1 2026:CGHC:26196 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Order Reserved on : 13.05.2026 Order Delivered on : 29.06.2026 WPC No. 2479 of 2026 1 - Sandeep Nirankari S/o Late Bhajan Singh Aged About 57 Years R/o B 37-38, Phase 2, Surya Vihar, Junwani, Ward No. 2, Bhilai, District - Durg Chhattisgarh 2 - Aditya Singh S/o Akhilesh Singh Aged About 36 Years R/o 53/10, Radhika Nagar, Supela, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 3 - Chandrashekhar Gavai S/o Sampatrao Gavai Aged About 60 Years R/o House No. 294, Laxmi Nagar, Ward No. 10, Supela, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 4 - Girwar Banti Sahu S/o M.R. Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Ward No. 12, Bajrang Para, Kohka, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 5 - Smt. Anju Sinha W/o Suman Sagar Sinha Aged About 33 Years R/o Sirsa Road, Sinha Complex, Bhatapara, Kohka, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 6 - Lalchand Verma S/o Late Jhumuk Lal Verma Aged About 59 Years R/o Ramnagar, Supela, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 7 - Abhishek Mishra S/o Radhekant Mishra Aged About 32 Years R/o House No. 1066, Road No. 20, Shanti Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 8 - Keshav Chaubey S/o Late Bahoran Chaubey Aged About 54 Years R/o Purani Basti, Subhash Chowk, Supela Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 9 - Smt. Neha Sahu W/o T.K. Sahu Aged About 31 Years R/o Plot No. 4, Kailash Nagar, Kurud Industrial Area, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.06.30 18:32:44 +0530 2 10 - Smt. Usha Sharma W/o Vinay Sharma Aged About 31 Years R/o Ghasidas Nagar, Near Jamul Police Station, Ward No. 23, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 11 - Smt. Sharda Rai W/o S.P. Rai Aged About 66 Years R/o Block No. 14 C, Camp-1, Ward No. 28, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 12 - Abdul Mannan S/o Late Ghaffar Mohammad Aged About 27 Years R/o Near Janta Vidyalaya, Camp-2, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 13 - Suresh Kumar Verma S/o Late Hemraj Verma Aged About 58 Years R/o House No. 10-D, Road No. 10, Sector-3, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 14 - Smt. Nemin Sahu W/o Basant Kumar Sahu Aged About 52 Years R/o House No. 31-F, Road No. 3, Sector-2, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 15 - Smt. Sadhana Singh W/o Mukesh Kumar Sahu Aged About 39 Years R/o House No. 14-A, Road No. 5, Sector-2, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 16 - Smt. Rita Singh Gera W/o Ramesh Chandra Singh Aged About 58 Years R/o L.I.G., Vaishali Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 17 - K. Jagdish Kumar S/o K. Koteshwar Rao Aged About 31 Years R/o Near Ganesh Temple, Sector 11, Zone-3, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 18 - Bhupendra Kumar Yadav S/o Late Janak Lal Yadav Aged About 42 Years R/o Bihari Colony, Near Oba Durga Temple, New Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 19 - Shubham Kumar Jha S/o Gunanand Jha Aged About 30 Years R/o House No. 6/b, Road No. 5, Zone 3, Sector 11, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 20 - Smt. M. Lakshmi W/o M. Apparao Aged About 48 Years R/o House No. 196, Ekta Nagar, Zone 2, Sector 11, Ward No. 34, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 21 - Smt. D. Sujata W/o D. Kamraju Aged About 50 Years R/o House No. 1G, Street 37, Zone 2, Sector 11, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 3 22 - Rajesh Chaudhary S/o Late Prahlad Chaudhary Aged About 51 Years R/o House No. 16b, Road No. 14, Sector 4, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 23 - Akansh Banchhor S/o Omprakash Banchhor Aged About 38 Years R/o Above Shop No. 04, Sector 04-A Market, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 24 - Neeraj Pal Verma S/o Late Satpal Verma Aged About 58 Years R/o Shop No. 55, Sector-5 Market, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 25 - Sevan Kumar S/o Late Harichandra Thakur Aged About 34 Years R/o House No. 4/a, Street 11, Sector - 6, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 26 - Smt. Malti Thakur W/o Rakesh Singh Thakur Aged About 44 Years R/o Quarter No. 4 A, Road No. 65, Sector 6, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 27 - Saket Chandrakar S/o Onkar Singh Chandrakar Aged About 46 Years R/o Quarter No. 5a, Road No. 70, Sector 6, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 28 - Abhay Kumar Soni S/o Late H.P. Soni Aged About 67 Years R/o Quarter No. 7B, Road No. 17, Sector 10, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 29 - Laxmipati Raju S/o Y. Ramlu Aged About 55 Years R/o Quarter No. 10b, Road No. 18, Sector 7, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 30 - Umesh Kumar Sahu S/o Late Laxman Sahu Aged About 38 Years R/o Quarter No. 12 A, Road No. 21 A, Sector 7, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 31 - Komaldas Tandon S/o Late Bisahat Tandon Aged About 47 Years R/o Quarter No. 3/4, Road No. 9, Ward No. 69, Hospital Sector 9, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 32 - Shiju Anthony S/o B.C. Anthony Aged About 57 Years R/o M I G- 1/368, Amadi Nagar, H.U.D.C.O., Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh ... Petitioners versus 4 1 - State of Chhattisgarh through Secretary Urban Administration And Development Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - The Secretary General Administration Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Collector Durg District Durg Chhattisgarh 4 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai through Secretary (petition is against the actions of the Commissioner hence through Secretory party is made) District Durg Chhattisgarh 5 - Rajiv Pandey holding the post of Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu and Mohammad Naqeeb, Advocates For State : Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate General Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge C A V Order 1. Heard Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu and Mohammad Naqeeb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State. 2. By filing the present writ petition, the Petitioners have assailed the inaction and failure of the Respondent Authorities in giving effect 5 to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed by the General Body of the Municipal Corporation under Section 54 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act, 1956’) whereby more than two-third of the elected Councillors expressed their lack of confidence in the functioning of the Commissioner and resolved that he be removed from his official position. The grievance of the Petitioners is that despite the Resolution having been passed in accordance with the statutory provisions and democratic mandate of the elected body, the State Authorities have neither taken any decision thereon nor passed any consequential order, thereby permitting the Commissioner to continue in office contrary to law. 3. The Petitioners further challenge the continued functioning of the Commissioner after the aforesaid Resolution as being wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the object and scheme of Section 54 of the Act, 1956. According to the Petitioners, the failure of the Respondent Authorities to act upon the Resolution has rendered the democratic will of the elected representatives nugatory and has adversely affected the administration of the Municipal Corporation. It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may issue appropriate writs, orders and directions commanding the Respondent Authorities to take a decision on and implement the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 within a time-bound manner and to restrain the Commissioner from exercising powers inconsistent with the mandate of the elected body of the Municipal Corporation. The petitioners have prayed for following relief(s) :- 6 “a. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing the Respondent's to forthwith remove the present commissioner of the Municipal Commissioner of Bhilai and appoint any appropriate Honest and dignified officer. b. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing Respondent's to forthwith act upon and implement the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed by the Mayor-in-Council under Section 54 of the Municipal Corporation Act whereby the Commissioner stood removed from office; c. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing Respondent's that the continued functioning and discharge of executive and administrative duties by the Commissioner after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is illegal, arbitrary, without authority of law and contrary to the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act; d. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing the Respondent's restraining the Commissioner from exercising any executive, administrative or financial powers/functions of 7 the Municipal Corporation during the pendency of the present petition; e. