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2026 DAILYLAW 23463 (CHH)

SMT. REETA AGRAWAL v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPC/434/2025 · 2026-06-21

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:25343-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 418 of 2025 1 - Smt. Amriti Agrawal W/o Monu Agrawal Aged About 36 Years R/o Vidya Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 - Deputy Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 4 - Collector Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 5 - Estate Officer (Sampada Adhikari) Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) WPC No. 420 of 2025 1 - Smt. Chitrangda Agrawal W/o Rajat Kumar Agrawal Aged About 36 Years R/o Vyapar Vihar Road, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 3 - Deputy Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 4 - Collector Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 5 - Estate Officer (Sampada Adhikari) Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) WPC No. 433 of 2025 1 - Smt. Ritu Agrawal W/o Sharad Agrawal Aged About 38 Years R/o Rama World House No. A-7 Bilaspur District - Bilaspur (C.G,) ---Petitioner(s) INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.06.29 11:21:28 +0530 2 Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Urban Administration and Development Department Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Capital Complex Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur District - Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 - Deputy Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur District - Bilaspur (C.G.) 4 - Collector Bilaspur District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 5 - Estate Officer (Sampada Adhikari) Municipal Corporation Bilaspur District - Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) WPC No. 434 of 2025 1 - Smt. Reeta Agrawal W/o Rajesh Agrawal Aged About 59 Years R/o Ageya Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Deputy Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Collector Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 5 - Estate Officer (Sampada Adhikari) Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Shri Manoj Paranjpe, Sr. Advocate along with Shri Kabeer Kalwani, Advocate. For State : Shri P.K. Bhaduri, Dy. Advocate General. For Municipal Corporation : Shri A.S. Kachhwaha and Ms. Shruti Bilaspur. Marmar, Advocates. For Intervenor : Shri Arjit Tiwari, Advocate (in WPC No.434 of 2025). Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 3 22.06.2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1 Since all these writ petitions arise out of same NIT and issues involved in all the writ petitions being common, they are being heard and decided together by this common order. 2 The petitioners have filed these writ petitions against the order dated 10.01.2025 by which NIT No.02/Sampada V/2023-24/542, dated 05.07.2023 has been cancelled and the petitioners have been directed to take refund of their security deposit. The petitioners also seek a direction to proceed for execution of registered deed in their favour under the terms and conditions of NIT with respect to plots situated at Vyapar Vihar Commercial Project, Zone-1, Bilaspur, for which they were declared H-1. The plot number and their details are as under : Name of petitioner Plot No. Area Smt. Amriti Agrawal WPC No.418 of 2025 B-108 50X80 sq.ft. Smt. Chitrangda Agrawal WPC No.420 of 2025 C-06 2250 sq.dft. Smt. Ritu Agrawal WPC No.433 of 2025 B-107 50X80 sq.ft. Smt. Reeta Agrawal WPC No.434 of 2025 D-89 1250 sq.ft. 3 It is the case of the petitioners that respondent Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, on 05.07.2023, issued a Notice Inviting Tender for allotment of commercial plots in Vyapar Vihar Commercial Project, Zone-1 inviting bids from eligible persons. As per the NIT, the minimum offset price was fixed at Rs.4500/- per square feet and the applicants were required to deposit 10 percent of the offered price as earnest money. It 4 was also the condition that on being cleared the highest bidder, the successful bidder would require the deposit 10 percent of the differential amount between the minimum price and the offered price within 3 days from the date of issuance of notice for its deposition and the remaining amount was required to pay within one month. 4 Pursuant to the said NIT, the petitioners submitted their bid along with all other required documents and deposited the requisite amount towards earnest money through Demand Draft. The financial bid was opened on 24.07.2023 in presence of concerned authority including the representatives of Collector and Municipal Corporation. Upon evaluation of the bids, the respective petitioners were found to be the highest bidder in respect of their respective plots and consequently the Municipal Corporation vide its letter dated 08.08.2023 informed the petitioners that their bids are accepted and directed to deposit the differential amount of 10 percent within three days. In compliance thereof, the petitioners deposited the requisite amount on 10.08.2023. The petitioners further pleaded that in between 10.08.2023 to 26.08.2024 they have deposited the amount as under: Name of petitioner Plot No. Amount deposited (Through Demand Draft) Date of deposit Smt. Amriti Agrawal WPC No.418 of 2025 B-108 18,00,000/- (EMD) 7,20,000/- (initial deposit) Total- 25,20,000/- 10.08.2023 