the Rules framed thereunder further makes it evident that no person can claim appointment or continuation on the post of Kotwar as a matter of right, much less on the basis of lineage, past occupation of a family member, or any equitable consideration dehors the statute. Any preference accorded to a near relative of an ex-Kotwar is merely discretionary and conditional, and does not confer any vested or enforceable right. 18. Thus, the statutory framework leaves no manner of doubt that rights and obligations relating to the post of Kotwar emanate solely from the statute, and any appointment, disciplinary action, or termination made in conformity with the Code and the Rules would fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the competent Revenue Authority and would not be open to interference unless shown to be vitiated by patent illegality, procedural irregularity, or arbitrariness. 19. From the pleadings and record, it is evident that the petitioner’s father, namely late Khelan Das Panika, was working as Kotwar of Village Ganiyari and expired on 06.11.2010. Consequent upon his death, a vacancy arose for the post of Kotwar and the Tahsildar initiated the process for filling up the said vacancy in accordance with law. After 9 following due procedure, one Laxman Singh was appointed as Kotwar of Village Ganiyari. The said appointment was assailed by the petitioner and the matter remained pending before the Board of Revenue. During pendency of the proceedings, Laxman Singh expired and, as a consequence thereof, the revision challenging his appointment stood terminated on account of his death. Thereafter, on 16.03.2018, the Tahsildar issued a fresh proclamation inviting applications for appointment to the post of Kotwar. Pursuant thereto, both the petitioner and respondent No. 6 submitted their applications. After undertaking the prescribed procedure, including verification of character and antecedents, the Tahsildar appointed respondent No. 6 as Kotwar. The petitioner challenged the said appointment before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Nawagarh, District Bemetara. The Sub-Divisional Officer set aside the appointment and directed reconsideration in accordance with Section 230 of the Code, 1959. However, in appeal, the Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and directed appointment of a permanent Kotwar in accordance with law. 20. The order passed by the Commissioner was challenged by the petitioner before the Board of Revenue in revision. The Board of Revenue, after considering the entire material on record, dismissed the revision and affirmed 10 the order passed by the Commissioner. The petitioner thereafter preferred a review application, which was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue on the ground that no error apparent on the face of the record, as envisaged under Section 51 of the Code, 1959 read with Order XLVII Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was made out. 21. Upon a careful perusal of the orders passed by the Board of Revenue in its revisional as well as review jurisdiction, this Court finds that the petitioner failed to raise any ground warranting interference. The Board of Revenue has recorded cogent and well-reasoned findings, particularly noting that at the time of preferring the appeal, the petitioner was about 54 years of age. The post of Kotwar being a government post, the age of superannuation is 60 years, and therefore, considering his advanced age, the petitioner was not found suitable for appointment to the said post. 22. Further, the record reveals that as many as three criminal antecedents exist against the petitioner. Separate complaints were filed against him by the Gram Panch, Gram Patel and other villagers before the Sub-Divisional Officer and the concerned Police Station. The Executive Magistrate, Nawagarh, by order dated 21.01.2011, directed the petitioner to execute a bond of ₹10,000/- with surety for maintaining peace in the village. Additionally, 11 the Station House Officer, Police Station Nandghat, District Bemetara, vide letter dated 28.08.2018, informed the Tahsildar that cases under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were registered against the petitioner in the years 1996 and 2013. In view of the aforesaid material, the competent authority rightly concluded that the petitioner does not possess good character and antecedents, as required under Rule 2 of the Kotwar Rules. 23. Though the petitioner claims preference on the ground that his father was earlier working as Kotwar, it is evident that after the death of his father, the petitioner was never appointed to the post even temporarily. Instead, Laxman Singh was appointed as Kotwar, and therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any experience of Kotwari duties even for a single day. The plea of preference cannot override the statutory requirement of suitability and eligibility. 24. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is educated only up to Class III, whereas respondent No. 6 has passed Class V and was aged about 34 years at the relevant time. Moreover, no criminal antecedent whatsoever is found against respondent No. 6. Considering the nature of duties attached to the post of Kotwar, which require efficiency, integrity, and continuous engagement with village administration, the comparative 12 assessment made by the competent authority cannot be faulted. 