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing the Respondent's declaring all actions, decisions, financial transactions and administrative acts undertaken by the Commissioner after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 as illegal, unauthorized and void ab initio; f. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing the Respondent's to make appropriate interim administrative arrangements for the smooth functioning and administration of the Municipal Corporation in accordance with law; g. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus, certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding and directing the Respondent's to conduct an independent inquiry/investigation into the unauthorized financial transactions, illegal payments and administrative irregularities committed by the Commissioner; h. Award costs of the present petition in favour of the Petitioners; and i. Pass any other order/orders, direction/directions or relief/reliefs which this 8 Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.” 4. Brief facts of the case, in nutshell, are that the petitioners are elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, who have approached this Court being aggrieved by the alleged inaction of the respondent authorities in giving effect to a Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed under Section 54 of the Act, 1956, seeking removal of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation. The case of the petitioners is that serious disputes had arisen between the elected representatives of the Municipal Corporation and the Commissioner with regard to the manner in which the affairs of the Corporation were being administered. According to the petitioners, the Commissioner had been taking several administrative and financial decisions without obtaining requisite approval from the Mayor-in-Council and the General Body of the Corporation and had allegedly failed to implement various resolutions passed by the elected body, resulting in growing dissatisfaction amongst the Councillors. 5. The petitioners contend that in view of the alleged administrative irregularities, financial improprieties and procedural violations attributed to the Commissioner, the Mayor of the Municipal Corporation submitted a detailed representation dated 12.03.2026 before the Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, seeking appropriate action against him. In the said representation, 9 allegations were made regarding sanction and execution of developmental works without obtaining prior technical sanction and without placing the proposals before the competent elected bodies of the Corporation. It was also alleged that substantial financial approvals had been granted in violation of the prescribed procedure and that certain actions of the Commissioner were contrary to governmental instructions and statutory requirements. The said representation was reportedly supported by several elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation. 6. Thereafter, during the Special Budget Session of the Municipal Corporation held on 25.03.2026, a Resolution under Section 54 of the Act, 1956 was placed before the General Body concerning the removal of the Commissioner from his office. According to the petitioners, after deliberations on the issues relating to the functioning of the Commissioner, the Resolution was passed with the requisite statutory majority contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, 1956. The petitioners assert that upon passage of the said Resolution, the State Government became under a statutory obligation to take consequential action in accordance with law. 7. The record further reveals that subsequent to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, various representations and reminder communications were submitted by elected Councillors and the Mayor before the Collector, Durg, the Chief Secretary, the Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department, 10 and other competent authorities requesting implementation of the Resolution and seeking necessary administrative action. The petitioners contend that notwithstanding such repeated representations, no effective decision was taken by the authorities concerned. It is their grievance that the Resolution passed by the elected body remained unattended and no consequential order was issued by the State Government. 8. It is further the case of the petitioners that despite the aforesaid Resolution, the Commissioner continued to function as the Executive Head of the Municipal Corporation and continued to exercise administrative, executive and financial powers. The petitioners allege that during this period various financial transactions, approvals and administrative decisions were undertaken without approval of the elected body and that such actions were detrimental to the interests of the Municipal Corporation. According to them, the continued functioning of the Commissioner after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is contrary to the mandate of Section 54 of the Act, 1956 and amounts to an encroachment upon the democratic functioning and autonomy of the local self-government institution. 9. Contending that the inaction of the respondent authorities in acting upon the Resolution passed by the elected body is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the constitutional principles governing local self-government institutions under Part IX-A of the 11 Constitution of India, the petitioners have preferred the present writ petition. 10. Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu and Mohammad Naqeeb, would submit that the present petition raises an issue of considerable importance touching upon the democratic functioning and autonomy of local self-government institutions under Part IX-A of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioners are elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, and the present proceedings have been necessitated on account of the complete failure of the respondent authorities to give effect to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed under Section 54 of the Act, 1956. It is contended that the said Resolution was passed by the elected body with the requisite statutory majority after serious concerns were raised regarding the functioning of the Commissioner, including allegations relating to financial irregularities, unauthorized approvals, administrative arbitrariness and repeated disregard of the resolutions passed by the elected representatives. According to learned counsel, once the Resolution was validly passed by the Corporation in exercise of powers conferred under Section 54 of the Act, 1956, the statutory consequence contemplated under the provision became automatic and mandatory, leaving no discretion with the State Government to defer, withhold or refuse implementation thereof. 12 11. Mr. Verma would further submit that despite the Resolution having been passed on 25.03.2026, the Commissioner has continued to function as the Executive Head of the Municipal Corporation and has continued to exercise administrative, executive and financial powers. It is argued that such continuation is wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the mandate of the statute. Drawing attention to the language employed in Section 54 of the Act, 1956, learned counsel would contend that the Legislature has consciously used mandatory expressions requiring the State Government to act upon the democratic decision of the elected body. It is submitted that once the statutory requirement regarding the requisite majority stood fulfilled, the State Government was left with no adjudicatory or discretionary role and was under a legal obligation to act in accordance with the Resolution. Learned counsel would argue that the respondent authorities cannot sit in appeal over the collective wisdom of the elected Councillors nor can they substitute their own satisfaction for the mandate expressed by the Corporation in a duly convened meeting. 12. It is further submitted by Mr. Verma that the inaction of the respondents has resulted in a situation where a Commissioner, who has lost the confidence of the elected body and against whom a Resolution under Section 54 of the Act, 1956 has been passed, continues to administer the affairs of the Corporation. According to learned counsel, such a situation is directly opposed to the constitutional philosophy underlying Part IX-A of the 13 Constitution, which seeks to strengthen democratic decentralization and empower local self-government institutions. Learned counsel would submit that Articles 243Q and 243W recognize Municipal Corporations as institutions of self- government and envisage administration of municipal affairs through elected representatives accountable to the public. It is contended that permitting the Commissioner to continue in office despite the democratic decision of the elected body amounts to executive overreach and undermines the constitutional autonomy guaranteed to Municipal Corporations. 