Smt. Chitrangda Agrawal WPC No.420 of 2025 C-06 10,12,500/- (EMD) 5,85,000//(initial deposit) Total-15,97,500/- 10.08.2023 Smt. Ritu Agrawal WPC No.433 of 2025 B-107 18,00,000/-(EMD) 8,20,400/-(initial deposit) Total-26,20,400/- 10.08.2023 5 Smt. Reeta Agrawal WPC No.434 of 2025 D-89 5,62,500/- (EMD) 3,25,000/-(initial deposit) Total- 8,87,500/- 10.08.2023 5 Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that they have fulfilled all the conditions stipulated in the NIT. Despite completion of tender process and deposits of amount as required under the NIT, no final decision regarding allotment of plots were taken by the Municipal Authorities. The petitioners also made several representations in this regard, but no allotment of plots were carried out by them. Considering the inaction on the part of Corporation, the petitioners filed separate writ petitions on 26.11.2024, one of which being WPC No.5968 of 2024, seeking appropriate direction. The said writ petitions were disposed of on 12.12.2024 by the learned Single Judge of this court with a direction to the respondent authorities to complete all the procedures and conclude the proceedings at the earliest for allotment of plots. Despite direction given by the Single Judge, the respondent authorities have not completed the process of allotment of plots, but unfortunately the entire tender process have been cancelled by order impugned dated 10.01.2025 without assigning any reason. The entire tender process was conducted in accordance with procedure and rates were opened in presence of the representatives of the Collector, Bilaspur, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur and other authorities. Bids were opened on 08.08.2023 and the petitioners were declared H-1. The allotment process was placed before the Collector for its approval, but the Collector seized up the matter and ultimately 6 the tender process has been cancelled after about one year and six months. 6 The counsel for the petitioners would further submit that reasons should have been assigned by the respondent authorities before cancelling the tender and it cannot be cancelled in such a manner that too after opening of a price bid and after declaring the petitioners H-1 and in pursuance thereof they have also deposited the requisite amount under the NIT within time. The additional amount has also been deposited by them which are still lying with the respondent authorities, however, instead of allotting plots to the respective petitioners, the entire tender process has been cancelled which is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Once the petitioners offer have been accepted and they have been found H-1, without assigning any reason, the entire tender process cannot be cancelled to frustrate the rights of successful bidders. Huge amount is lying with the respondent authorities under the legitimate expectations that they will be allotted plots. The tender process and proposal for allotment of plots were approved by the Corporation in its general body meeting and Mayor in Council and forwarded for its approval from the Collector. Though the Municipal Corporation is having right to accept or reject the bids of bidders, however, they have no right to cancel the entire tender process on such a advanced stage i.e. after declaring H-1 bidder and approved by Mayor in Council and Municipal Corporation. Therefore, the arbitrary action of the respondent authorities may be quashed and they may be directed to allot the plots to the respective petitioners. 7 7 Learned counsel for the respondents No.2,3&5-Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, would submit that allotment process under the subject NIT was governed not only by the terms and conditions of the NIT dated 05.07.2023, but also by the provisions of Section 80 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short, the Act, 1956) and also under Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994 (in short, the Rules, 1994). Though, respective petitioners were declared H-1 after opening of price bid on 24.07.2023 and they deposited the requisite security amount, the tender process had not attained its finality. The guidelines were issued by the Department of Urban Administration, Govt. of Chhattisgarh on 10.04.2017 and fixed the timeline for tender process. In the subject NIT, all rights were reserved to the Municipal Corporation either to accept or reject the bids. The tender committee approved the bids and recommended the proposal on 05.09.2023 and the Mayor in Council accorded their approval and the General body of Municipal Corporation approved the proposal on 29.02.2024, however, since the transfer of property of municipal corporation requires prior sanction under Section 80 of the Act, 1956, the matter was forwarded to Collector, Bilaspur, who was the competent authority. After examination of proposal and entire tender process, the Collector Bilaspur raised objection regarding tender proceeding and a five members committee was constituted for examination of the matter and after having received its report, the Collector declined to approve the tender process on 08.01.2025 and considering the irregularities occurred during tender process and in view of the objections noticed 8 by the Collector, the competent authority declined to grant approval for allotment of plots and ultimately the entire process have been cancelled which has been informed to the petitioners vide letter dated 10.01.2025. 