1 2026:CGHC:25761 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 693 of 2026 1 - Tulsiram Son Of Late Raghunath Jaiswal, Aged About 70 Years Resident Of Ward No. 03, Kushalnagar, Sarangarh, District- Sarangarh- Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Madhuri Wife Of Late Janakram Jaiswal Aged About 56 Years Resident Of Ward No. 03, Kushalnagar, Sarangarh, District- Sarangarh- Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh. 2 - Vidhyashankar, Son Of Late Janakram Jaiswal Aged About 31 Years Resident Of Ward No. 03, Kushalnagar, Sarangarh, District- Sarangarh- Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh. 3 - Parul, Son Of Late Janakram Jaiswal Aged About 30 Years Resident Of Ward No. 03, Kushalnagar, Sarangarh, District- Sarangarh- Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Sarangarh, District- Sarangarh- Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ravi Kumar Banjare, Advocate 2 For Respondent No.4/State : Ms. Isha Jajodiya, PL (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Order on Board 23/06/2026 Heard. 2. The present petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India calling in question the legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 27.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.03/2026, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 31.07.2025 passed by the learned Second Additional Judge to the Court of First Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sarangarh in Civil Suit No.27-A/2024 has been affirmed. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the plaintiff before the learned trial Court and has instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property bearing Khasra No.486/1/?k/1, admeasuring 0.081 hectare, situated at Village Sarangarh, Tahsil Sarangarh, DistrictSarangarh-Bilaigarh. It is contended that the petitioner, being the Karta of the joint Hindu family, had acquired the subject property from the income and resources of the joint family. 4. It is further submitted that during the lifetime of late Janak Ram, a part of land admeasuring 0.145 hectare situated at Village Chingripali 3 was alienated to meet the legal necessities and requirements of the joint family. According to the petitioner, the husband of respondent No.1 had consented to the said transaction and had also received his share of the sale consideration. 5. Learned counsel would further submit that after the demise of late Janak Ram, the lands situated at Village Chingripali came to be mutated exclusively in the names of defendants No.1 to 3. Likewise, the suit property situated at Village Sarangarh has also been mutated in their names. It is contended that taking advantage of such revenue entries, defendants No.1 to 3 are making efforts to alienate the suit property and are negotiating with prospective purchasers. It is argued that if the respondents are permitted to transfer the property during the pendency of the suit proceedings, the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and injury which cannot be adequately compensated in monetary terms. Therefore, a prayer was made for restraining the respondents from alienating the suit property till final adjudication of the civil suit. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record. 7. Except the orders passed by the learned trial Court and the learned appellate Court, along with a copy of the memorandum of appeal, no other material document has been placed on record by the petitioner in support of the present writ petition. 8. From a careful perusal of the order dated 31.07.2025 passed by the learned trial Court, it appears that the petitioner's case is founded 4 on the assertion that the suit property constitutes joint family property and that respondent Nos.1 to 3 have got their names mutated exclusively in the revenue records after the death of his brother, late Janak Ram. On the other hand, the stand taken by respondent Nos.1 to 3 is that the land admeasuring 0.543 hectares situated at Village Chingripali was purchased by late Janak Ram from his independent income during his lifetime and, therefore, the same constituted his self- acquired property. Consequently, upon his demise, the names of respondent Nos.1 to 3 were lawfully entered in the revenue records. 9. The respondents have further denied the existence of any partition between the brothers of late Janak Ram and have specifically disputed the petitioner's claim of any right, title or interest over the suit property. The learned trial Court, after considering the pleadings of the parties, affidavits and the material placed on record, recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner had failed to establish the three essential ingredients for grant of temporary injunction, namely, the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury. The learned trial Court also took note of the fact that the respondents were in possession of the suit property and their names stood duly recorded in the revenue records. Consequently, the application seeking temporary injunction came to be rejected. 10. The said order was assailed before the learned appellate Court. However, upon an independent consideration of the material available on record, the learned appellate Court concurred with the findings 5 recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed the order rejecting the application for temporary injunction. 11. When the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently rejected the application filed by the plaintiff, the interference of this Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited as the Apex Court has dealt in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 in para 42 to 45 and 49 which reads as under: “42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonard Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222, (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan, (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand (1972) 1 SCC 898. 43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616 and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there 6 is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out: “38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case (supra), SCC pp. 695-96. 38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) * * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of 7 being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal 8 subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence 9 under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of 10 relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 12. In the case of Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181, the Apex Court has held in paragraphs Nos. 15 and 16 as under: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief 11 must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd, (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the contours of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are no longer res integra. The Apex Court in 12 Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, has held that the power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and not of appellate review. Interference is warranted only in cases of patent perversity, manifest miscarriage of justice or jurisdictional error. Similar principles have been reiterated in M/s Garments Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 INSC 37, wherein it has been held that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below ought not to be disturbed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction unless the findings are shown to be perverse or wholly unsustainable in law. 14. In the case at hand, no such exceptional circumstance has been brought to the notice of this Court. The petitioner has failed to make out any ground warranting exercise of the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the present writ petition. The writ petition, being devoid of substance and merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.06.27 11:48:35 +0530