13. Mr. Verma would further submit that repeated representations and reminder communications were submitted by elected Councillors, the Mayor and other office bearers before the Collector, the Chief Secretary, the Secretary of the Urban Administration and Development Department and other competent authorities requesting implementation of the Resolution. However, despite being fully aware of the Resolution and the statutory consequences flowing therefrom, the respondent authorities failed to take any effective action. It is argued that during the interregnum, the Commissioner allegedly continued to undertake administrative and financial decisions, including release of payments and approvals of transactions, thereby causing serious prejudice to the Municipal Corporation. According to learned counsel, the continued exercise of power by the Commissioner after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is void ab initio and all 14 consequential actions undertaken by him thereafter are rendered vulnerable in law. 14. Placing strong reliance upon the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Karsanbhai R. Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1988 SCC OnLine Guj 219, learned counsel would submit that the issue involved in the present case is no longer res integra. Referring extensively to paragraphs 16, 33, 34, 36 and 38 of the said judgment, it is argued that where the statute provides for removal of the Municipal Commissioner upon a Resolution being passed by the requisite majority of the elected body, the State Government is bound to act upon such Resolution forthwith and has no authority to examine the correctness of the allegations contained therein or to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the elected representatives. Learned counsel would particularly emphasize the observations of the Gujarat High Court that the Legislature has consciously reposed confidence in the elected body and that any interpretation permitting the Government to delay or refuse implementation of such Resolution would defeat the very purpose of the statutory provision and jeopardize the independence and functioning of local self-government institutions. 15. Reliance has also been placed upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramkrushna Gangaram Rathi v. Kisan Zingraji Madke, 1970 SCC OnLine Bom 129, to contend that where the 15 Legislature has consciously omitted any requirement of assigning reasons or granting an opportunity of hearing before removal pursuant to a democratic vote of no-confidence, the Court cannot read such requirements into the statute. Learned counsel would submit that the principle emerging from the said judgment is that the continuance of a person holding an office dependent upon the confidence of an elected body cannot be protected once such confidence is lost. 16. Further reliance has been placed on the decisions in Shammi Sharma & Another v. Municipal Corporation & Others, I.L.R. (2013) M.P. 2569, Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129 and Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 3 SCC 619 in support of the proposition that statutory authorities are bound to act strictly in accordance with the legislative mandate and that democratic institutions created under the Constitution must be permitted to function free from arbitrary executive interference. 17. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel would pray that appropriate directions be issued commanding the respondents to give effect to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and to ensure compliance with the mandate of Section 54 of the Act, 1956. 18. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, vehemently opposes the 16 submissions advanced by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, and would submit that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, premature and not maintainable either in law or on facts. Learned State counsel would contend that the petitioners, being individual Councillors of the Municipal Corporation, have no locus standi to maintain the present petition seeking implementation of a Resolution allegedly passed by the Corporation. According to him, if at all any right is claimed to have accrued pursuant to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, the same is a right of the Municipal Corporation as a statutory body and not of individual Councillors. It is argued that the petitioners cannot seek enforcement of a Resolution on behalf of the Corporation, particularly when the Corporation itself has neither authorized nor instituted any proceedings seeking such relief. On this ground alone, learned State counsel would submit that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 19. Mr. Dadariya would further submit that the entire edifice of the petition rests upon an erroneous interpretation of Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. Referring to the language employed in the provision, he would argue that although a Resolution may be passed by the elected Councillors recommending removal of the Commissioner, the actual removal is not automatic and cannot be treated as self-operative. It is contended that Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 contemplates a further decision by the State Government, which alone is the appointing authority of the 17 Commissioner. According to learned counsel, the statutory scheme clearly indicates that an order is required to be passed by the Government pursuant to such Resolution and until an appropriate decision is taken by the Government, no vested right accrues in favour of the petitioners. It is submitted that admittedly no decision has yet been taken by the Government on the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and, therefore, the petitioners cannot presume removal of the Commissioner merely on the basis of the Resolution. The present petition, according to learned counsel, is therefore premature and liable to be rejected on this ground alone. 20. Mr. Dadariya would next submit that even otherwise the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 itself suffers from serious procedural infirmities and cannot be treated as a valid Resolution under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. Inviting attention to Annexure P/1 and the minutes of the meeting, it is submitted that the meeting convened on 25.03.2026 was admittedly a Special Budget Meeting convened for consideration of budgetary matters. According to learned counsel, the agenda concerning removal of the Commissioner was never included in the notice convening the meeting and was allegedly introduced at the last moment during the course of deliberations. It is argued that the proposal seeking removal of the Commissioner was neither part of the notified agenda nor was any separate notice issued for consideration of such a proposal. In such circumstances, the very foundation of 18 the Resolution relied upon by the petitioners is rendered legally unsustainable. 21. Elaborating the aforesaid submission, Mr. Dadariya would place reliance upon the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Procedure for Conduct of Business) Rules, 2016 (for short, ‘Rules, 2016’). Referring particularly to Rule 3 of the Rules, 2016, he would submit that the proviso thereto specifically mandates that no business other than that specified in the notice shall be transacted at a special meeting. It is contended that since the meeting dated 25.03.2026 was convened exclusively for budget- related business, no unrelated matter could legally have been transacted therein. He would further draw attention to Rule 5 of the Rules, 2016, which requires prior notice specifying the date, time, place and agenda of the business proposed to be transacted. According to him, admittedly no notice whatsoever was issued proposing consideration of removal of the Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. He would therefore submit that the alleged Resolution is in direct violation of the mandatory statutory rules governing the conduct of meetings and is consequently void ab initio. 22. Mr. Dadariya would further rely upon Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016 and submit that although the Rule permits consideration of a proposal relating to or ancillary to a matter included in the agenda, such provision has no application to the facts of the present case. 19 According to him, a proposal seeking removal of the Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a matter ancillary or incidental to a Special Budget Meeting. The subject-matter of budget approval and the issue of removal of the Commissioner operate in entirely distinct fields. Consequently, the Resolution cannot derive legitimacy by invoking Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016. It is therefore submitted that the proceedings culminating in the alleged Resolution dated 25.03.2026 are wholly contrary to the statutory framework and incapable of enforcement through a writ of mandamus. 