25. The Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, as well as the Board of Revenue, have concurrently held that the petitioner was not suitable for appointment, whereas respondent No. 6 was found eligible and competent in all respects. Consequently, respondent No. 6 was initially appointed as temporary Kotwar and thereafter as permanent Kotwar in compliance with the directions issued by the appellate authority. These findings are based on appreciation of facts and statutory provisions and do not suffer from any illegality or perversity. 26. It is well settled that orders passed by quasi-judicial authorities exercising appellate, revisional or review jurisdiction are not to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction unless there is manifest illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice. No such circumstance is made out in the present case. 27. In Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate, (2019) 10 SCC 738, the Supreme Court emphasized that decisions taken in undue haste or by bypassing mandatory statutory requirements are liable to be struck down even if taken in good faith. The Hon’ble Surpeme Court while dealing with the issue, has held as under :- “14. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of an administrative action is 13 very limited. Unless the Court comes to a conclusion, that the decision maker has not understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when it is found that the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the principle of “Wednesbury Unreasonableness” or unless it is found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the decision-making process, it would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the decision making process. It is also equally well settled, that it is not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can examine only the correctness of the decision- making process. 15. This Court recently in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 902 had again an occasion to consider the scope of interference under Article 226 in an administrative action. “31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is selfevident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there 14 may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari. 32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by a writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, the same may be regarded as perverse. 33. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no 15 reasonable person could have taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect. 16. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law, i.e., when the error is apparent on the face of the record and is self evident. The High Court would be empowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the decision impugned is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that the test is not what the court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken. Not only this but such a decision must have led to manifest injustice.” 28. Further, the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair, (2020) 5 SCC 421, has authoritatively reiterated the well-settled parameters governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters involving departmental proceedings and findings of fact recorded by competent authorities. In the said decision, the Court held that where findings of fact have been concurrently recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority, and/or the Revisional Authority, such findings 16 ordinarily attain finality and are not to be lightly interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that judicial review is not an appeal on facts. The High Court does not sit as a court of re- appreciation of evidence, nor can it substitute its own conclusions for those arrived at by the statutory authorities. It was further clarified that interference would be justified only in exceptional circumstances, namely where the findings are: (i) Perverse — i.e., findings which are based on no evidence at all, or are such that no reasonable person acting judicially could have arrived at; (ii) Arbitrary or capricious — where relevant material has been ignored or extraneous considerations have influenced the decision; (iii) Vitiated by patent illegality — such as violation of principles of natural justice, non-observance of mandatory statutory provisions, or procedural irregularities causing manifest prejudice. The Court underscored that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is not a ground for interference in writ proceedings. So long as there is some evidence to support the findings and the decision-making process is fair, reasonable, and in accordance with law, the High Court must exercise restraint. The principle flowing from the said judgment is that writ jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and not appellate. Therefore, once statutory authorities have concurrently examined the record and arrived at reasoned conclusions, 17 the High Court would transgress the limits of judicial review if it were to reassess the factual matrix merely because another view is possible. Thus, the dictum in M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) reinforces the doctrine of judicial restraint and finality of concurrent factual findings, unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or a manifest error apparent on the face of the record. 29. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the statutory scheme governing the appointment of Kotwars and the principles of judicial review discussed hereinabove, this Court finds that the entire controversy essentially relates to comparative suitability and eligibility of the candidates considered by the competent authority. The petitioner has sought to build his case primarily on the ground of being the son of the deceased Kotwar and on the alleged right of preference under Rule 4(2) of the Kotwar Rules. However, as already noticed, preference to a near relative of the ex-Kotwar is not an absolute or vested right; it is merely discretionary and conditional, to be exercised only when “other things are equal”. In the present case, the materials on record clearly demonstrate that other relevant factors, including character, antecedents, age, and overall suitability, were not equal. 30. The competent authority, as well as the 18 appellate and revisional authorities, have taken into consideration the petitioner’s criminal antecedents, complaints received from the villagers, and the order passed by the Executive Magistrate requiring him to execute a bond for maintaining peace. These aspects directly bear upon the requirement under Rule 2 that a person must be of good character and antecedents. The finding that the petitioner does not fulfill this essential eligibility condition cannot be said to be arbitrary, perverse, or unsupported by material on record. On the contrary, it is founded upon documentary material and verification conducted by the police authorities. 31. Furthermore, the petitioner was admittedly around 54 years of age at the time of consideration, whereas respondent No. 6 was significantly younger and possessed better educational qualifications. Although educational qualification may not be a statutory requirement, comparative merit and capacity to effectively discharge the multifarious duties of a Kotwar are certainly relevant considerations for the appointing authority. The assessment of comparative suitability is primarily within the domain of the administrative authority and does not warrant substitution by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. 32. The revisional order dated 16.07.2021 passed by the Board of Revenue and the 19 order dated 23.06.2023 rejecting the review application reflect a conscious application of mind to the rival submissions and the material placed on record. The Board has rightly observed that no error apparent on the face of the record, as contemplated under Section 51 of the Code, 1959 read with Order XLVII Rules 1 and 2 CPC, was made out. The scope of review being extremely limited, the dismissal of the review petition cannot be faulted. 33. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Neemuch (supra) and M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra), this Court is reminded that it does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by statutory forums. Judicial review is confined to examination of the decision- making process and not the decision itself. Unless the petitioner establishes perversity, arbitrariness, manifest illegality, or violation of principles of natural justice, no interference is called for. In the present case, none of these vitiating factors are demonstrated. 34. It is also significant to note that the petitioner has not chosen to assail the subsequent order whereby respondent No. 6 was appointed as permanent Kotwar pursuant to the directions issued by the appellate authority and affirmed in revision. The said order, having attained finality, cannot be indirectly unsettled in the present 20 proceedings. Even otherwise, the record reveals that respondent No. 6 was appointed after issuance of fresh proclamation, consideration of applications received in response thereto, verification of character and antecedents through the concerned Police Station, and due consideration of the resolution of the Gram Sabha as mandated under Rule 4(1) of the Kotwar Rules framed under Section 230 of the Code, 1959. The competent authority has exercised its statutory discretion after evaluating eligibility, suitability, antecedents, age, and overall capacity to perform the duties attached to the post. In absence of any material demonstrating violation of mandatory statutory provisions or procedural impropriety, the appointment cannot be branded as illegal, arbitrary, or dehors the statutory framework. 35. Upon a comprehensive and anxious consideration of the pleadings of the parties, the statutory provisions governing the field, the material placed on record, and the concurrent findings recorded by the Commissioner as well as the Board of Revenue in exercise of revisional and review jurisdiction, this Court finds no infirmity in the decision-making process adopted by the authorities below. The findings with regard to the petitioner’s lack of eligibility under Rule 2, particularly concerning character and antecedents, as well as comparative suitability, are based upon relevant material 21 and cannot be said to be perverse or unsupported by evidence. The scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is supervisory and not appellate. This Court does not reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 36. The impugned order dated 23.06.2023 passed by the Board of Revenue reflects due application of mind and assigns cogent reasons while rejecting the review petition on the ground that no error apparent on the face of the record was established. The limited jurisdiction of review has rightly been kept in perspective by the Board, and no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated before this Court. 