8 It is also submitted by the respondent Municipal Corporation that mere participation in the tender process, declaration of H-1 bidder and deposition of the earnest amount by itself does not confer any vested right upon the petitioners to seek allotment of plots. Under Clause- 25 & 27 of the tender conditions, the right have been reserved to the Municipal Corporation to accept or reject any tender and stipulated that the tender process should be governed by the Rules, 1994. In the enquiry it was found that tender was floated without prior sanction of the Commissioner and it was opened in absence of the Commissioner Municipal Corporation after amending the opening date of tender. The tender was floated on 05.07.2023 and last date for submission of bid was 24.07.2023. As per circular issued by the State Govt., minimum 20 days are required between issuance of tender and opening date of bids, but in the present case the tender was opened on 24.07.2023 which comes to 18 days. Considering all these discrepancies, the tender was cancelled. He would further submit that the other bidders have accepted refund of amount which they deposited under the subject NIT. Therefore, the writ petitions do not have any merit and are liable to be dismissed. 9 Learned counsel for the State supported the stand taken by the Municipal Corporation and pleaded that the Collector Bilaspur, after having found that there were violation of statutory rules and guidelines 9 issued by the State Govt., directed the Commissioner Municipal Corporation to submit a detailed report clarifying the discrepancies. After considering the report submitted by the Municipal Corporation on 08.01.2025, the Collector considered that there was a fundamental flaw in publication of NIT and while invoking the powers under Section 80(3) of the Act, 1956, the tender process was cancelled. The cancellation of tender process is within the jurisdiction of respondent authorities and there is no merit in the writ petitions and the same requires dismissal. 10 Learned counsel appearing for intervenor (in WPC No.434 of 2025) submits that controversy involved in these writ petitions are the individual grievance of the petitioners. He raises various issues concerning the legality and transparency of tender process adopted by the Municipal Corporation for allotment of valuable properties of the Municipal Corporation. The material available in the writ petitions surfaced indicating that tender process in respect of respective plots situated at Vyapah Vihar Bilaspur was vitiated by serious irregularities, manipulation and corrupt practices. Such a private parties including persons associated with the bidders in connivance with the officials of the Municipal Corporation influenced the tender process and obtained undue advantage. A complaint was also lodged by the intervenor before the respondent authorities. It is also submitted by him that cancellation of tender process cannot be examined in a private litigation, but considering involvement of public property and influential tender process, it should be examined in a broad aspect as public 10 interest is involved in the matter. Therefore, rejection of tender process is in accordance with rules and circulars applicable in the case. 11 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the writ petitions. 12 Considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and the material available on record, it reveals that the petitioners have admittedly participated in the tender process initiated by the Municipal Corporation for allotment of commercial plots situated at Vyapar Vihar Commercial Project Zone-1, Bilaspur. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners were declared highest bidder and had deposited the earnest amount as well as differential amount as required under the terms of NIT, however, the record further reveals that the tender process was governed not only by the conditions contained in the NIT, but also by the provisions of Section 80 of the Act, 1956 and Rules, 1994. Under the statutory scheme, transfer of Municipal property could not attain finality without prior approval of the competent authority. The declaration of petitioners as H-1 bidder and acceptance of bid by tender committee were only intermediate stages in the decision making process and were subjected to statutory approval by the competent authority. After being approved by the tender committee, Mayor in Council and General Body of Municipal Corporation, the matter was placed before the Collector for its approval to whom power was delegated by the State under Section 80 of the Act, 1956. The record indicate that the Collector scrutinized the proposal; constituted a committee for examination of tender process and considering the report of the committed, declined the approve the tender process and 11 allotment of plots in favour of petitioners. Once the competent authority declined to grant approval, the Municipal Corporation left with no other option to proceed with allotment. In such circumstances, vide order dated 10.01.2025 the Municipal Corporation Bilaspur communicated the cancellation of tender process vide letter dated 10.01.2025 and accordingly the petitioners were informed with the same. Merely because the petitioners were emerged as highest bidders would not create any indefeasible right in their favour to claim execution of sale deed contrary to the framework governing transfer of municipal property. 