2026:HHC:39209 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 748 of 2026 Reserved on: 09.09.2026. Decided on: 15.09.2026 Chander Mani …. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Raj Kumar Verma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the victim : Mr Gurmeet Bhardwaj, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 7 of 2024 dated 18.03.2024 registered at Women Police Station, Kullu District, Kullu for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376(2) (n), (3) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39209 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim was aged 15 years. She fell ill in October 2023 and was taken to the hospital for medical treatment. The doctor found, after examination of the victim, that she was pregnant. The victim's mother repeatedly asked her about the father of the child, but she did not name any person. The victim's parents tried to marry her, but somebody lodged a complaint regarding the marriage of the minor child. The victim fell ill and was taken to the hospital. She disclosed the name of Kishan Bhai as the father of the child. She also stated that the petitioner, Chander Mani, had raped her repeatedly and threatened her. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The petitioner is in custody for more than 2 years. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family. The petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim became ill in October 2023. The informant took her to the hospital, where the doctors disclosed that the victim 3 2026:HHC:39209 was pregnant. The informant asked the victim repeatedly about the name of the child’s father, but she did not disclose anything. The victim subsequently revealed that Kishan Bhai and Chander Mani had raped her. They had threatened to kill her in case the incident was revealed to any person. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. As per the victim’s medical examination, she was found pregnant. The police arrested the petitioner and Chander Mani. The victim delivered a child subsequently. As per the analysis report, the petitioner's DNA was consistent with him being the biological father of the baby, whereas Krishan Chand's DNA was inconsistent. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court. The statements of seven witnesses have been recorded. The matter was listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 25.06.2026. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Raj Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, and Mr Gurmeet Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the victim. 5. Mr Raj Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely 4 2026:HHC:39209 implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The petitioner was arrested on 19.03.2024, and the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. The report of the analysis proved that the petitioner is the biological father of the child and the victim is the biological mother of the child. The victim was a minor on the date of the incident. The petitioner has committed a heinous offence which is severely punishable. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Mr Gurmeet Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the victim, has adopted the submission of Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State and prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5 2026:HHC:39209 9. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the 6 2026:HHC:39209 criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. 7 2026:HHC:39209 Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: 8 2026:HHC:39209 (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a 9 2026:HHC:39209 court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The report of analysis states that the petitioner is the biological father of the baby of the victim. Therefore, prima facie, the report of the analysis corroborates the victim's version that the petitioner had raped her, resulting in a pregnancy. 12. The petitioner is aged 43 years, and the victim was aged 15 years. The petitioner asserted in his petition that his wife had left her matrimonial home, clearly showing that the petitioner was married at the time of the incident. He prima facie took advantage of the innocence of the victim to rape and impregnate her. Therefore, prima facie the act of the petitioner is heinous. 13. The offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 20 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, 10 2026:HHC:39209 which means the imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person. Therefore, the punishment is severe. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of, and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in 11 2026:HHC:39209 considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 14. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail considering the severity of the punishment. 15. It was submitted that the co-accused has been released on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission cannot be accepted. The principle of parity demands that the circumstances between the petitioner and the co- accused should be similar. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230; (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that while determining the parity, the role of the accused has to be considered. It was observed at page 246 “Parity, while granting bail, must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was 12 2026:HHC:39209 granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail based on parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident, and the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.” 16. This position was reiterated in Tarun Kumar v. Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486, wherein it was observed: “18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co- accused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.” 17. In the present case, the petitioner and not the co- accused was found to be the biological father of the child. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused. 18. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial and the petitioner is entitled to bail because his right to speedy trial is being violated. This submission will not help the petitioner. The status report shows that the statements of 7 witnesses have been recorded and the matter was listed on 25.06.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. 13 2026:HHC:39209 The recording of statements of 7 witnesses cannot constitute any delay in the progress of the trial. The petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheets to demonstrate that the prosecution or the Court is responsible for the delay. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the violation of his right to speedy trial. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and is dismissed. 21. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th September, 2026 (Nikita)