23. Mr. Dadariya would also submit that the mandatory requirement of voting contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 has not been demonstrated by the petitioners. Referring to the statutory language, he would contend that the provision specifically requires that not less than three-fourths of the total number of elected Councillors must vote in favour of the proposition. However, neither the minutes of the meeting nor the pleadings in the writ petition disclose any voting process having been undertaken in the manner contemplated by law. It is argued that there is no material on record demonstrating the number of Councillors who voted, the manner of voting or the fulfillment of the statutory requirement prescribed under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. In absence of such foundational facts, the petitioners 20 cannot claim that a legally enforceable Resolution came into existence. 24. Lastly, Mr. Dadariya would submit that the judgments relied upon by the petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts and have no application to the present case in view of the statutory scheme governing the Act, 1956 as well as the Rules, 2016. According to him, before any question regarding implementation of the Resolution arises, the petitioners are first required to establish that the Resolution itself was validly passed in accordance with law. Since serious disputes exist regarding the legality of the meeting, the agenda, the procedure adopted and the alleged voting process, no writ can be issued directing implementation of such a disputed Resolution. He would therefore submit that the writ petition is devoid of merit, suffers from lack of maintainability and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 25. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival contentions and perused the material available with the writ petition with utmost circumspection. 26. The controversy involved in the present writ petition lies in a narrow compass. The petitioners, who are elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation, seek implementation of the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 purportedly passed under Section 54 of the Act, 1956, whereby the elected body resolved to remove the Commissioner from his office. According to the petitioners, once 21 the Resolution was passed with the requisite statutory majority, the consequence contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, 1956 became mandatory and the State Government was left with no discretion except to give effect to the same. The petitioners further contend that the continued functioning of the Commissioner despite the Resolution is contrary to the statutory mandate and violative of the constitutional principles governing local self- government institutions under Part IX-A of the Constitution of India. In turn, the State has questioned the very maintainability of the writ petition and has also challenged the validity of the Resolution itself. The principal objections raised by the respondents are that the petitioners lack locus standi to seek enforcement of the Resolution; that no final decision has yet been taken by the State Government in the matter and, therefore, the writ petition is premature; and that the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is itself legally unsustainable, having allegedly been passed in a Special Budget Meeting without prior notice, without inclusion of the subject in the agenda and without adherence to the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Rules, 2016. The State has also disputed compliance with the voting requirements contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, 1956. 27. Thus, the questions which arise for consideration are whether the petitioners possess the requisite locus to maintain the present petition; whether the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 can be said to have been validly passed in accordance with the provisions of the 22 Act and the Rules governing the conduct of meetings; whether the State Government is under a mandatory obligation to act upon such Resolution immediately upon its passage; and whether any direction as prayed for by the petitioners can be issued in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 28. 28. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties and upon a careful examination of the statutory provisions, the documents placed on record and the legal position governing the field, this Court proceeds to examine the aforesaid issues. 29. Before adverting to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and examining the legality and validity of the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, this Court considers it appropriate to first notice the statutory scheme governing the field. Since the controversy in the present case revolves around the interpretation of Section 54 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the procedure prescribed for convening and conducting meetings under the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Procedure for Conduct of Business) Rules, 2016, a proper appreciation of the relevant statutory provisions becomes indispensable for adjudication of the issues involved herein. 30. It is a settled principle of law that where the rights and obligations of the parties flow from a statute, the Court is required to ascertain the legislative intent from the language employed by the 23 Legislature itself. The scope, ambit and effect of the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, the extent of the powers exercisable by the elected body of the Municipal Corporation, the role of the State Government in relation thereto, as well as the procedural objections raised by the respondents concerning the validity of the meeting and agenda, can be effectively examined only in the backdrop of the relevant statutory provisions. Therefore, before proceeding further to consider the rival contentions on merits, it would be apposite and advantageous to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Procedure for Conduct of Business) Rules, 2016, which have a direct bearing on the controversy involved in the present writ petition. The relevant provisions read as under:- Section 54 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 “54 - Appointment and removal of Commissioner.(1) The Commissioner for the Corporation shall be appointed by the Government for a renewable period not exceeding five years. (2) He shall be forthwith removed from office if at a meeting of the Corporation not less than three-fourths of the total number of [elected Councillors] vote in favour of a proposition in this behalf; and he may be removed by the Government at any time if it appears to the 24 Government that he is incapable of performing the duties of his office or has been guilty of any misconduct or neglect which renders his removal expedient: Provided that when the Commissioner holds a lien on any post under Government, he may be recalled at any time by the Government. [...]” Rules 3, 4, 5, 13, 16 & 19 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Procedure for Conduct of Business) Rules, 2016 “3. Agenda.- The Agenda to be included in the notice for meeting of the Municipality shall be under,- (a) confirmation of the minutes of previous meeting, if the same was not confirmed in that meeting; (b) question asked by the Councillors and their reply; (c) information regarding important correspondence; (d) remaining agenda of business which could not be transacted in the previous meeting; (e) suggestions and proposals submitted by the committees or the Chief Executive Officer; 25 (f) proposals submitted by the Councillors for asking the statement on the matters of public importance: Provided that no business other than that specified in the notice shall be transacted at a special meeting: Provided further that the proposal of asking for the statement on the matters of public importance shall be placed in the general meeting only. 4. Orders of items in the Agenda.- The order of items in the agenda shall be as per Rule 3. However, the order may be changed with the special permission of the Municipality. 5. Intimation of the meeting.- The Secretary shall send the notice of the meeting to every Councillor specifying the date, time and place thereof and the agenda of business to be transacted before seven working days of an ordinary meeting and three working days of a special meeting. A copy of such notice shall also be displayed at the notice board of the office. The notice of meeting shall be sent in Form 'A' appended to these rules. * * * 13. Business in the Meeting.- Every Councillor, while discussing any proposals of any amendment or any question shall address to Presiding Officer by rising from his seat. He will restrict his speech to the immediate 26 question put for discussion in the meeting and will not make irrelevant talk and if the Presiding Officer desires so, shall conclude his speech. If any councillor disobeys instructions of Presiding Officer and causes hindrance in the conduct of business then, such councilor shall be liable for action under Section 19 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) or Section 41 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), as the case may be. * * * 16. Decision on question by majority of votes.