1 2026:CGHC:25931 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 475 of 2018 Amar Singh S/o Late Gyan Singh, Aged About 88 Years R/o Village Jhalap, Tahsil Mahasamund, District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Devanand Nayak S/o Rajgulapi Nayak Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Jhalap, Tahsil Mahasamund, District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 2 - Kriparam S/o Madhuban Shahni Aged About 58 Years R/o Village Jhalap Tahsil Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate For Respondent(s) : None (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Judgment on Board 24.06.2026 1. Heard on admission. 2. The parties shall be referred to as per their original status before the learned Trial Court. 3. This second appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "CPC"), assailing the legality, correctness and validity of the judgment and decree dated 29.06.2018 passed by the learned HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2026.06.27 11:34:05 +0530 2 District Judge, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (C.G.) (for short ‘learned First Appellate Court’) in Civil Appeal No. H-18A/2017. 4. By the impugned judgment and decree, the first appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 96 of the CPC was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 21.07.2017 passed by the learned 2nd Civil Judge, Class-I, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (C.G.) (for short ‘learned Trial Court’) in Civil Suit No. 231/2014 were affirmed. 5. The facts of the case in a nutshell is that the plaintiff/appellant instituted a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property comprising a part of Khasra No. 686 admeasuring 1250 sq. ft. recorded as Abadi land situated at Village Jhalap, Patwari Halka No. 13, RIC Patewa, District Mahasamund (C.G.). He pleaded that during his lifetime, his father- Gyan Singh had purchased a portion of agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 428/02 admeasuring 0.30 acre from Madhuban and Ramprasad by a registered sale deed dated 13.05.1968. Thereafter, on 17.08.1983 the plaintiff purchased a portion of Abadi land bearing Khasra No. 424/01 admeasuring 0.41 acre from Kriparam son of Madhuban, Madhuban son of Tiko and Narayan son of Daulat by a registered sale deed. It was further pleaded that since the dates of purchase, the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest remained in peaceful possession of the said lands. During the settlement proceedings conducted in Village Jhalap, the Khasra numbers of the aforesaid lands were changed and came to be recorded under Khasra No. 686 admeasuring 1.46 hectares and classified as Abadi land. According to the plaintiff, the lands purchased under the registered sale deeds dated 13.05.1968 and 17.08.1983 formed part of the newly recorded Khasra No. 686. It was further pleaded that no person other than the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. However, on 15.10.2006, 3 Defendant No. 2, by allegedly fabricating and manipulating a resolution purportedly passed by the Gram Sabha, Jhalap, got his name entered in the revenue records through the concerned Halka Patwari and thereafter sold the suit property to Defendant No. 1 by a registered sale deed dated 23.07.2007. It was contended that Defendant No. 2 had no right, title, or interest in the suit property and, therefore, the sale deed executed in favour of Defendant No. 1 did not confer any valid title upon him. Alleging interference with his possession by Defendant No. 1, the plaintiff filed the present suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction. 6. Defendant No. 1 filed his written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint. It was pleaded that Defendant No. 2 was in possession of the property and had validly sold the same to him through a registered sale deed. It was further pleaded that Defendant No. 1 is in lawful possession of the suit property. 7. Defendant No. 2 also filed a written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiff's claim relates to Abadi land recorded under a new Khasra number during settlement proceedings and, therefore, the dispute essentially concerns correction of entries made during settlement operations. As such, the plaintiff was not entitled to seek a declaration of title in the manner claimed. It was further pleaded that Defendant No. 2 is the owner of the suit land situated in Village Jhalap. The plaintiff had earlier instituted Civil Suit No. 13-A/1998 before the competent Court which was dismissed. Therefore, the present suit was not maintainable and was barred by law. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues for determination. 4 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of declaration declaring that he is the owner of the suit property shown in red colour in Schedule “A” annexed to the plaint? “Not Proved.” 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the suit property?| “Not Proved.” 3. Relief and costs. “Suit Dismissed” 9. Respective parties led their evidence to prove their pleadings. 10. Upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred a first appeal before the learned First Appellate Court which was also dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, the present appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts below have failed to properly appreciate the evidence available on record. It is contended that the findings recorded on Issues No. 1 and 2 are perverse and contrary to the evidence. He further submits that the suit property had been purchased by the plaintiff through registered sale deeds executed in the years 1968 and 1983. Merely because the Khasra numbers were changed during settlement proceedings, Defendant No. 2 took advantage of the situation and illegally transferred the suit property to Defendant No. 1, despite having no right or title therein, Defendant No. 1 also acquired no valid title over the suit property. He further submits that the plaintiff has remained in possession of the suit property and, therefore, the rejection of the relief of permanent injunction is unsustainable in law. Learned counsel also submits that the substantial questions of law proposed in the memorandum of appeal arise for 5 consideration. He further submits that the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC before the First Appellate Court was illegally rejected. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 13. Issue No. 1 was framed by the learned Trial Court with regard to the plaintiff's entitlement to a decree of declaration of title in respect of the property described in Schedule-A of the plaint. Upon consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, particularly concerning the sale deed executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 1, the learned Trial Court recorded a categorical finding that the property comprising a part of Khasra No. 686 admeasuring 1250 sq. ft. was in possession of Defendant No. 2 and had been validly sold to Defendant No. 1. With regard to the plaintiff's contention that portions of old Khasra Nos. 424/01 and 428/02 were subsequently included in Khasra No. 686, the learned Trial Court found that the plaintiff had failed to produce any renumbering list, settlement record, revenue document or Khasra entries establishing that the suit property forming part of Khasra No. 686 corresponded to the lands purchased under the sale deeds relating to Khasra Nos. 424/01 and 428/02. Consequently, on appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish his title over the suit property described in Schedule-A and accordingly dismissed the suit. 14. The learned First Appellate Court upon re-appreciation of the evidence, concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. The findings recorded by both the Courts below are essentially findings of fact based upon proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. This Court does not 6 find any perversity, illegality or misreading of evidence warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. 15. Another argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC was wrongly rejected by the learned First Appellate Court. It is submitted that the documents sought to be produced as additional evidence were important for deciding the dispute effectively. 16. A perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that the learned First Appellate Court considered the application in detail and examined the conditions under which additional evidence may be permitted under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Upon such consideration, the Court found that the requirements of the said provision were not satisfied and, therefore, rejected the application by assigning cogent and valid reasons. 17. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned First Appellate Court has not committed any error in rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Furthermore, the findings recorded by both the Courts below are findings of fact based upon appreciation of evidence and do not give rise to any substantial question of law. 18. It is well settled that for admission of a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, formulation of a substantial question of law is sine qua non, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1314 and in the matter of Chandrabhan (Deceased) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Saraswati & Ors. reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273. In the present case, no substantial question of law arises for consideration. 7 19. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. All pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. Decree be drawn. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE H. Ansari