2026:HHC:39639 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 520 of 2026 Reserved on: 11.9.2026 Decided on: 17.9.2026 Rattan Lal …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Informant : Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 5 of 2026, dated 26.01.2026, registered at Police Station Ramshehar, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 79 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, and Section 3(1)(w)(ii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) (SC&ST) Act, 1989. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39639 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is innocent. There was a dispute related to the passage between the informant’s family and the petitioner. The petitioner is a government employee in the State of Haryana and he occasionally visits his native place. Civil and criminal cases are pending against the informant. The petitioner will join the investigation and abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant had gone to feed her cattle on 26.01.2026. The petitioner abused her. The petitioner also used to abuse the informant and threatened to kill her on earlier occasions. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version. It was found that there was a dispute between the informant and the petitioner. The informant had not produced any witness of the incident. The informant belongs to the Scheduled Caste, whereas the petitioner does not belong to the Scheduled Caste. The police interrogated the petitioner. The investigation is 3 2026:HHC:39639 complete and only the charge-sheet is to be filed before the Court. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr. Vinod Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, and Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the informant. 5. Mr Vinod Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The relationship between the informant and the petitioner is strained. The civil and criminal litigations are pending between the parties. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The police have completed the investigation and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had abused the informant in the name of her caste and he had also hurled filthy abuses to the informant. The enmity can be a motive for the commission of the crime. The petitioner would intimidate the 4 2026:HHC:39639 witnesses in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the informant, adopted the submissions of Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, and submitted that the petitioner had abused the informant. He had also threatened to kill her. The informant belongs to the Scheduled Caste and the petitioner can intimidate her in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also 5 2026:HHC:39639 pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused 6 2026:HHC:39639 at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court 7 2026:HHC:39639 is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 8 2026:HHC:39639 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 9 2026:HHC:39639 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The status report mentions that the petitioner had abused the informant in the name of her caste. However, no person had witnessed the incident. It is undisputed that civil and criminal litigations are pending between the petitioner and the informant. Therefore, in the absence of corroboration, the petitioner’s custody is not justified. 13. The status report also mentions that the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is yet to be filed. It means that the petitioner’s custody is not required. Thus, no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. 14. The petitioner asserted that he is a permanent resident of District Solan, which was not stated to be incorrect in the status 10 2026:HHC:39639 report. Hence, the petitioner has roots in society, and there is no chance of his absconding. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. This apprehension can be removed by imposing conditions and is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner. 16. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the order dated 2.4.2026, is made absolute, till the disposal of the petition. 17. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th September, 2026 (Chander)