-All question brought before any meeting of the Municipality shall be decided by a majority of votes of the Councillors present, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and all such issues, for which there is no provision in these rules or in the Act or in any other rules made under the Act, shall be decided by majority of votes of the Councillors present. General Assembly does not have any right to delete any question included in the agenda. * * * 19. Other business in the Meeting.- Any proposal which relates to or is ancillary to any matter included in the agenda may be submitted. However, the same shall only be considered, if the consent of two third Councillors present has been obtained.” 27 31. From a careful perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act, 1956, particularly Section 54(2), it clearly emerges that the Legislature has envisaged a two-fold mechanism concerning the tenure and removal of the Commissioner of a Municipal Corporation. While the Commissioner is appointed by the State Government under Section 54(1) of the Act, 1956, sub-section (2) thereof provides for his removal upon the happening of certain contingencies. The provision stipulates that the Commissioner "shall be forthwith removed from office" if, at a meeting of the Corporation, not less than three-fourths of the total number of elected Councillors vote in favour of a proposition seeking his removal. The provision further confers an independent power upon the State Government to remove the Commissioner if it appears to the Government that he is incapable of performing the duties of his office or has been guilty of misconduct or neglect rendering his removal expedient. Thus, the statute recognizes two distinct modes of removal of the Commissioner, one founded upon the democratic will of the elected body and the other upon the subjective satisfaction of the State Government on the grounds specifically enumerated therein. 32. A further reading of Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 would demonstrate that the Legislature has attached considerable significance to the decision of the elected body of the Corporation by prescribing a special majority of not less than three-fourths of the total number of elected Councillors for passing a proposition 28 seeking removal of the Commissioner. Equally significant is the requirement that such removal must be preceded by a vote in a duly convened meeting of the Corporation. Therefore, for attracting the consequences contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, the existence of a valid meeting, consideration of a proposition in accordance with law and voting by the requisite statutory majority constitute foundational requirements which cannot be ignored. 33. Likewise, from a conjoint reading of Rules 3, 4, 5, 13, 16 and 19 of the Rules, 2016, it transpires that the procedure governing the conduct of business in meetings of the Municipal Corporation is not merely directory in nature but is intended to ensure transparency, orderly deliberation and informed participation of the elected representatives. Rule 3 mandates that the agenda to be transacted in a meeting must be specified in the notice convening the meeting and the first proviso thereto specifically provides that no business other than that specified in the notice shall be transacted at a special meeting. Rule 5 further requires prior notice to every Councillor specifying the date, time, place and agenda of the business proposed to be transacted. The object behind these provisions is evidently to ensure that every Councillor receives adequate notice of the matters proposed to be considered and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate in the deliberative process. 29 34. The Rules, 2016 further reveal that deliberations in a meeting are required to remain confined to the business legitimately brought before the House. Rule 13 obliges the Councillors to restrict their discussions to the immediate question under consideration, whereas Rule 16 contemplates that questions brought before a meeting shall ordinarily be decided by majority of votes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Rule 19 carves out a limited exception by permitting consideration of a proposal relating to or ancillary to a matter included in the agenda, subject to obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the Councillors present. The expression "relates to or is ancillary to any matter included in the agenda" assumes significance, for it indicates that matters wholly foreign to the notified agenda cannot ordinarily be introduced and transacted under the guise of ancillary business. 35. Thus, the statutory framework emerging from the Act, 1956 and the Rules, 2016 makes it abundantly clear that while the elected body has been vested with an important role under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 in relation to removal of the Commissioner, the exercise of such power is required to conform to the procedural safeguards and requirements prescribed under the Rules, 2016. 36. From a perusal of Annexure P/2 dated 08.05.2026, which is a communication addressed by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Bhilai to the Collector, Durg, it is apparent that reference has been made therein to the Resolution passed by the General Body of the 30 Municipal Corporation on 25.03.2026 under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 as well as the decision taken in the emergent meeting of the Mayor-in-Council held on 08.05.2026. The said communication records that serious objections had been raised by the elected representatives regarding the functioning of the Commissioner, alleged financial irregularities, change of items in sanctioned works and continuous violation of statutory procedures. It has further been stated therein that after deliberations in the General Body meeting dated 25.03.2026, a Resolution seeking removal of the Commissioner was passed under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. It would reveal that the Mayor-in-Council, in its emergent meeting held on 08.05.2026, expressed concern regarding the continued discharge of administrative and financial functions by the Commissioner notwithstanding the Resolution passed by the General Body. The communication also indicates that the Mayor-in-Council considered the forwarding of the budget booklet to the Government without forwarding the proceedings of the General Body meeting as an administrative irregularity. Consequently, a decision appears to have been taken by the Mayor-in-Council to apprise the Collector and the State Government of the Resolution passed by the General Body and to seek appropriate directions from the Government in the matter. Thus, Annexure P/2 primarily reflects that even as on 08.05.2026, the elected body and the Mayor-in-Council were insisting upon implementation of the 31 Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and were requesting the competent authorities to take consequential action in accordance with law. 37. Likewise, Annexure P/8 dated 25.04.2026, which is a communication addressed by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Bhilai to the Collector, Durg, would indicate that the elected body of the Municipal Corporation was proceeding on the premise that the Resolution passed in the General Council Meeting dated 25.03.2026 had the effect of removing the Commissioner from office under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. The said communication records that the General Council had unanimously passed a proposal expressing lack of confidence in the functioning of the Commissioner and seeking his removal from office. Reference has also been made therein to the provisions of Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, with an assertion that upon passage of the Resolution by the requisite majority, the Commissioner ceased to possess authority to exercise powers under the Act. 38. A further perusal of Annexure P/8 reveals that the Mayor expressed reservations regarding the continuance of official and administrative functions by the Commissioner after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026. It has been stated therein that a note-sheet was placed before the Mayor by the Commissioner for convening a meeting of the Mayor-in-Council and that any decision taken on such note-sheet would, according to the Mayor, run contrary to 32 the Resolution passed by the General Council. The communication further reflects a request made to the Collector for appointment of a competent authority to discharge the functions of the Commissioner till appropriate orders were passed by the State Government so as to ensure smooth administration of the Municipal Corporation. 