13 It is necessary here to notice Clause 25 & 27 of the NIT issued by the Municipal Corporation by which the right has been reserved by the Corporation to accept or reject the tender, which reads as under: “25. uxj ikfyd fuxe] fcykliqj dks fufonk Lohd`r vFkok vLohd`r djus dk vf/kdkj lqjfZ{kr jgsxkA 27- N0x0 uxj ikfyd fuxe vf/kfu;e 1956 (vpy laifRRk varj.k fu;e ) 1994 ykxw gksxkA” 14 It is also apposite to notice here Section 80 of the Act, 1956 which empowers the competent authority to approve the transfer of property of Municipal Corporation, which reads as under: “80. Provisions governing the disposal of municipal property or property vesting in or under the management of Corporation. (1) No streets, lands, public places, drains or irrigation channels shall be sold, leased or otherwise alienated, save in accordance with such rules, as may be made in this behalf. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section -(1) (a) the Commissioner may, in his discretion, grant a lease of any immovable property belonging to the Corporation, including any right of fishing or of gathering and taking fruit, flowers and the 12 like, of which the premium or rent, or both, as the case may be, does not exceed five hundred rupees for any period not exceeding twelve months at a time : Provided that every such lease granted by the Commissioner, other than the lease of the class in respect of which the Mayor-in-Council has by resolution exempted the Commissioner from compliance with the requirements of this proviso, shall be reported by him to the Mayor-in-Council within 15 days after the same has been granted; (b) with the sanction of the Mayor-in-Council, the Commissioner may by sale or otherwise grant a lease of immovable property including any such right as aforesaid, for any period not exceeding three years at a time of which the premium or rent or both, as the case may be, for any one year does not exceed three thousand rupees; (c)with the sanction of the Corporation the Commissioner may lease, sell or otherwise convey any immovable property belonging to the Corporation. (3)The Commissioner may- (a) in his discretion dispose of by sale, letting out on hire or otherwise, any movable properly belonging to the Corporation not exceeding five hundred rupees in value; (b) with the sanction of Mayor-in-Council, dispose of by sale, letting out on hire, or otherwise any movable property belonging to the Corporation not exceeding five thousand rupees in value; (c) with the sanction of the Corporation, sell, let out on hire or otherwise convey any movable property belonging to the Corporation. (4) The sanction of the Mayor-in-Council or of the Corporation under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) may be given either generally for any class of cases or specifically in any particular case. (5)The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to every disposal of property belonging to the Corporation made under or for the purpose of this Act : Provided that- (i) no property vesting in the Corporation in trust shall be leased, sold or otherwise conveyed in a manner that is likely to pre- judicially affect the purpose of the trust subject to which such property is held; (ii) no land value of which may be prescribed shall be sold or otherwise conveyed without the previous sanction of the Government and every sale, or other conveyance of property vesting in the Corporation shall be deemed to be subject to the 13 conditions and limitations imposed by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force.” 15 The State Govt. issued a circular dated 10.04.2017 with respect to issuance of tender and fixing of timeline. According to the timeline fixed by the State Govt., the first call was to be provided minimum 20 days time between floating of tender and opening of bid. In the the present case the tender was floated on 05.07.2023 and last date for submission of bid was 24.07.2023 at 4 PM and opening date of tender was 24.07.2023 at 5:15 PM which is less than 20 days time as provided vide letter dated 10.01.2017 issued by the State (Annexure R -2/3). Considering these discrepancies, the Collector declined to accord approval of the tender process and allotment of plots in favour of the petitioners. 16 The law on the subject matter is settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Others Vs. Om Prakash Sharma, 2013(5)SCC182 wherein it has been held that acceptance of the highest bid does not result in a concluded contract unless all conditions prescribed are fulfilled. In paragraph 30, 36 and 41 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “30. In support of the said proposition, learned senior counsel for the defendant, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi has also placed reliance upon another decision of this Court in State of U.P vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh (supra). The learned senior counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Rajasthan Housing Board case (supra) which reads as under: “9. This being the settled legal position, the respondent acquired no right to claim that the auction be concluded in its favour and the High Court clearly erred in entertaining the writ petition and in not only issuing a direction for consideration of the representation but also issuing a 14 further direction to the appellant to issue a demand note of the balance amount. The direction relating to issuance of the demand note