Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI M.A No. 27 of 2009
Meghraj Choudhary, S/o Late Baldeo Choudhary, Resident of Village Mouza Mahuwar, Tola Chhatabad, P.O. & P.S. Sengabad, District: Giridih (Jharkhand)
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… Appellant Versus
1. Manoj Kumar Mantri S/o Mr. Fateh Chand Mantri, Resident of Main Road, Gumla, District: Gumla Presently residing at Ratu Road, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, P.O. Ranchi-834001 District: Ranchi
2. Sanjay Kumar Kujur, S/o Late Gawariyal Kujur, Resident of Village and post Getalsudh, P.S. Angara, Dist: Ranchi
3. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Doranda Branch Office, Near State Bank of India, Doranda, Post and P.S. Doranda, Ranchi 834002 District: Ranchi
4. Md. Shamid S/o Sri Kamruddin, Resident of At Quarter No. 18-33 Kumda Colliery, Post and P.S. Bishrampur, District: Surguja (Chhatisgarh), At present residing at Budhiakhad, P.O. Budhiakhad, P.S. Giridih(m), District: Giridih
5. Md. Afroj Khan, S/o Md. Sadik Khan Resident of Gwal Toli, Hindpiri, P.S. Hindpiri, Ranchi-834001 District: Ranchi, At present at Bishanpur, P.O. Pachnama, District: Giridih
6. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Sadar Road, Near State Bank of India, P.S. and P.O. Ambikapur - 497001, District: Sarguja (Chhatisgarh) …
… ... Respondents
--------- CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
--------- For the Appellant: Mr Arvind Kumar Lall, Advocate
Mrs D. Arati Kumari, Advocate For the Respondent No. 1: Mrs Rakhi Rani, Advocate For the Respondent No. 3: Mr Mukesh Kumar Dubey, Advocate
--------- 07 / Dated: 14.08.2026
1. Heard Mr Arvind Kumar Lall for the Appellant and Mr Mukesh Kumar Dubey for the Respondent No. 3 (United India Insurance Company Limited). (2026: JHHC:24353)
2. Mr Arvind Kumar has submitted, and the record also shows, that all respondents have been duly served in this matter. This is an appeal of 2009, and therefore, it cannot brook any delay. 3. The Appellant-Claimant challenges the judgment and award dated 14.08.2008 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Giridih on the ground that the compensation awarded on account of the death of his father, late Baldeo Choudhary, is inadequate and does not represent just compensation. 4. The record shows that late Baldeo Choudhary died on account of a vehicular accident on 10.01.2001. The Tribunal has held that two vehicles were responsible for the accident and consequently, liable to pay compensation. Accordingly, the Respondent Nos.
3 and 6 – Insurance Companies were held liable for compensating the Appellant and his mother. 5. The Appellant’s mother, i.e., the widow of late Baldeo Choudhary, was also one of the claimants, but she died before the impugned judgment and award was made by the learned Tribunal. 6. The Tribunal had also made a pay and recovery order. However, Mr Lall points out that the Insured's appeal succeeded and the pay and recovery order was set aside. In this appeal, we are not concerned with that controversy. 7. The Tribunal held that the income of the deceased, Baldeo Choudhary, was Rs. 1,500/- per month. Mr Lall submits that this determination was inadequate and the income should have been taken at least at Rs. 4,000/- per month. He pointed out that the deceased was a Tantrik and also involved in agriculture. He submitted that some amount of
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guesswork is inevitable in such matters and the claim that the deceased was earning Rs. 4,000/- per month was not even seriously challenged in cross-examination. 8. Mr Lall pointed out that no addition has been made towards future prospects and there is no award towards consortium. He pointed out that the award towards funeral expenses and loss of estate is completely inadequate and contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 and National Insurance Company Ltd versus Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680. 9. Accordingly, he submitted that compensation of at least Rs. 5,60,000/- should have been awarded in this matter. 10. Mr Lall submitted that the learned Tribunal made a serious error in awarding interest for only one year. He pointed out that there was no delay on the part of the claimants, who examined their three witnesses promptly and concluded their evidence on 08.09.2004.
He submitted that the impugned judgment and award were made only on 14.08.2008, and that too because the Respondents, including the Insurance Companies, sought several adjournments to lead evidence, which evidence ultimately was not led before the learned Tribunal. 11. Mr Dubey, learned counsel for the 3rd Respondent, submitted that the profession of Tantrik is a banned profession. In any event, no evidence was led to show that the deceased was involved in this profession. Not a single witness was examined to show that any witness took treatment from the deceased. He further pointed out that no land documents were
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produced to substantiate this claim that the deceased was an agriculturist. He submitted that in these circumstances, there was no error in the Tribunal determining the income of the deceased at Rs. 1,500/- per month. 12. Mr Dubey submitted that the compensation towards funeral expenses and loss of estate was consistent with the law as it then stood. He submitted that any future change in the law cannot be applied retrospectively. He submitted that the validity of the award has to be tested on the date it was made and, therefore, there was no error in the compensation amount determined. 13. Mr Dubey submitted that the Tribunal categorically found that the Appellant delayed the matter and, therefore, there is no error in awarding interest for only one year. He further pointed out that the compensation amount was paid sometime in 2009. For all the above reasons, Mr Dubey submits that this appeal should be dismissed. 14. The rival contentions now fall for my determination. 15. The first point to be determined is the income of the deceased Baldeo Choudhary. The appellant deposed that his income was Rs. 4,000/- per month. It is not as if this statement was not challenged in cross- examination. This statement was contested. 16. The claimants led no independent evidence to corroborate their claim that the deceased used to earn Rs. 4,000/- per month.
