2026:HHC:39636 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 72 of 2014 Reserved on: 10.09.2014 Date of Decision: 17.09.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Surjit Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr. P.K. Nadda, Additional Advocate General. For the respondent : Ms. Neha Thakur, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.9.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Dehra, District Kangra (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39636 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the IPC, and Sections 181 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). 3. It was asserted that the informant, Dharam Singh (PW-4), and Jagdish Chand (PW-5) were returning to their homes on 14.7.2008. They reached Kohala at about 8:30 PM. A scooter bearing registration No.DL-4SS-7230 came from Nadaun at high speed and hit Jagdish Chand and the informant. Jagdish Chand and the informant sustained injuries to their right legs. The accused Sanjeev Kumar was driving the scooter at the time of the accident. The accident occurred because of his negligence and the high speed of the scooter. The injured were taken to the hospital, and an intimation was given to the police. 4. Inspector Karam Singh (PW-7) recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-4/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW-6/F) was registered. The medical examination of the injured was conducted, and MLCs (Ext. PF and Ext. PF1) were issued. ASI Bhupender Singh (PW-6) investigated 3 2026:HHC:39636 the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW-6/A). He took photographs (Ext. P-1 and Ext. P-2) of the spot and seized the scooter vide memo (Ext. P-A). Chaman Lal (PW-1) examined the scooter and found that there was no defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW-1/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 5. The learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of IPC and Sections 181 and 196 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Chaman Lal (PW-1) mechanically examined the vehicle. Baljeet Kumar (PW-2) and Tilak Raj (PW-3) did not support the prosecution case. Dharam Singh (PW-4) and Jagdish Chand (PW- 5) sustained injuries. ASI Bhupender Singh (PW-6) and Inspector Karam Singh (PW-7) investigated the matter. Om Prakash (PW- 8) is the owner of the scooter. 4 2026:HHC:39636 7. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), admitted that he was driving the scooter bearing registration No.DL-4SS-7230 at about 8:30 PM. He denied the rest of the prosecution case. He stated that when he reached the spot, the informant and injured were crossing the road. The accused applied the brakes to let them pass. The scooter skidded, he lost balance, and the scooter fell on the spot. The scooter had not hit the informant or the injured. He could not say how they had sustained injuries. The accused did not produce any evidence in his defence. 8. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other. The injured had sustained injuries on their right leg and the left leg, which was not possible if they were walking in a single file and were hit by the scooter coming from the rear. The photographs do not support the injured version that he had gone towards the drain after seeing the scooter, as no such drain was visible. Independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution case. The defence taken by the accused was probable. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of IPC. 5 2026:HHC:39636 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The testimonies of the witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. Injured Dharam Singh and Jagdish had specifically stated that the accident occurred because of the high speed of the scooter and negligence of the accused. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. The learned Trial Court erred in discarding their testimonies. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr P.K. Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, and Ms Neha Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent-accused. 11. Mr P.K. Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The injured had specifically stated that the accused was driving the scooter at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner. The learned Trial Court erred in 6 2026:HHC:39636 discarding their testimonies. The prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the prosecution version. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 12. Ms Neha Thakur, learned counsel for the accused/respondent, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Mere use of high speed is not sufficient to infer negligence. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: 7 2026:HHC:39636 Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein 8 2026:HHC:39636 one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the 9 2026:HHC:39636 power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Baljeet Kumar (PW-2) and Tilak Raj (PW-3) did not support the prosecution case. They stated that no accident had occurred in their presence and they were not aware of the facts of the case. They were permitted to be cross-examined, and they 10 2026:HHC:39636 denied that they had seen the scooter hitting the injured. They denied their previous statements recorded by the police. It is apparent that both the witnesses have not supported the prosecution version, and no advantage can be derived from their testimonies by the prosecution. 17. Dharam Singh (PW-4) stated that a scooter had hit Jagdish Chand at a high speed, and thereafter hit him. Jagdish sustained injury on the left leg, and he sustained injury on the right leg. Jagdish Chand (PW-5) stated that a scooter came from Nadaun at a high speed. He went towards a drain, but the scooter hit his left leg. Dharam Singh also sustained an injury on his head, but he could not say how Dharam Singh had sustained injuries. 18. Dharam Singh (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that they were walking in a single file. He was walking ahead, and Jagdish was behind him. Jagdish Chand (PW- 5) stated that they were walking in a single file. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that when the injured were walking in a single file, it was not possible for one of the injured to sustain injury on his right leg and for another to sustain injury on his left 11 2026:HHC:39636 leg. They were walking on the left side of the road, and the scooter was being driven on the left side of the road; therefore, their right side would be exposed, and both of them should have sustained injury on the right side and not on the left side. Thus, the inference drawn by the learned Trial Court that these witnesses had not stated the complete truth, and the statement of the accused that the injured were crossing the road, was a probable conclusion. 19. The accused had stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the scooter had skidded, he lost balance, and sustained injuries. Jagdish Chand (PW-5) admitted in his cross-examination that the scooter turned turtle and fell; however, the scooterist had not applied the brake. Similarly, Dharam Singh (PW-4) stated that the scooterist had applied the brakes and fell. These admissions corroborate the defence version. 20. Dharam Singh (PW-4) and Jagdish Chand (PW-5) stated that the scooterist was driving the scooter without switching on the light. However, both of them admitted in their cross-examination that they had not told the police about the 12 2026:HHC:39636 fact that the accused was driving the scooter without switching on the light. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 3 SCC 164: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 126: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 17 that the prosecution cannot prove a fact that was not told to the investigating officer during the investigation. It was observed at page 176 31. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements under Section 161CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before the court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. The prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to the police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See : (i) Rohtash v. State of Haryana [Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 287], (ii) Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375 : (2011) 72 ACC 699], (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v. State of Karnataka [Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1954] and (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. [Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P., (2003) 3 SCC 175: 2003 SCC (Cri) 596] ] 21. Thus, the statements made by them were clear improvements and could not have been relied upon. 22. The site plan and the photographs do not show any drain on the spot, and the testimony of Jagdish Chand (PW-5) 13 2026:HHC:39636 that he had gone towards the drain is not corroborated by the photographs and the site plan. 23. Dharam Singh (PW-4) and Jagdish Chand (PW-5) stated that the scooter was being driven at a high speed. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that the mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to convict the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 14 2026:HHC:39636 24. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 25. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925, that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 26. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot 15 2026:HHC:39636 be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 27. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses stated that he was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care. 28. The statements of the witnesses that the accused was negligent are also not sufficient. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, 16 2026:HHC:39636 but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 29. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.” 30. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 31. There was no evidence to show that the accused had acted in violation of the statutory duty, and the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. No interference is required with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 32. No other point was urged. 33. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 34. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha 17 2026:HHC:39636 Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th September, 2026 (Chander)