39. From a conjoint perusal of Annexure P/9 dated 06.05.2026 and Annexure P/10 dated 07.05.2026, it reflects that subsequent to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed by the General Council under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, the Mayor and members of the Mayor-in-Council were actively deliberating upon the administrative consequences arising therefrom. Annexure P/9 is a communication issued by the Mayor directing the Commissioner/Secretary of the Municipal Corporation to convene an emergent meeting of the Mayor-in-Council on 08.05.2026. The said communication specifically refers to the Resolution passed by the General Council regarding removal of the Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 and records that serious concerns had been expressed by the members of the Mayor-in- Council regarding the administrative situation prevailing thereafter as well as certain alleged irregularities in financial matters. The Mayor, therefore, considered it necessary to convene an emergent meeting in view of the sensitivity and importance of the issues involved. 33 40. Annexure P/10, which is the consequential notice issued by the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation on 07.05.2026, reveals that acting upon the directions of the Mayor, a meeting of the Mayor-in-Council was formally scheduled to be held on 08.05.2026 at 12:00 noon in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15(3), (4) and (5) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (President-in-Council Functions and Duties) Rules, 1998. The notice was circulated to the Mayor, Commissioner, Additional Commissioner and other concerned officers and departmental heads for information and participation in the meeting. 41. Thus, the aforesaid documents indicate that even after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, the elected functionaries of the Municipal Corporation were proceeding on the premise that issues concerning the status of the Commissioner and the consequential administrative arrangements required immediate consideration by the Mayor-in-Council. The documents further demonstrate that the emergent meeting dated 08.05.2026 was convened specifically to deliberate upon the administrative and financial concerns which, according to the elected representatives, had arisen in the aftermath of the Resolution passed under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. 42. From a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, it is quite vivid that the meeting convened on 25.03.2026 was admittedly a Special Budget Meeting of the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. The 34 notice convening the said meeting as well as the proceedings placed on record unmistakably demonstrate that the purpose for which the meeting was called was consideration and approval of the budget and other allied financial matters of the Municipal Corporation. It is not the case of the petitioners that any separate meeting was convened specifically for consideration of a proposal under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 seeking removal of the Commissioner. Equally, it is not in dispute that no agenda proposing removal of the Commissioner was included in the notice convening the meeting. However, during the course of the budget meeting, a proposal came to be moved and a Resolution was purportedly passed seeking removal of the Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. It is on the strength of the said Resolution that the petitioners seek a direction to the State Government to remove the Commissioner from office. 43. The issue, therefore, is not whether the elected Councillors possess the power to initiate a proposal under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. The real question is whether the Resolution relied upon by the petitioners can be regarded as a valid Resolution in the eyes of law having been passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statute and the rules framed thereunder. It is trite law that where a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing a thing, the same has to be done in that manner alone or not at all. Any departure from the prescribed procedure ordinarily renders the action vulnerable to challenge. 35 44. At this stage, it would be profitable to notice the scheme of the Rules, 2016. Rule 3 specifically provides that no business other than that specified in the notice shall be transacted at a special meeting. The legislative intent behind the said provision is evident. Every elected Councillor is entitled to know in advance the business proposed to be transacted in a meeting so that he may effectively participate in the deliberations. Rule 5 further mandates issuance of notice to every Councillor specifying the date, time and place of the meeting together with the agenda proposed to be transacted. The requirement of prior notice is not an empty formality but a substantive safeguard intended to ensure transparency, fairness and informed decision-making within democratic institutions. 45. A conjoint reading of Rules 3 and 5 leaves no room for ambiguity that where a special meeting is convened, only such business as is specified in the agenda can be transacted therein. In the present case, neither the notice convening the meeting nor any material placed on record indicates that removal of the Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 formed part of the notified agenda. No document has been brought on record to demonstrate that the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation issued any notice to the Councillors informing them that a proposal regarding removal of the Commissioner would be considered in the meeting scheduled on 25.03.2026. There is also no material to establish that such agenda was circulated within 36 the period prescribed under the Rules. Consequently, the foundational procedural requirements contemplated under the Rules, 2016 stand conspicuously absent. 46. The contention of the petitioners that the proposal could nevertheless be considered in the meeting is equally untenable. Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016 permits consideration of a proposal only if the same relates to or is ancillary to a matter included in the agenda. The expression "relates to or is ancillary to" cannot be interpreted in a manner so expansive as to permit introduction of an altogether independent and substantive item of business having no nexus with the notified agenda. Consideration of the annual budget of the Municipal Corporation and removal of the Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 operate in entirely distinct fields. By no stretch of imagination can a proposal for removal of the Commissioner be regarded as ancillary to consideration of the budget. Accepting such a proposition would render the safeguards contained in Rules 3 and 5 wholly otiose and would defeat the very object behind prescribing prior notice and agenda for meetings of democratic bodies. 47. What further assumes significance is that Section 54(2) itself contemplates a proposition being considered and voted upon in a meeting of the Corporation. The expression employed by the Legislature necessarily postulates a meeting validly convened in accordance with law. A proposition which itself is introduced 37 contrary to the mandatory provisions governing the conduct of business cannot be elevated to the status of a valid statutory Resolution merely because a majority of Councillors supported it. Democratic decision-making, howsoever important, must operate within the framework of law. Procedural safeguards are not obstacles to democracy; rather, they are indispensable components of democratic governance. 48. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutory procedures governing democratic and statutory institutions cannot be diluted on considerations of expediency or convenience. In the celebrated decision of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), the Privy Council laid down the principle, which has since been consistently approved and followed by the Supreme Court, that where a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. 49. The said principle was expressly reiterated in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Others, (2002) 1 SCC 633, wherein the Supreme Court held that statutory requirements couched in mandatory language are required to be strictly adhered to and cannot be circumvented by invoking considerations of equity or substantial compliance, by observing as follows :- 38 “29. Nextly, the Commission has elaborately discussed the object of introduction of Chapter XIX-A in the Act, the history behind the introduction and schematic rationalisation of the provisions of Chapter XIX-A brought about through the Finance Act, 1987 to hold that in exercising its power under Chapter XIX-A it has almost an unbridled power to arrive at a settlement. This exercise of purposive interpretation by looking into the object and scheme of the Act and legislative intendment would arise, in our opinion, if the language of the statute is either ambiguous or conflicting or gives a meaning leading to absurdity. We do not find any such problem in the provisions of the Act to which we have already referred to. Sections 234-A, 234-B and 234-C in clear terms impose a mandate to collect interest at the rates stipulated therein. The expression “shall” used in the said section cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as “may”. There are sufficient indications in the scheme of the Act to show that the expression “shall” used in Sections 234-A, 234-B and 234-C is used by the legislature deliberately and it has not left any scope for interpreting the said expression as “may”. This is clear from the fact that prior to the amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 1987, the legislature in the corresponding section pertaining to imposition of interest used the expression “may” thereby giving a discretion to the authorities concerned to either reduce or waive the interest. The 39 change brought about by the amending Act (Finance Act, 1987) is a clear indication of the fact that the intention of the legislature was to make the collection of statutory interest mandatory. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in Jaywant S. Kulkarni v. Minochar Dosabhai Shroff [(1988) 4 SCC 108 : AIR 1988 SC 1817] wherein this Court held that when the legislature changes the expression “may” to “shall” by amendment of the statute, it is clear that it intended to make the provision mandatory from the existing directory provision. Therefore, the question of the Commission relying upon external aids, for the purpose of interpretation like Wanchoo Committee Report, Discussions of Select Committee of Parliament and introduction of Chapter XIX-A in the Act, press release of the Board dated 21-5-1996 etc. are purposeless because of the clear and unambiguous language used in Sections 234-A, 234-B and 234-C and Sections 245-D(4) and (6). We notice that if only the Commission were to follow the golden rule of interpretation by giving the words of the statute their natural and ordinary meaning without unnecessarily going into a forensic exercise of trying to find out the object of the introduction of Chapter XIX-A or Part F of Chapter XVII, the Commission would not have fallen in error.” 50. The Supreme Court in Bhanumati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 12 SCC 1, while dealing with statutory local self- 40 government institutions, held that such bodies are creatures of statute and their powers, rights and functioning are regulated by the statute under which they are constituted. Consequently, every action of the elected body must conform to the statutory procedure prescribed by the Legislature. Any resolution passed in disregard of mandatory procedural requirements cannot derive legitimacy merely because it enjoys numerical support of the members present in the meeting. 51. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharmin Bai Kashyap v. Babli Sahu and Others, (2023) 10 SCC 461, while examining the validity of actions taken under a statutory framework governing local self-government institutions, reaffirmed the well-established principle that where the Legislature has prescribed a specific procedure for exercise of a statutory power, strict adherence to such procedure is mandatory and any deviation therefrom renders the resultant action legally vulnerable. The Supreme Court observed as under:- “13. It is well-settled principle of law that where a right or a liability is Created by a statute, which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by the statute must be availed of. It is also well-settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for doing a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. In Cherukuri Mani v. State of A.P.5, it is observed that: (SCC p. 727, para 14) 41 "14. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed procedure."” 52. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforementioned judicial precedents, this Court finds that the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 suffers from a patent and incurable defect affecting its very legality and enforceability. The statutory scheme governing the conduct of meetings of the Municipal Council clearly contemplates that every item proposed to be considered at a meeting must be specifically incorporated in the agenda circulated to the members in advance. Such requirement is not an empty formality but constitutes an essential safeguard intended to ensure transparency, informed deliberation and meaningful participation by all elected representatives. Admittedly, the Special Meeting convened on 25.03.2026 was called exclusively for consideration of the Budget of the Municipal Council. The agenda circulated to the Councillors did not contain any proposal relating to the removal of the Commissioner nor was any notice issued indicating that such a matter would be taken up for consideration. 53. The power contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 carries serious civil and administrative consequences, both for the Commissioner concerned and for the functioning of the Municipal 42 Council. A proposal seeking removal of a Commissioner cannot be equated with an incidental or ancillary matter arising during the course of budget deliberations. Such a proposal constitutes an independent and substantive subject requiring prior notice, due deliberation and strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under the governing statutory framework. In the absence of compliance with these mandatory procedural requirements, the consideration of such a proposal in a Special Budget Meeting stands vitiated from its inception. 54. The aforesaid conclusion also finds support from the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharmin Bai Kashyap (supra), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the well- established principle that where a statute creates a right and simultaneously prescribes the manner and procedure for its enforcement, such right can be exercised only in the manner contemplated by the statute itself. 55. The Supreme Court further emphasized that when the law requires an act to be performed following a particular procedure, the same must be performed strictly in accordance with that procedure and not otherwise. The principle assumes particular significance in the context of statutory local self-government institutions where the source of power as well as the manner of its exercise are both regulated by the governing enactment. Therefore, when the Act, 1956 read with the Rules, 2016 43 prescribes the procedure by which a proposition for removal of the Commissioner is to be considered in a duly convened meeting, any deviation from such mandatory procedure strikes at the root of the exercise itself and renders the resultant Resolution incapable of legal enforcement. 56. The principle laid down in Dharmin Bai Kashyap (supra) is not merely procedural in character but is founded upon the larger doctrine of rule of law. The requirement of adherence to the prescribed statutory procedure ensures transparency, certainty and fairness in institutional decision-making and prevents arbitrary exercise of power. Consequently, once it is found that the proposal seeking removal of the Commissioner was considered in a meeting convened for an altogether different purpose and without compliance with the mandatory requirements relating to notice and agenda, the Resolution cannot be treated as a valid exercise of power under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 merely because it may have received support from a majority of the members present. 57. The legal position in this regard is no longer res integra. As held in Nazir Ahmad (supra) and consistently followed by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions including Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (supra), where a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, the act must be performed in that manner alone and in no other. The statutory procedure cannot be substituted by 44 considerations of convenience, expediency or perceived public interest. Once the Rules, 2016 prescribe the manner in which business is to be transacted in a meeting and the mode by which matters are to be included in the agenda, any departure therefrom strikes at the very root of the decision-making process. Therefore, the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 cannot be validated by invoking the doctrine of substantial compliance or by contending that the ultimate object sought to be achieved was otherwise within the powers of the Council. 58. Equally significant is the principle reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bhanumati (supra) that statutory local self-government institutions are creatures of statute and derive their authority exclusively from the enactment under which they are constituted. Consequently, the exercise of powers by such bodies must remain confined within the statutory limits and procedural safeguards enacted by the Legislature. Any action taken in disregard of those safeguards is rendered legally unsustainable irrespective of the support it may command among the members participating in the meeting. Thus, the mere fact that a majority of Councillors present in the meeting voted in favour of the proposal cannot confer legality upon a Resolution that was itself initiated and considered contrary to the mandatory statutory procedure. 59. This Court is also unable to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the State Government was under a 45 statutory obligation to act upon the Resolution solely because it was passed by the Municipal Council. The obligation of the State Government to consider or act upon a Resolution under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 necessarily presupposes the existence of a Resolution validly adopted in accordance with law. A Resolution which is tainted by non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements cannot acquire legal sanctity merely by reason of its passage in a meeting of the Council. Acceptance of such a contention would amount to permitting statutory requirements to be circumvented and would render the procedural safeguards incorporated in the Rules, 2016 wholly otiose. 60. The judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts and in law. Those decisions proceed on the premise that the meetings in question were validly convened and that the resolutions under consideration had been passed in conformity with the applicable statutory provisions. None of the authorities cited before this Court lays down a proposition that a resolution passed in violation of mandatory procedural requirements must nevertheless be enforced. The ratio of those decisions, therefore, cannot be extended to validate the impugned Resolution. Likewise, authorities dealing with no-confidence motions against elected office bearers arise under distinct statutory schemes containing separate procedural safeguards and cannot be mechanically 46 imported into the framework governing Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. 61. The Court is further of the view that adherence to procedure is not a matter of technicality but a fundamental component of the rule of law. Democratic decision-making within statutory institutions derives its legitimacy not merely from numerical superiority but from observance of the procedure established by law. Procedural safeguards ensure fairness, accountability and informed participation in the decision-making process. To hold otherwise would permit statutory mandates to be overridden whenever a majority chooses to do so, thereby undermining the very foundation of lawful governance. Such an approach would be wholly inconsistent with settled constitutional principles and the jurisprudence governing statutory bodies. 62. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, which forms the very foundation of the present writ petition, cannot be recognized as a legally valid and enforceable Resolution under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. The material placed on record unequivocally demonstrates that the meeting in question was convened as a Special Budget Meeting and that the proposal relating to removal of the Commissioner neither formed part of the notified agenda nor was any prior notice issued to the Councillors indicating that such an important and substantive matter would be taken up for 47 consideration. The mandatory requirements contained in Rules 3 and 5 of the Rules, 2016, which are intended to secure transparency, informed participation and orderly conduct of business in meetings of democratic institutions, were not complied with. The proposal also cannot be brought within the ambit of Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016, as a motion seeking removal of the Commissioner is an independent and substantive subject having no nexus with the business of budget consideration. Consequently, the proceedings culminating in the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 stand vitiated by non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements. 63. This Court is also constrained to observe that the Act, 1956 and the Rules, 2016 constitute a complete statutory code governing the functioning of Municipal Corporations and the conduct of their business. The powers conferred upon elected representatives, the Mayor, the Mayor-in-Council and other statutory authorities are all traceable to and regulated by the provisions of the statute. Once the Legislature has prescribed a particular procedure for convening meetings, specifying agenda items, conducting deliberations and passing resolutions, every stakeholder is bound to act strictly within that statutory framework. Neither the perceived urgency of a matter nor the strength of the majority supporting a proposal can justify departure from the procedure established by law. 48 64. It is a settled principle that statutory institutions derive legitimacy not merely from the democratic character of their composition but equally from their fidelity to the governing statute. The Act and the Rules are required to be followed in their letter as well as spirit. Any action taken in disregard thereof would not only expose the decision to legal challenge but would also undermine the institutional discipline and certainty which the statutory framework seeks to preserve. Therefore, while the elected body undoubtedly possesses important powers under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, the exercise of such powers must necessarily conform to the requirements prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 65. This Court is mindful of the fact that local self-government institutions occupy an important position in the constitutional framework envisaged under Part IX-A of the Constitution of India and that the democratic will of elected representatives deserves due respect and recognition. However, it is equally well settled that democratic institutions created by statute must function within the boundaries prescribed by law. The legitimacy of a democratic decision does not flow merely from the number of persons supporting it but from the fact that such decision has been arrived at through a procedure sanctioned by law. Procedural safeguards are not empty technicalities; they constitute essential checks designed to preserve fairness, transparency, accountability and institutional integrity. Once the Legislature has prescribed a 49 specific procedure for transacting business and passing resolutions having serious administrative consequences, the same cannot be dispensed with on the ground that a majority of members were otherwise willing to support the proposal. 66. The Court is further of the view that no mandamus can be issued directing the State Government to act upon or implement a Resolution which itself lacks legal sanctity. The obligation contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 to give effect to the democratic decision of the elected body necessarily arises only when such decision has been taken in accordance with the statutory scheme governing the field. In the absence of a validly adopted Resolution, no corresponding legal duty can be said to have arisen in favour of the petitioners capable of being enforced through issuance of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 67. It is, however, clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations levelled against the Commissioner, nor has it adjudicated upon the correctness, truthfulness or otherwise of the grievances raised by the elected representatives regarding the functioning of the Municipal administration. The dismissal of the present petition rests solely upon the legal infirmity affecting the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and the non-compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements governing its consideration and adoption. It shall 50 remain open to the competent authority or the elected body of the Municipal Corporation to take recourse to such remedies and procedures as may be available to them in accordance with law. 68. Before parting, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that statutory powers carrying significant civil and administrative consequences, such as those contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, ought to be exercised with due deliberation and in strict conformity with the statutory framework. Compliance with procedural requirements not only safeguards the rights of all stakeholders but also ensures that decisions taken by democratic institutions withstand legal scrutiny and command public confidence. Observance of procedure is the hallmark of the rule of law, and any departure therefrom has the potential to erode the institutional discipline upon which statutory governance is founded. 69. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no merit in the present writ petition. The same deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. 70. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/-/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh 51 The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 13.05.2026 29.06.2026 ------ 30.06.2026 52 Head-Note No writ of mandamus can be issued directing the State Government to implement a Resolution lacking legal sanctity. The obligation under Section 54(2) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 arises only in respect of a Resolution validly adopted in accordance with the statutory scheme; in the absence of such a Resolution, no enforceable legal duty exists under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.