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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CMPMO No. 2 of 2026 Decided on: 17.9.2026 Lata Bhardwaj
… Petitioner Versus Ajay Kashyap
…Respondent _____________________________ ______________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge Whether approved for reporting? ___________________________________________________ For the Petitioner: Mr. Jagat Paul, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokesh Thakur, Advocate vice Mr. G.R. Palsra, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge
(oral)
Petitioner Lata Bhardwaj has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 10.12.2025, passed by the court of Additional District Judge-II-cum-Appellate Authority under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., in Rent Appeal No. 1 of 2025, titled as ‘Lata Bhardwaj vs. Ajay Kashyap’.
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2. The learned Appellate Authority has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner, which she had filed against the order dated 28.05.2025, passed by learned Rent Controller (1), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Rent Controller’), in CMA No. 74 of 2025, bearing Registration No. 485 of 2025, titled as, ‘Ajay Kashyap vs. Lata Bhardwaj’.
3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the lis are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned Rent Controller.
4.
Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition, as borne out from the record and the documents annexed with the petition, may be summed up as under: Tenant, Ajay Kashyap, filed the petition under Section 11 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, for restoration of electricity supply and protection from unlawful interference, in the peaceful possession of rented commercial premises. Along with the main petition, an application under Section 11(3) of the Act was filed to direct the landlady to restore the electricity
3 supply to the rented premises, which consists of two adjacent shops, situated at House No. 45/6, Lower Samkheter Street, Mandi, H.P., bearing electricity meter No. 1311106047 and Consumer ID No. 100002233011.
5. The said application was contested by the respondent-landlady by taking preliminary objections that the application is not maintainable. She has averred that the tenant was posted as Manager in H.P. State Cooperative Bank, and his house is situated at Samkheter, Mandi. The landlady owned two shops on the ground floor, and the tenant requested her to rent out one shop to him. She initially rented out one shop, and thereafter, the tenant obtained the second shop, on rent, as well. 5.1 As per the further stand of the landlady, there was a load-bearing wall between both the shops, and the tenant was specifically informed that the landlady would retire from service, in the year 2022 to start her own business, and tenant will vacate the shops immediately. On this assurance, the landlady rented both shops to him. However, he failed to vacate them.
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6. The application under Section 11(3) of the Rent Act was contested on the same grounds. 6.1 The learned Rent Controller allowed the application, vide order dated 28.05.2025, directing the restoration of electricity supply to the rented premises. 6.2 This order was unsuccessfully assailed by the landlady before the learned Appellate Authority. Consequently, the landlady is now before this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, where the scope of interference is very limited.
7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in "K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus Kumaresan”, 2025 INSC 606" has elaborately discussed the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Relevant para 9 of the
judgment, is reproduced, as under:
"Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227."
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8. In a recent decision in "Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors.”, 2026 INSC 434", the scope of interference has again been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:-
"35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this. Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal."
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9. Moreover, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot re-assess or review the material, which was taken into consideration, by the learned trial Court. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided, by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh versus Natwarlal Shamji Gada and another, 2026 INSC 416. Relevant paragraph-16 of the judgment is, reproduced, as under:-
“16. Yet another aspect that goes to the root of the matter is that the tenants challenged the
order passed by the Appellate Bench permitting the amendment by filing a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that in exercise of such jurisdiction, it would not be open for the High Court to review or reassess the material that was taken into consideration by the Court while passing the impugned order. In this regard we may usefully refer to the decision in Raj Kumar Bhatia Vs. Subhash Chander Bhatia, wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court held as under:
“11 ……The High Court has in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution entered upon the merits of the case which was sought to be set up by the
7 appellant in the amendment. This is impermissible. Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case which is proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial. In enquiring into merits, the High Court transgressed the limitations on its jurisdiction under Article
227. In Sadhna Lodh v National Insurance Company4, this Court has held that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal and it is not open to it to review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order. The Trial Court had in the considered exercise of its jurisdiction allowed the amendment of the written statement under
Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. There was no reason for the High Court to interfere under Article 227.” Thus, the discretion exercised by the Appellate Bench while allowing the amendment was not liable to be interfered with in exercise of the Article 227 of the Constitution of India, especially when there was no error of jurisdiction nor a statutory bar for permitting the plaint to be amended based on subsequent events.”
(Self emphasis supplied)
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10. In this case, after considering the rival
contentions raised by the parties, the learned Rent Controller ordered the restoration of the electricity supply. As per the pleadings, the landlady admitted that the premises were rented out by her to the tenant. Since electricity supply falls within the definition of ‘essential supply/service’, the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, as affirmed by the Appellate Authority, does not require any interference by this Court.
17. Considering all these facts, there is no substance in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
18. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal of the present application.
19. The pending application(s), if any, are also
disposed of. (Virender Singh) 17.9.2026 Judge Kalpana
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