- 1 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN WRIT PETITION NO. 25048 OF 2024 (SCST) BETWEEN: SRI K. V. MUNIRAJAPPA S/O. LATE OBAIAH, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/AT KARAPPANAHALLI VILLAGE, NANDAGUDI HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, PIN-562 114. (BENEFIT OF SENIOR CITIZEN NOT CLAIMED) …PETITIONER (BY SRI VIJAYA KUMAR K, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING, 1ST FLOOR, BEERASANDRA VILLAGE, KUNDANA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU-562 110. 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER DODDABALLAPURA SUB-DIVISION, DODDABALLAPURA -561 203. 3. THE TAHSILDAR HOSAKOTE TALUK, HOSAKOTE-562 129. 4. SRI. A. M. G. SURENDAR S/O. M. D. ANTHONY RAJ, Digitally signed by V MANJUSHA BAI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/AT NO. 536, SECTOR-3, R.K.PURAM, NEW DELHI-110 022, REP. BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER, SRI. A. M. STANISLAUS, AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, R/AT NO. 134, 5TH CROSS, OIL MILL ROAD, LINGARAJAPURAM, BENGALURU-560 084. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.ANITHA N., AGA FOR RESPONDENT 1 TO 3, SRI MOHAN CHANDRA P, ADV. FOR C/R4) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DTD 31.03.2023 PASSED BY THE R-1 IN CASE NO.LND/SC ST(A) 47/2019 (ANNX-A) CONSEQUENTLY UPHELD THE ORDER DTD 19.12.2018 PASSED BY THE R-2 IN CASE NO.PTCL SR (HO) 4/2014-15 (ANNX-H) BY ALLOWING THIS WP AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN ORAL ORDER The case of the petitioner is that his forefather was granted the land in respect of the subject matter of the writ petition on 12.07.1940. That he belongs to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community. The said land was alienated by a registered sale deed on 23.07.1963. It was first - 3 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 challenged in the year 2014 before the Assistant Commissioner by the petitioner. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the application filed by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same, respondent No.4 who is the present owner of the property challenged the same before the Deputy Commissioner (respondent No.1). The first respondent has allowed the appeal and has set aside the order passed by respondent No.2- Assistant Commissioner. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 2. The case of the petitioner is that, his forefather (original grantee) was an innocent person who did not have the worldly knowledge and misusing the same the predecessor in title of respondent No.4 purchased the property. Thereafter, several transactions have taken place and presently respondent No.4 is the owner of the property. According to him as per Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 ('PTCL, Act') any alienation of grant land in violation of the terms and conditions of the grant whether it was before or after the commencement of the Act is not valid. It is his further contention that the original grant restrained the grantee from - 4 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 alienating the land permanently. On the said ground, it is prayed that the order of the first respondent be set aside and the land be restored in his favour. 3. He also relies upon the judgment passed in Manchegowda and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others1 wherein paragraphs 18, 19 and 22 read as under:- "18. The transferees of the granted lands from the original grantees, acquired the lands improperly and illegally in contravention of the condition imposed on such transfers. Such transferees must have been aware and must in any event be deemed to have been aware of the condition regarding the prohibition on transfer and they cannot be considered to be bona fide transferees for value. Such persons acquired in the granted lands only a voidable title which was liable to be defeated and possession of such lands could be resumed from such transferees. Such a person who only acquires a defeasible legal right cannot make a grievance of any violation of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, when the defeasible legal right is, in fact, defeated by appropriate legal action or by any suitable provision enacted in an Act passed by the competent Legislature. It may further be noted that in most cases such transferees have after the transfer, which is liable to be avoided in accordance with law, 1 (1984) 3 SCC 301 - 5 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 enjoyed for a sufficiently long period the benefits of lands transferred to them before the lands could be recovered from them. Article 19(1)(f), therefore, did not invalidate Section 4 of the Act. 19. We have earlier noticed that the title which is acquired by a transferee in the granted lands, transferred in contravention of the prohibition against the transfer of the granted lands, is a voidable title which in law is liable to be defeated through appropriate action and possession of such granted lands transferred in breach of the condition of prohibition could be recovered by the grantor. The right or property which a transferee acquires in the granted lands, is a defeasible right and the transferee renders himself liable to lose his right or property at the instance of the grantor. We have further observed that by the enactment of this Act and particularly Section 4 and Section 5 thereof, the Legislature is seeking to defeat the defeasible right of the transferee in such lands without the process of a prolonged legal action with a view to speedy resumption of such granted lands for distribution thereof to the original grantee or their legal representatives and in their absence to other members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes communities. In our opinion, this kind of defeasible right of the transferee in the granted lands cannot be considered to be property as contemplated in Articles 31 and 31-A. The nature of the right of the transferee in the granted lands on transfer of such lands in breach of the condition of prohibition relating to such transfer, the object of such grant and the terms thereof, also the law governing such grants and the - 6 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 object and the scheme of the present Act enacted for the benefit of the weaker sections of our community, clearly go to indicate that there is in this case no deprivation of such right or property as may attract the provisions of Articles 31 and 31-A of the Constitution. 