The argument about the profession being banned etc., cannot be considered in the absence of any foundational pleadings or evidence. Besides, the claimants had also deposed that the deceased was involved in
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agriculture. Therefore, there is no error in the Tribunal determining the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 1,500/-. 17. However, the Tribunal has failed to make an addition for future prospects. The addition, according to Sarla Varma (Supra), should have been 25%, given the deposition that the deceased was 50 years old at the time of the accident. Mr Dubey, however, refers to the post- mortem report, which records his age as 55 years. 18. The age stated in the postmortem report can never be regarded as conclusive. It is not as if the doctors conducted tests and then determined the age themselves. The evidence about the deceased being about 50 years at the time of the accident has been virtually unrebutted. 19. By adding 25%, the deceased's annual income can be safely taken at Rs. 22,500/-. From this, a deduction of 1/3rd is due because that is the amount the deceased would have spent on himself. After deduction, the deceased's annual income would be Rs. 15,000/-. 20. The multiplier in this case would be 11; therefore, the compensation towards dependency would be Rs. 1,65,000/- and not merely Rs. 1,32,000/-, as determined by the Tribunal. 21. Towards consortium, the Appellant would be entitled to Rs. 80,000/-. This is because the Appellant, who is the surviving son, would be entitled to Rs. 40,000/- for himself and another Rs. 40,000/- as legal representative of his deceased mother. This would be consistent with the law laid down in Magma General Insurance Company Limited versus Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & others [2018 (18) SCC 130] and the recent decision in Sameem Begum and others v. K. Venkat Swamy and others, 2026 INSC 864. (2026: JHHC:24353)
22.
Further, the Appellant would be entitled to the compensation of Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses and another Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of estate. This would be consistent with the law laid down in Sarla Verma (Smt) and Pranay Sethi (Supra). 23. The contention that the law as on the date of the impugned award is what should prevail and not the subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject is quite misconceived and liable to be rejected. 24. Firstly, learned counsel referred to the Schedule under section 163A of the M.V. Act, which was not applicable in the present case, where the claim was filed under section 166 of the M.V. Act. 25. Secondly, it is well settled that the Hon’ble Supreme Court declares the law, and once the law is declared, the same will have to be regarded as being the law right from its nativity. The only exception is where the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically provides that the law it has laid down will have prospective application. 26. In the recent decision in Government of India and Another versus Sri Devraj Urs Medical College in Civil Appeal No. 10669 of 2010, decided on 04.08.2026, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained that if an Apex Court decision does not expressly provide that it is prospective, it is settled law that all decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are retrospective in application, as held in paragraph 29 of P.V. George versus State of Kerala [(2007) 3 SCC 557]. 27. In P.V. George (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the law declared by a Court will have a retrospective effect if not otherwise stated to be so specifically. (2026: JHHC:24353)
28. Besides, it is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. Therefore, if during pendency of the appeal the law is declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the benefit of such declared and binding law cannot be denied to a suitor.
This is more so in a claim petition under the M.V. Act. 29. Accordingly, the total compensation must be determined at Rs. 2,75,000/- instead of Rs. 1,48,000/-, as determined by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment and award. 30. The Tribunal in this case has awarded interest at 6% per annum but has restricted it to one year. This error requires correction. The record shows that the claim petition in this case was filed in the same year as the accident, i.e., 2001. The record further shows that the Appellants examined their first witness on 10.04.2004, their second witness on 24.08.2004, and their third witness on 08.09.2004. This includes the time spent in cross-examining these witnesses. 31. Thereafter, the matter was posted for evidence of the Respondents, including the Insurance Companies. The record shows that the matter was adjourned at the instance of the Respondents to enable them to lead evidence. Finally, no evidence was led on behalf of the Respondents. The impugned judgment and award were pronounced only on 14th August 2008. 32. For the delay between 2004 and 2008, the Appellant certainly cannot be held responsible. There is nothing on record to show that the Appellant has otherwise delayed the proceedings. Therefore, while award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum is maintained, the restriction that it should be paid only for one year is set aside. Interest
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will have to be paid from the date of the claim petition till the date of actual payment of the compensation amount to the Appellant. 33. Mr Dubey pointed out that the compensation amount was paid to the Appellant sometime in the year 2009. Upon payment, the interest to the extent of such payment will stop. However, on the enhanced component, interest at the rate of 6% per annum will have to be paid. 34. The Appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation to Rs.
2,75,000/-, along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, commencing from the date of the claim petition until the date of actual payment of this amount. In computing the interest component, the fact that some amount has already been paid to the Appellant will have to be considered and adjustments made. 35. The Respondent Nos. 3 and 6 are directed to deposit the enhanced compensation amount, together with interest thereon, within four weeks from today in this Court, after giving due notice to the learned counsel for the Appellant. Upon such deposit, the Appellant is permitted to withdraw the said amount by furnishing his identity and bank details. 36. The Registry must transfer the deposited amount to the Appellant's bank account and, under no circumstances, should any payment be made other than through regular banking channels. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) August 14, 2026 AFR Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp.2 Uploaded on 17.08.2026