2026:HHC:39638 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 514 of 2026 Reserved on: 10.9.2026 Decided on: 17.9.2026 Jagdish Chand & ors. …. Petitioners Versus State of HP & ors. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Ankit Dhiman, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 and 2/State : Mr. Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 7 of 2026, dated 23.1.2026, registered at Police Station Kasauli, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 191(2), 351(2), and 352 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Madan Lal, made a complaint to 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39638 the police that he was returning to his home on 14.1.2026, at about 8:00 PM. Jagdish Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Rajender Kumar, Baldev, and Ram Chand stopped him on the way and told him that he could not proceed further because the land belonged to them. They also abused the informant and threatened to kill him. Chaman Lal, Sonu, Paramjeet, Praveen, Prem Lata, Satya, Meena, Deepika, and Sheela Devi also came to the spot and abused the informant. The informant thought that the matter would be sorted out at the village level; however, an FIR was registered against the informant and he wanted that action should be taken against the accused. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the petitioners are respectable and peace-loving citizens belonging to reputed families of the locality. The informant is a retired Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and he enjoys considerable influence within the police machinery. The informant misused his official position, influence, and personal contact to falsely implicate the petitioners. The informant has levelled false allegations against the petitioners. The informant lodged the FIR as a counter-blast to FIR No. 5 of 2026 to harass the petitioners. 3 2026:HHC:39638 The entire incident was videographed, and the video recording clearly depicts the falsity of the allegations. The petitioners had lodged an FIR against the informant and other persons before the registration of the present FIR. The informant had also mentioned in his FIR that he could not report the matter earlier because he thought that the matter would be sorted out at the village level. Several petitioners are senior citizens who are suffering from old age-related ailments and medical complications, and the continuation of the proceedings would cause harassment to them. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the police investigated the matter. The notices were served upon the petitioners under Section 35(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). The challan was prepared against the petitioners, which is pending scrutiny in the office of the Assistant District Attorney. There is a dispute between the informant and the petitioners over the construction of the road. Both the parties levelled allegations against each other. An FIR 4 2026:HHC:39638 No. 5 of 2026 was registered against the informant and other persons, which was investigated, and charge-sheet was filed against seven persons before Gram Panchayat, Chandi on 28.2.2026. Hence, the status report. 5. I have heard Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent Nos. 1 and 2/State. 6. Mr. Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. The petitioners have not committed any offence. They had lodged an FIR against the informant and other persons, and the present FIR was registered by the informant when he came to know about the registration of FIR against him. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioners amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 7. Mr. Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent Nos. 1 and 2/State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR prima facie show the commission of cognizable 5 2026:HHC:39638 offences. The police investigated the matter and found sufficient reasons to prepare the challan. The challan is pending scrutiny before the learned Assisant District Attorney. The petitioners have a remedy of approaching the learned Trial Court for seeking their discharge, and this Court should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it to quash the FIR and the consequential criminal proceedings. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the 6 2026:HHC:39638 inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is 7 2026:HHC:39638 sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 8 2026:HHC:39638 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioners gathered and prevented the informant from proceeding further 9 2026:HHC:39638 in his vehicle. They abused the informant and threatened to kill him. These allegations prima facie show the commission of cognizable offences. 13. It was submitted that allegations made against the petitioners are false; however, this submission will not help the petitioners. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 14. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to 10 2026:HHC:39638 the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 11 2026:HHC:39638 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 16. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 12 2026:HHC:39638 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 17. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 18. It was submitted that the petitioners had lodged FIR No. 5 of 2026 against the informant, and the informant had lodged an FIR against the petitioners as a counter-blast. This submission will not help the petitioners. It is for the learned Trial Court to find out which version is correct, and it cannot be presumed at this stage that the FIR lodged by the petitioners is correct because it was lodged earlier. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from the registration of the FIR against the informant. 13 2026:HHC:39638 19. It was submitted that the relationship between the parties is strained, and a false FIR was lodged against the petitioners. This submission will not help the petitioners. Enmity is a double-edged weapon; while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime. It is for the learned Trial Court to find out, after the appreciation of the evidence, whether any offence was made out against the petitioners or not. 20. It was submitted that the FIR lodged by the petitioners has been sent to the Gram Panchayat, whereas the charge-sheet has been prepared against the petitioners, which is pending scrutiny. This submission will not help the petitioners. The charge-sheet has to be scrutinized even if it is to be filed before the Gram Panchayat, and merely because the charge- sheet is under scrutiny, cannot mean that the same cannot be filed before the Gram Panchayat. Further, it would depend upon the nature of the offences disclosed after the commission of the offences whether the charge-sheet is to be filed. If the offences cognizable by Gram Panchayat are found, the charge-sheet would be filed before the Gram Panchayat, and if the offences triable by the learned Magistrate are disclosed, the charge-sheet 14 2026:HHC:39638 would be filed before the learned Magistrate. Therefore, not much can be made out from the filing of the charge-sheet before the Magistrate or the Gram Panchayat. 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 23. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th September, 2026 (Chander)