37. In the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner has utterly failed to demonstrate infringement of any enforceable statutory right or violation of any mandatory provision contained in Section 230 of the Code, 1959 or the Rules framed thereunder. The principles of natural justice have not been shown to have been breached at any stage of the proceedings. The petitioner was afforded due opportunity before the competent authority as well as before the appellate, revisional, and review forums. The concurrent findings recorded against him are based on relevant material available on record, particularly with regard to his antecedents, suitability, and 22 comparative merit. The findings cannot be termed as perverse, arbitrary, or such that no reasonable person acting judiciously could have arrived at. 38. The contention of the petitioner that being the son of the deceased Kotwar he possesses a superior right to appointment is misconceived in law. The statutory scheme clearly indicates that preference to a near relative is conditional and discretionary, applicable only when all other parameters stand on equal footing. The said provision does not create a hereditary right nor confer an indefeasible claim to appointment. Appointment to a statutory post must strictly conform to the eligibility criteria and suitability assessment prescribed by the Rules. Where the competent authority, on objective consideration, finds a candidate unsuitable on grounds recognized under Rule 2, such decision cannot be displaced merely on equitable considerations or familial connection. 39. It is trite that this Court, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not act as a court of appeal over administrative determinations. Judicial review is confined to examining the legality, procedural propriety, and rationality of the decision-making process. In the present case, the process adopted by the authorities does not suffer from any patent illegality, 23 jurisdictional error, malafides, or procedural irregularity causing prejudice to the petitioner. No manifest injustice is made out. On the contrary, the appointment of respondent No. 6 appears to have been made after adherence to the prescribed procedure and based on comparative suitability. 40. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the unequivocal view that the writ petition lacks merit and substance. The challenge to the order dated 23.06.2023 passed by the Board of Revenue is unsustainable in law. 40. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” 14. The principal grievance of the appellant is that the mandatory procedure prescribed under Rule 4(1) and Rule 4(2) of the relevant Rules was not followed while appointing respondent No.6 as Kotwar. However, from the record, it is evident that the competent authorities, namely the Commissioner as well as the Board of Revenue, have considered the entire factual matrix and have concurrently upheld the appointment of respondent No.6. The learned Single Judge has also examined the matter in the backdrop of the statutory scheme governing appointment to the post of Kotwar and has rightly held that no indefeasible or hereditary right accrues in favour of the son of a deceased Kotwar merely because his father had earlier held the post. The preference contemplated under the Rules is not absolute but 24 conditional and is always subject to fulfillment of the prescribed eligibility and suitability criteria. 15. The contention that respondent No.6 was appointed without following the prescribed procedure also does not persuade us to take a view different from that taken by the learned Single Judge. The issue stood examined by the statutory authorities, who, upon appreciation of the entire material available on record, arrived at a concurrent finding that respondent No.6 was suitable for appointment. It is well settled that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and much less in an intra-Court appeal arising therefrom, does not sit as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the factual findings recorded by the competent statutory authorities unless such findings are shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from manifest illegality. No such perversity or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated before us. 16. We also find no merit in the submission that the learned Single Judge erred in taking note of the proceedings initiated against the appellant under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Single Judge has not dismissed the writ petition solely on the basis of the said proceedings but has considered the appellant's overall suitability, character, antecedents, comparative merit, age and other relevant factors, all of which fall within the exclusive domain of the appointing 25 authority. Equally, the contention that the appellant has been pursuing the litigation since the year 2012 does not create any enforceable right in his favour. Mere pendency of litigation or passage of time cannot confer a right to appointment when the competent authority has, upon objective consideration, found another candidate to be more suitable. 17. It is a settled principle that judicial review is directed against the decision-making process and not against the decision itself. Unless the decision is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, or in violation of any mandatory statutory provision, the High Court would refrain from substituting its own opinion for that of the competent authority. In the present case, we find that the authorities have acted within the four corners of the statutory framework and the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge and do not find any ground warranting interference in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. 18. Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ appeal, the same deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order dated 28.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.7497 of 2023 is hereby affirmed. 19. There shall be no order as to costs. 26 20. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu