2026:HHC:39587 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CWP No. 3317 of 2025 Decided on: 16.9.2026 ________________________________________________________ Balwant Singh Khimta and Anr. ………..Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others ….Respondents ________________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioners : Mr. Ashok Kumar Verma, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Anoop Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Mr. B.C. Verma, Additional Advocates General & Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. ________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge (oral): By way of instant petition, petitioners have prayed for following main reliefs: “a) That the respondents may kindly be directed to initiate the land acquisition proceedings on account of the land of petitioners used for the construction/upgradation of the road namely Khadapatthar-Patsari, measuring 0/0 to 19/00 Kms. and publish the notification under section 11 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 immediately in the interest of justice.” 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2026:HHC:39587 2 2. Precisely, the grouse of petitioners as has been highlighted in grounds of petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ashok Kumar Verma, learned counsel representing the petitioners is that despite there being utilization of the land belonging to the petitioners for construction of Khadapatthar-Patsari road measuring 0/0 to 19/0 kms, they have not been paid adequate compensation by the respondents while initiating proceedings under Land Acquisition Act. Land of the petitioners comprised in Khata Khatoni No. 63, 60, 69 and 65/62, Khasra No. 553 area measuring 00-01-44 hectare, 554 area measuring 00-38-89 hectare and 558 area measuring 00-14-27 hectare belonging to petitioner No. 1, Khatoni No. 122, Khasra No. 136 area measuring 00-07-81 hectare, Khatoni No. 116, Khasra No. 137 area measuring 00-16-17 hectare, Khasra No. 138 area measuring 00-02-58 hectare, Khasra No. 139 area measuring 00-01-55 hectare belonging to petitioner No. 2 situate at Mauza Astandali, Tehsil Jubbal, District Shimla, came to be acquired in year 1985 for construction of road as detailed hereinabove, but fact remains that till date, no steps whatsoever, came to be taken at the behest of respondents for acquisition of land, as a result thereof, petitioners have not been paid compensation till date and as such, they are compelled to approach this Court in the instant proceedings, praying for the relief as reproduced hereinabove. 3. Pursuant to notice issued in instant proceedings, respondents have filed reply, wherein facts as have been noticed hereinabove are not in dispute, rather stand duly admitted. 2026:HHC:39587 3 4. Claim of the petitioners has been attempted to be refuted by the respondents on ground that present petition is barred by delay and laches and land was made available by the petitioners of their own volition with clear cut understanding that they would not seek any compensation. 5. Learned counsel representing petitioners vehemently argued that once it is not in dispute that land of the petitioners stands utilized for construction of road in question, respondents cannot escape from their liability to pay the compensation after initiating proceedings in terms of provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act. He further submitted that no document worth credence has been placed on record so as to substantiate fact that land in question was ever provided by the petitioners to respondents with understanding that they shall not ask for any compensation after construction of road. While making this Court peruse judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that plea of delay and laches cannot be raised in the case of continuing cause of action, especially in land acquisition matters. He also invited attention of this court to judgment dated 27.7.2023 passed in CWP No. 5928 of 2022 in Vir Sain v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors,, wherein, admittedly, this Court, having taken note of the judgments passed in Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra, supra, negated the plea of delay and laches raised by the respondent-State. While referring to 2026:HHC:39587 4 communication dated nil issued under signatures of Executive Engineer, B&R Division, HPPWD Jubbal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though on one hand respondents in their reply have stated that they are ready and willing to return the land, but on the other hand, notice has been issued to M/s BLN Infra Private Limited for upgradation of Khadapatthar-Patsari road under PMGSY-III package No. HP09-712, meaning thereby, road in question constructed upon the land of the petitioners is not in existence, but has been further upgraded by the respondent-State for benefit of public at large. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, while fairly admitting the use of the land belonging to the petitioners for construction of the road stated that though there is no written document suggestive of the fact that land was utilized with the consent of the petitioners, but having taken note of the fact that petitioners remained silent for more than three decades, this Court can infer and presume that there was an implied consent on the part of the petitioners for construction of the road without there being compensation. While making this court peruse judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shankar Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No. 1966 of 2010, decided on 2.3.2013, Mr. Kahol, contended that that appropriate remedy for redressal of grievance as raised in the instant petition is to approach the civil court by way of civil suit. He also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, 1995 (4) SCC 683, to state that claim being highly stale deserves outright rejection. 2026:HHC:39587 5 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that land of the petitioners was utilized for construction of the road as detailed herein above in the year 1985, but at no point of time, acquisition proceedings were initiated, as a result of which, no compensation was paid to the petitioners. Though, it has been claimed by the respondents that there was consent on the part of the petitioners for utilization of the land for construction of the road, but there is no documentary evidence, if any, available on record. 8. Though Mr. Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General attempted to carve out a case that there was an oral consent, but such plea of his cannot be accepted simply on the ground that petition at hand has been filed after three decades of use of the land. Otherwise also, plea of delay and laches raised by the petitioners is not available to them in light of judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra's cases supra. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that plea of delay and laches cannot be raised in case of continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court, it can always condone the delay to do substantial justice. Most importantly, in the aforesaid judgment, it has been held that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case and while doing so, there is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. It has been 2026:HHC:39587 6 further held that forcible dispossession of a person from his private property without following due process of law, is violative of both human right and constitutional right under Article 300-A. 9. Crux of the aforesaid judgments is that land owners cannot be deprived of the property without due process of law, if it is so, ground raised by the respondents that land of the petitioners was made available with his consent is of no consequence, rather this Court having taken note of the fact that land of the petitioners already stands utilized, is compelled to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that they are entitled to compensation qua the land used by the respondents for construction of the road. 10. 10. Though, in the case at hand, learned Additional Advocate General invited attention of this court to judgment dated 24.2.2023, passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1278 of 2023, State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors V. Rajiv and Anr., but having perused the same, this Court finds that same is not applicable in the case at hand because in the aforesaid judgment, it has been nowhere stated/ruled that claim raised for acquisition and compensation after delay cannot be considered, rather in the aforesaid case, claimants were not held entitled to interest under the Land Acquisition Act from the date of notification under Section 4 till the filing of the writ petition. Since in the case at hand, no notification under Section 4 has been issued till date, ruling, if any, given in the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court has no application in the present case. In the instant case, land of the petitioners has been utilized for construction of 2026:HHC:39587 7 the road in the year, 1990 without paying compensation. Despite there being repeated requests, respondents have failed to initiate acquisition proceedings, as a result of which, great prejudice has been caused to the petitioners. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of the following paras of the judgment passed in Vidya Devi, supra: “10.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 10.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that: “ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a 2026:HHC:39587 8 public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied) In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that: “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied) In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property."Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied) In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat this Court held as follows : “48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her 2026:HHC:39587 9 payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 10.4. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 10.5. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.8 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension. 10.6. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 10.7. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a 2026:HHC:39587 10 continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors., this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)” 11. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sukhdutt Ratra’s cases (supra). “23. This Court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical set of facts and circumstances – rejected the 2026:HHC:39587 11 contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State: “12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn., wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.” 24. And with regards to the contention of delay and laches, this court went on to hold: “12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 2026:HHC:39587 12 12.13 In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case. 26. In view of the above discussion, in view of this court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State is hereby directed to treat the subject lands as a deemed acquisition and appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants in the same terms as the order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005 in Land Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 (and consolidated matters). The Respondent-State is directed, consequently to ensure that the appropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the compensation, and disburses it to the appellants, within four months from today. The appellants would also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium, and interest on all sums payable under law w.e.f 16.10.2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act), till the date of the impugned judgment, i.e. 12.09.2013.” 12. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute that petitioners are suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate acquisition proceedings. 2026:HHC:39587 13 13. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of judgment passed by Full Bench of this Court in LPA No. 33 of 2021 alongwith Execution Petition No. 17 of 2019, titled State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sita Ram, wherein reference made to Full Bench came to be answered in the affirmative that, “a person, whose land has been utilized for construction of road under PMGSY is entitled for compensation, unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, that land was donated or given by the land owner willingly, of his own free will and consent, for construction of such road”. It would be apt to take note of following paras of the aforesaid judgment: “31. In Shankar Dass, the Full Bench relied on the Three Judge Bench judgment of Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Versus Digambar, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 683, where filing of writ petition with enormous delay and latches on the part of a citizen on the alleged infraction of his legal right against the State, seeking a direction to initiate acquisition proceedings for their land of which possession was taken long time ago, was held to be fatal. It was held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, being power of discretion, could not be entertained with blameworthy conduct of the petitioner of such undue delay or laches, acquiescence or waiver inapproaching the Court. The Full Bench also relied on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Bhailal Bhai, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006, in which it was held “that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured.” Delay and how far ratio of Shankar Dass would hold field in view of later judgments of the Supreme Court are not the questions for us to examine and answer. In view of the terms of reference 2026:HHC:39587 14 made by the Division Bench, which does not include the question of delay, we have to confine our examination to the limited scope, whether a person whose land has been utilized for construction of road under PMGSY is entitled to compensation. 32. In view of above, the question referred to by the Division Bench, is, therefore, answered in the affirmative that a person whose land has been utilized for construction of road under PMGSY is entitled to compensation unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the land was voluntarily donated or given by him willingly with free will and consent for construction of such road.” 14. In the aforesaid case, specific reference was made to Full Court, “Whether a person(s) whose land(s) has been utilized for construction of road under ‘PMGSY’ is entitled to compensation?” While answering aforesaid reference, Full Bench though held that a person whose land has been utilized for construction of road under PMGSY is entitled to compensation unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the land was voluntarily donated or given by him willingly with free will and consent for construction of such road. 15. 15. Since in the case there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the land was ever donated or gifted by petitioners of their own free will for construction of road under PMGSY, plea of learned Additional Advocate General that person cannot claim compensation qua the land utilized for construction of road under PMGSY, deserves outright rejection. 16. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that entire 2026:HHC:39587 15 State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area and without workable roads, no communication is possible; every person is entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India; every person has right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life itself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a policy for providing roads on demand of residents as a favour to them on conditions that they would not claim compensation, cannot be sustained because such stand is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India 17. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust vs State of Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though right to property is not a fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a human right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person can be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. No doubt, State possesses the power to take or control the property of the owner of the land for the benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged to compensate the injury by making just compensation. 18. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds merit in the present petition and accordingly same is allowed with direction to the respondents to initiate acquisition proceedings within four weeks under the relevant statute vis-à-vis land of the petitioners and thereafter, just and fair compensation qua the same be awarded to 2026:HHC:39587 16 the petitioners. Since petitioners have been fighting for their rightful claim for years together, this Court hopes and trusts that authority concerned would do the needful expeditiously, preferably, within three months. In the aforesaid terms, present petition is disposed of alongwith pending applications, if any. (Sandeep Sharma) Judge September 16, 2026 (manjit)