2026:HHC:39635 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 47 of 2014 Reserved on: 9.9.2026 Date of Decision: 17.09.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Santosh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Ajay Kumar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Vinay Thakur, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.09.2013, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 2, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39635 ) shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the Police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Kiran Bala (PW-1), was residing with her family in House Nos. 101 and 102 at Parwanoo. House No. 103 also belonged to her. The accused are the informant’s neighbours who used to quarrel with the informant and her family members. The accused used to obstruct the drain and prevent the officials of the Municipal Committee from cleaning it. The accused had constructed one gate near the informant’s gate. They constructed the flower beds at the parking place. They used to park their car in front of the gate to prevent the informant's egress. They used to tie their dog towards the informant’s bedroom. The dog barked during the night and disturbed the informant's sleep. They also used to abuse the informant and her family members in the name of their caste. The accused had also abused the informant and her husband on 3 2026:HHC:39635 ) 23.11.2005 in the presence of Susheel Mittal (PW-6). The accused quarrelled with the informant on 29.11.2005. They gave beatings to the informant and her family members and abused them in the presence of the Junior Engineer and Supervisor of the Municipal Committee. The informant made a written complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) to the police, and the police registered the FIR (Ext.PW-5/A) at the Police Station. 3. Dy. S.P. Gurdyal Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW- 5/B). He seized the documents. He took the photographs (Ext.P- 1 to Ext.P-5), whose negatives are Ext.P-6 to Ext. P-10. He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 4. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to frame charges against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and Section 506 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4 2026:HHC:39635 ) 5. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Informant Kiran Bala (PW-1) and Chaman Lal (PW-2) narrated the incident. Ved Kaushal (PW-3), Rajneesh Kumar (PW-4), and Susheel Mittal (PW-6) did not support the prosecution case. Dy.S.P. Gurdyal Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. Vijay Kumar (PW-7) is an eyewitness. 6. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that the witnesses had deposed falsely against them and that a false case was made against them. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 7. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of the informant and her husband were not corroborated by independent witnesses. There were major contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, which made the prosecution’s case suspect. Ved Kaushal and Rajneesh Kumar did not state that the accused had abused the informant and her family members in the name of their caste. The dispute was over the green area which was given to the accused. The informant and her family 5 2026:HHC:39635 ) members had no right over the green area. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Section 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and Section 506 of the IPC. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant's statement was corroborated by the other witnesses. Minor contradictions are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case because such contradictions can arise with time. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, and Mr Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Vinay Thakur, Advocate, for the respondents/accused. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred 6 2026:HHC:39635 ) in acquitting the accused. The informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the statement of her husband. The learned Trial Court erred in relying upon minor contradictions to doubt the prosecution case. Minor contradictions can come with time and should not have been used to acquit the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. Mr Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents/accused, submitted that the informant had specifically asserted that she was abused in the presence of independent witnesses; however, the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 7 2026:HHC:39635 ) Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion 8 2026:HHC:39635 ) or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two 9 2026:HHC:39635 ) views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant had specifically asserted in the complaint that the accused had abused and threatened the informant and her family members in the presence of Susheel 10 2026:HHC:39635 ) Mittal on 23.11.2005. Susheel Mittal (PW-6) stated that he had gone to the informant’s house on 23.11.2005. The family members of the accused were repairing the drain. Chaman Lal Kachri, the informant’s husband, objected to it. He asked the accused to stop the repair. An argument commenced between the accused and the informant. Both parties abused each other. He returned. 16. It is apparent from the statement of this witness that he has nowhere stated that the accused had abused the informant in the name of her caste. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied in cross-examination by the learned APP that the accused had abused the informant and her husband in the name of their caste. Hence, his testimony does not prove the prosecution’s version. 17. It was also stated in the complaint (Ext. PW-1/A) that the accused had abused the informant in the presence of the Supervisor and Junior Engineer of the Municipal Committee on 29.11.2005. Ved Kaushal (PW-3) stated that he and the Work Supervisor went to the spot and found that Chaman Lal, the informant’s husband, and the accused were quarrelling with 11 2026:HHC:39635 ) each other. He and the Work Supervisor returned to the office after some time. He narrated the incident to the Executive Officer. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He specifically denied that the accused had abused the informant and her family members in the name of their caste. Therefore, this witness has also not supported the prosecution case. 18. Rajneesh Kumar (PW-4) stated that he was posted as Work Supervisor in Nagar Parishad, Parwanoo. He and Ved Kaushal went to the spot. He saw Chaman Lal, Kiran Bala (the informant), Nityanand, Dharampal Kuthiala, and Santosh Kuthiala quarrelling and abusing each other. He returned to the office. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accused had abused the informant and her family members in the name of their caste. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Therefore, this witness has also not supported the prosecution version. 19. Vijay Kumar (PW-7) stated that he had gone to the informant’s house on 29.11.2005. The informant and her husband were not at home and returned at about 2:30 PM. The 12 2026:HHC:39635 ) accused and the informant’s husband started abusing each other over the land. 20. The statement of this witness also does not show that any abuses in the name of the caste were hurled in his presence or that the informant or her husband were threatened by the accused. Thus, the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution version. 21. Dy. S.P. Gurdyal Singh (PW-5) admitted in his cross- examination that the flower bed was being maintained by the accused as per the arrangement made with the Housing Board. The informant party believed the green area to be theirs. The informant had uprooted the bricks laid outside the flower bed. Susheel Mittal (PW-6) also admitted that the green area had been provided to the accused for maintenance. Rajneesh Kumar (PW-4) admitted that the Housing Board had provided the green area to the accused for maintenance. The accused had constructed a brick wall to prevent the fall of soil into the drain. Ved Kaushal (PW-3) also admitted in his cross-examination that the water drain was being maintained by the Committee and the green area adjacent to the drain was being maintained by the 13 2026:HHC:39635 ) accused. The accused had constructed a brick wall to prevent the fall of soil into the drain. Both parties had a dispute over the wall. 22. The statements of these witnesses clearly show that the green area was given to the accused, but it was claimed by the informant party. The accused had constructed a brick wall to prevent the fall of soil into the drain, but the informant party had damaged it. Thus, the real dispute between the parties is over the flower bed and the brick wall constructed adjacent to the flower bed. The informant party had damaged the brick wall, which shows that the informant party was the aggressor. 23. The independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution version. The informant party had a motive to depose against the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 24. No other point was urged. 14 2026:HHC:39635 ) 25. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th September, 2026 (Chander)