22. The next contention urged is that Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as these sections make special provisions only with regard to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled the Tribes to the exclusion of persons belonging to other communities. This Act has undoubtedly been passed for the benefit of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are recognised as backward citizens and weaker sections in the country. There cannot be any manner of doubt that persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes can be considered to be separate and distinct classes particularly in the matter of preservation and protection of their economic and educational interests. In view of the peculiar plight of these two classes, the Constitution in Article 15(4) makes specific mention of these two classes and in Article 16(4) speaks of backward class of citizens. One of the directive principles as contained in Article 46 of the Constitution enjoins that “the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation”. The object of this Act is to protect and preserve the economic interests of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled - 7 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 Tribes and to prevent their exploitation. For the purpose of the present Act, the classification has a clear nexus to the object sought to be achieved. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that special provisions made for the resumption of granted lands, originally granted to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and restoration of the same to the original grantees or their heirs and legal representatives and failing them to other members of these communities do not infringe Article 14 of the Constitution". 4. The counsel for the caveator/respondent No.4 is absent. 5. The learned Additional Government Advocate justifies the order passed by the respondent No.2 which is in support of the petitioner herein and she prays the writ petition may be allowed. 6. However, it is seen that the Hon'ble Apex Court in NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER2 in paragraph No.8 has held as under: "8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This 2 (2020) 14 SCC 232 - 8 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly." - 9 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 7. Thereafter, the State has introduced an amendment to Section 5 of the PTCL Act; which reads as under: "2. Amendment of section 5.- In the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act No.2 of 1979), in section 5, in sub- section (1), after clause (b), the following clauses shall be inserted and shall always deemed to have been inserted, namely:- "(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section." 8. Further, pursuant to the amendment that has been carried out to Section 5 of the PTCL Act, a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.100101/2024 in paragraph No.3 has held as under: "3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: - 10 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 (a) The subject land does not answer the definition of ‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003. (b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on - 11 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a “hereditary land” falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty- two years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in (Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of Karnataka1), that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered. (c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of “limitation and delay” has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under: “(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” _________________ 1(2020) 14 SCC 232 - 12 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated. (d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity. (e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view: “8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. - 13 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. …..” (Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least. (f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to - 14 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate. (g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan2 make out this point: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps _________________ 2 (2022) 2 SCC 25 at para 20, 21 & 22 - 15 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches. 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. - 16 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond. (i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify." 9. In the instant case, there is an inordinate delay of 51 years in challenging the first alienation. In the light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI (supra) and the judgment of division Bench of - 17 - HC-KAR NC:2026:KHC:29887 WP No.25048 of 2024 this Court in Writ Appeal No.100101/2024 the delay cannot be justified. 10. For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petition stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Sd/- (M.I.ARUN) JUDGE CHS-List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5