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2026 DAILYLAW 2332 (RAJ)

MUKESH KUMAR S/O LATE SHRI MOHAN SINGH, v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

CRLMP/6551/2022 · 2026-04-15

Chandra Prakash Shrimali

Transfer Petitionbody2026

Judgment text

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[2026:RJ-JP:15060] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 6551/2022 Mukesh Kumar S/o Late Shri Mohan Singh, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Aman Mohalla, Mandi Atalbandh, Police Station Atal Bandh, District Bharatpur. ----Accused-Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan, through the Public Prosecutor. 2. Mahendra S/o Late Shri Gopal, Aged About 38 Years, R/o Village Rampura, Police Station Sewar, District Bharatpur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Nikhlesh Katara For Respondent(s) : Mr. Onkar singh Rajpurohit, PP Mr. Ambrish Vashishta Ms. Renu Pachouri HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI Order 1. Arguments Concluded On: 06.04.2026 2. Order Reserved On: 06.04.2026 3. Full Order/Operative Part Pronounced: Full Order 4. Pronounced On: 15.04.2026 1. The present criminal miscellaneous petition has been preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of FIR No. 609/2022 registered at Police Station Mathura Gate, District Bharatpur for the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. [2026:RJ-JP:15060] (2 of 7) [CRLMP-6551/2022] 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant-respondent Mahendra lodged the impugned FIR alleging that the petitioner-Mukesh Kumar, being the khatedar tenant of certain land, had executed an agreement to sell dated 15.09.2017 in favour of the complainant’s grandfather and had received a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- as advance consideration. It is alleged that despite repeated requests, the petitioner failed to execute the sale deed and thereby committed the offence of cheating. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. It is contended that the dispute, at its core, is purely of a civil nature arising out of an agreement to sell. It is further submitted that the petitioner was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and, in fact, had issued a notice to the complainant calling upon him to pay the remaining consideration and get the sale deed executed. However, the complainant-respondent failed to fulfill his contractual obligations. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant-respondent have opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioner has received a substantial amount and has failed to execute the sale deed, thereby prima facie attracting the ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC. It is, therefore, urged that the matter requires investigation [2026:RJ-JP:15060] (3 of 7) [CRLMP-6551/2022] and this Court ought not to exercise its inherent jurisdiction at this stage. 5. I have considered the submissions made at the Bar and have perused the material available on record. 6. The record reflects that the accused-petitioner, Mukesh, is stated to have issued a notice dated 16.05.2018 calling upon the complainant-respondent to comply with the agreement for sale allegedly executed on 15.09.2017 between the parties through the complainant’s grandfather. However, at the outset, it is significant to note that no documentary proof or receipt has been placed on record to establish that the said notice was ever served upon or received by the complainant-respondent Mahendra. 7. A further crucial aspect emerges from the agreement for sale itself, wherein the accused-petitioner had specifically undertaken to execute the final sale deed in favor of the complainant within a period of three months from the date of the agreement, i.e., 15.09.2017. In this backdrop, the issuance of the alleged notice after a lapse of approximately eight months, i.e., on 16.05.2018, assumes considerable importance. 8. Even if, for the sake of argument, the contention of the accused-petitioner is accepted that the complainant-respondent did not evince sufficient interest in getting the sale deed executed, the contractual obligation to complete the transaction within three months rested squarely upon the accused-petitioner. The failure to issue any notice or take steps within the stipulated period raises a [2026:RJ-JP:15060] (4 of 7) [CRLMP-6551/2022] substantial doubt regarding the bona-fides of the accused-petitioner. 9. Moreover, it is an admitted position, as recorded in the agreement dated 15.09.2017 and also reflected in the charge-sheet, that a sum of ₹20,00,000/- (Twenty Lakhs) was paid by the complainant-respondent through his grandfather, Shri Roop Singh, by way of RTGS from his account in Bharatpur Central Co-operative Bank bearing number 15004111110012875 to the account of the accused-petitioner maintained with Punjab National Bank bearing account number 7849000100022861. The balance amount of ₹6,50,000/- was agreed to be paid at the time of handing over possession and execution of the final sale deed. 10. The payment of such a substantial amount prima-facie demonstrates the readiness and willingness of the complainant-respondent to perform his part of the contract, as no prudent person would part with such a significant sum without intending to complete the transaction. This aspect, therefore, militates against the contention of the accused-petitioner that the complainant lacked intention to proceed with the sale. Hon’ble Supreme Court has in the case of “P.Ramasubbamma Vs. V.Vijayalakshmi and Others” 2022 [7] SCC 384 held as under; 9. Considering the fact that original Defendant 1—vendor original owner admitted the execution of agreement to sell dated 12- 4-2005 and even admitted the receipt of substantial advance sale consideration, the learned trial court decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 12-4-2005. Once the execution of agreement to sell and the payment/receipt of [2026:RJ-JP:15060] (5 of 7) [CRLMP-6551/2022] advance substantial sale consideration was admitted by the vendor, thereafter nothing further was required to be proved by the plaintiff vendee. Therefore, as such the learned trial court rightly decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell. The High Court was not required to go into the aspect of the execution of the agreement to sell and the payment/receipt of substantial advance sale consideration, once the vendor had specifically admitted the execution of the agreement to sell and receipt of the advance sale consideration; thereafter no further evidence and/or proof was required. 11. Additionally, during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer, while filing the charge-sheet, has found prima-facie material constituting offences under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC against the accused-petitioner. Sec.420 I.P.C reads as under; “420. Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine”. Sec 405 I.P.C reads as under; “405. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes off that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”. [2026:RJ-JP:15060] (6 of 7) [CRLMP-6551/2022] 12. It has come on record that the accused-petitioner was allegedly aware from the very inception that the land in question, being situated in Scheme No. 13 of the Nagar Vikas Nyas, Bharatpur, was not legally transferable, and also the petitioner is alleged to have kept ₹20,00,000/- of the complainant-respondent with himself in lieu of the agreement for sale of the disputed property, and hence, at this stage, it cannot be said that no offence under Section 420,406 IPC is made out against the petitioner. However, the veracity of this allegation shall, of course, be determined only during the course of trial. 13. Even if for once the argument raised by the petitioner is concerned that there was a lack of willingness on the part of the complainant-respondent to execute the agreement for sale, than also it was the responsibility of the petitioner to bestow upon the complainant a notice within a time period of 3 months from the date of said agreement regarding the accomplishment of the said agreement. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of Haryana and ors. V/s Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors” 1992 SCC (CRI) 426 has illustratively laid down categories of cases where the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised, including cases where the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala-fide and instituted with an ulterior motive. However, in the present case, the essential ingredients of Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC prima facie on the basis of charge-sheet appear to be [2026:RJ-JP:15060] (7 of 7) [CRLMP-6551/2022] satisfied, and it cannot be concluded that the proceedings are manifestly tainted by mala fide intent or have been initiated with an ulterior motive. 14. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, particularly the unexplained delay in issuing the notice beyond the stipulated contractual period, absence of proof of service of such notice, and the admitted receipt of a substantial portion of the sale consideration, this Court is of the considered opinion that, at this stage, it cannot be held that the accused-petitioner has not committed the alleged offences under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC. 15. This Court does not find any merit in the present petition. The allegations made in the FIR prima facie disclose the commission of alleged offences under sec 420 and 406 IPC and require thorough investigation. At this stage, no case is made out for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. 16. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. 17. Pending Applications, if any, shall be disposed off. 18. Any view expressed by this Court shall not have any adverse effect on the merits of the case before the Trial Court. (CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI),J Garima/Res.