for balance amount virtually amounted to confirmation of the auction in favour of the respondent which was not the function of the High Court.” The law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid paragraph in support of the proposition of law that so long as an order regarding final acceptance of the bid had not been passed by the Chairman of the Housing Board, the highest bidder acquire no vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour and the auction proceedings could always be cancelled. Further, he has placed reliance on another decision of this Court in the case of Laxmikant referred to supra . In support of the proposition of law this Court has rightly pointed out that the ‘State’ or the Authority, which can be held to be a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, is not bound to accept the highest tender/offer or bid and the Government could validly retain its power to accept or reject the highest bid in the interest of public revenue. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the State of Orissa vs. Harinarayan Jaiswal case (supra), relevant paragraph of which reads as under: “13. Even apart from the power conferred on the Government under Sections 22 and 29, we fail to see how the power retained by the Government under clause (6) of its order, dated January 6, 1971, can be considered as unconstitutional. As held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha case, one of the important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. Excise revenue forms an important part of every State's revenue. The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. Hence quite naturally, the Legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue. It is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of contravention of Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 can arise in these cases. The Government's power to sell the exclusive privileges set out in Section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that those privileges could be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate. There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was 15 open to the bidders to withdraw their bids — see Union of India v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram[13]. By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights. The fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government—nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights. The High Court was wholly wrong in thinking that purpose of Sections 22 and 29 of the Act was not to raise revenue. Raising revenue as held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha vs.The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer & Ors’ case was one of the important purposes of such provisions. The fact that the price fetched by the sale of country liquor is an excise revenue does not change the nature of the right. The sale in question is but a mode of raising revenue. Assuming that the question of arbitrary or unguided power can arise in a case of this nature, it should not be forgotten that the power to accept or reject the highest bid is given to the highest authority in the State i.e. the Government which is expected to safeguard the finances of the State. Such a power cannot be considered as an arbitrary power. If that power is exercised for any collateral purposes, the exercise of the power will be struck down. It may also be remembered that herein we are not dealing with a delegated power but with a power conferred by the Legislature. The High Court erroneously thought that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders. The High Court was not sitting on appeal against the order made by the Government. The inference of the Government that there was a collusion among the bidders may be right or wrong. But that was not open to judicial review so long as it is not proved that it was a make-believe one. The real opinion formed by the Government was that the price fetched was not adequate. That conclusion is taken on the basis of Government expectations. The conclusion reached by the Government does not affect any one's rights. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court misapplied the ratio of the decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. Company Law Board and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.T. Agarwal.” (emphasis supplied) 36. It is an undisputed fact that the final bid has not been accepted by the third defendant. This is borne out from the 16 letters dated 26.5.1977 and 8.7.1977. Further, even assuming that the Assistant Housing Commissioner had the authority to supervise and conduct the public auction and the authority to accept the final bid of the plaintiff in relation to the plot which was auctioned on 11.3.1977, it is also an undisputed fact that he did not accept the bid of the plaintiff in writing and communicated the same to him. Therefore, there is no concluded contract in favour of the plaintiff in relation to the offer made by him, whose offer is highest in public auction held on 11.3.1977. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff seeking for declaratory relief as prayed in the plaint is wholly misconceived and is not maintainable in law. Thus, the judgment and order passed by the second appellate court is wholly unsustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 41. The substantial questions framed by the court in the second appeal did not arise for its consideration. The High Court ought to have noticed that the legal right claimed by the plaintiff seeking relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act on the basis of the pleadings is wholly untenable in law. In view of the fact that no legal right accrued in his favour in the absence of a concluded contract which was said to have existed by mere offering of highest bid in relation to the property in question to obtain the property on lease for a period of 90 years amounting to disposal of the property of the first defendant being an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution, no right was accrued upon the bidder in relation to the property in question………” 17 In Rajasthan Housing Board and Another Vs. G.S. Investments and Another, 2007(1)SCC477, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that highest bidder does not acquire any vested right to have the bid accepted merely because he has offered the highest bid, and in paragraph 8 & 9 it was observed that: “8. The auction notice dated 3.2.2002 contained a condition to the effect that the Chairman of the Housing Board shall have the final authority regarding acceptance of the bid. The second auction notice issued on 19.2.2002 mentioned that the conditions of the auction will be same as mentioned in the earlier auction notice. In view of this condition in auction notice it is obvious that a person who had made the highest bid in the auction did not acquire any right to have the auction concluded in his favour until the Chairman of the Housing Board had passed an order to that effect. Of course the Chairman of the Housing Board could not exercise his power in an arbitrary manner but so long as an order regarding final acceptance of the bid had not been passed by the Chairman, the highest bidder 17 acquired no vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour and the auction proceedings could always be cancelled. What are the rights of an auction bidder has been considered in several decisions of this Court. However, we will refer to only one such decision, viz., Laxmikant vs. Satyawan 1996 (4) SCC 208 which is almost identical on facts as it related to auction of a plot by Nagpur Improvement Trust. The auction notice in this case contained a condition that the acceptance of the highest bid shall depend upon the Board of Trustees and further the person making the highest bid shall have no right to take back his bid and the decision of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees regarding acceptance or rejection of the bid shall be binding on the said person. After taking note of the aforesaid conditions it was held:- "From a bare reference to the aforesaid conditions, it is apparent and explicit that even if the public auction had been completed and the respondent was the highest bidder, no right had accrued to him till the confirmation letter had been issued to him. The conditions of the auction clearly conceived and contemplated that the acceptance of the highest bid by the Board of Trustees was a must and the Trust reserved the right to itself to reject the highest or any bid. This Court has examined the right of the highest bidder at public auctions in the cases of Trilochan Mishra, etc. v. State of Orissa (1971) 3 SCC 153, State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal (1972) 2 SCC 36, Union of India v. Mis. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram (1969) 3 SCC 146 and State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh (1982) 2 SCC 365. It has been repeatedly pointed out that State or the authority which can be held to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution is not bound to accept the highest tender or bid. The acceptance of the highest bid is subject to the conditions of holding the public auction and the right of the highest bidder has to be examined in context with the different conditions under which such auction has been held. In the present case no right had accrued to the respondent either on the basis of the statutory provision under Rule 4(3) or under the conditions of the sale which had been notified before the public auction was held." 9. This being the settled legal position, the respondent acquired no right to claim that the auction be concluded in its favour and the High Court clearly erred in entertaining the writ petition and in not only issuing a direction for consideration of the representation but also issuing a further direction to the appellant to issue a demand note of the balance amount. The direction relating to issuance of the demand note for balance amount virtually amounted to confirmation of the auction in 18 favour of the respondent which was not the function of the High Court.” 18 Further, in State of Orissa & Others Vs. Harinarayan Jaiswal & Others, 1972(2)SCC36, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 13 as under : “13. Even apart from the power conferred on the Government under ss. 22 and 29, we fail to see how the power retained by the Government under cl. (6) of its order dated January 6, 1971 can be considered as unconstitutional. As held by this Court in Cooverjee Bharucha's case (supra), one of the important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. Excise revenue forms an important part of every State's revenue. The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. Hence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue. It is for the. Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of contravention of Art. 19(1)(g) or Art. 14 can arise in these cases. The Government's power to sell the exclusive privileges set out in s. 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that those privileges could be sold by public auction. Public actions are held to get the best possible price. 'Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be, no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate.- There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids-see Union of India and ors. v. M/s. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram (2) . By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights. The fact that the Government was the seller does not change legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Art. 19(1)(g) or Art. 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government, nor can there be any infringement of Art. 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights. The High Court was wholly wrong in thinking that purpose of ss. 22 and 29 of the Act was not to raise revenue. Raising revenue as held by this Court in Cooverjee Bharucha's case (supra) was one of the important purposes of such provisions. The fact that the price fetched by the sale of country liquor is an excise revenue does not change 19 the nature of the right. The sale in question is but a mode of raising revenue. Assuming that the question of arbitrary or unguided power can arise in a case of this nature, it should not be forgotten that the power to accept or reject the highest bid is given to the highest authority in the State i.e. the Government which is expected to safeguard the finances of the State. Such a power cannot be considered as an arbitrary power. If that power is exercised for any collateral purposes, the exercise of the power will be struck down. It may also be remembered that herein we are not dealing with a delegated power but with a power conferred by the legislature. The High Court erroneously thought that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders. The High Court was not sitting on appeal against the order made by the Government. The inference of the Government that there was a collusion among the bidders may be right or wrong. But that was not open to judicial review so long as it is not proved that it was a make- believe one. The real opinion formed by the Government was that the price fetched was not adequate. That conclusion is taken on the basis of Government expectations. The conclusion reached by the. Government does not affect any one's rights. Hence, in our opinion the High Court misapplied the ratio of the decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and anr. v. Company Law Board and ors. and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. T. Agarwal.” 19 Though the petitioners contended that cancellation order does not disclose detail reasons and that there was a considerable delay in taking a final decision, such circumstances by itself cannot confer a substantive right to seek allotment of the plots which is a public property. The material available on record demonstrate that proposal did not get mandatory approval of the competent authority as required under Section 80 of the Act, 1956. Once such approval is declined, no concluded contract came into existence between the parties. 20 Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Motors Limited Vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking, 2023 SCC Online SC 671 has emphasized that judicial review in contractual and tender matters is confined to examine the decision making process and the court would not substitute its own view unless 20 the action is shown to be patent arbitrary, malafide or against the public interest. In paragraph 52 to 54 it was observed as under : “52. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Others. 53. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. 54. As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Others, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public 21 interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.” 21 In view of the aforesaid discussions, this court is of the considered opinion that no ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been made out by the petitioners. The petitioners have failed to establish any enforceable legal right to compel allotment of subject plots or execution of registered deed in their favour. The challenge to the impugned communication dated 10.01.2025, therefore deserves to be and is hereby rejected. Consequently, all the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. 22 Since the petitioners have deposited their amount with the respondent Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, and the same is also not disputed by the Corporation and they expressed their willingness to refund the amount deposited by the respective petitioners, and also the fact that allotment of plots have not attained its finality, the petitioners are entitled for refund of their amount along with accrued interest since date of its deposit. 23 Accordingly, while dismissing all the four writ petitions, the petitioners are held entitled for refund of their deposited amount along with interest @ 7 percent per annum till its realization. Let all these exercise be done by the respondents at the earliest. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder